Full Faith and Credit Clause

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Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution, commonly known as the Full Faith and Credit Clause, addresses the duties states have to respect and enforce the judicial rulings of other states.

1 Text
2 Interpretation
3 Same-sex controversy
4 External links

[edit] Text

“

Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect there of.

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[edit] Interpretation

The clause was primarily intended to provide for comity between states and enforcement across state lines of non-federal laws, civil claims and court rulings. Without this clause, enforcement of state-to-state extradition, portability of court orders, nationwide recognition of legal status, out-of-state taxation, spousal and child support, and the collection of fees and fines would all be impossible without separate federal action, or a similar action by the other states.

As the United States Supreme Court explained in Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 494 (2003):

The [United States] Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." Art. IV, § 1. As we have explained, our precedent differentiates the credit owed to laws (legislative measures and common law) and to judgments." Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998). Whereas the full faith and credit command "is exacting" with respect to "[a] final judgment . . . rendered by a court with [jurisdiction] over the subject matter and persons governed by the judgment," id. at 233, it is less demanding with respect to choice of laws. We have held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel "'a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.'" Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988) (quoting Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939)).

The Supreme Court of the United States has long recognized a "public policy exception" to the clause. In Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 502 (1939), the court wrote:

[T]here are some limitations upon the extent to which a state may be required by the full faith and credit clause to enforce even the judgment of another state in contravention of its own statutes or policy. See Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U.S. 265; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657; Finney v. Guy, 189 U.S. 335; see also Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186; Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U.S. 386; Hood v. McGehee, 237 U.S. 611; cf. Gasquet v. Fenner, 247 U.S. 16. And in the case of statutes, the extrastate effect of which Congress has not prescribed, as it may under the constitutional provision, we think the conclusion is unavoidable that the full faith and credit clause does not require one state to substitute for its own statute, applicable to persons and events within it, the conflicting statute of another state, even though that statute is of controlling force in the courts of the state of its enactment with respect to the same persons and events.

Thus if the legal pronouncements of one state conflict with the public policy of another state, federal courts in the past have been reluctant to force a state to enforce the pronouncements of another state in contravention of its own public policy. The public policy exception has been applied in cases of marriage (such as polygamy, miscegenation, consanguinity, or gay marriage), civil judgments and orders, criminal conviction and others.

[edit] Same-sex controversy

The Full Faith and Credit Clause has been noted for its application involving orders of protection, for which the clause was expounded upon by the Violence Against Women Act, child support, for which the enforcement of the clause was spelled out in the Federal Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (28 U.S.C. § 1738B), and its possible application to same-sex marriage, civil union and domestic partnership laws and cases, as well as the controversial Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment. The clause has been the chief constitutional basis for the repeated attacks on the DOMA. Regardless of whether DOMA is constitutional, most legal scholars recognize that it is more probably superfluous given the public policy exception. For even if DOMA is deemed unconstitutional, the long precedence of the public policy exception weighs in against the recognition of same-sex marriage, civil unions and domestic partnerships in states whose public policy prohibits it.

As of early 2004, 39 states have passed their own laws nearly all of which specifically reject same-sex marriages recognized in other jurisdictions. Many of these laws have been passed in the last few years. By taking a legal stance on the issue these states have helped inform the Supreme Court what the public policy of the various states are before the Court takes up the issue and it is left to review the constitutionality of those policies.

Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia stated in his dissenting opinion to the landmark Lawrence v. Texas decision that he feared application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to the majority’s decision in that case might destroy "the structure . . . that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions." If Scalia's dissenting opinion held true, the majority ruling could potentially negate the DOMA and create a legal loophole allowing same-sex marriages and obliging all other states to recognize them.

Likewise, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court case of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health is being eyed by observers on both sides of the issue because of similar concerns stemming from this clause.

Supporters of the DOMA, however, have claimed that the clause could very well be used to defend the law. They say that the clause’s explicit language spelling out the role of Congress is precisely what makes the law Constitutional, without the further need for the Federal Marriage Amendment. They point out that Congress has made several laws, including those on firearms controls and safety standards, employment discrimination, disability, and rights to unionization, and environmental protection, which have all withstood Constitutional attacks on the basis of full faith and credit.