Naval Forces Vietnam

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[edit] Commissioning

The vast, continuing increase in Free World Military Forces in Vietnam, in 1965 and 1966 had brought with it a corresponding increase in United States Navy forces. In early 1965 U.S. Navy activity in Vietnam was limited to support functions in the Saigon area, construction and medical activities, and advising the Vietnamese Navy and Marine Corps. In March of 1965 the first operational U.S. Navy units commenced counter-infiltration patrols. The Vietnam Coastal Patrol Force under CFT 71 was designated Operation Market Time on 24 March. On 30 July, TF 71 was deactivated and operational control was shifted to CTF 115 in Saigon. MARKET TIME continued, with addition of surveillance aircraft, United States Coast Guard units, and the high speed PCF (SWIFT) coastal patrol boats.

Late 1965 saw planning for the second major influx of operational U.S. Navy units. Operation GAME WARDEN, designed to supplement Vietnamese units in patrol of the Mekong Delta and Rung Sat Special Zone waterways, was to come into operation during 1966, with high speed River Patrol Boats (PBRs) as the principal patrol units.

With these operations came the requirement for construction of new facilities. Navy Civil Engineer Corp personnel, assigned to the Officer in Charge of Construction, Vietnam, were designated to supervise the bulk of military construction, although the majority of the work was being performed by civilian contractors. Included in this construction were new MARKET TIME and GAME WARDEN bases.

Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon was destined to transfer its functions to the Army by May of 1966, but some of its personnel and facilities were to be incorporated into Naval Support Activity, Saigon to provide logistic support for U.S. Navy activities in the II, III, and IV Corps Tactical Zones. Naval Support Activity, DaNang, activated in 1965 for support of Marine and Navy operations in the I CTZ (Corp Tactical Zone), was to be expanded to support all Free World Military Forces in the I CTZ.

Also under construction were harbor facilities to support the military buildup. U.S. Navy Harbor Defense and Harbor Clearance units were to be assigned to these areas. In addition, mine countermeasures forces were to be employed, both on the main ship channels to Saigon and in the harbor and coastal areas. The possibility of a U.S. River Assault Group was under consideration to supplement the Vietnamese Navy RAGs in operations in the Mekong Delta and the Rung Sat Special Zone.

With the continually increasing United States Navy commitments in Vietnam, early 1966 brought the requirement for better integration of all U.S. Navy activities assigned to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Three months of planning culminated in the establishment of U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam on 1 April. In early January the requirements for a Naval Component Commander were forwarded to COMUSMACV.(1) At this time, the Commanding General III Marine Amphibious Force, with headquarters in Da Nang, was performing the task of Naval Component Commander for MACV; and Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines was navy area coordination authority. Commanding General III MAF's many functions encompassed the direction of the bulk of the war effort in the I Corps Tactical Zone in addition to discharging the Naval Component Commander functions in South Vietnam (with the exception) of those functions performed by Chief, Naval Advisory Group. His many duties in the I CTZ resulted in the NCC being unable to adequately supervise many NCC functions in the II, III and IV CTZ. In addition, the presence of the Commanding General, III MAF was almost continually required in the I CTZ, a 340 mile separation from COMUSMACV Headquarters in Saigon. This prohibited frequent personal contact between COMUSMACV and his Naval Component Commander.

With the increase in U.S. naval forces, there also existed the need for a more responsive organization to provide for supervision of uni-service Navy matters. Again, geography prevented effective supervision by Commanding General, III MAF, and to an even greater extent prevented effective participation by Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines.

Chief, Naval Advisory Group has unavoidably involved in naval natters not necessarily related to NAVADVGRP functions. As CHNAVADVGRP, he was a member of COMUSMACV staff, as such not in command of a naval organization, but tasked to advise COMUSMACV on naval matters. In addition, he was CTF 115 and CTF 116. Yet, involved as he was, he had not fully appropriate channels to the Naval Component Commander, the Fleet Commander nor the Pacific Fleet type commanders.

With the continuing growth of the Navy establishment in Vietnam, and the problems of a Naval Component Commander remote from the center of naval operations, the need existed for a change in the Naval Component Commander structure to provide an organization more responsive to the needs of COMUSMACV and the Navy. It was proposed that a major Navy command with a flag officer be established in Saigon under the command of Commander in Chief,U.S. Pacific Fleet and under the operational control of COMUSMACV. This command would exercise operational control under COMUSMACV of the Coastal Surveillance Force, the River Patrol Force, and other Navy units as specifically assigned. In addition, the command would serve as Navy area coordinator for South Vietnam.

On 13 January COMUSMACV proposed to CINCPAC the formation of just such a major Navy command, and that it be titled U.S. Naval Forces, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (NAVFORV).(2) Under this proposal COMNAVFORV would have the additional duty of CHNAVADVGRP because of the prestige and possible political gain to the Vietnamese Navy and Vietnamese Marine Corps. In addition COMUSMACV proposed: that III MAF be designated as a separate uni-service command within MACV; that a flag officer junior to COMNAVFORV be Commander Naval -Support Activity, DaNang; and that COMNAVFORV through NAVSUPPACT DaNang provide logistic support to all U.S. Forces in the 1 CTZ; that Navy captains be ordered to command of Task Force 115 and Task Force 116; and that NAVFORV be established at the earliest possible date.

In late January the proposal was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.(3) Approval was granted on 14 February,(4) and mere definite requirements were worked out. Estimates of personnel requirements were prepared and forwarded to CINCPACFLT on 13 February. On 14 March CINCPACFLT forwarded the proposed tasks for COMNAVFORV, and recommended that the transfer of Naval Component Commander functions and the activation of NAVFORV be effected on 1 April.(5)

On 1 April, in ceremonies aboard USS LOWE (DER-325) in Saigon Harbor, Rear Admiral Norvell G. Ward established and assumed command of NAVFORV. He retained the posts of CTF 115, CTF 116, and CHMAVADVGKP. On 16 April Admiral Ward was relieved as CTF 115 by Captain Clifford L. Stewart. On 21 April CINCPACFLT defined the terms of reference for COMNAVFORV as a in-service commander.(6)

[edit] Naval Intelligence Liaison Offices

Coincident with formation of NAVFORV, the intelligence section was expanded to meet the growing intelligence requirements of the new command. During the first week of April the first of ten graduates of the Army's special basic intelligence course for Vietnam, conducted at Fort Holabird, arrived in country. They were to be assigned to ARVN Sector Operational Intelligence Centers in Coastal and Mekong Delta sectors. Previous personnel assigned as Navy Intelligence Liaison Officers at Sector Operational Intelligence Centers had only a cursory introductory course prior to arrival in country. This represented an expansion from ten to twenty of the number of SOICs with Naval Intelligence Liaison Officers.

In addition, assistant intelligence officers were assigned to each of the four Coastal Zones to assist the intelligence officer at Coastal Zone Headquarters. Three intelligence analyst billets were created for DaNang, Nha Trang and Can Tho.

As a final note, again coincident with formation of NAVFORV, the daily intelligence summary was sent to out-of-country commands, and was forwarded to CINCPACFLT and CNO.

Footnotes:

"An Examination of the Naval Component Commander Requirements for the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam," prepared by Naval Advisory Group, MACV, 3 January 1966.
COMUSMACV msg 130159z January 66 (S)
CINCPAC msg 251120Z Jan 66 (S)
JCS msg 142250Z Feb 66 (S)
CINCPACFLT msg 142351Z Mar 66 (S)
CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 5440.11