Mongol invasion of Europe
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The Mongol invasions of Europe were centered in their destruction of the Ruthenian states, especially Kiev, under the leadership of Subutai. The Mongols then invaded the Kingdom of Hungary and the fragmented Poland (see History of Poland (966–1385)), the former invasion commanded by Batu Khan, a grandson of Genghis Khan, and the latter a diversion commanded by Kadan, also a grandson of Genghis Khan, though both invasions were also masterminded by Subutai.
Historians have debated since the 1200s whether or not the Eastern European campaigns of the Mongols had macrohistorical importance. Most military historians believe they essentially were diversions, meant to frighten the Western powers sufficiently to keep them out of the Mongols' affairs in the East, specifically in Russia. The evidence does indicate that Batu Khan was primarily interested in securing the western frontiers of his Russian conquests, and only after the swift destruction of both the Hungarian and Polish armies did he begin thinking about the conquest of Western Europe. Mongolian records indicate that Subutai was planning a complete conquest of the remaining European powers, beginning with a winter attack on Austria and other states of the Holy Roman Empire, when he was recalled to Mongolia upon the death of Ögedei Khan. [1]
To the Mongols the European invasions were a third theater of operations, second to both the Middle East and Song China.
| The Mongol Invasions |
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| Central Asia – Georgia and Armenia – Kalka River – Volga Bulgaria – Ryazan – Rus' – Sit River – Köse Dag – Legnica – Mohi – Baghdad – Ain Jalut – Korea – Japan (Bun'ei – Kōan) – Vietnam – Xiangyang – Ngasaunggyan – Yamen – Pagan – Bach Dang – Syria – Kulikovo – Vorskla – Ugra River |
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[edit] Invasion of Europe (1241-1242)
The Mongols invaded central Europe in three groups. One group defeated an alliance which included forces from the fragmented Poland (see History of Poland (966–1385)) and members of various Christian military orders, led by Henry II the Pious, Duke of Silesia at Legnica (see Battle of Legnica). A second crossed the Carpathian mountains and a third followed the Danube. The armies re-grouped and crushed Hungary in 1241, defeating the Hungarian army at the Battle of Mohi on April 11, 1241. The armies swept the plains of Hungary over the summer and in the spring of 1242 regained impetus and extended their control into Austria and Dalmatia as well as invading Moravia. Had the Great Khan not died, necessitating the return of all the "Princes of the Blood" (of Genghis Khan), all of Europe might have fallen as easily as Poland and Hungary. It should be noted that the larger army--larger with respect to the Polish-German force at the Battle of Legnica--of Venceslas I of Bohemia came in contact with only a small detachment of the Mongol army.
The attack on Europe was planned and carried out by Subutai, who achieved perhaps his most lasting fame with his victories there. Having devastated the various Russian Principalities, he sent spies into Poland, Hungary, and as far as Austria, in preparation for an attack into the heartland of Europe. Having got a clear picture of the European kingdoms, he brilliantly prepared an attack nominally commanded by Batu Khan and two other princes of the blood. Batu Khan, son of Jochi, was the overall leader, but Subutai was the actual commander in the field, and as such was present in both the northern and southern campaigns against Russian Principalities. He commanded the central column that moved against Hungary. While Kadan's northern force won the Battle of Liegnitz and Güyük's army triumphed in Transylvania, Subutai was waiting for them on the Hungarian plain. The newly reunited army then withdrew to the Sajo River where they inflicted the tremendous defeat on King Bela IV of Hungary at the Battle of Mohi. Subutai masterminded the operation, and it was proven to be one of his greatest victories.
[edit] Invasion of Hungary
Around 1241 Hungary looked much like any other feudal kingdom of Europe. Although the throne was still inherited by the successors of Arpad, the authority and power of the king were greatly curtailed. The rich magnates cared less about the national security of the whole kingdom than about petty feudal quarrels with their fellow landlords. the Golden Bull authorized the magnates to rebel against the king in some circumstances, and made the king only 'primus inter pares', first among equals. Bela IV, tried to restore the king's former authority and power without much success. Thus, Hungary lived in a "happy feudal anarchy" at the time when the Mongols began to expand toward Europe.
The Hungarians had first learned about the Mongol threat in 1229, when King Andrew granted asylum to some fleeing Russian boyars. A small band of Magyars, left behind during the main migration to the Pannonian basin, still lived on the banks of the upper Volga; in 1237, a Dominican friar, Julianus, set off on an expedition to lead them back, and was sent back to King Bela with a letter from Batu Khan. In this letter, Batu Khan called upon the Hungarian king to surrender his kingdom unconditionally to the Tatar forces or face complete destruction. Bela did not reply. Two more Mongol messages were brought to Hungary: the first, in 1239, by the defeated Cuman tribes, who asked for and received asylum in Hungary, and the second, in February, 1241, by the defeated Polish princes.
Only now did King Bela call his magnates to join his army in defense of the country. He also asked the papacy and the Western European rulers for additional help. Foreign help came in the form of a small knight-detachment under the leadership of Frederick, Prince of Austria, but they were too few to influence the outcome of the campaign. The majority of the Hungarian magnates did not believe in the seriousness of the Mongol danger; some of them perhaps even hoped that a defeat of the royal army would force Bela to discontinue his centralization efforts and thus strengthen their own power.
Although the Mongol danger was serious and real, Hungary was not prepared to deal with it, as in the minds of the people (who had lived free from nomadic invasions for the last few hundred years) a new invasion seemed impossible. The population was no longer a soldier population. Only the rich nobles were trained as heavy-amored cavalry. The Hungarians had long since forgotten the light-cavalry strategy and tactics of their ancestors, which were almost the same as those now used by the Mongols.
The Hungarian army (some 60,000 on the eve of the Battle of Muhi) was made up of brave individual knights without tactical knowledge, discipline, or talented expert commanders. Inasmuch as the Hungarian army had no trained light cavalry at all, King Bela welcomed the Cuman king, Kotony, and his fighters. They were not only experts in nomadic warfare, but on two occasions they had already proved that they could fight successfully against the Mongols. But the sudden change from a migrating, warrior life to a civilized, settled, peaceful way of life was too traumatic for the Cumans. Soon a rumor began to circulate in Hungary that the Cumans were the agents of the Mongols. On the other hand, Batu Khan himself justified his invasion of Hungary because Bela had given asylum to the Cumans who were regarded as rebels and traitors in the Mongol Empire.
If this were true, then King Bela had taken an unnecessarily great risk which proved to be detrimental to his plans. When some hot-headed Hungarians attacked the Cuman camp and killed their king, the Cumans escaped to the south, looting, ravaging the countryside, and slaughtering the surprised Magyar population. The Austrian troops moved back to Austria shortly thereafter to "enlist more Western help." The Hungarians remained alone.
Arriving at the Hernad River without having been challenged to a fight by the Mongols, the army encamped on April 10, 1241. The area proved to be excellent for nomadic tactics. The many arms of the Hernad and Tisza Rivers and the numerous little forests and meadows made the terrain impracticable for the battle formation of a heavy-cavalry army. The Mongols began their attack the next night. Soon, it was clear that the Hungarians were losing the battle. The king escaped with the help of his faithful and brave bodyguard, but the rest of the army was either killed without mercy by the Mongols or drowned in the rivers while attempting an escape.
The Mongols now systematically occupied the Great Hungarian Plains, as well as the slopes of the northern Carpathian Mountains, and Transylvania. Where they found local resistance, they cilessly killed the population. Where the people did not offer any resistance, they forced the men into servitude in the Mongol army and the women and children were killed or carried off. Still, tens of thousands avoided Mongol domination by taking refuge behind the walls of the few fortresses or by hiding in the huge, jungle-like forests or the large marshes alongside the rivers. The Mongols, instead of leaving already defenceless and helpless peoples behind and continuing their campaign through Pannonia to Western Europe, spent the entire summer and fall securing and "pacifying" the occupied territories. Then, during the winter, contrary to the traditional strategy of the nomadic armies which started campaigns only in spring-time, they crossed the Danube and continued their systematic occupation including Pannonia. They reached all the way to the Austrian borders and the Adriatic shores in Dalmatia.
During the spring of 1242, Ogdai Khan died. Batu Khan, who was one of the contenders to the imperial throne, returned at once with his armies to Asia, leaving the whole of Eastern Europe depopulated and in ruins. But Western Europe escaped unscathed.
The majority of Hungarian historians claim that Hungary's long resistance against the Mongols actually saved Western Europe. Western European historians almost unanimously reject this interpretation. They point out that the Mongols evacuated Hungary of their own free will, and that Western Europe was saved by the sudden death of Ogdai Khan, not by the heroic struggle of the Hungarians.
The Mongolian invasion taught the Magyars a simple lesson: although the Mongols had destroyed the countryside, the forts and fortified cities had survived. To improve their defence capabilities for the future, they had to build forts, not only on the borders but also inside the country. During the remaining decades of the 13th century and throughout the 14th century, the kings donated more and more royal land to the magnates with the condition that they build forts and take care of their defences.
[edit] Reasons for Mongol success
The Mongols were generations ahead of the armies of the age. They fought in modern-style organization, with the smallest command being 10, then 100, then 1000, then 10,000 (a tumen), commanders were called noyans. Soldiers and bureaucrats were promoted on the basis of ability, rather than birth, with the exception of Ghengis Khan's relatives. Most European armies consisted of a few professional men at arms, and knights, and levies of peasants. Mongol armies were more nomadic with constant practice in riding, archery, and organized combat by group. They travelled very light, able to live off the land. Their incredible intelligence organization combined with centralized command demonstrated remarkable ability to coordinate armies separated by great distances. They showed mobility unheard of by armies of the time—up to 100 miles/day (the Mongol military post express made 600 kilometers/day). Mongol combination of mobility and communication was not equalled until World War II.[1] They had extraordinary military discipline, extraordinary endurance and were above all practical, readily assimilating advanced siege technology.
[edit] End of the Mongol advance in Europe
Some western historians attribute European survival to Mongol unwillingness to fight in the more densely populated German principalities, where the wetter weather affected their bows. But the weather did not stop them from devastating Russia and China, and Europe was far less densely populated than China.
The probable answer for Batu's stopping after the Mohi River, and the destruction of the Hungarian army, was that he never intended to advance further. He had made the Russian conquest safe for the next ten generations, and when the Great Khan died and he rushed back to Mongolia to put in his claim for power, it ended his westward expansion. Subutai's recall at the same time left the Mongol armies without their spiritual head and primary strategist. Batu Khan was not able to resume his plans for conquest to the "Great Sea" (the Atlantic Ocean) until 1255, after the turmoil after Ögedei's death had finally subsided with the election of Möngke Khan as Great Khan.
[edit] Mongol infighting
From 1241 to 1248 a state of almost open warfare existed between the son of Jochi, Batu, and the son of Ögedei, Güyük. The Mongol Empire was ruled by a regency under Ögedei's widow Töregene Khatun, whose only goal was to secure the Great Khanate for her son, Güyük. There was so much bitterness between the two branches of the family that Güyük died in 1248 on his way to confront Batu to force him to accept his authority. He also had problems in his last years with the Principality of Halych-Volhynia, whose ruler, Danylo of Halych, adopted a politic of confronting the Golden Horde and defeated some mongol assaults in 1254. He was only defeat in 1259, under the Berke's rule. Batu Khan was unable to turn his army west until 1255, after Möngke had become Great Khan, 1251, and he had repaired his relations with the Great Khanate. However, as he prepared to finish the invasion of Europe, he died. His son did not live long enough to implement his father's and Subutai's plan to invade Europe, and with his death, Batu's younger brother Berke became Khan of the Kipchak Khanate. Fortunately for Europe, Berke was not interested in invading Europe as much as halting his cousin Hulagu Khan from destroying the Holy Land. Berke had converted to Islam before and watched with horror as his cousin destroyed the Abbasid Caliph, the spiritual head of Islam as far as Berke was concerned. The Mamluks of Egypt, learning through spies that Berke was both a Muslim and not fond of his cousin, appealed to him for help and were careful to nourish their ties to him and his Khanate.
Both entities were Turkic in origin.[2] Most of the Mamluks were of Turkic descent and Berke's Khanate was almost totally Turkic also. Jochi, Ghenghis Khan's oldest son, was of disputed parentage and only received 4,000 Mongol warriors to start his Khanate. His nearly 500,000 warriors were virtually all Turkic people who had submitted to the Mongols. Thus, the Khanate was Turkic in culture and had more in common with their brother Muslim Turkic Mamluks than with the Mongol shamanist Hulagu and his horde. Thus, when Hulagu Khan began to mass his army for war against the Mamluk-controlled Holy Land, they swiftly appealed to Berke Khan who sent armies against his cousin and forced him to defend his domains in the north.
Hulagu returned to his lands by 1262, but instead of being able to avenge his defeats, had to turn north to face Berke Khan, suffering severe defeat in an attempted invasion north of the Caucasus in 1263, after Berke Khan had lured him north and away from the Holy Land. Thus, the Kipchak Khanate never invaded Europe; keeping watch to the south and east instead. Berke only sent troops into Europe once, a relatively light raid in 1259, simply to collect booty he needed to pay for his wars against Hulagu from 1262-65.
[edit] Later campaigns
[edit] Against Poland (1259 and 1287)
In 1259, 18 years after the first attack, two tumens (20,000 men) from the Golden Horde, under the leadership of Berke, attacked Poland after raiding Lithuania. This attack was commanded by Nogai Khan and general Burundai. Lublin, Sandomierz, Kraków, and Bytom were ravaged and plundered by Nogai's army. Berke had no intention of occupying or conquering Poland. After this raid the Pope Alexander IV tried whitout success to create a crusade against the Tatars.
An unsuccessful raid followed in 1287, led by Telubuga and Nogai Khan. Lublin, Mazovia, Sandomierz and Sieradz were successful raided, but they were defeated in Kraków. Despite this, Kraków was devastated. This raid consisted of less than one tumen, since the Golden Horde's armies were tied down in a new conflict with the Il-Khanate initied in 1284. The force sent was not sufficient to meet the full Polish army, nor did it have any siege engineers or equipment to breach city walls. It raided a few caravans, burned a few small towns, and fled when the Polish army was mustered.
[edit] Against Lithuania (1259, 1275 and 1277)
The Mongols also raided the Grand Duchy of Lithuania during the campaign of 1259. There were other raids against Lithuania in 1275 and 1277, as the Lithuanians were emerging as a rival to Mongol power.
[edit] Against Thrace (1265)
During the reign of Berke there was also a raid against Thrace. In the winter of 1265 Nogai Khan led a Mongol raid of two tumens (20,000 soldiers) against the territories of Bulgaria and Byzantine Eastern Thrace. In the spring of 1265 he defeated the armies of Michael VIII Palaeologus. After this Thrace was plundered by Nogai's army, and the Byzantine emperor made an alliance with the Golden Horde, giving his daughter Euphrosyne in marriage to Nogai.
[edit] Against Bulgaria (1242, 1271, 1274, 1280 and 1285)
In the return after the premature end of the invasion of Europe, mongols devastated Bulgaria. In 1271 Nogai Khan led a successful raid against the country, which was a vassal of Golden Horde until the early 14th century. Bulgaria was again raided by the Tatars in 1274, 1280 and 1285.
[edit] Against Serbia (1293)
In 1293 Nogai Khan leds a mongol raid into Serbia, who forced the king to acknowledge him as overlord.
[edit] Invasion of Hungary (1284)
In the 1280s Nogai Khan led an invasion of Hungary alongside with Telubuga. But as with later invasions, it was repelled handily, the Mongols losing much of their invading force. The outcome could not have contrasted more sharply with the 1241 invasion, mostly due to the reforms of Béla IV of Hungary, which included advances in military tactics and, most importantly, the widespread building of stone castles, both in response to the crushing defeat of the Hungarian Kingdom in 1241.
[edit] References
- ^ Saunders, J.J. The History of the Mongol Conquests
- ^ Amitai-Preiss, Reuven. The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War
- Chambers, James -- The Devil's Horsemen: The Mongol Invasion of Europe
- Hildinger, Eric -- Warriors of the Steppe: A Military History of Central Asia, 500 B.C. to A.D. 1700
- Morgan, David -- The Mongols, ISBN 0-631-17563-6
- Nicolle, David, -- The Mongol Warlords, Brockhampton Press, 1998
- Reagan, Geoffry -- The Guinness Book of Decisive Battles, Canopy Books, NY (1992)
- Saunders, J.J. -- The History of the Mongol Conquests, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1971, ISBN 0-8122-1766-7
- Sicker, Martin -- The Islamic World in Ascendancy: From the Arab Conquests to the Siege of Vienna, Praeger Publishers, 2000
- Soucek, Svatopluk -- A History of Inner Asia, Cambridge, 2000
