Bell-LaPadula model

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The Bell-LaPadula Model was developed by David Elliott Bell and Len LaPadula in 1973 ^{[1] [2] [3]} to formalize the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) multilevel security (MLS) policy. The model is a formal state transition model of computer security policy that describes a set of access control rules which use security labels on objects and clearances for subjects. Security labels range from the most sensitive, e.g. "Top Secret", down to the least sensitive, e.g. "Unclassified" or "Public."

Contents 1 Features 1.1 Strong * Property 2 See also 3 Footnotes 4 References

[edit] Features

The Bell-LaPadula model focuses on data confidentiality and access to classified information, in contrast to the Biba Integrity Model which describes rules for the protection of data integrity.

In this formal model, the entities in an information system are divided into subjects and objects. The notion of a "secure state" is defined, and it is proven that each state transition preserves security by moving from secure state to secure state, thereby inductively proving that the system satisfies the security objectives of the model. The Bell-LaPadula model is built on the concept of a state machine with a set of allowable states in a system. The transition from one state to another state is defined by transition functions.

A system state is defined to be "secure" if the only permitted access modes of subjects to objects are in accordance with a security policy. To determine whether a specific access mode is allowed, the clearance of a subject is compared to the classification of the object (more precisely, to the combination of classification and set of compartments, making up the security level) to determine if the subject is authorized for the specific access mode. The clearance/classification scheme is expressed in terms of a lattice. The model defines two mandatory access control (MAC) rules and one discretionary access control (DAC) rule with three security properties:

1. The Simple Security Property states that a subject at a given security level may not read an object at a higher security level (no read-up).
2. The *-property (read star-property) states that a subject at a given security level must not write to any object at a lower security level (no write-down).
3. The Discretionary Security Property uses an access matrix to specify the discretionary access control.

The transfer of information from a high-sensitivity paragraph to a lower-sensitivity document may happen in the Bell-LaPadula model via the concept of trusted subjects. Trusted Subjects are not restricted by the *-property. Untrusted subjects are. Trusted Subjects must be shown to be trustworthy with regard to the security policy.

This security model is directed toward access control and is characterized by the phrase: no read up, no write down. Compare the Biba model, the Clark-Wilson model and the Chinese Wall.

With Bell-LaPadula, users can only create content at or above their own security level (Secret researchers can create Secret or Top-Secret files but may not create Public files): no write-down. Conversely, users can only view content at or below their own security level (Secret researchers can view Public or Secret files, but may not view Top-Secret files): no read-up.

The Bell-LaPadula model explicitly defined its scope. It did not treat the following extensively:

• Covert channels. Passing information via pre-arranged actions was described briefly.
• Networks of systems. Later modeling work did address this topic.
• Policies outside multilevel security. Work in the early 1990's showed that MLS is one version of boolean policies, as are all other published policies.

[edit] Strong * Property

The Strong * Property is an alternative to the *-property in which subjects may only write to objects with a matching security level. Thus, the write up operation permitted in the usual *-property is not present, only a write to same operation. The Strong * Property is usually discussed in the context of multilevel database management systems and is motivated by integrity concerns. ^[4]

This Strong * Property was anticipated in the Biba model where it was shown that strong integrity in combination with the Bell-La Padula model resulted in reading and writing at a single level. This strong version has proven to be of limited practical utility.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] See also

• Multilevel security - MLS
• Mandatory Access Control - MAC
• Discretionary Access Control - DAC
• Biba Integrity Model
• Take-Grant Model
• The Clark-Wilson Integrity Model
• Graham-Denning Model
• Security Modes of Operation

[edit] Footnotes

1. ^ Bell, D. Elliott and LaPadula, Leonard J. (1973). "Secure Computer Systems: Mathematical Foundations". MITRE Corporation.
2. ^ Bell, D. Elliott and LaPadula, Leonard J. (1976). "Secure Computer Systems: Unified Exposition and MULTICS Interpretation". MITRE Corporation.
3. ^ Bell, David (December 2005). "Looking Back at the Bell-La Padula Model". Proc. 21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference.  Slides for the talk
4. ^ Sandhu, Ravi S. (1994). "Relational Database Access Controls". Handbook of Information Security Management (1994-95 Yearbook): 145-160, Auerbach Publishers. Retrieved on 2006-08-12. 

[edit] References

• Bishop, Matt (2003). Computer Security: Art and Science. Boston: Addison Wesley. 

• McLean, John. (1994). "Security Models". Encyclopedia of Software Engineering 2: 1136–1145. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

• Krutz, Ronald L.; Russell Dean Vines (2003). The CISSP Prep Guide, Gold Edition, Indianapolis, Indiana: Wiley Publishing.