Transcendental argument for the existence of God

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The Transcendental Argument for the existence of God (TAG) is an argument for the existence of God which attempts to show that logic, science, ethics (and generally every fact of human experience and knowledge) are not meaningful apart from a preconditioning belief in the existence of the Christian God. A version was formulated by Immanuel Kant in his 1763 work The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God. A version is also commonly used by presuppositional apologists and is considered by some of them (especially those of the Van Tillian variety) to be the most persuasive method of apologetical argumentation.

Contents 1 Transcendental reasoning 2 The argument 3 Criticisms of the TAG 4 Defenses of the TAG 5 See also 6 References 7 External links 7.1 Articles 7.2 Debates

[edit] Transcendental reasoning

Transcendental arguments should not be confused with transcendent arguments, or arguments for the existence of something transcendent. In other words, they are distinct from both, arguments that appeal to a transcendent intuition or sense as evidence (Fideism), and arguments which move from direct evidence to the existence of a transcendent thing (Classical Apologetics).

They are also distinct from standard deductive and inductive forms of reasoning. Where a standard deductive argument looks for what we can deduce from the fact of X, and a standard inductive argument looks for what we can infer from experience of X, a transcendental argument looks for the necessary prior conditions to both the fact and experience of X. Thus, "I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori." (Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Introduction, VII).

[edit] The argument

The TAG is a transcendental argument which attempts to prove that the Christian God is the precondition of all human knowledge and experience, by demonstrating the impossibility of the contrary. R. L. Dabney shed some light on what is meant by "impossibility of the contrary" when he wrote:

A truth is not necessary, because we negatively are not able to conceive the actual existence of the opposite thereof; but a truth is necessary when we positively are able to apprehend that the negation thereof includes an inevitable contradiction. It is not that we cannot see how the opposite comes to be true, but it is that we are able to see that that the opposite cannot possibly be true. (Systematic Theology, sect. 1, chap. 6, lect. 8[1]).

Cornelius Van Til likewise wrote:

We must point out to [our opponents] that [non-theistic] reasoning itself leads to self-contradiction, not only from a theistic point of view, but from a non-theistic point of view as well. . . . It is this that we ought to mean when we say that we reason from the impossibility of the contrary. The contrary is impossible only if it is self-contradictory when operating on the basis of its own assumptions. (A Survey of Christian Epistemology [Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1969], p. 204).

Therefore, the TAG differs from Thomistic and Evidentialist arguments, which posit the probable existence of a God in order to avoid an infinite regress of causes or motions, to explain life on Earth, and so on. The TAG posits the necessary existence of a particular God in order for human knowledge and experience to be possible at all. The TAG argues that, because the triune God of the Bible, being completely logical, uniform, and good, exhibits his character in the created order and the creatures themselves (especially in humans), human knowledge and experience are possible. This reasoning implies that all other worldviews (Atheism, Buddhism, Islam, etc), if carried out to their logical conclusions, must be reduced to either absurdity, arbitrariness or inconsistency.

An example of the TAG can be formulated with regard to moral absolutes. The TAG asserts an omnibenevolent God whose own character is the basis for the predication of right and wrong to any thought or action. In creation he has equipped man to be a moral being, and in his self-revelation he reveals how man should act, and commands him to do so. Thus, man has an absolute standard of morality by which to condemn evil thoughts and actions (or commend good ones).

It is argued that the moral relativist, by contrast, cannot condemn theft, rape or genocide (nor commend generosity, marriage, or the preservation of life) without exposing his reliance on the very assumption of absolute morality which he claims to reject. But the relativist does make such value judgments, often about the very teachings contained in the Bible. No moral condemnations (or exhortations), it is argued, can be accounted for from the relativist's own worldview — instead they are derived from unconsciously "borrowed capital" from Christianity, which allegedly proves the truth of the Christian worldview.

[edit] Criticisms of the TAG

Several criticisms of the TAG have emerged. One says that TAG is not a distinctive form of argument. That is, this objection claims that the form of the TAG (indirect, transcendental), is really just a reworking of the standard deductive and inductive forms of reasoning; that there is really not much difference between Thomas Aquinas and Cornelius Van Til. Notably, John Frame, a student of Van Til, has endorsed this objection.

Another objection is that the TAG does not provide a uniqueness proof. That is, this objection claims that even if the TAG can prove a God -- it doesn't prove the Christian God -- any sufficiently similar God would do (e.g., Allah). John Warwick Montgomery presented this objection in the article titled Once Upon an A Priori..., presented in Van Til's festschrift, Jerusalem and Athens.

Another criticism comes in the form of claiming that the TAG, while proving the Christian God, still doesn't necessarily prove it. Christianity may be sufficient as a precondition of human experience and knowledge, but it is not necessary. This objection is essentially the same as the prior one, just stated in different language.

Another objection claims that the TAG moves from conceptual necessity to necessary existence. This criticism argues that proving the conceptual necessity of a worldview, doesn't establish its ontological reality. In other words, one may need to think about the world a certain way to make sense of their experience and knowledge, but that doesn't prove that the world actually is that way. David P. Hoover has raised this objection in his article titled For the Sake of Argument.

Another objection claims that the TAG utilizes circular reasoning to make its case. That is, the TAG is assuming from the beginning what it intends to establish by its conclusion (namely, the existence of God). This has been a common popular objection.

Another objection is in relation to the argument that one cannot object to an evil without reference to an absolute morality (and hence the deity) without considering other possible ways of classifying behaviour (such as, an act is wrong if and only if it causes human suffering)

[edit] Defenses of the TAG

Van Til himself didn't directly attempt to answer any of the criticisms of the TAG noted above. Bahnsen has offered a defense against all of them in various places in his literature and media, however he never attempted to answer all of them in one place. Michael Butler published a chapter in Bahnsen's festschrift, The Standard Bearer titled "The Transcendental Argument for God's Existence" which examines the TAG along with transcendental arguments in the contemporary philosophical literature and defends them against objections.

As the most common popular objection is the claim that the TAG involves circularity, the defense will be briefly outlined. Proponents of the argument claim that worldview level considerations are supposed to be circular as a sign of internal cohesion. In dealing with the inevitable circularity of worldviews, Bahnsen maintains that two criteria must be met to demonstrate a given worldview as true:

1. Internal consistency -- The statements made by the worldview do not contradict one another or otherwise lead to internal contradictions. Logical Positivism fails this test by its claim that “A statement is literally meaningful if and only if it is either analytic or empirically verifiable,” a statement which is not itself verifiable analytically or empirically. Another example is the claim by moral relativists that absolutes do not exist, which is itself an absolute claim.

2. Arbitrariness -- The statements must not be believed simply out of convenience, tradition, or prejudice. Mormonism fails this test with its claim that the truth of Mormonism is known due to a subjective, positive feeling---a claim which any adherent of any worldview could make.

In argumentation, apologists will attempt to demonstrate that only the Christian worldview satisfies these conditions and is therefore coherent. However, Van Tillian presuppositionalists also point out that these conditions are applicable only because they themselves presuppose Christianity. To say that Christianity is true because it meets these conditions is to say that a greater standard exists than that of the God of the Bible.

[edit] See also

• Christian apologetics
• Argument from morality (Some forms of which are TAGs)
• Transcendental Argument for the Non-existence of God

[edit] References

• E. R. Geehan, ed., Jerusalem and Athens: Critical Discussions on the Philosophy and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1980).
• Greg L. Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic: Readings and Analysis (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1998).
• John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1995).
• Steven M. Schlissel, ed., The Standard Bearer: A Festschrift for Greg L. Bahnsen (Nacogdoches: Covenant Media Press, 2002).
• Greg L. Bahnsen, Always Ready: Directions for Defending the Faith". Robert R. Booth, ed. (Nacogdoches: Covenant Media Press, 1996).
• John M. Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God: An Introduction (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1994).
• John M. Frame, The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1987).

[edit] External links

[edit] Articles

• Responses to Atheist Philosopher, Michael Martin
• Naturalism Defeated A recent transcendental argument by Alvin Plantinga.
• Derrida, Van Til and the Metaphysics of Postmodernism An appraisal of Postmodernism, specifically Deconstruction, in light of Van Til by Jacob Gabriel Hale.
• The Transcendental Argument for God's Existence by Michael Butler

[edit] Debates

• "The Great Debate: Does God Exist?" Audio (in RealAudio format) of a formal debate between Christian Greg Bahnsen and skeptic Gordon Stein from the University of California, Irvine.
• The Martin-Frame Debate A written debate between skeptic Michael Martin and Christian John Frame about the transcendental argument for the existence of God.
• The Drange-Wilson Debate A written debate between skeptic Theodore Drange and Christian Douglas Wilson.
• "Is Non-Christian Thought Futile?" A written debate between Christian Doug Jones and skeptics Keith Parsons and Michael Martin in Antithesis magazine (vol. 2, no. 4).
• Bahnsen at the Stein Debate by John M. Frame