Talk:Process philosophy
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"He understood quantum theory, even to the point of developing a Theory of Relativity similar to Einstein’s." This sentence is ambiguous. If Whitehead's theory of relativity is a physical theory of relativity like Einstein's, it is unrelated to his understanding of quantum mechanics. If it is an analogous philosophical theory with the same name as Einstein's physical theory, it is unrelated to his understanding of quantum mechanics, and also unrelated to Einstein. This should be clarified. -- Anon, (15 December 2004)
- This was clarified in the article by Aliman on 20 December 2004. The anonymous writer is correct in that relativity, as presently understood is unrelated to quantum theory. However, he probably does not know that Whitehead was a consumate mathematician of his day, and did formulate his relativity theory in mathematical terms, albeit unrelated to Einstein's principle of equivalence. Whitehead's theory, rather than understanding matter warping spacetime as Einstein did, proposed (roughly) that gravity bent light rays in flat space. Whitehead's 1922 theory was mostly overlooked until the 1960s, and is thought by some to have been disproved in 1972. (see the Wiki entry on Alfred North Whitehead or external website at Whitehead/Einstein Relativity Comparison). Ironically, Anon is assuming the either/or Cartesian split between the physical and the metaphysical (or philosophical) realms, which Whitehead explicitly rejected. Whitehead's philosophy is generalized from his physics, not separate from it. --Blainster 13:25, 4 Mar 2005 (UTC)
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[edit] General relativity not until 1915!
The current version has a flatly incorrect discussion of relativity. [Special relativity] emerged in 1905 and deals with non-accelerating objects in a fixed flat space background. [General relativity] emerged in 1915 and deals with accelerating objects in a curved and dynamical space or spacetime. The idea of an expanding universe is also logically independent of general relativity, and only emerged some years later with investigation of possible cosmological models in the light of [Hubble]'s measurements of 1929. Like much else in the article the current discussion is mush. --Tdent 20:35, 29 October 2006 (UTC)
"In 1905, the theory of general relativity curtailed exploration of pure process views and made the case for a specific and expanding universe that did exist as an objective object of our human perception and cognition." Is incorrect...try 1915, as the hyperlink correctly tells you. 198.97.67.57 18:24, 29 November 2006 (UTC) radar-mark, 29 Nov 2006
[edit] Non-Whiteheadian process ontology?
Would this article be an appropriate place to add information about non-Whiteheadian approaches, e.g. Johanna Seibt's theory, Sellarsian stuff, etc? I know 'process philosophy' is often taken as synonymous with 'Whiteheadian philosophy' but it seems to me it may also function as an umbrella term including other approaches. Would anyone be opposed to the addition of a section on non-Whiteheadian approaches? Countermereology 15:08, 12 February 2007 (UTC)
[edit] Explanation of Citation Missing and Weasel Tags
This article includes a very large number of attribution of views to persons seemingly in the service of establishing the credentials of process philosophy. Virtually none of the attributions are substantiated by citations. Some of the attributions are controversial. Here are some concrete examples of worrisome passages in the article:
René Descartes, for instance, proposed that the mind and body were actually connected and unified by a single process, the imagination. This was often discarded or devalued by Descartes' followers and critics who attributed to him (incorrectly) advocating a mind-body dualism.
Perhaps, contrary to common understanding[1] Descartes was not a dualist. But this would need substantiation. Notice that in the above quote, it is the mind and the body that are connected - the most natural way of understanding this is that in Descartes' ontology substances like minds and bodies are fundamental which then somehow get connected.
Very similarly, the law of the excluded middle was raised to ontological status by those of Aristotle's followers, notably those practicing medieval scholasticism, who wished to ignore some of his telling observations about moderation (the very ones that Francis Bacon celebrated) and rhetoric (which Aristotle praised, seemingly foreshadowing Descartes' imagination).
What is an ontological status? And before the law of excluded middle was raised to that status, what status did it have? What are the telling observations about moderation that Bacon celebrated? Maybe there are such observations but the reader needs to be told what they are. Finally, I'm not sure anyone practiced scholasticism.
A number of other key Enlightenment figures ... made note of their working processes in terms that suggest change is what they seek to quantify because it is the most fundamental basis on which perception and thus reality proceeds.
Citations? Are we sure that they did not see change as changes of objects such that the objects that are changing are not themselves changes? Process philosophy is not simply the view that processes are important - that 's a boring and uncontroversial claim - but the far more radical claim that changes are ontologically fundamental in the sense that they are not to be understood as changes of things that are not themselves changes.
Of other philosophers, more dominant at that time, Immanuel Kant noted that either experience made objects possible, or objects made experience possible. He seemed to have missed that processes might make both possible.
How might processes make both possible? Which processes are we talking about here? Might the process of digestion make possible both experience and objects?
These hopes proved vain, although it remained for Russell and Whitehead to prove that so in 1913
Which hopes? And what exactly did Russell and Whitehead prove in 1913?
Since, it is argued, free will is inherent to the nature of the universe, God is not omnipotent in Whitehead's metaphysics.
it is argued by who?
other process philosophers have questioned Whitehead's theology, seeing it as a regressive Platonism.
Who are these other philosophers?
Quatsch77 19:36, 27 February 2007 (UTC)
[edit] Other Problems
Here are some more infelicities:
Process philosophy ... does not characterize change as illusory but as the cornerstone of metaphysical reality, or ontology
This insinuates that philosophical views other than process philosophy hold that change is somehow unreal. But it is one thing to hold that changes are not the most basic elements of ontology, quite another thing to hold that changes are illusory, just as it is one thing to say that tables are made from fundamental particles, quite another thing to say that the existence of tables is illusory.
This resulted in the most famous work of process philosophy—Alfred North Whitehead's Process and Reality. - a work which can be seen as a lighter and more accessible form of describing the basic Hegelian truth, namely that absolute, or "philosophical", truth can only be a logical and /or worldly "movement" in and through determinates, not these deteminates as fixed concepts or "things". Hegel is the real (modern) rootsource of what (clumsily) can be termed dialectical-dynamical-ontology, and of which process philosophy is a branch.
This needs some serious reworking before it is intelligible. Whitehead's work is lighter and more accessible than what? Why is truth is qualified as 'absolute' or 'philosophical'? Are there unphilosophical and relative truths? And are those other truths fixed concepts? What exactly does it mean to say that a truth is a concept, fixed or otherwise?
The process metaphysics elaborated in Process and Reality proposes that the fundamental elements of the universe are occasions of experience.
What is an 'occasion of experience'? Is it different from the plain experience? I'm sure there is a point in talking about occasions of experience, but the term here needs explaining.
Whitehead's philosophy resembles in some respects the monads of Leibniz.
Whitehead's philosophy does not resemble monads. For that matter, Leibniz's philosophy does not resemble monad's, either. As the next sentence suggests, this should probably be: occasions of experience resemble in some respects the monads of Leibniz.
These experiences may be summed in some sense but can only approximately be shared, even among very similar cognitions with identical DNA.
Cognitions don't have DNA.
Quatsch77 19:33, 27 February 2007 (UTC)
