User:ArmyAnt/Sandbox
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
| Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett | |||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
 |
|||||||||||||
| Argued October 11, 2000 Decided February 21, 2001 |
|||||||||||||
|
|||||||||||||
| Holding | |||||||||||||
| The Court held that Congress's enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution did not extend to the abrogation of state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment where the discrimination complained of was rationally based on a disability. | |||||||||||||
| Court membership | |||||||||||||
| Chief Justice: William Rehnquist Associate Justices: John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer |
|||||||||||||
| Case opinions | |||||||||||||
| Majority by: Rehnquist Joined by: O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas Concurrence by: Kennedy Joined by: O'Connor Dissent by: Breyer Joined by: Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg |
|||||||||||||
| Laws applied | |||||||||||||
| U.S. Const. amends. XI, XIV | |||||||||||||
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), was a United States Supreme Court case about Congress's enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. It decided that the Americans with Disabilities Act was unconstitutional insofar as it allowed states to be sued by private citizens for money damages.
Contents |
[edit] Facts
The plaintiffs were Milton Ash and Patricia Garrett, employees of the University of Alabama school system. Both were disabled under the definition of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA): Ash had a lifelong history of severe asthma, and Garrett had been diagnosed with breast cancer, and had received radiation and chemotherapy treatments. Both alleged that they had been discriminated against at their jobs, and filed a suit in federal court against the University of Alabama for money damages, arguing that the University had violated Title I of the ADA.
The University of Alabama responded with a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the Eleventh Amendment prohibited the suit. The United States District Court dismissed both cases on this ground, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that Congress had expressly abrogated the sovereign immunity of the states.
[edit] Issue
Was Congress able to abrogate the immunity of the states under its Fourteenth Amendment power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause?
[edit] Result
- See also: article about the Rehnquist Court for more about cases from this era.
The majority opinion stated that Congress, in enacting the ADA, had satisfied the requirement that it make clear its intention to abrogate state sovereign immunity and allow states to be sued for damages under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the majority opinion also stated that this part of the ADA lacked the "congruence and proportionality" required when Congress exercises its enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment, citing City of Boerne v. Flores.
Under the Equal Protection Clause, discrimination against people with disabilities is analyzed using "rational basis" scrutiny. If the discrimination has a rational basis, it is constitutional. In Garrett, the Court held that Congress (like the judiciary) was required to use rational basis review of state action, with its presumptions favoring constitutionality. The Court decided that the legislative record of the ADA, "fails to show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the disabled."
The Garrett Court stated that the "reasonable accommodation" requirement of the ADA law failed the congruence and proportionality test even though there was a hardship exception to the accommodation requirement.[1] The Court said that disability discrimination is rational in that hiring non-disabled employees would conserve scarce financial resources by avoiding the need for costly reasonable accommodations,[2] and that states have rational reasons for violating the part of the ADA law banning policies that have a disparate impact on the disabled. According to the Court, even in cases where rational basis review does not apply, such as racial discrimination, evidence of disparate impact "alone is insufficient even where the Fourteenth Amendment subjects state action to strict scrutiny."[3]
Rehnquist's opinion for the Court said that the burden of proof was upon those who alleged that a state action toward the disabled was irrational. As Rehnquist said, "the burden is upon the challenging party."[4]
The majority in Garrett also stated that Congress can subject local governments within a state to private claims for damages, without needing to rely upon the Fourteenth Amendment, because Eleventh Amendment principles do not protect local governments.[5] Additionally, the Court suggested that the disabled might be further protected by federal positive law:
| “ | States are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions towards such individuals are rational. They could quite hardheadedly–-and perhaps hardheartedly–-hold to job-qualification requirements which do not make allowance for the disabled. If special accommodations for the disabled are to be required, they have to come from positive law and not through the Equal Protection Clause. | ” |
The ADA, by allowing states to be sued for damages for failing to provide reasonable accommodations, thus provided significantly more protection than was allowed by Boerne. This level of protection, the Court held, was not "congruent and proportional" to the wrong (i.e. rational discrimination against people with disabilities) which could constitutionally be remedied via private actions enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment.[6] Hence the ADA did not constitutionally abrogate the states' sovereign immunity.
[edit] =========================================================
The holding of Garrett said that the "reasonable accommodation" requirement of the ADA law failed the congruence and proportionality test even though there was a hardship exception to the accommodation requirement.[7]
The Court said that disability discrimination is rational in that hiring non-disabled employees would conserve scarce financial resources by avoiding the need for costly reasonable accommodations,[8] and that states have rational reasons for violating the part of the ADA law banning policies that have a disparate impact on the disabled. According to the Court, even in cases where rational basis review doesn't apply, such as racial discrimination, evidence of disparate impact "alone is insufficient even where the Fourteenth Amendment subjects state action to strict scrutiny."[9]
Rehnquist's opinion for the Court said that the burden of proof was upon those who alleged that a state action toward the disabled was irrational. As Rehnquist said, "the burden is upon the challenging party."[10]
Rehnquist said that while local governments within a state are state actors, the Equal Protection Clause doesn’t apply to them because "It would make no sense to consider constitutional violations on their part, as well as by the States themselves, when only the States are the beneficiaries of the Eleventh Amendment."[11]
As the Court explained:
| “ | Thus, the result of Cleburne is that States are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions towards such individuals are rational. They could quite hard headedly–and perhaps hardheartedly–hold to job-qualification requirements which do not make allowance for the disabled. If special accommodations for the disabled are to be required, they have to come from positive law and not through the Equal Protection Clause. | ” |
The ADA, by allowing states to be sued for damages for failing to provide reasonable accommodations, thus provided significantly more protection than was allowed by Boerne. This level of protection, the Court held, was not "congruent and proportional" to the wrong which could constitutionally be remedied – namely, irrational discrimination against people with disabilities. Hence the law did not constitutionally abrogate the states' sovereign immunity.
[edit] Dissent
The Court split 5-4, with Justice Stephen Breyer filing a dissenting opinion in which he was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. As the dissent noted, Congress had found that, "[t]wo-thirds of all disabled Americans between the age of 16 and 64 [were] not working at all." Congress attributed this fact not only to purposeful unequal treatment, but also "stereotypic assumptions."
The dissent argued that even though disparate treatment based on disability is subject only to rational basis review by the judiciary, "The problem with the Court's approach is that neither the 'burden of proof' that favors States nor any other rule of restraint applicable to judges applies to Congress when it exercises its §5 power." The dissent asserted that Congress was not limited by rational basis review when Congress reviewed state action for Equal Protection violations:
| “ | Limitations stemming from the nature of the judicial process have no application to Congress. Rational-basis review–-with its presumptions favoring constitutionality–-is a paradigm of judicial restraint. And the Congress of the United States is not a lower court. (Citations and quote marks omitted) | ” |
Regarding "congruence and proportionality", Breyer said that City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc and Katzenbach v. Morgan were precedents that require deference by the Court to legislation passed by Congress to require equal protection of the laws, and that the Court was using an argument for judicial restraint (the rationality test) as an argument for Congressional restraint. Also, Breyer argued that the Court should interpret the sovereign immunity of states more narrowly, according to the Fourteenth Amendment's origin as a Civil War amendment.
[edit] =============================================================================
The Court split 5-4, with Justice Stephen Breyer filing a dissenting opinion in which he was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. The dissent argued that even though disparate treatment based on disability is subject only to rational basis review, Congress nevertheless had the power to protect the handicapped from distinctions made with no rational basis. As for "congruence and proportionality", Breyer said that City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc and Katzenbach v. Morgan were precedents that require deference by the Court to legislation passed by Congress to require equal protection of the laws, and that the Court was using an argument for judicial restraint (the rationality test) as an argument for Congressional restraint and judicial activism. Also, Breyer thought the Court should interprete the sovereign immunity of states according to the Fourteenth Amendment's origin as a Civil War amendment.
The dissent stated:
| “ | Congress found that “[t]wo-thirds of all disabled Americans between the age of 16 and 64 [were] not working at all,” even though a large majority wanted to, and were able to, work productively. S. Rep. No. 101—116, at 9. And Congress found that this discrimination flowed in significant part from “stereotypic assumptions” as well as purposeful unequal treatment.” ...
The problem with the Court’s approach is that neither the “burden of proof” that favors States nor any other rule of restraint applicable to judges applies to Congress when it exercises its §5 power. “Limitations stemming from the nature of the judicial process … have no application to Congress.” Oregon v. Mitchell [citations omitted] Rational—basis review–with its presumptions favoring constitutionality–is “a paradigm of judicial restraint.” FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc. [citations omitted] And the Congress of the United States is not a lower court. ... I recognize nonetheless that this statute imposes a burden upon States in that it removes their Eleventh Amendment protection from suit, thereby subjecting them to potential monetary liability. Rules for interpreting §5 that would provide States with special protection, however, run counter to the very object of the Fourteenth Amendment. By its terms, that Amendment prohibits States from denying their citizens equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const., Amdt. 14, §1. Hence “principles of federalism that might otherwise be an obstacle to congressional authority are necessarily overridden by the power to enforce the Civil War Amendments ‘by appropriate legislation.’ Those Amendments were specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty.” |
” |
[edit] References
- ^ The Garrett Court stated:
“ The ADA does except employers from the “reasonable accommodatio[n]” requirement where the employer “can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.” §12112(b)(5)(A). However, even with this exception, the accommodation duty far exceeds what is constitutionally required in that it makes unlawful a range of alternate responses that would be reasonable but would fall short of imposing an “undue burden” upon the employer. The Act also makes it the employer’s duty to prove that it would suffer such a burden, instead of requiring (as the Constitution does) that the complaining party negate reasonable bases for the employer’s decision. See ibid. ” - ^ The Garrett Court stated:
“ whereas it would be entirely rational (and therefore constitutional) for a state employer to conserve scarce financial resources by hiring employees who are able to use existing facilities, the ADA requires employers to “mak[e] existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities." ” - ^ The Garrett Court stated:
“ The ADA also forbids "utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration" that disparately impact the disabled, without regard to whether such conduct has a rational basis. §12112(b)(3)(A). Although disparate impact may be relevant evidence of racial discrimination, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239 (1976), such evidence alone is insufficient even where the Fourteenth Amendment subjects state action to strict scrutiny. ” - ^ The Garrett Court stated:
“ Moreover, the State need not articulate its reasoning at the moment a particular decision is made. Rather, the burden is upon the challenging party to negative “ ‘any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.’ ” Heller, supra, at 320 (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)). ” - ^ The Garrett Court stated:
“ Respondents contend that the inquiry as to unconstitutional discrimination should extend not only to States themselves, but to units of local governments, such as cities and counties. All of these, they say, are "state actors" for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brief for Respondents 8. This is quite true, but the Eleventh Amendment does not extend its immunity to units of local government. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U. S. 529, 530 (1890). These entities are subject to private claims for damages under the ADA without Congress' ever having to rely on §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to render them so. It would make no sense to consider constitutional violations on their part, as well as by the States themselves, when only the States are the beneficiaries of the Eleventh Amendment. ” - ^ The Garrett case did not address the ability of the federal government to directly sue the states for violation of the Equal Protection Clause, nor did it address the ability of Congress to subject local governments to private lawsuits enforcing federal anti-discrimination laws enacted pursuant to, for example, Article I.
- ^ The ADA does except employers from the “reasonable accommodatio[n]” requirement where the employer “can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.” §12112(b)(5)(A). However, even with this exception, the accommodation duty far exceeds what is constitutionally required in that it makes unlawful a range of alternate responses that would be reasonable but would fall short of imposing an “undue burden” upon the employer. The Act also makes it the employer’s duty to prove that it would suffer such a burden, instead of requiring (as the Constitution does) that the complaining party negate reasonable bases for the employer’s decision. See ibid. - Opinion of the Court
- ^ whereas it would be entirely rational (and therefore constitutional) for a state employer to conserve scarce financial resources by hiring employees who are able to use existing facilities, the ADA requires employers to “mak[e] existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. - Opinion of the Court
- ^ The ADA also forbids "utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration" that disparately impact the disabled, without regard to whether such conduct has a rational basis. §12112(b)(3)(A). Although disparate impact may be relevant evidence of racial discrimination, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239 (1976), such evidence alone is insufficient even where the Fourteenth Amendment subjects state action to strict scrutiny. - Opinion of the Court
- ^ Moreover, the State need not articulate its reasoning at the moment a particular decision is made. Rather, the burden is upon the challenging party to negative “ ‘any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.’ ” Heller, supra, at 320 (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)). - Opinion of the Court
- ^ Respondents contend that the inquiry as to unconstitutional discrimination should extend not only to States themselves, but to units of local governments, such as cities and counties. All of these, they say, are "state actors" for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brief for Respondents 8. This is quite true, but the Eleventh Amendment does not extend its immunity to units of local government. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U. S. 529, 530 (1890). These entities are subject to private claims for damages under the ADA without Congress' ever having to rely on §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to render them so. It would make no sense to consider constitutional violations on their part, as well as by the States themselves, when only the States are the beneficiaries of the Eleventh Amendment. – Opinion of the Court
[edit] External links
