Kavod HaBriyot

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Kavod HaBriyot כבוד הברייות (literally in Hebrew: "honor [of/due to] the [God's] creations (human beings)" also variously translated as "individual dignity", "individual honor", or "human dignity" is a phrase used in Judaism and by Jews when wanting to stress the importance of treating others with dignity and honor. It has a variety of common usages, particularly among Orthodox and Conservative Jews, depending on the context.

The Gemarrah of the Talmud which applies in discussions of contemporary Jewish Law under certain circumstances. The nature and scope of the concept is a matter of contemporary dispute.

Kavod HaBriyot is mentioned in the Babylonian Talmud in Berakhot 19b; Shabbat 81b, 94b; Eruvin 41b; and Megillah 3b.

Contents 1 Etymology 2 Talmudic context 3 In later commentaries 4 In the Shulkhan Arukh 5 Related to similar concepts in the Torah 6 Related notions in Pirkei Avoth and the Oral Torah 7 Kavod HaBriyot as a halakhic principle 7.1 Dispute as to scope 8 References

[edit] Etymology

The recent opinions discussed in this article all base the concept of Kavod HaBriyot on a section of the Gemarrah in Berachot 19b.

The words kavod [ha]briyot bear some resemblance to a phrase found in the the Mishnah's Pirkei Avoth: "Ben Zoma says: איזה הוא מכובד--המכבד את הברייות ...Who is honored? He who honors others, as it is said: 'For those who honor Me (God) I will honor, and those who scorn Me shall be degraded' (Samuel I 2:30)" (Avot 4:1) [1] The words kavod and mechubad are different uses of the Hebrew root word "כבד" (in this sense "honor"). According to ^[specify], the two concepts are related.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] Talmudic context

The Talmud in Tractate Berachot 19b cites it in a baraita that the Gemara eventually rejects! according to ^[specify], in that sugya in Berachot 19b it's cited as part of an attempt to challenge an earlier statement by Rav Yehudah in the name of Rav that someone who discovers that he is wearing a garment with shatnez in it must remove the garment even if he is standing in the middle of the marketplace. "Why so?" he asks, and answers by citing from the verse in the Book of Proverbs 21:30 אֵין חָכְמָה, וְאֵין תְּבוּנָה וְאֵין עֵצָה, לְנֶגֶד יְהוָה "There is no wisdom nor understanding nor counsel against the Lord" [2] and reinforces it by declaring that this teaches that wherever there is the threat of Chillul Hashem one does not worry about giving honor ("kavod") to one's (or any) teacher because "...considerations of human dignity cannot weigh against the desecration of God's Name that results from transgressing one of His commandments. Therefore discovering a forbiden mixture of wool and linen [shatnez] one must immediately shed the offending garment, despite the indignity involved." ArtScroll commentary on Berachot 19b1 point 9) and it's then that the Gemara launches a series of questions against Rav's statement (including the baraita (alone) with the quote about Kavod HaBriyot that says: תא שמע גדול כבוד הבריות שדוחה לא תעשה שבתורה "great is honor of people that it pushes aside a negative commandment in the Torah"). Accoprding to ^[specify] the Gemara rejects the premises of all of them, and Rav's statement in the Halakha becomes the basis of a definitive ruling in the Shulkhan Arukh (see below).

The Gemara (Berachot 20a) had gone even further, when it reinforces a statement by Abaye "that earlier generations sacrificed themselves for Kiddush Hashem and that is why God performed miracles for them" and the Gemara gives an example in an episode that happened to Rav Adda bar Ahavah who "saw a Cuthean woman who was wearing a karbalta (an ostentatious type of garment; it is mentioned in Daniel 3:21 [ArtScroll Berachot 20a2:14]) in the street. He mistook her for a Jewess and arose and tore it from her. It was then discovered that she was really a Cuthean woman and he had to pay a fine. They evaluated his fine at four hundred zuz. He asked her: What is your name? She answered him: My name is Matun. He said to her: Matun matun was worth four hundred zuz to me!" (Matun resembles the Aramaic word matan, which is 200. Thus the woman's name portended this outcome, 2x200=400 [ArtScroll Bercahot 20a2:17].) The Gemara is thus clearly reinforcing its point that "Kavod HaBriyot" is not some kind of "ironclad" rule that can never be breeched because, on the contrary, the sages of the Talmud were not afraid nor ashamed to act in a manner that would defy a false application of the notion of Kavod HaBriyot when the honor the mitzvot, the Torah, and God are at stake.

Of course, no-one in any modern application has ever claimed that it is an "iron-clad rule that can never be breached", only that it is a principle that can sometimes be used in practical applications.

[edit] In later commentaries

The Rishonim and Acharonim accept Rav's statement and conclusions, and carify them further, showing where there may be delays or alternatives to immediate action, based on Kavod HaBriyot, but not that Kavod HaBriyot can be summoned to justify or rationalize acts and actions that were neither widely practiced nor accepted by Jews during Jewish history.

For example, Maimonides in the Mishneh Torah, Zera'im, Hilchot Kilayim 10:29 states:

One who sees Kilayim (shatnez) forbidden by the Torah on his friend even if he was walking in the marketplace, he jumps on him and tears (his clothing with shatnez in it) from him immediately, even if it was his rabbi who had taught him the majority of his (Torah) wisdom because honoring people (Kavod HaBriyot) does not push aside a negative commandment that was specified in the Torah ("Thou shalt not wear a mingled stuff, wool and linen together" Deuteronomy 22:11 [3])...but that which is forbidden by rabbinical decree (divreihem) can be pushed aside by the principle of Kavod HaBriyot in every place...therefore if someone was wearing shatnez forbidden by the rabbis one does not tear it from him in the marketplace and does not remove it from him in the market place until he gets home and if it was indeed from the Torah he removes it immediately. [4]

Maimonides is thus making a number of differentiations between negative commandments (lavin) and positive ones (esehs) and betweeen commandments of the Torah (de'oraisas) and those from the rabbis (derabanans) so one would need to be very highly regarded qualified Posek and Torah scholar with wide universal acceptance to arrive at the conclusions that you have done when initially composing this article. One cannot imagine, under any circumstances, that Maimonides or anyone in the Talmud would use the rationales and reasonings that you mention to justify women getting aliyot, or accepting gay rabbis and homosexuality, something which the Torah itself calls an abomination ("And if a man lie with mankind, as with womankind, both of them have committed abomination (toeivah תּוֹעֵבָה): they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall be upon them" Leviticus 20:13 [5]) when you can see that the Torah itself sentences people to death, a very obvious "disregard" for an interpretation of "Kavod HaBriyot." So it's a huge mistake to apply "Kavod HaBriyot" as a fig leaf or a false license to breech and break the Torah's commandments, a logical impossibility. This type of reasoning would be condemned as naval birshus hatorah (Nahmanides at the beginning of Parshas Kedoshim [6]) and megaleh panim batorah [shelo kehalachah] (Sanhedrin 99a, and Mishneh Torah Mada, Hilchot Teshuva 3:11)

[edit] In the Shulkhan Arukh

The Halakha in the Shulkhan Arukh goes according to Rav (as quoted above):

Shulkhan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 303:1 "[That it is] Permissible to remove kilayim from [his] friend even in [the] marketplace:

[Mechaber]: One who sees kilayim of (forbidden by) the Torah on his friend even if they were walking in the marketplace [he] jumps upon him and tears it from upon him immediately even if he was his rabbi

[Ramo]: And there are those who say that if had worn them in error then he does not need to tell him about it in the markerplace because of Kavod HaBriyot he [should] remain silent and not remove it it due to [the] error [of the wearer] (Tur in the name of the Rosh)

[Mechaber]: And if it was [forbidden] by the words [of the rabbis] (divreihem) he does not tear it from him and he does not remove it in the marketplace until he arrives at home

[Ramo]: And also (likewise) in the Beth midrash there is no need to hurry to leave (Tur)

[Mechaber]: But if it was from (forbidden by) the Torah he removes immediately.

[edit] Related to similar concepts in the Torah

According to ^[specify] Kavod HaBriyot is connected to the concept of the Tselem Elokim (the "image of God" or "Godly image") in every person, based on the Torah in Genesis stating that Man was/is created in the image of God (the Tselem Elokim): "And God said: Let us make man in our image, after our likeness (בְּצַלְמֵנוּ כִּדְמוּתֵנוּ)..." Genesis 1:26 [7]; "And God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them." (וַיִּבְרָא אֱלֹהִים אֶת-הָאָדָם בְּצַלְמוֹ, בְּצֶלֶם אֱלֹהִים בָּרָא אֹתוֹ: זָכָר וּנְקֵבָה, בָּרָא אֹתָם.) Genesis 1:27 [8]; "Then the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul." (וַיִּיצֶר יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים אֶת-הָאָדָם, עָפָר מִן-הָאֲדָמָה, וַיִּפַּח בְּאַפָּיו, נִשְׁמַת חַיִּים; וַיְהִי הָאָדָם, לְנֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה) Genesis 2:7 [9] Thus when God breathed his spirit into Adam giving him life, Adam is an "extension" of God through the spirit that God breathed into him, so that when we honor any human we are also honoring God.^{[citation needed]}

Many episodes in the Torah such as are based on "Kavod HaBriyot":^{[citation needed]}

• The Flood brought to the world and the people of the Tower of Babel dispersed because they did not honor each other
• Shem and Japhet covering the naked Noah and not looking at his state
• Abraham praying for Sodom and Gemora worrying about the fate of possible innocents
• Rachel not wanting to embarrass her sister Leah by allowing Jacob to marry Leah unwittinly
• The commandment of "...thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: I am the Lord" (וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ) Leviticus 19:18 [10]

[edit] Related notions in Pirkei Avoth and the Oral Torah

According to ^[specify]The principal is related to a variety of citations in the Mishnah's Pirkei Avoth ("Ethics of the Fathers")^{[citation needed]} which is considered to be the Oral Torahs primary source of Jewish ethics:

• Yose ben Yochanan...says: Let your house be open wide; [and] treat the poor as members of your household (Avot 1:5)
• Yehoshau ben Peracyah [said]:...Judge everyone favorably. (Avot 1:6)
• Hillel says: Be among the disciples of Aaron, loving peace and pursuing peace, loving people, and bringing them closer to Torah (Avot 1:12)
• Rabbi Eliezer says: Let your fellow's honor be as dear to you as your own. (Avot 2:15)
• Rabbi Yose says: Let your fellow's money be dear to you as your own. (Avot 2:17)
• [Rabbi Chanina ben Dosa] used to say: If the spirit of one's fellows is pleased with him, the spirit of (God) is pleased with him. (Avot 2:13)
• [Rabbi Akiva] used to say: Beloved is man, for he was created in God's image. (Avot 2:18)
• [Ben Azzai said]: Do not be scornful of any person. (Avot:4:3)
• Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua said: Let the honor of your student be as dear to you as your own. (Avot 4:15)
• Rabbi Masya ben Charsh said: Initiate a greeting to every person. ((Avot 4:20)
• Shmuel HaKattan says: When your enemy falls be not glad, and when he stumbles be not joyous. (Avot 4:24)

According t ^[specify] the 24,000 students of Rabbi Akiva died because they did not honor each other.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] Kavod HaBriyot as a halakhic principle

The Tannaim (rabbis of the Mishnah) and the Amoraim (rabbis of the Talmud) applied the concept of 'Kavod HaBriyot in their interpretations of and rulings on halakhah. The following is an example of this from the Mishnah.

"Ben Zoma says: איזהו מכובד? המכבד את הבריות Who is honored (mechubad)? He who honors (mechabed) others habriyot, as it is said: 'For those who honor Me (God) I will honor, and those who scorn Me shall be degraded' (Samuel I 2:30)" (Avot 4:1) [11]

Examples of the use of this principle in the responsa literature include:

• an Orthodox responsum by Eliezer Waldenberg permits wearing a hearing aid on Shabbat,^[1]

• a responsum by a Modern Orthodox rabbi permits women to be called to a Torah reading in a synagogue service^[2]

• A responsum adopted by Conservative Judaism's Committee on Jewish Law and Standards lifting rabbinic restrictions on homosexual conduct and permitting Conservative rabbis and congregations to bless homosexual unions and ordain openly homosexual clergy.^[3]

Orthodox Rabbi Menachem Elon, in his Encyclopaedia Judaica article on Takkanot emphasized the importance of Kavod HaBriyot:

The scholars stressed the need to guard, in the exercise of such wide legislative authority, against doing undue injury to man's image and dignity: "All these matters apply to the extent that the dayyan shall find them proper in the particular case and necessitated by the prevailing circumstances; in all matters he shall act for the sake of Heaven and he shall not lightly regard the dignity of man... "(Yad, Sanhedrin 24:10; see also Resp. Rashba, vol. 5, no. 238)

In the Encyclopaedia Judaica article on Honor Rabbi Louis Isaac Rabinowitz writes that "So great was 'the honor of God's creatures' regarded that 'God has regard to the dignity of His creatures' (Sif. Deut. 192) and honor annuls even a negative commandment of the Bible (Ber. 19b), especially the honor of the community (TJ, Ber. 3:1, 6a)."

Most classical poskim, however, maintained in accordance with the opinion in the Talmud that Kavod HaBriyot can only justify overriding rabbinic restrictions.

[edit] Dispute as to scope

The applicability of the concept to contemporary controversies is a matter of dispute. Conservative Rabbi Joel Roth wrote that the concept allows one to override certain rabbinic injunctions out of honor or respect for someone else, but never out of ones own honor. Rabbi Roth argued that the idea that a person's own honor (as distinct from giving honor to someone else) could justify overriding an injunction was not only inconsistent with any fair reading of the history of the concept, but theologically unjustifiable, because traditional Judaism has long recognized that a person can honor God by honoring others, but the idea that in matters between oneself and God only one can or should consider owns honor as more important than God's represents a completely different concept. ^[4]

Roth's reasoning was disagreed with by the Dorff, Nevins, and Reisner responsum, which claimed that the Talmud refers to "human dignity" without making the distinction between ones own and others that Rabbi Roth claimed. The Dorff, Nevins, and Reisner responsum explained its reasoning as follows:

Rabbi Roth believes that human dignity may not be used as a rationale by a person to violate the law for his own sake–this, he argues, would be a theological absurdity in that an observant Jew would be invited to place his own dignity higher than God’s. Of course, this is precisely the argument used in the Talmud for why human dignity does not supersede biblical law. Yet the Talmud does not discern a theological objection when human dignity supersedes rabbinic law. It even provides a drashah to explain that “sometimes you can ignore the injunction” because of human dignity. ^[5]

[edit] References

1. ^ Eliezer Waldenberg, Responsa Tzitz Eliezer, 6:6:3
2. ^ Sperber, D., "Congregational Dignity and Human Dignity: Women and Public Torah Reading” (pdf) Edah 3:2, 2002
3. ^ Elliott N. Dorff, Daniel Evans, and Avram Reisner, Homosexuality, Human Dignity, and Halakha. Committee on Jewish Law and Standards, Rabbinical Assembly, December 6, 2006
4. ^ Rabbi Joel Roth, "Op-Ed: Law committee in its gay ruling stepped outside halachic framework", JTS News, December 10, 2006
5. ^ Dorff, Nevins, and Reisner, p. 15. The responsum footnotes Brakhot 19b, Bava Metzia 30a, and Sanhedrin 18b.