Battle of Santiago de Cuba
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| Battle of Santiago de Cuba | |||||||
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| Part of Spanish-American War | |||||||
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| Combatants | |||||||
| United States | Spain | ||||||
| Commanders | |||||||
| William T. Sampson, Winfield Scott Schley |
Pascual Cervera | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 4 battleships 1 armoured cruiser 2 torpedo boats |
4 armoured cruisers 2 torpedo boats |
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| Casualties | |||||||
| 2 dead ~100 wounded |
474 dead or wounded 6 ships lost |
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| Cuban Campaign |
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| Cárdenas – Cienfuegos – Guantánamo Bay – Las Guasimas – Tayacoba – Aguadores – El Caney – San Juan Hill – Naval Santiago – Santiago – Manimani |
The Battle of Santiago de Cuba, fought between Spain and the United States on 3 July 1898, was the largest naval engagement of the Spanish-American War, and resulted in the destruction of the Spanish Caribbean Squadron (also known as the Flota de Ultramar).
Contents |
[edit] Historical background
The Spanish realized that the war could be made or broken by the campaign in Cuba. Even before the opening of hostilities, Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete had been dispatched from Spain with the ultimate destination of Cuba. At best, the Spanish hoped to show the flag in their largest remaining New World colony; at worst, the Spanish hoped to have a force prepared to meet the powerful but relatively inexperienced U.S. Navy.
Cervera's squadron and the squadron lost by Admiral Patricio Montojo y Pasarón at the Battle of Manila Bay could not have been more different, statistically. Montojo's squadron had been composed largely of relics and cast-offs meant for patrol and revenue collection; Cervera's squadron was composed of modern warships, most of them less than a decade old. Montojo's squadron had virtually no torpedo launching capability; Cervera brought with him the destroyers Pluton, Terror and Furor, three of the most feared torpedo-armed warships in the world at the time. This flotilla was commanded by capitán de navío Fernando Villaamil, well-known by having been the destroyer concept designer. Montojo's squadron was almost entirely unarmored; nearly all of Cervera's vessels were protected by armor of some kind.
However, it is evident from the records of the time and from Cervera's own writings, that the Spanish admiral had the feeling that he was sailing to his doom. The breech mechanisms in many of the Spanish guns were dangerously faulty, causing jams and other mishaps; many of the naval boilers were in desperate need of repair; some ships, such as the respected armored cruiser Vizcaya, desperately needed a bottom-cleaning and were suffering from extra drag. Worst yet, some of the gunners were long out of practice, having little experience with firing live rounds. The most well-protected ship in Cervera's fleet, the armored cruiser Cristóbal Colón, had not even had her main battery installed and carried wooden dummy guns instead.
Early in the year, Cervera had attempted to convince the Ministerio de Marina — the bureaucratic body responsible for governing Spain's admiralty — that the best strategy lay in resisting the Americans near the Canary Islands. Here, the fleet could be repainted, recoaled, and overhauled. It would then lay within range of the vast reserves of ammunition established in Spain and the firepower of the Home Squadron. Cervera argued that he could then meet the U.S. fleet, which would be exhausted from the trip across the Atlantic, and destroy it. This strategy was endorsed by every officer under his command, and many in the Home Squadron besides, but was utterly rejected by the Admiralty. Cervera's own misgivings reveal the seriousness of the situation faced:
- It is impossible for me to give you an idea of the surprise and consternation experienced by all on the receipt of the order to sail. Indeed, that surprise is well justified, for nothing can be expected of this expedition except the total destruction of the fleet or its hasty and demoralized return.
On April 30, Cervera set sail from Cape Verde, and panic gripped the U.S. populace, who did now know what his ships might do - attack the largely undefended East Coast while the fleet sailed about in a vain effort to engage him, prey upon American shipping, or perhaps sail up the Potomac and set fire to Washington, D.C..
What followed was a classic game of cat and mouse. Cervera managed to evade the U.S. fleet for several weeks, confounding his American counterparts and managing to re-coal in the process. Meanwhile Villaamil, who was in disagreement with both the Spanish Government's shaky war direction and Cervera's rather passive strategy, advocated trying to offset the superiority of the American forces by scattering the fleet and taking the initiative through quick and dispersed daring actions; and he even volunteered to lead an audacious diversionary attack to New York with his destroyers, but his proposals were not accepted.
Finally, on May 29, after several misadventures, Cristóbal Colón was spotted in the harbor at Santiago de Cuba by a bewildered American squadron. Contact was now inevitable.
[edit] Operational background
With the exception of Commodore George Dewey's squadron in the Pacific, nearly every warship in the U.S. Navy was near or on its way to Cuba. Only a handful of reactivated American Civil War vintage monitors and overworked Coast Guard cutters remained to defend the U.S. coastline.
The primary elements of this deadly force were divided between two men — Rear Admiral William T. Sampson and his Atlantic Squadron, and Commodore Winfield Scott Schley and his so-called "Flying Squadron". All records seem to indicate that the marriage was not a match made in heaven. Sampson's orders were contradictory and somewhat confusing; Schley often took unnecessary risks, something which greatly offended the taciturn Sampson.
On the morning of 29 May, Cervera's squadron was sighted inside the safety of Santiago Bay, Cuba by elements of the Flying Squadron. On the 31st, Schley was joined by Sampson, who took control of the situation and instructed a general blockade.
So long as Cervera remained within Santiago, his fleet was relatively safe. The guns of the city were quite sufficient to make up for deficiencies in his own, and the area was well defended with mines and other obstructions. Nevertheless, Cervera was terribly outmatched. Though his ships were excellent, they were too few, and technical problems discussed above compounded his worries. Worst yet, the inexplicable failure of Cuba's governor to assist with the repairs of the vessels in Cervera's squadron made the situation all the more desperate.
For more than a month, the two fleets faced off, with a few inconclusive skirmishes as the only result. For his part, Cervera was content to wait, hoping for bad weather to scatter the Americans so that he could make a run to a position more favorable for engaging the enemy. As was so often the case during the Spanish-American War, fate intervened. U.S. land forces began to drive on Santiago, and by the end of June, Cervera found himself unable to remain safely in the harbor. He would have to break out immediately if the fleet was to be saved.
The breakout was planned for 09:00 on Sunday, 3 July. This seemed the most logical time — the Americans would be at religious services, and waiting until night would only serve to make the escape that much more treacherous. By noon on Saturday, 2 July, the fleet had a full head of steam, and had fallen into position for the breakout. The Americans sighted the steam, and prepared for battle.
Fate intervened again, this time on Cervera's behalf. About 08:45, just as his ships had slipped their moorings, several ships of Sampson's command, including Sampson and his flagship, left their positions with Schley and opened a gap in the western portion of the American blockade line, leaving a window for Cervera. Better yet, Sampson took with him the armored cruiser USS New York, one of only two ships in the squadron fast enough to catch Cervera if he managed to break through.
At 09:35, the navigator of the armored cruiser USS Brooklyn sighted a plume of smoke coming from the mouth of the port. He anxiously signaled the rest of the fleet:
- The Enemy is coming out!
The Battle of Santiago de Cuba had begun.
[edit] Battle is commenced
Spanish forces began pouring out of the mouth of Santiago Bay about 09:45, travelling in a rough line ahead formation consisting of the flagship, armored cruiser Infanta Maria Teresa, followed by the armored cruisers Vizcaya, Cristobal Colón, and Almirante Oquendo, and finally the Torpedo boat destroyers Furor and Pluton. The four Cruisers immediately cut in a southwest direction, attempting to break into the open sea before the U.S. blockade, momentarily weakened by Sampson's withdrawal, could respond. All were traveling as fast as their boilers would allow, belching black smoke into the sky.
The Americans, for their part, all had to turn to the south, for they had all been facing towards the harbor entrance that morning, The USS Brooklyn headed nearly straight in at first, but when it appeared that she would be surrounded by all four of the spanish Crusiers, and was already the only American ship battling all four ships at the same time, Admiral Schley ordered a retro-grade loop, that pulled him away, and then beside the line of Spanish ships fleeing south west. The Battleship USS Texas was next to the Brooklyn, and the Oregon soon raced past the Indiana, that had an engine problem, and could only do 9 knots at the time. The Iowa, who's forward 13"turret was disabled, from shore bombarding previously focused on the two Torpedo boats fleeing north east. The Brooklyn, Texas and Oregon where the three American ships that pursued and destroyed 3 of the 4 Spanish Cruisers. The formation that morning consisted of the flagship USS Brooklyn ACR_3 1896", followed by the battleships USS Texas, Oregon, Iowa, and Indiana, and the armed yachts Vixen and Gloucester. The flag ship USS New York and Torpedo boat Ericsson where en-route to Siboney to have a meeting with General Shafter, and although all effort was put into getting into action, neither contributed to the destruction of any of the Spanish ships, and was never closer than 5 miles behind in the long pursuit of the Cristobal Colon. Also the Battleship USS Massachusetts, had left that morning to coal.
The battle commenced almost immediately and was a very confused affair. While the Spanish held the initiative in the beginning of the engagement buy running close the to the coast and south west all all haste, two factors slowed their escape. The first was the continuing problem experienced in maintaining proper speed by Vizcaya; the second was the poor quality of coal in the Spanish holds.
The initial object of U.S. firepower was at the Spanish flagship, the cruiser Infanta Maria Teresa; taking a withering punishment. Rather than allowing the rest of his line to be sacrificed, Cervera signaled the fleet to continue to the southwest, and himself attempted to plow into the U.S. line. The maneuver, undoubtedly brave but also assuredly suicidal, the Brooklyns devastating onslaught of f her gun fire resulted in the death of most of Cervera's bridge crew. After sustaining a brutal bombardment, Maria Teresa began to burn furiously, and grounded herself in the shallows along Cuba's coast completly on fire and a wreck.
G
The rest of the Spanish fleet continued to make good on its reteat. Oquendo herself fought bravely, but was driven out of the battle by the sudden explosion in her primary 11-inch turret of a shell stuck in a defective breach-block mechanism. The two small torpedo boat destroyers, Pluton and Furor, made a dash in the opposite direction of the rest of the Spanish squadron, and ran into the small arms desimating fire of the armeded Yacht Gloucester, and with some shelling from the Battleships, USS Iowa, USS Indiana, and The USS Oregon the Vipers of the Spanish squadron were utterly destroyed, and sunk. a Few survivors made it to land from ne of the two ships.
Of particular note was Vizcaya, which fought a running gun duel with Brooklyn for nearly an hour, steaming side by side at about 1,200 yards with the U.S. flagship spueing a withing fire form it's main and secondary guns, that the Spanish where overwelmed by the USS BRooklyn's onslaught with all four of the spainish cruisers. During the encounter with Schley's flagship, The crew of Vizcaya, however, was amazed to see a strange result of their effort. Despite knocking out a secondary gun aboard Brooklyn, almost none of the nearly three hundred shots fired by Vizcaya on her adversary only 25 caused any damage, which was minimal at most. The few that did apparently flew through the galley with little effect. Subsequent claims by Cervera and research by historians have suggested that nearly eighty-five percent of the Spanish ammunition at Santiago was utterly useless. either defective, or simply filled with sawdust as a cost-saving measure. (For another contemporaneous account of loss due to defective ammunition, see the Battle of Yalu River (1894).) Vizcaya continued to fight, and by the end of the engagement had been struck as many as two hundred times by the fire of the Brooklyn. Unfortunately for the Spanish, the U.S. shells themselves had no such issues.
Within a little more than an hour and a quarter, nearly all the ships of the Spanish Caribbean Squadron had been completely destroyed, captured, or forced aground. Only one vessel, the quick new Cristobal Colón, had survived, steaming as fast as she could to the west and freedom. The Cristobol Colon had one serious problem, the new cruiser had been recently purchased from Italy, and for some reasons unknown, her 2 main turret 11" guns where not installed, she sailed with empty turrets, and only 12 6" guns, Speed was her only virtue at this time, and was trying to get up to 20 knots, but could only get about 16, and the Brooklyn, with only two of her four engines coupled, was gaining at 16 plus and the Oregon was catching up at 16 from behind, The escape of Cristobal Colón lasted for nearly 50 miles along the coast, with the USS Brooklyn less than 1 1/2 miles behind and out to sea, while the Battleship, USS Oregon, followed at about the same distance but 1/2 mile away from the coast, the Cristobol Colon, could not double back, or head out to sea, and would be soon cut-off by an east jutting peninsula, sporadic firing from the Brooklyn's main 8" forward guns, and a few shots by the USS Oregon's, massive 13" shells kept the Cristobol Colon hugging by 1/4 of a mile the rocky coastline to the south-west. Admiral Schley aboard the USS Brooklyn, signaled the USS Oregon, and asked if she could put a shot close into her at the extreme range of the 13" guns, The Oregon did so and a shell burst in front of the Colon, which then, suddenly turned to the North-West and ran aground, the crew busted the sea cocks and threw the gun's breech mechanisms overboard and then struck her colors]].
One last, bizarre incident occurred before the battle could truly be considered over. As the U.S. fleet patrolled the carnage, mercifully attempting to rescue Spanish survivors, they fished out a young Spanish officer, half-mad with third-degree burns and covered in oil and blood. The officer, captain of Vizcaya, warmly thanked his rescuers. Shortly thereafter, the Spaniard turned his attention to the burning wreck that was Vizcaya and saluted her.
- Adios, Vizcaya…
At his words, the fires raging onboard Vizcaya reached her magazine, and she exploded, throwing bodies and debris for hundreds of feet into the evening sky.
[edit] Conclusion of the engagement
The battle was the end of any noteworthy Spanish naval presence in the New World. It forced Spain to re-assess her strategy in Cuba, and resulted in an ever-tightening blockade of the island. While fighting continued until August, when a Peace treaty was signed, the great capital ships of Spain now rushed to defend their homeland.
The U.S. fleet, for its part, suffered numerous hits, but very little serious damage. The yacht Vixen was nearly sunk, but casualties on the American side of the affair were remarkably light damage; only one killed, Chief yeoman George H Ellis, and two wounded, Lt Ryan and fireman J burns, all of the USS Brooklyn. Spanish losses where estimated to be about 400 killed, 600 wounded,including Villaamil, who was the highest Spanish officer to lose his life in the battle. The Spaniards in addition lost all six their vessels.
Two of the Spanish vessels, Infanta Maria Teresa and Cristobal Colón, were later re floated and captured by the United States. They foundered in a storm early in the twentieth century, and played no further role. A third Spanish vessel, abandoned in Santiago Bay due to engine troubles, was the unprotected cruiser Reina Mercedes, captured by the U.S. and used as a training vessel until the 1950s as the USS Reina Mercedes.
[edit] External links
- http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Agora/8088/SantiagoB.html
- http://www.spanamwar.com/index.htm
- http://www.homeofheroes.com/wallofhonor/spanish_am/12_santiago.html
[edit] References
- Most of the details were taken with the permission of the author from A Dirty Little War by A. Bagosy. Works by Nofi, Mahan, and Cervera were also referenced.
