Consequentialism

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Consequentialism refers to those moral theories that hold that the consequences of a particular action form the basis for any valid moral judgment about that action. Thus, on a consequentialist account, a morally right action is an action which produces good consequences. Perhaps the most famous statement of a form of consequentialism comes from Nicolo Machiavelli, "the ends always justify the means", though consequentialism is not necessarily committed to this view. More precisely, while on a consequentialist account, the ends provide the justification for the means, not all ends can serve as a valid justification for the means.

Consequentialism is usually understood as distinct from both deontology, which derives the rightness or wrongness of an act from the nature of the act itself and virtue ethics, which focuses on the character of the agent rather than on the nature or consequences of the action itself. The difference between these three approaches to morality tends to lie more in the way moral dilemmas are approached than in the moral conclusions reached. For example, a consequentialist may argue that lying is wrong because of the negative consequences produced by lying — though a consequentialist may allow that certain foreseeable consequences might make lying acceptable. A deontologist might argue that lying is always wrong, regardless of any potential "good" that might come from lying. A virtue ethicist, however, would focus less on lying in any particular instance and instead consider what a decision to tell a lie or not tell a lie said about one's character.

Contents 1 Defining consequentialism 1.1 What kinds of consequences 1.2 Consequences for whom 1.2.1 Agent-focused or agent-neutral 1.2.2 Human-centered? 1.3 Action guidance 1.3.1 The ideal observer 1.3.2 The real observer 2 Varieties of consequentialism 2.1 Utilitarianism 2.2 Ethical egoism 2.3 Rule consequentialism 2.4 Negative consequentialism 3 Consequentialism and other moral theories 3.1 Deontology 3.2 Virtue ethics 4 Criticisms of consequentialism 4.1 General criticisms 4.2 Character-based criticisms 5 Bibliography 6 Notable consequentialists 7 Further reading 8 External links

[edit] Defining consequentialism

The term "consequentialism" was coined by G.E.M. Anscombe in her essay "Modern Moral Philosophy" in 1958.^[1] It has since become common throughout English-language moral theory. The consequentialism that Anscombe identifies is associated with utilitarian moral theories, such as John Stuart Mill's. Because of this historical tie to utilitarianism, the two terms are sometimes conflated. However, in general, utilitarianism is a particular species of consequentialism.

As was said above, the defining feature of consequentialist moral theories is the normative weight given to the consequences in evaluating the rightness and wrongness of actions. Apart from this basic outline, there is little else that can be unequivocally said about consequentialism as such. However, there are some questions that most consequentialist theories address:

• What sort of consequences count as good consequences?
• Who is the primary beneficiary of moral action?
• How are the consequences judged and who judges them?

[edit] What kinds of consequences

One way to divide various consequentialisms is by the types of consequences that are taken to matter most, that is, which consequences count as good states of affairs. According to hedonistic utilitarianism, a good action is one that results in an increase in pleasure, and the best action is one that results the most pleasure possible. Closely related is eudaimonic consequentialism, according to which a full, flourishing life, which may or may not be the same as enjoying a great deal of pleasure, is the ultimate aim. Similarly, one might adopt an aesthetic consequentialism, in which the ultimate aim is to produce beauty. However, one might fix on non-psychological goods as the relevant effect. Thus, one might pursue an increase in material equality or political liberty instead of something like the more ephemeral "pleasure". Other theories adopt a package of several goods, all to be promoted equally. Since there would be no overarching consequence to aim for, conflicts between goods are to be adjudicated by the fine contextual discernment and intuition of the agent. Even in a consequentialist system that focuses on a single good, though, conflicts and tensions between different good states of affairs are to be expected. One might even take the course advocated by G.E. Moore and argue that "the good" is unanalyzable, and thus argue that good states of affairs do not necessarily share any other property than "goodness" itself ^[2].

[edit] Consequences for whom

Moral action always has an effect on certain people or things, the consequences. Various kinds of consequentialism can be differentiated by beneficiary of the good consequences. That is, one might ask "Consequences for whom?"

[edit] Agent-focused or agent-neutral

A fundamental distinction along these lines is between theories that demand that agents act for ends in which they have some personal interest or motivation to pursue and theories that demand that agents act for ends perhaps disconnected from their own interests and drives. These are called "agent-focused" and "agent-neutral" theories respectively. Agent-neutral consequentialism ignores the specific value a state of affairs has for any particular agent. Thus, in an agent-neutral theory, my own personal goals do not count any more than anyone else's goals in evaluating what action I should take. Agent-focused consequentialism, on the other hand, focuses on the particular needs of the moral agent. Thus, in an agent-focused account, such as one that Peter Railton outlines, I might be concerned with the general welfare, but I am more concerned with the immediate welfare of myself and my friends and family^[3]. These two approaches could be reconciled by acknowledging the tension between an agent's interests as an individual and as a member of various groups, and seeking to somehow optimize among all of these interests. For example, it may be meaningful to speak of an action as being good for someone as an individual but bad for them as a citizen of their town.

[edit] Human-centered?

Many consequentialist theories may seem primarily concerned with human beings and their relationships with other human beings. However, some philosophers argue that we should not limit our ethical consideration to the interests of human beings alone. Jeremy Bentham, who is regarded as the founder of Utilitarianism, regarded non-human animals as a serious object of moral concern, arguing that they can experience pleasure and pain, and thus, the consequences a certain course of action would have on them was directly relevant^[4]. More recently, Peter Singer has argued that it is unreasonable that we do not give equal consideration to the interests of animals as to those of human beings when we choose the way we are to treat them^[5]. Such equal consideration does not necessarily imply identical treatment of humans and non-humans, no more than it necessarily implies identical treatment of all humans.

[edit] Action guidance

One important characteristic of many normative moral theories such as consequentialism is the ability to produce practical moral judgements. At the very least, any moral theory needs to define the standpoint from which the goodness of the consequences are to be determined. What is primarily at stake here is the responsibility of the agent.

[edit] The ideal observer

One common tactic among consequentialists, particularly those committed to an altruistic (selfless) account of consequentialism, is employ an ideal, neutral observer from which moral judgements can be made. John Rawls, a critic of utilitarianism, argues that utilitarianism, in common with other forms of consequentialism, relies on the perspective of such an ideal observer^[3]. The particular characteristics of this ideal observer can vary from an omniscient observer, who would grasp all the consequences of any action, to an ideally informed observer, who knows as much as could reasonably be expected, but not necessarily all the circumstances or all the possible consequences. Consequentialist theories that adopt this paradigm hold that right action is the action that will bring about the best consequences from this ideal observer's perspective.

[edit] The real observer

Of course, in practice, it seems very difficult to always adopt the point of view of an ideal observer. An individual moral agent, after all, only knows a certain number of things about the situation they are in, and thus the possible consequences of a particular course of action. Thus, some theorists have argued that consequentialist theories can only require an agent to choose the best action in line with what they know about the situation. However, naïvely adopted, this concept could lead to undesirable results, if the moral agent does not go out of the way to inform themselves about the situation. Acting in a situation without first informing oneself of the circumstances of the situation can lead to even the most well-intended actions yielding miserable consequences. As a result, certain theorists have argued that there is a moral imperative for an agent to inform themselves as much as possible about a situation before judging the appropriate course of action. This imperative, of course, is derived from consequential thinking: a better informed agent is able to bring about better consequences.

[edit] Varieties of consequentialism

Consequentialism comes in many forms. However, there are certain consequentialist theories that serve as paradigms of consequentialism.

[edit] Utilitarianism

Main article: Utilitarianism

Hedonistic Utilitarianism is, historically, the paradigmatic example of a consequentialist moral theory. It holds that right action produces the most happiness for all agents. "Happiness" on this account is defined as the maximization of pleasure and the minimization of pain. This form of utilitarianism holds that what matters is the aggregate happiness; the happiness of everyone and not the happiness of any particular person. John Stuart Mill, in his exposition of hedonistic utilitarianism, proposed a hierarchy of pleasures, meaning that the pursuit of certain kinds of pleasure is more highly valued than the pursuit of other pleasures.^[6] However, some contemporary utilitarians, such as Peter Singer are concerned to maximize the satisfaction of preferences, hence "preference utilitarianism". Other contemporary forms of utilitarianism mirror the forms of consequentialism outlined below.

[edit] Ethical egoism

Main article: Ethical egoism

Ethical egoism can be understood as a consequentialist theory according to which the consequences for the individual agent are taken to matter more than any other result. Thus, egoism may license actions which are good for the agent, but it is generally seen as detrimental to general welfare. Some like Henry Sidgwick, however, argue that a certain degree of egoism promotes general welfare for two reasons: because individuals know how to please themselves best, and because if everyone were an austere altruist then general welfare would inevitably decrease.^[7]

[edit] Rule consequentialism

In general, consequentialist theories focus on actions, however, this need not be the case. Rule consequentialism is a theory that is sometimes seen as an attempt to reconcile deontology and consequentialism. Like deontology, rule consequentialism holds that moral behavior involves following certain rules. However, rule consequentialism chooses rules based on the consequences that the selection of those rules have.

Various theorists are split as to whether the rules are the only determinant of moral behavior or not. For example, Robert Nozick holds that a certain set of minimal rules, which he calls "side-constraints", are necessary to ensure appropriate actions.^[3] There are also differences as to how absolute these moral rules are. Thus, while Nozick's side-constraints are absolute restrictions on behavior, Amartya Sen proposes a theory which recognizes the importance of certain rules, but these rules are not absolute.^[3] That is, they may be violated if strict adherence to the rule would lead to much more undesirable consequences.

[edit] Negative consequentialism

Most consequentialist theories focus on promoting some sort of good consequences. However, one could equally well lay out a consequentialist theory that focuses solely on minimizing bad consequences. Of course, the maximization of good consequences could also involve the minimization of bad consequences, but the promotion of good consequences is usually of primary import.

One major difference between these two approaches is the agent's responsibility. Positive consequentialism demands that we bring about good states of affairs, whereas negative consequentialism may only require that we avoid bad ones. A more strenuous version of negative consequentialism may actually require active intervention, but only to prevent harm from being done.

[edit] Consequentialism and other moral theories

[edit] Deontology

Consequentialism is often contrasted with deontological moral theories. Deontological theories hold that we have a duty to perform or refrain from certain types of actions and that this duty derives from the nature of the act itself, rather than from the consequences produced by the action. Consequently, a deontologist might argue that we should stick to our duty regardless of the consequences. For example, Kant famously argued that we had a moral duty to always tell the truth, even to a murderer who asks where the would-be victim is.

However, consequentialist and deontological theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, T.M. Scanlon advances the idea that human rights, which are commonly considered a "deontological" concept, can only be justified with reference to the consequences of having those rights^[3]. Similarly, Robert Nozick argues for a theory that is mostly consequentialist, but incorporates inviolable "side-constraints" which restrict the sort of actions agents are permitted to do^[3].

[edit] Virtue ethics

Consequentialism can also be contrasted with aretaic moral theories such as virtue ethics. Whereas consequentialist theories posit that consequences of action should be the primary focus of our thinking about ethics, virtue ethics insists that it is the character rather than the consequences of actions that should be the focal point. Some virtue ethicists hold that consequentialist theories totally disregard the development and importance of moral character. For example, Phillipa Foot argues that consequences in themselves have no ethical content, unless it has been provided by a virtue such as benevolence^[3].

However, consequentialism and virtue ethics need not be understood to be entirely antagonistic. Consequentialist theories can consider character in several ways. For example, the effects on the character of the agent or any other people involved in an action may be regarded as a relevant consequence. Similarly, a consequentialist theory may aim at the maximization of a particular virtue or set of virtues. Finally, following Foot's lead, one might adopt a sort of consequentialism which argues that virtuous activity ultimately produces the best consequences.

[edit] Criticisms of consequentialism

[edit] General criticisms

William Gass argues that moral theories such as consequentialism are unable to adequately explain why a morally wrong action is morally wrong. Gass uses the example of an "obliging stranger" who agrees to be baked in an oven. Gass claims that the rationale that any moral theory might attempt to give for this wrongness, e.g. it does not bring about good results, is simply absurd. According to Gass, it is wrong to bake a stranger, however obliging, and nothing more can or need be said about it^[8].

G. E. M. Anscombe, whose previously mentioned paper coined the term "consequentialism"^[1], objects to consequentialism on the grounds that it does not provide guidance in what one ought to do, since the rightness or wrongness of an action is determined based on the consequences it produces. Futhermore, she argues that consequentialism since Henry Sidgwick denies that there is any distinction between consequences that are foreseen and those that are intended (see Principle of double effect). Finally, Anscombe obejcts to the very character of consequentialism itself insofar as it is concerned with determining the rightness and wrongness of actions. She argues that the distinction between right action and wrong action only makes sense within the framework of Judeo-Christian divine law—and, according to Anscombe, Judeo-Christian divine law is incompatible with consequentialism.

[edit] Character-based criticisms

Bernard Williams has argued that consequentialism is alienating because it requires moral agents to put too much distance between themselves and their own projects and commitments. Williams argues that consequentialism requires moral agents to take a strictly impersonal view of all actions, since it is only the consequences, and not who produces them, that is said to matter. Williams argues that this demands too much of moral agents — since (he claims) consequentialism demands that they be willing to sacrifice any and all personal projects and commitments in any given circumstance in order to pursue the most beneficent course of action possible. He argues further that consequentialism fails to make sense of intuitions that it can matter whether or not someone is personally the author of a particular consequence. For example, that having "dirty hands" by participating in a crime can matter, even if the crime would have been committed anyway, or would even have been worse, without the agent's participation.

Some consequentialists — most notably Peter Railton — have attempted to develop a form of consequentialism that acknowledges and avoids the objections raised by Williams. Railton argues that Williams's criticisms can be avoided by adopting a form of consequentialism in which moral decisions are to be determined by the sort of life that they express. On his account, the agent should choose the sort of life that will, on the whole, produce the best overall effects^[3].

However, more recently, there have been attacks upon consequentialism in a similar vein. For example, Thomas Nagel holds that consequentialism fails to appropriately take into account the people affected by a particular action. He argues that a consequentialist cannot really criticize human rights abuses in a war, for example, if they ultimately result in a better state of affairs^[3].

[edit] Bibliography

1. ^ ^{a b} Anscombe, G. E. M.. "Modern Moral Philosophy". Philosophy 33: 1-19. 
2. ^ Moore, G. E. (1903). Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-44848-2. 
3. ^ ^{a b c d e f g h i} Scheffler, Samuel (Ed.) (1988). Consequentialism and Its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-875073-4. 
4. ^ Bentham, Jeremy (1996). An Introduction to the Principles of Moral Legislation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-820516-6. 
5. ^ Singer, Peter (2002). in Helga Kuhse, ed.: Unsanctifying Human Life. Oxford: Blackwell. ISBN 978-0-631-22507-2. 
6. ^ Mill, John Stuart (1998). Utilitarianism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-875163-2. 
7. ^ Sidgwick, Henry (1907). The Method of Ethics. NY: Dover (1981). ISBN 0915145286. 
8. ^ Gass, William H.. "The Case of the Obliging Stranger". The Philosophical Review 66: 193-204. 

[edit] Notable consequentialists

• Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832)
• William Godwin (1756-1836)
• John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)
• Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900)
• G.E. Moore (1873-1958)
• Richard B. Brandt (1910-1997)
• R.M. Hare (1919-2002)
• John Harsanyi (1920-2000)
• J. J. C. Smart (born 1920)
• Amartya Sen (born 1933)
• R. M. Adams (born 1937)
• Philip Pettit (born 1945)
• Peter Singer (born 1946)
• David Brink
• Julia Driver
• Shelly Kagan
• David Lyons
• Peter Railton
• Samuel Scheffler

[edit] Further reading

• Darwall, Stephen (Ed.) (2002). Consequentialism. Oxford: Blackwell. ISBN 978-0-631-23108-0. 
• Honderich, Ted (2003). "Consequentialism, Moralities of Concern and Selfishness".
• Scheffler, Samuel (1994). The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-823511-8. 

[edit] External links

• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
  • Consequentialism
  • Rule Consequentialism
• Utiliarianism Resources
• "Utilitarianism as Secondary Ethic" An overview of utilitarianism with summary of its critiques.