Problem of mental causation
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The problem of mental causation is a conceptual issue in the philosophy of mind. That problem is how to account for the common-sense idea that intentional thoughts or intentional 'mental states' are causes of intentional actions. The problem divides into many distinct sub-problems. The sub-problem which has attracted most attention in the philosophical literature is the causal exclusion problem. Note that there are many different ways of stating this particular problem of mental causation. Some, for example, include mention of supervenience and causal closure. What follows is the exclusion problem in its simplest form, and it is merely one many possible formulations.
[edit] The Exclusion Problem
To the extent that we do not have to go outside human physiology in order to trace the causal antecedents of any bodily movement, intentional action can be fully causally explained by the existence of these physiological antecedents alone. No mention of mental states need enter into the explanation. This troubles philosophers because, pre-theoretically, it seems that what is crucial in causing a person to act is their mental states (i.e., their beliefs and desires). But, given that physiological facts are sufficient to account for action, mental states appear to be superfluous; they are at risk of being causally and explanatorily irrelevant with respect to human action. Philosophers consider this to be a highly counter-intuitive and undesirable position to be in.
[edit] Further reading
- Heil, John; and Alfred Mele (eds.) (1993). Mental Causation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ISBN 0-19-823929-7.
- Jaegwon Kim (1998). Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-11234-5.
- Walter, Sven; and Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.) (2003). Physicalism and Mental Causation. Exeter, England: Imprint Academic. ISBN 0-907845-47-9.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on mental causation.
