Hack-a-Shaq
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Hack-a-Shaq is the name commonly ascribed to a basketball defensive strategy initially instituted in the National Basketball Association (NBA) by former Dallas Mavericks coach Don Nelson to hinder the scoring ability of the Chicago Bulls. However, it ultimately became more well-known for its application against center Shaquille O'Neal and the Los Angeles Lakers, the team for which O'Neal played at the time. The strategy, which became somewhat controversial, consisted of intentionally committing a personal foul against O'Neal every time the Lakers took possession of the basketball over a certain period of time.
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[edit] Name
The name is a colloquial rhyme that comes from the term hack being common basketball slang meaning to commit a personal foul, and Shaq being the oft-used shortened version of O'Neal's first name. Although the name is obviously informal, no more formal name for the strategy has yet come into common usage (probably because the strategy is relatively new and rarely used). Even in the context of more formal conversation, the name Hack-a-Shaq is generally used.
The term Hack-a-Shaq, with its "catchy" sound and its familiarity among basketball fans, is frequently used even when referring to the use of the strategy against a specific player other than O'Neal. However in many such cases, fans, broadcasters and members of the media seek another appellation coined to use a different rhyme or alliteration based upon the specific targeted player's name. Recently used examples include Bruise-a-Bruce for Bruce Bowen, Bop-a-Ben or Whack-a-Wallace for Ben Wallace and Chop-a-Diop for DeSagana Diop. In other cases, attempts at a clever sound are abandoned, and the name of the targeted player is simply substituted for Shaq in Hack-a-Shaq (e.g. Hack-a-Ben or Hack-a-Wallace).
[edit] Background
[edit] Strategy of repeated intentional fouling
Committing repeated intentional personal fouls is a long-standing defensive strategy used by teams who are trailing near the end of the game. The downside of the strategy is that it results in the fouled team being awarded free throws. The typical NBA player makes a high enough percentage of his free throws that, over time, opponents' possessions that end by their taking free throws will yield more points than those possessions in which the opponents must actually execute their offense against a standard defense.
For example, even the highest scoring teams in the NBA average only approximately 1.1 points per possession overall. [1]. If such a team instead shot two free throws on each possession, they could better their offensive output even while making fewer than 60% of those free throws. However, even the poorest free throw shooting teams in the NBA typically make around 70% of their free throws. [2]
Therefore, intentionally fouling repeatedly is not generally the best way for a defense to assure that its opposition scores the fewest possible points.
However, the potential advantage of such fouling is that it stops the game clock. Thus, if a team is trailing with time running out in the game, the strategy may be their only hope. Even if playing a regular defense yields a greater chance of stopping the opponent from scoring, the trailing team cannot afford to allow time to elapse from the game clock while the opposition possesses the ball. So, they must foul quickly as a means of terminating the opponent's possession as soon as possible. From there, they must hope that the opponents experience a short-term run of poor free throw shooting, so that the opponents' points scored will be kept to a minimum.
For a team in such a situation, it is naturally in their best interest that the opposing player who is fouled, and thus will shoot free throws, be as poor a free throw shooter as possible, so as to minimize the number of points the strategy causes the defense to surrender. Thus, when this strategy was originally employed in the NBA, the trailing team often made a point of fouling the opposition player who was statistically the worst free throw shooter in the game at that time. This was done regardless of whether that player had the ball at the time. Fouling "off the ball" like that, however, eventually became a problem for the league when a player came onto the scene who was of true superstar calibre, but was an atrocious free throw shooter. That player was Wilt Chamberlain.
[edit] Wilt Chamberlain and the off-the-ball foul rule
Chamberlain was such a great player and dominant force that he would be certain to be on the floor in late-game situations if the score was close. However, he was such a poor free throw shooter (51% over his career) that if the opposition needed to employ intentional fouling late in the game, Chamberlain would always be that team's target. Just as the opposition was eager to send Chamberlain to the free throw line because of his ineptitude there, Chamberlain himself was reluctant to go for that same reason. This led to the spectacle of virtually an entire other contest being held away from the ball and almost completely outside of the basketball game being played, as Chamberlain essentially played a de facto game of tag with defenders, attempting to run from and dodge them as they chased him trying to foul him.
The NBA decided to address this undesirable situation by instituting a new rule regarding off-the-ball fouls — that is, committing a personal foul against an offensive player who neither has the ball nor is making an effort to obtain it. The new rule stated that if the defensive team commits an off-the-ball foul within the last two minutes of the game, the offensive team would be allowed to keep possession of the ball after the awarding of either one or two free throws. Since the entire reason for employing intentional fouling as a strategy was to quickly terminate the offensive team's possession, this new rule, when in effect, forced the team using intentional fouling to foul only the offensive player who had the ball. This brought an end to the need for Chamberlain, or any other poor free throw shooter, to play "hide and seek" with opposing defenders in intentional fouling situations.
The reason they have that rule is that fouling someone off-the-ball looks foolish . . . Some of the funniest things I ever saw were players that used to chase [Wilt Chamberlain] like it was hide-and-seek. Wilt would run away from people, and the league changed the rule based on how silly that looked.
- -- Pat Riley, as quoted by Basketball Digest magazine (Nov/Dec 2004)
[edit] The birth of Hack-a-Shaq
[edit] Nelson's innovation
Although there are a number of game situations in which it may make sense for a defense to commit an isolated intentional foul, from its inception, the strategy of intentional fouling repeatedly, on each and every possession by the opposition, was used only as a desperation measure. It was thought to make sense only when time was so short in the game, that a team trailing in the game, when they were on defense, had to make stopping the clock an even greater priority than stopping the other team from scoring. The strategy was not thought to make sense at most other times because, as mentioned above, allowing a team to shoot free throws typically will generate more points for them over time than does playing a standard defense.
In the late 1990's, however, Don Nelson theorized that if an especially bad free throw shooter were targeted every time, then intentionally fouling him repeatedly might actually yield fewer points per possession for his team than would playing a typical defense against them.
Since Nelson would be employing the strategy even in the absence of any late-game need to stop the clock, he would be free to use it with greater than two minutes left to play. Thus, the off-the-ball foul rule would not apply. So Nelson's innovation was not the creation of the strategy. Rather, his innovation was to take a strategy whose primary purpose had always been simply stopping the clock, and employ that strategy in an entirely different fashion: with a primary purpose of minimizing the opposition's scoring.
[edit] Hack-a-Rodman
Nelson first employed the tactic against Dennis Rodman of the Chicago Bulls in 1997. Rodman was shooting free throws at 38% on the season entering that game. The strategy could not be used over the entirety of the game, since each player is disqualified from the contest upon commission of their sixth personal foul. However, Nelson felt he could still employ the strategy at selective times by assigning a little-used player to commit the fouls — one whose contributions the team would not particularly miss upon his fouling out. In so doing, the theory went, Rodman's horrific foul shooting would result in the Mavericks actually giving up fewer total points during those Bulls possessions than they would give up by playing a standard defense against the Bulls' efficient offense, led by Michael Jordan and Scottie Pippen.
In that game, Rodman shot 9-for-12 from the free throw line, completely nullifying the strategy, and the Bulls went on to victory. Given its ineffectiveness on that occasion, the strategy was then largely forgotten, aside from the fact that Maverick player Bubba Wells, whose assignment it had been to foul Rodman, set the all-time NBA record for fewest minutes played (3) in fouling out of a game.
However, Nelson revisited the strategy in 1999, this time against Shaquille O'Neal (53% free throw shooting over his career). And this time, some other NBA coaches chose to follow his lead and also employ the strategy against O'Neal. The result was that despite the fact that it had been first used two years earlier against Rodman, the strategy became much more well-known for its use against O'Neal.
[edit] Problem for the league
Just as had been the case with Chamberlain decades earlier, the using of off-the-ball intentional fouling against O'Neal became somewhat problematic for the NBA. During the 2000 NBA Playoffs, there were two games in particular, one involving the Portland Trail Blazers and one involving the Indiana Pacers, in which the Hack-a-Shaq defense was employed by those two teams against the Lakers so relentlessly as to render the games virtually unwatchable with their incessant stoppages for foul shots. As a result, there was some discussion of expanding the off-the-ball foul rule to encompass more than just the final two minutes of the game, or instituting some other rule change which would discourage the use of Hack-a-Shaq.
Ultimately though, the NBA decided not to adopt any new rules designed specifically to discourage the Hack-a-Shaq strategy. One factor that likely influenced that decision is that the Lakers won both of the aforementioned games. Thus, since the strategy had not worked well enough to provide a win for either of the teams that had used it, there seemed to be reason to hope that its use would not become widespread.
We're not planning to rush out and enact some Hack-a-Shaq antidote.
We've had a couple of games . . . where . . . there was a lot of early deliberate fouling . . . without great success. And for us to . . . create some new rule in response to that just doesn't seem logical.
- -- NBA Commissioner David Stern, as quoted by the Associated Press on June 12, 2000.
- -- NBA Deputy Commissioner Russ Granik, as quoted by the Associated Press on June 12, 2000.
[edit] O'Neal's response
O'Neal's own attitude toward the strategy has generally been one of defiance. He claims confidence that he'll make the most crucial free throws "when they count", and that thus the strategy simply does not work against him.
O'Neal reached a low point in his free throw shooting during the 2000-2001 season, finding himself at a miserable 38% on the season in December of 2000. At that time, the Lakers hired Ed Palubinskas, a 90% free throw shooter during his own playing days, to help coach O'Neal. The tactic seemed to eventually pay dividends and O'Neal shot almost 68% over the last 15 games of that season, prompting O'Neal at one point to loudly bark, "It doesn't work any more!" at his opposition when the Hack-a-Shaq strategy was being used.
Ultimately however, O'Neal ceased his work with Palubinskas and has since been unable to maintain the level of success he found late in that 2000-2001 season. O'Neal managed to consistently shoot free throws slightly better for the next two seasons than he had earlier in his career. However, he still managed to break 60% over a full season only one time: in the 2002-2003 season. And since that season, his free throw shooting has gotten much worse, remaining consistently below 50%. Despite his regression, O'Neal eschews the idea any further special coaching, a la his time working with Palubinskas.
I don’t care about my [free throw shooting] percentages. I keep telling everyone that I make them when they count.
- -- Shaquille O'Neal, in post-game interviews recorded by WOAI-TV on Novermber 7, 2003.
[edit] Application against other players
A player against whom the Hack-a-Shaq strategy is most effective is one who shoots free throws very poorly, and also is so effective in other areas that their coach is reticent to simply remove that player from the game. Not surprisingly, there are very few players, aside from O'Neal, who meet such criteria. Two notable such examples playing currently are Ben Wallace of the Chicago Bulls and Bruce Bowen of the San Antonio Spurs.
Wallace is enormously talented with regard to his defense and rebounding. But at only 42% over his career, he is statistically the worst free throw shooter in the history of the NBA (minimum 1000 attempts). Bowen is also considered one of the games better defenders. Additionally, he is one of the league's best three-point shooters. This latter fact is particularly remarkable considering that his foul shooting is just 56% over his career. Because of their struggles at the free throw line, each man has at times become a target of the Hack-a-Shaq strategy.
[edit] Criticisms
The merits of the strategy have been debated, with detractors arguing that in addition to its making the game unpleasant to watch, using it also violates "the spirit" of the game (a criticism which technically could be applied to all usages of intentional fouls) and shows weakness or underconfidence in a team's defensive abilities.
All that did was allow us to set our defense. I think that's disrespectful to their players. Basically, they were telling their players that they couldn't guard us.
- — Detroit Pistons forward Tayshaun Prince, regarding Los Angeles Clippers coach Mike Dunleavy's decision to employ the Hack-a-Shaq strategy against Pistons center Ben Wallace in a game in December of 2005
Since its initial appearance, many coaches have become reluctant to use the strategy amid those criticisms of it, as well as doubts about its ultimate effectiveness in minimizing scoring. One contributing factor to those doubts is that O'Neal has sometimes shown a penchant for making a greater percentage of his free throws when the Hack-a-Shaq strategy is being employed against him than he does on the whole. Some have theorized that sending O'Neal to the foul line repeatedly over a short period of time, as the Hack-a-Shaq strategy does, runs the risk of allowing him to "get into a rhythm" in shooting his free throws. If that happens, then the strategy will have negated itself by inadvertently converting O'Neal (temporarily) into a better free throw shooter. This theory, to the maximum effect, may explain exactly what happened in 1997 when Nelson tried it on Rodman.
These factors, combined with the fact there are only handful of important players who shoot free throws poorly to even make the use of the strategy a viable option, have meant that the Hack-a-Shaq strategy has not found commonplace usage in the NBA. However, as no rule change has been instituted against it, the strategy is still seen occasionally, and it remains as an option for use against O'Neal, Wallace, Bowen or any other player who is a key component of his team, but still a notoriously poor free throw shooter.
I wish they'd get together next year and do away with the intentional, away-from-the-ball foul just because a guy can't make free throws. But it's part of the game. [Detroit Pistons coach] Flip [Saunders] is going to use it and I'll use it.
- —Miami Heat coach Pat Riley after Game 3 of the 2006 Eastern Conference Finals, in which the Detroit Pistons used the Hack-a-Shaq strategy against Heat center Shaquille O'Neal. Riley countered by employing the strategy against Pistons center Ben Wallace.
[edit] References
- NBA Official Rule Book (Rule 12-B, Section X)
