Talk:Canadian Units of the War of 1812

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[edit] Militia in the War of 1812

The conclusion stated here is simply overstated. The defence of Canada relied upon the British, who led the strategic, operational and tactical levels of the war. The blockade was a British affair and most of the sailors on inland waters British as well. The regular Canadian units had a high percentage of British officers and NCOs leading them and while the "militia" was present at many actions, it was not responsible for all the key victories. Certainly in the spring of 1813, the British beat orders for a number of provincial and emobodied units to be raised, these did not outnumber the British, who had by the end of the year, over 13,000 troops in British North America. Embodied and provincial units were called out for the remainder of the war, while most units were only called out for limited periods. Not everyone could serve as that would affect the planting and harvest season, and thus the foodstuffs available to the British. The entire militia was never called out and for most units, they were only out for brief periods, less of course the embodied and provincial units called up for the period of the war. By 1814, there were over 30,000 British regulars in the BNA and another 18,000 off or in the US, and they were the backbone of the defence.

By and large, unless they were called out for long periods and given proper training, there was no means for Canadians to develop the necessary skill and expertise to fight in the open. The sedentary militia was only called out above company level once a year and if lucky, the companies might be out a maximum of six times. That is no way to develop any skill at all. There was no professionalism to speak of and that made most units more dangerous in the open than of any use. Report after report speak of COs using unit funds to buy colours rather maintain arms.

Canadians were present at many actions and in some played important roles. The victory at the Chateauguay is often described as a key Canadian victory, but Salaberry had served in the British army since 1796 and was more of a regular than a Canadian militiaman, while his victory is overstated. There were so many divisions in the American camp, that their defeat was almost certain.

The references to actions here generally involved small numbers and in some cases were not key engagements. The American and Canadian militia, and civilians regularly engaged each other along their respective frontiers, and in the case of the Upper St Lawrence, there were some 14 minor skirmishes that really decided nothing. The key engagement was the attack on Ogdensburg in Feburary 1813, which chased the last American regulars off the frontier and ensured the British line of communication along the St Lawrence.

The problem with this topic is the sorry state of the literature. Much of it speaks to nationalistic aspirations in the 1850s and after rather than relying on evidence. Generalisms are not supported by the documentation, nor is nationalistic sentiment. How does one define "British" in 1812 for example? While there is some literature coming out that is much more objective, we still have a far way to go. Thank-you.