English Armada

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The English Armada (also known as the Counter Armada, or The Drake-Norris Expedition, 1589) was a fleet of warships sent to the Iberian coast by Queen Elizabeth I of England in 1589, during the Anglo-Spanish War (1585–1604). It was led by Sir Francis Drake as admiral and Sir John Norreys as general, and failed in its attempt to drive home the advantage England had won upon the defeat and dispersal of the Spanish Armada in the previous year.

1 Aims and Planning
2 Execution
3 Consequences
4 References
5 See also
6 External links

[edit] Aims and Planning

Queen Elizabeth's intentions were to capitalise upon Spain's temporary weakness at sea after the successful repulsion of the Spanish Armada and to compel Philip II to sue for peace. It was not a simple matter, and the expedition had three distinct aims: to burn the Spanish Atlantic fleet, to make a landing at Lisbon and raise a revolt there against Philip II, and then to continue south and establish a permanent base in the Azores. A further aim was to seize the treasure fleet as it returned from America to Cadiz, although this depended largely on the success of the Azores campaign.

The critical calculation was based on an understanding of Portuguese politics. The Portuguese empire included Brazil, and the East Indies, among others, and trading posts in India and China. By securing an allegiance with the Portuguese crown, Elizabeth hoped to curb Spanish power in Europe and open up for her favourites the trade routes that these possessions commanded.

It was a tricky proposition, because the domestic aristocracy of Portugal had accepted Philip II as their king in 1580. The pretender to the throne, Antonio, Prior of Crato - last surviving heir of the House of Aviz - failed to establish an effective government in exile in the Azores, and turned to the English for support. But he was not a charismatic figure, and with his cause compromised by his illegitimacy, he faced an opponent with perhaps the better claim, in the eyes of the Portuguese nobles of the Cortes, Catherine, Duchess of Braganza.

The complex politics were not the only drawback for the expedition. Like its Spanish predecessor, the English Armada suffered from overly optimistic planning, based on hopes of repeating Drake's successful raid on Cadiz in 1587. A critical contradiction lay between the separate plans, each of which was ambitious in its own right. But the most pressing need was the destruction of the Spanish Atlantic fleet lying at port at A Coruña, San Sebastian and Santander along the north coast of Spain, as directly ordered by the Queen.

The expedition was floated as a joint stock company, with capital of about £80,000 — one quarter to come from the Queen, and one eighth from the Dutch, the balance to be made up by various noblemen, merchants and guilds. Concerns over logistics and adverse weather delayed the departure of the fleet, and confusion grew as it waited in port. The Dutch failed to supply their promised warships, a third of the victuals had already been consumed, and the number of veteran soldiers was only 1,800 while the ranks of volunteers had increased the planned contingent of troops from 10,000 to 19,000. The fleet also lacked siege guns and cavalry — items that had been lavishly laid on in the Spanish Armada expedition of the previous year — which raises serious doubts about the intentions of those in charge of the preparations.

[edit] Execution

When the fleet sailed, it was made up of six royal galleons, 60 English armed merchantmen, 60 Dutch flyboats and about 20 pinnaces. In addition to the troops, there were 4,000 sailors and 1,500 officers and gentlemen adventurers. Drake assigned his vessels to five squadrons, led respectively by himself in the Revenge, Sir John Norreys in Nonpareil, Norreys' brother Edward in Foresight, Thomas Fenner in Dreadnought, and Roger Williams in Swiftsure. Also sailing with them — against the Queen's express orders — was the Earl of Essex.

Most of the ships lost in Philip II's expedition of 1588 had been armed merchantmen, while the core of the armada — the galleons of the Spanish navy's Atlantic fleet — survived their voyage home and docked in Spain's Atlantic ports for a refit, where they lay for months, vulnerable to attack.

Unforeseen delays and a fear of becoming embayed in the Bay of Biscay led Drake to bypass Santander, where most of this refitting was underway, and attack A Coruña in Galicia instead. Norreys took the lower town and killed 500 Spaniards, while Drake managed to destroy a few unimportant ships. A feeble siege of a A Coruña's fortified upper town consumed their efforts for the next two weeks, with little to show. A pair of Spanish galleys slipped past the English fleet and repeatedly resupplied the defenders, forcing the English at length to abandon the siege and turn their attention to Lisbon, having lost four captains and several hundred soldiers in the fighting.

Lisbon was said to be defended by a disaffected garrison, but while the English bloodied themselves at A Coruña the Spaniards spent a crucial fortnight shoring up Portugal's defences. When Norreys invested the city, the expected uprising was not forthcoming and little was achieved. Drake did take the opportunity on June 30 of seizing a fleet of Hanseatic ships, which had broken the English blockade on trade with Spain by sailing all around the north of Scotland only to fetch up before the English cannon in the mouth of the Tagus. This seizure later required a publicly-printed justification, a Declaration of Causes, from the Queen's own printer, as, without booty, she and her fellow English investors faced considerable losses.

Despite the bravado of Essex, who thrust a sword in at the gates of the city with a challenge to the defenders, the English could not take Lisbon. Essex received Elizabeth's orders to return to court, and it was decided to concentrate on the third aim of the expedition, the establishment of a permanent base in the Azores. But the campaign had taken its toll. Drake's forces had initially caught the Spanish authorities off guard, perhaps mainly by sheer audacity, but were now suffering increasingly from disease.

It was soon understood that any attempt to land in the Azores was out of the question, and Drake made a final attempt to retrieve the mission. At this point, there were only 2,000 men fit to be mustered, and stormy weather had damaged a number of ships. While Norreys sailed for home with the sick and wounded, Drake took his pick of what was left and set out with twenty ships to hunt for the treasure fleet. He was struck by another heavy storm and was unable to carry out even that task, and while Porto Santo in Madeira was plundered, his flagship, the Revenge, sprung a leak and almost foundered as it led the remainder of the fleet home to Plymouth.

[edit] Consequences

With the opportunity to strike a decisive blow against the weakened Spanish lost, the failure of the expedition further depleted the crown treasury that had been so carefully restored during the long reign of Elizabeth I. The Anglo-Spanish war was very costly to both sides, and Spain itself, also fighting France and the United Provinces, had to default on its debt repayments in 1596, following another raid on Cadiz. But the failure of the English Armada was a turning point, and the fortunes of the various parties to this complicated conflict fluctuated until the Treaty of London in 1604, when a peace was agreed.

Spain's rebuilt navy had quickly recovered and exceeded its pre-Armada dominance of the sea, until defeats by the Dutch fifty years later marked the beginning of its decline. With the peace, the English were able to consolidate their hold on Ireland and make a concerted effort to establish colonies in North America.

[edit] References

Winston Graham The Spanish Armadas (reprint, 2001) pp.166ff. ISBN 0-14-139020-4
R. B. Wernham, "Queen Elizabeth and the Portugal Expedition of 1589: Part I" The English Historical Review 66.258 (January 1951), pp. 1-26; "Part II" The English Historical Review 66.259 (April 1951), pp. 194-218. Wernham's articles are based on his work editing Calendar State Papers Foreign: eliz. xxiii (January-June 1589).

The most detailed account, written in the form of a letter by an anonymous participant (Anthony Wingfield), was published in 1589: A true Coppie of a Discourse written by a Gentleman, employed in the late Voyage of Spain and Portingale… which set out openly to restore the credit of the participants.