Talk:Eliminative materialism

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Bryan and Adam, Since Fred allowed me to have a link to Occam's Sword at Wikinfo for the Occam's Razor entry, I thought it would also be alright to have one here. If its not ok with either of you let me know. Phil 14:36 Jun 25, 2004

Contents 1 Odd expression - "objectors's premise" 2 Inaccuracies 3 Recent edits NPOV? 4 Expanded 5 Self contradicting statement 6 Bickle: PsychoNeural Reduction 7 New EM Image Proposal 8 Propositional attitudes 9 GA Re-Review and In-line citations 10 It's about time!! 11 Question

[edit] Odd expression - "objectors's premise"

Hey guys, While I'm not a native speaker of English, the last sentence seems to be convoluted:

"Furthermore, the eliminativist's claim that folk psychology cannot explain phenomena such as mental disorders or many memory processes has become often the objectors's premise, namely that it is not at all the task of folk-psychology to account for these phenomena."

I couldn't find any mention of what is "objectors's premise" (nor "objector's" or "objectors'"). It should be changed to at least a grammatically correct version, however since I'm not sure which version is proper I can't change it. --olya 04:57, 2 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Inaccuracies

To the hanged man: I noticed you made some changes to my last edit here. I'm wondering what you found inaccurate about what I said. Could you please explain? Alienus 06:37, 8 December 2005 (UTC)

Two major inaccuracies: First, the claim that "eliminative materialists and their allies argue that qualia don't exist." This isn't true. For example, Paul Churchland fully admits that there are qualia, he just denies the arguments that they can't be identified with physical states. Second, it doesn't seem to me that the old gloss on Dennett was entirely accurate. At least, it makes some very broad claims about a subtle view. Does he deny that beliefs exist? Well, on the intentional stance, there is a sense in which he doesn't, though they certainly don't have the kind of ontological status that has traditionally been ascribed to them. --The Hanged Man 20:30, 3 January 2006 (UTC)

I think this is definitely a matter of trying to fit subtle views into broad categories. If I remember correctly, Churchland's view of qualia does not feature the elements that make it incompatible with materialism. In contrast, Dennett rejects qualia outright because his definition does include these features. As for beliefs, Dennett is a realist, but not as hard as some. He would say that beliefs are as real as center of gravity, which brings up the issue of just how real that is.

Ok, I didn't keep the line about denying qualia, since it's a fine point depending on the definition. I put back a little to distinguish Dennett's view, though. Alienus 21:34, 3 January 2006 (UTC)

As of today, this 'eliminative materialism' article still suggests that Paul and Patricia Churchland deny the existence of "consciousness and phenomenological qualia." Could the author(s) of this article please change this? As The Hanged Man has pointed out, this is false. For references, see Churchland, P. M. 1985. "On the speculative nature of our self-conception"; as well as various chapters discussing consciousness and qualia found in Paul Churchland's books, "A Neurocomputational Perspective" (1989) and "The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul" (1995). The eliminativism espoused by the Churchlands is largely about belief-desire folk psychology; they take a more reductionist (not eliminativist) stance with respect to consciousness and phenomenological qualia.

I second this request (indeed, perhaps I'll just make the edit myself). As a PhD student at UCSD, I specifcially discussed these issues with Pat and Paul and this is one area where they specifically see their version of EM differing from that of Dennett. Roughly, you could say that the Churchlands are reductive materialists about qualia, but eliminative materialists about propositional attitudes, while Dennett is an eliminative materialist about qualia, and a reductive materialist about propositional attitudes. Edhubbard 14:07, 8 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Recent edits NPOV?

Recent edits seem to stray a little from a NPOV... e.g. "In the end, Eliminative Materialists must acknowledge that their theory is self-defeating, or simply cease to engage in dialogues with their opponents."

Perhaps someone with a little more knowledge of the area can address the issues here.

- Vaughan 22:03, 9 January 2006 (UTC)

It looks as if someone has pasted their Philosophy of mind 101 essay into the article. Yes, I agree, it is POV. It is also poorly formatted and needs wikifying and references. Banno 22:23, 9 January 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Expanded

I expanded the article, but we still need a better "Arguments for eliminativism" section, further explaining the theory-theory. --Kripkenstein 12:42, 14 February 2006 (UTC)

Expanded arguments for, but not the "theory" theory. --Lacatosias 13:57, 14 February 2006 (UTC) {{}}

[edit] Self contradicting statement

"Eliminativists believe that no coherent neural basis will be found for many everyday psychological concepts such as belief or desire and that behaviour and experience can only be adequately explained on the biological level."

In case you didn't notice, neurons are on the biological level. Either the first half of the sentece is right, or the second half is, but not both.

You're missing the point of the sentence. The first part refers to the the fact that EM proponents argue that belief and desire cannot be explained on the biological level as they are incoherent (and hence, there is no coherent neural basis for them), the second part to the fact that all experience and behaviour should only be explained in terms of biology.

- Vaughan 07:08, 17 May 2006 (UTC)

Perhaps, since some people are having difficulty with the sentence, it could be rewritten to be more clear. How about, "Eliminativists believe that no coherent neural basis will be found for many everyday psychological concepts such as belief or desire, since they are poorly defined. Rather, they argue that psychological concepts of behaviour and experience should be judged by how well they reduce to the biological level." Edhubbard 14:10, 8 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Bickle: PsychoNeural Reduction

Is anyone familiar with Bickle's (1998) ideas about "smooth" versus "bumpy" reductions? In his book, Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave, Bickle lays out a framework in which reductions are the main framework, and the question is just how much the two frameworks need to be modified so that they fit together. So, in the case of reductive materialism, he would suggest a fairly smooth reduction, while in the case of eliminative materialism, a fairly bumpy reduction. The bumpier the reduction, the more theory change required, and the more likely that one of the two frameworks is likely to be eliminated (the extreme case of a bumpy reduction). Paul Churchland finds this framework quite useful, and has used Bickle's book as the starting point for one of his grad philosophy classes. Perhaps some mention of that would be useful here? Edhubbard 14:15, 8 August 2006 (UTC)

Interesting. I haven't Bickle's book, but I have read some of his articles. It seems more appropriate to add to an article specifically on reductionism or perhaps physicalism. You might even write it up as part of an article on John Bickle, seeing as we don't have one yet!! But, if you feel you can work it in here somehow, try to simplify/syntheize it and make into some kind of argument for or against EM. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 18:09, 8 August 2006 (UTC)

Yeah, I think you might be right, in that Bickle's book isn't really an argument *for* or *against* EM, but really more of a metaphilosophical excersise, giving a framework to make sense of where EM falls on the spectrum of possible reductions. I'll have to go back and think a bit about how it might be added. Edhubbard 18:18, 8 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] New EM Image Proposal

Hi, I've created a new image for the EM framework. Essentially, I've added some shading to the Folk Psychology box to illustrate two things 1) Different EM theorists make different bets about which bits of FP will be eliminated and which will be reduced (see my additions re: Dennet v. the Churchlands), and this new version illustrates that range of positions and 2) My reading of Dennett and the Churchlands suggests that they do not believe that neuroscience will completely eliminate all higher level theories, of vocabularies. Therefore, there must be some higher order vocabulary, even if it is radically different from the vocabulary of FP that we currently employ. If people think that this image and this discussion could improve the article, I will be happy to change the main page. If not, no worries, it only took a few minutes to add the gradient. Edhubbard 21:56, 11 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Propositional attitudes

I have re-added in the term "propositional attitudes" in reference to the Churchlands' views. since there is a subtle distinction to be made here. In general, there are different ways to concieve of the Intentionality relationship between our mental contents and the objects in the world. One common way, related to Searle's thinking (drawing on speech act theory), Fodor's language of thought, and many others, is to think of the Intentionality relationship like a set of sentences (propositions) whose content is identified with a "that" clause. Joe belives that X, Rene assumes that y, etc. However, there are other ways to concieve of the intentionality relation, for example as an imagistic isomorophism between mental contents and physical objects in the world. The Churchlands are opposed to this propositional view of Intentionality, but do not deny that there is something like an intentionality relation that needs to be satisfied between our mental contents and the objects in the world. Pat Churchland's PhD student (and now UCSD faculty member) Rick Grush dealt with the "architecture of representation" in his PhD dissertation, and how a non-propositional attitude system could still be thought of a representational or Intentional system. Edhubbard 22:57, 12 August 2006 (UTC)

I'm aware of all that. See my failed FAC Jerry Fodor. Please remember that this is Wikipedia and not the SEP, though. Simplify radically!! --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 06:52, 13 August 2006 (UTC)

I know you know, Lacatosias. I've spent a lot of time looking at all of the impressive work that you've done, on wikipedia. But, there's no guarantee that eveyone else coming to this discussion will know these disticntions as well as other people do. My concern is that if we simplify too radically, then we run the risk of caricature. One of the common caricatures/misrepresentations of EM is that they deny the need for any high-level mental vocabulary, whereas the hypothesis (or at least the one advanced by the Churchlands) is that *our current* high-level vocabulary will be eliminated. So pointing out this subtlety, we briefly indicate that there are bigger issues, even if we cannot dive into every subtlety in the philosophy of the mind. Edhubbard 07:07, 13 August 2006 (UTC)

Well, thanks for the compliment, first of all. Secondly, I'm not suggesting that such information be left out. The Churchland's position has definitely changed somewhat over the years (like almost eveything in philosophy).And Dennett's ideas are often delibaretely intended to be difficult to pin-down into simple categories and definite positions. Iìve read some interesting arguments that Dennet is only eliminativist about a certain subset of qualia ("sensory qualia"), while being realist about others, and istrumenalist about intentional attidudes. But that sort of thing could go on ad infinitum. The main thing is to try to keep it as comprehensible to the average reader as possible (although it's not likely that such a person would read this page anyway (0;) and to document all the claims made. This is all I'm suggesting. I will come back at some point and add in-line cites for the parts that I wrote. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 08:34, 13 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] GA Re-Review and In-line citations

Members of the Wikipedia:WikiProject Good articles are in the process of doing a re-review of current Good Article listings to ensure compliance with the standards of the Good Article Criteria. (Discussion of the changes and re-review can be found here). A significant change to the GA criteria is the mandatory use of some sort of in-line citation (In accordance to WP:CITE) to be used in order for an article to pass the verification and reference criteria. Currently this article does not include in-line citations. It is recommended that the article's editors take a look at the inclusion of in-line citations as well as how the article stacks up against the rest of the Good Article criteria. GA reviewers will give you at least a week's time from the date of this notice to work on the in-line citations before doing a full re-review and deciding if the article still merits being considered a Good Article or would need to be de-listed. If you have any questions, please don't hesitate to contact us on the Good Article project talk page or you may contact me personally. On behalf of the Good Articles Project, I want to thank you for all the time and effort that you have put into working on this article and improving the overall quality of the Wikipedia project. Agne 01:40, 26 September 2006 (UTC)

I think we're just about there on this one. Another four or five cites will do the job. Anything else?--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 15:34, 26 September 2006 (UTC)

Done. Also expanded lead section. Now I just need to add refs to lead section. Anything else?--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 12:17, 27 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] It's about time!!

I'm glad to see this small improvment in the GA process actually. It shuld not be limited to just references though. I was going to delist this myself, even though I wrote the whole thing!! I don't have the time or desire to do the in-line cites now though.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 07:50, 26 September 2006 (UTC)

I agree with Francesco. It is good that the GA process is becoming more defined. I will have more time this weekend to start to add some in-line citations, so if we can hold off on delisting until this weekend, perhaps we will be able to avoid having to at all. Overall, it's not too bad, as many of the important references are in the references section, and most arguments are referred to with in text names, if not citations. So, it just seems like a matter of cutting and pasting the references into the appropriate place. I'm happy to do what I can. Edhubbard 09:04, 26 September 2006 (UTC)

Yes, this one shouldn't be much of a problem. I'ìll start working on it today and tommorow. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 09:09, 26 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Question

Does anyone oppose eliminativism on the grounds that folk psych not a theory but more akin to a system of classification that ( despite intial appearances) makes no actual emprical claims?

Yes, for example Peter Hacker, in Bennett/Hacker Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience --Davidlud 04:37, 11 November 2006 (UTC)

Oh Christ, yet another interesting book I have to order from the States? I'm NOT RICH, damnit!!--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 11:00, 16 March 2007 (UTC)