Duvdevan Unit

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Sayeret Duvdevan is the elite, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) special forces (SF) undercover unit designed to operate in the Territories. Unlike other undercover-skilled units belonging to Israeli intelligence gathering organizations, Sayeret Duvdevan wasn't designed for long term undercover infiltration, but rather for quick surprise, hit-and-run raids intended to apprehend or eliminate individuals of interest. This unit's nature derives from being a counter terror (CT) oriented unit rather than an intelligence gathering one. Moreover, the rather basic Arab speaking linguistic skills of the unit's operators, as well as the European origin of many operators don't allow the execution of such long term undercover missions without exposure. Sayeret Duvdevan is also unique in the sense that it's one of handful units, which are pure CT units, rather than a hard-core long range reconnaissance patrol units with advanced CT capability like most other IDF SF units.

Contents 1 History 2 Training 3 Deployment 4 Reorganization

[edit] History

In 1987 the Intifada - the Palestine uprising against the Israeli regime in the Territories - broke out. The Intifada was much different from the previous Palestinian resistance in 1970-1971. This time the IDF faced thousands of heavily armed terrorists that enjoyed the full support of the local Palestinians. On the other hand, after years of occupation, Israel's media status wasn't good so deploying full-scale military force was impossible, especially when the Israeli society was struggling within itself on the Intifada legitimacy.

At first the IDF decided to use traditional SF tactics, which turn out to be a complete failure. In day-time when the Israeli units tried to perform an operation they soon found themselves in the middle of a violent civilian riot, which they weren't equipped nor trained to handle. The target was, of course, long gone. In night-time the situation wasn't much different. The incoming soldiers could be identified from miles away by their unique weapons and uniforms. When they finally arrived they usually found an empty house. The need for a Mistaravim like unit, that could perform fast and effective SF missions deep in the Territories, rose up again. Unlike in the 1940s when the Mistaravim were used more as an intelligence gathering tool and to covertly move weapons and equipment around, the new Mistaravim units were built as pure CT units. When the Mistaravim units were recreated in the late 80's, the experience from the Palmach Mistaravim teams was put into use. The IDF was the first to create Mistaravim units, and formed two units each operating in a different Area of Operations (AO):

Sayeret Shimshon, which operated in the Gaza Strip AO. Sayeret Duvdevan, which operates in the Judah and Samaria AO. Although the two IDF Mistaravim units were sister like units and almost completely identical, they were divided into two separate units since each region has its own unique families, manners and customs with whom the soldiers must be fully familiar with. Like in most other cases, in which a new IDF SF unit was born, each Mistaravim unit was made of one integral, active duty, team from one of the infantry Sayerets as well as dropouts from the IDF elite units. Since the IDF needed these units combat operational as soon as possible and also had to give them a formidable CT capability due to their very delicate operations in the middle of civilian population, many of the first units' officers were former officers of Shayetet 13 and under these officers' guidance and with generous resources, the Mistaravim were operationally ready in less than one year, and acquired a fearsome CT capability.

The existence of Mistaravim units was made publicly known in 1992 in a very detailed television special. The program lead many IDF SF operatives to the belief that the IDF High Command, many of whom being former members of elite units, authorized this TV special in order to present the Mistaravim as just "regular" SF rather than "elite" SF units like their former units were.

In 1994, due to the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks held in Oslo, Norway, the Gaza Strip became an official Palestinian Territory, in which the Israeli forces weren't allowed to enter and operate. As a result, the Sayeret Shimshon was disbanded, many of its members forming the new Sayeret Egoz. Sayeret Duvdevan remained active in the other Territory, and is currently the primary IDF CT unit there.

[edit] Training

Unlike most other IDF SF units that have a 20 months training period, Sayeret Duvdevan only has 15 months. The reason for this gap is that there is no need to train the soldiers for months and months in long range reconnaissance patrol and in open field navigation. Instead, Sayeret Duvdevan does open field navigation exercises only for a month, while most of their navigation exercises are dedicated to real-time photos navigation. These photos taken by satellites or airplanes, allow Sayeret Duvdevan to plan its approach to the raid area as well as its gateway routes once the operation is completed. Training phases:

• Four months basic infantry training in the Mitkan Adam Army Base - the IDF Special Training Center.
• Two and a half months of advanced infantry training in the same base.
• Two months unit's basic training, which focus on advance urban navigation exercises and the beginning of CT training.
• Five weeks CT course in IDF Counter Terror Warfare School in Mitkan Adam.
• One month advanced inner-unit CT training with the unit's own instructors.
• Four months Mistaravim course, which covers everything from learning the Arabs' traditions, language and their way of thought to civilian camouflage (hair dying, contact lenses, Arabs' clothing).
• One-month courses - sniper, driving and different instructors courses.
• The rest of the time is devoted to advanced urban combat techniques.

Because of the daily contact with civilians, the unit places special focus on Krav Maga - the IDF famous Martial Art technique. The mastering of this subject allows Sayeret Duvdevan to minimize the use of live fire on standby civilians who get involved.

[edit] Deployment

Over the years, the success of the IDF two Mistaravim units was amazing. The units conducted thousands of operations and killed or capture hundreds of terrorists. Since most of the wanted were killed rather than captured alive, the Mistaravim gained reputation as assassination units. This reputation is only partly true. Most of the terrorists were fanatic, deeply religious people who preferred fighting to the death and becoming martyrs than surrendering themselves to the Israeli forces. On the other hand, the Mistaravim did had light trigger-finger, specially compared to other SF units. In 1989-1994, the hot years of the Intifada, almost not a single day went by without one of the units or both of them performing an operation. This incredible, almost wartime rate of missions lead to the fact that the Mistaravim were then the units with the highest number of combat missions in the entire IDF. This amazing missions' rate had its price. Many of the Mistaravim graduates finished their three years IDF mandatory service with psychological and physical damage. Broken ribs, smashed noses, head concussions and other injuries had become almost a daily routine in the units' Krav Maga training. Moreover, many of the units' COs were either court-martialed or had to leave their command due to excessive, unnecessary force against Palestinian civilians. Many of the unit's graduates, not finding their place in low adrenaline civilian life, volunteered for YAMAM - the Israeli domestic CT and hostage rescue unit.

The Mistaravim units were very unorganized units. At some point, enjoying the huge IDF credit, the Mistaravim even began to plan and execute their own missions, sometimes without asking for authorization, or even notifying anybody else. These kind of free enterprises lead, in some cases, to unintentional live fire combats between the Mistaravim teams and other Israeli SF units on missions in the same AO.

Beside of the actual killing and capturing of the terrorists, the Mistaravim also had a tremendous psychological effect on the terrorists. The Mistaravim often operated in broad daylight in heavy populated places, killing or snatching the terrorists into cars, making no place secure. In some cases the units also acted as a backup unit for other forces, primarily for YAMAM.

In 1992-1993, when the Palestinian police and the Palestinian internal Security Service started working in the Territories in large scale, the Mistaravim operations became even more confusing to the local Palestinians. In many cases when the Mistaravim performed an operation to capture a terrorist, the locals thought the soldiers in disguise were actually Palestinian security personnel apprehending Israeli collaborators or Israeli spies, and even started cheering at the Mistaravim soldiers. The fact that Palestinian security personnel often used western weapons and not the traditional (Palestinian/Arab issued) AK-47, also helped to this identity mistake.

Until today, four members of Sayeret Duvdevan were killed in two separated friendly fire incidents. One operator was killed in 1992, and three others were killed in August 2000, in a failed operation to capture the number one terrorist in the Territories - Machmoud Abu Hanud.

Today, due to the escalation in the LIC in the Territories, Sayeret Duvdevan is the IDF busiest SF unit, and conducts more then 200 operations per year. Some operations are in uniforms, others are in plain clothes. Sometimes several teams from the unit operate simultaneously in different areas.

[edit] Reorganization

After the fiasco in August 2000, in which three of the unit's operators were killed by fellow unit snipers, the IDF conducted long due work on the status of the unit and how to upgrade it. The recommendations, which were implemented in 2001, were as follows:

The unit's training regime will be longer - 15 months instead 13 months as before. Over the years this relatively short training regime of Sayeret Duvdevan has been largely criticized as insufficient, especially due to the unit's very complex and intense combat deployment. The length of the unit training regime designed to produce better trained soldiers, especially since later on they will hardly had time to train in an orderly fashion.

The unit will form a new inner-unit Undercover School with permanent staff instead of each team training its own members.

The unit will place greater focus on urban CT sniping.

The selection to the unit will be much more carefully. Today, in order to be accepted to the unit one must first undergone two selections series (Gibush): a T'zanhanim (paratroopers) infantry brigade Gibush held before the soldier's recruitment to the IDF. In this Gibush, Sayeret Duvdevan will have priority over the T'zanhanim infantry brigade in getting the best manpower. Duvdevan (Hebrew: דובדבן. Literally - cherry, or a cherry tree) is a Special Forces unit within the Israeli Defense Forces created in the mid-1980’s. Duvdevan are particularly noted for conducting undercover operations against Palestinian militants in urban areas within the West Bank. During these operations Duvdevan soldiers typically drive modified civilian vehicles and wear Arab civilian clothes as a disguise.

Recruitment to Duvdevan is highly desirable among pre-recruit youths in Israel. As is common with other Israeli elite units, the selection process is arduous, an average of 99 out of 100 applicants fail the selection process. Any soldier who has had a family member hurt or killed in a militant attack is automatically disqualified.

Training involves the use of disguise and the ability to pass for short periods of time as Palestinians, in both dress, mannerisms and speaking Arabic. It is practiced in a mock Palestinian village constructed of plywood. Some members have been known to dress as women to get close to their targets, a tactic once used by former Israeli PM Ehud Barak during his service in Sayaret Matkal, another Israeli special forces unit, in a raid on Beirut. Barak authorised the creation of Duvdevan in 1987, when he was commander of the IDF central command.

Although extremely successful, Duvdevan operations sometimes result in ambushes and gunbattles rather than arrests. According to one Israeli human rights organisation, B'Tselem, at least 160 Palestinians have died in undercover operations such as those run by Duvdevan. There have also been errors resulting in friendly fire deaths. One of the first and most notorious friendly-fire incidents occurred on July 10, 1992, in the village of Barta’a in the West Bank. A Duvdevan team, attempting to capture a Hamas squad meeting in a local mosque, accidentally killed one of its own, 19-year-old Sgt. Eli Isha, when he was mistaken for an armed Arab teenager. The commander of the operation was court-martialed after the incident in a closed-door proceeding, and was stripped of his command. Other unit officers were disciplined as well.

But perhaps the worst friendly fire incident occurred on the night of August 27, 2000, when three Duvdevan soldiers made a fatal mistake in Asira A-Shamaliyya, near Nablus/Shechem. The Duvdevan undercover squad had operated in the village for weeks in the hope of capturing Mahmoud Abu Hanoud, a 28-year-old Hamas commander wanted for helping to plan a series of suicide bombings in Jerusalem. Residents in the area sensed something unusual was going on, and informed Hanoud, who went onto his roof and opened fire on approaching Dunvedan soldiers. Three of them, dressed as locals, departed from their plan, gained access to a nearby building, climbed to the roof and opened fire in return. They were misidentified as Hamas men by Duvdedan snipers and shot dead by their own side.

Although the idea of undercover units remains unpalatable in some quarters of Israeli society, their use is seen as more precise and proportionate than targeting Hamas leaders with laser guided bombs or anti-tank missiles, causing less harm to the surrounding population, to say nothing of the intelligence information that comes from live prisoners as opposed to those subjected to targeted killings.