Talk:End of World War II in Europe

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Notice: This is a daughter article of World War II - It was taken from the mother page made to alleviate the size of the older article. WhisperToMe 07:21, 12 Nov 2003 (UTC)

Contents 1 Surrender documents in Rheims and Berlin 2 Time Zones at Ceasefire 3 Führer 4 Italy? 5 details 6 Reasons not to recognise German self-government 7 Did Hitler really commit suicide? 8 what does it matter now?

[edit] Surrender documents in Rheims and Berlin

Jodl was not present at the signing in front of Zhukov in Berlin! The very documents linked to in the article show this. Reverting. --Nelnadon 07:29, 11 May 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Time Zones at Ceasefire

If All forces under German control to cease active operations at 2301 hours Central European time on 8th May 1945. Given that Britain was on Double Summer time what time was it in London? Also what time was it in Washington and Moscow? Philip Baird Shearer 15:08, 12 Oct 2004 (UTC)

Central European Time is GMT +1. Assuming Germany was on Daylight Saving Time in May 1945 then it would have been GMT+2. British Double Summer Time was also GMT+2. So it was the same time in both Britain and Germany, which as this site points out would have facilitated troop movements onto the Continent. The US was observing War Time, so Washington (GMT -5) was at GMT -4 at ceasefire, 3:01 PM, May 8. Moscow is at GMT +3. Assuming a DST/War Time was in effect there (I haven't found anything concrete), then it was 1:01 AM, May 9 at ceasefire. Otherwise, it was one minute past midnight. --Nelnadon 22:51, 7 May 2005 (UTC)

The RAF says "On 7 May General Eisenhower, with representatives from Britain, Russia and France, accepted the unconditional surrender of all German forces on all fronts, to be effective from 0001 hours on 9 May." This suggests that Germany was not (yet) on daylight saving time on 8 May, or if the civilians were, the Armies were not or the times in the docment were CET not CET+1.

Until anyone comes up with a better source which contradicts it. I have added a note to the page stating that British Double Summer Time meant that the effective time of the surrender in the UK was 0001 hours on 9 May. Philip Baird Shearer 13:23, 8 May 2005 (UTC)

Agreed. GMT+2 (or more accurately as you put it, CET+1) is properly called "Central European Summer Time" according to ["timeanddate.com"], but for whatever reason the docs are in CET. Germany has observed Summer Time since the first World War, and I have found nothing to indicate the Nazis repealed it or moved its start date from the typical early spring time. So we can conclude it was 0001 hours in both Britain and Germany, May 9, 1945. --Nelnadon 07:47, 11 May 2005 (UTC)

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The next day 22:43 (CET) German officials in Berlin signed a similar document,

I have removed 22:43 because it is not sourced and and does the source quote CET or "Central European Summer Time" (CET+1)? --Philip Baird Shearer 20:13, 8 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Führer

Removed references to Karl Dönitz as Führer, as it is stated in his article that by order of Hitler he was not to carry that title. User:130.89.166.237 19:08, 1 Nov 2004

As the article says at the top Dönitz was Reichspräsident, but with the suicide of Goebbels he acted as Führer in that he collected all the remining government he could around him. So he was not just acting as head of state he was also acting as Chancellor, which made him acting Führer. The whole thing is very dubious though because under what constitutional article did Hitler get to nominate his successors? Philip Baird Shearer 19:20, 1 Nov 2004 (UTC)

[edit] Italy?

Why is the "end of World War II in Europe" solely about Germany and Austria? What about Scandinavia, Eastern Europe and Italy? Get-back-world-respect 13:10, 5 Nov 2004 (UTC)

The article states:

General Böhne announced the unconditional surrender of German troops in Norway. It included the phrase All forces under German control to cease active operations at 2301 hours Central European time on 8th May 1945. The next day shortly before midnight, Jodl repeated the signing in Berlin at Zhukov's headquaters.

German troops in Italy had already surrendered on May 2, 1945, (as had many other German soldiers at different stages of the war), which is why they are not mentioned. After the surrender on the 8th. Some small garrisons held out for a day or so, like the Channel Islands. Theses are not mentioned because only Norway held enough soldiers to fight as an army and they surrendered on the 8th. There were no significant forces on the Eastern Front who did not obey the May 8 order to surrender. Group Army Centre was the only coherent force left and it did. Philip Baird Shearer 14:22, 5 Nov 2004 (UTC)

[edit] details

This article is a strategic overview of the last days of the war. It is not about individual actions. So I have removed the sinking of the SS Cap Arcona which is IMHO too detailed for this article. For example the entry on the RAF Bomber command web site Diary for May 2/3 it says:

16 Mosquito bombers of No 8 Group and 37 Mosquitos of No 100 Group were first dispatched to attack airfields in the Kiel area.

126 Mosquitos of No 8 Group then attacked Kiel in 2 raids, 1 hour apart. The target area was almost completely cloud-covered but H2S and Oboe were used. Large fires on the ground were seen through the cloud. No Mosquitos were lost on these raids. Towards morning, a large column of military vehicles departed in the direction of Flensburg on the Danish frontier.

If the sinking is included why not the bombing of Kiel? (or the air drops of Operation Manna). If these are included why not all regimental actions by all the participants on all sides for the last week of the war? Philip Baird Shearer 14:49, 6 May 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Reasons not to recognise German self-government

I removed the following passage:

The Allies had a problem, because they realised that although the German armed forces had surrendered unconditionally, SHAEF had failed to use the document created by the "European Advisory Commission" (EAC) and so the civilian German government had not. This was considered a very important issue, because just as the civilian, but not military, surrender in 1918 had been used by Hitler to create the "stab in the back" argument, the Allies did not want to give any a future hostile German regime a legal argument to resurrect an old quarrel.

(I removed the same passage from Allied Control Council, by the way.) It was, of course, in the stated interest of the Allies (see the Potsdam Agreement, for an example) that the point that they were actually defeated was driven home to the German population, so that the developments of 1918 could not be repeated, and military occupation was one of the means to accomplish this. But the reasons to establish military rule in Germany were manifold, and of course the total reorganisation of the German state went far beyond avoiding any "stab in the back" stories. So I think that the paragraph that I have stricken out is simply not germane. If somebody wants to detail the developments that led to the mode of occupation which was finally implemented, I have nothing against that. (A good place to start may be here.) But I don't know if it's really necessary in this article. --SKopp 03:03, 10 May 2005 (UTC)

I refer you to page 109 and the section "Tripartite Agreements". The Surrender Instrument.

Therefore, in agreeing at Moscow in November 1943 to make the writing of a surrender instrument the first task for the European Advisory Commission, the Allied foreign ministers had not selected an innocuous assignment for a body they viewed with mixed emotions. The Americans in particular, as little as their enthusiasm was for the London-situated EAC, attached great significance to the manner in which the surrender was accomplished, probably more than either the British or the Russians. The British saw the task as a major milestone in modern diplomacy, though neither an absolute end nor a beginning. The Russians wanted to document the fact of victory; the legal aspects concerned them less. The Americans tended to see the surrender as an end in itself, an end not only to German stab-in-the-back theories but also to the need for U.S. intervention in European wars.

When the Germans went to Rhiems to surrender, there was a typical military SNAFU, a junior British staff officer drew up the document based on the one used for the Italian surrender not realising that the EAC had something else in mind. page 256 "CHAPTER XV. The Victory Sealed. Surrender at Reims"I

SHAEF's wartime mission was completed, but with a last-minute twist. What the Germans signed at Reims was the "Act of Military Surrender," written three days before in the SHAEF G-3, not the painstakingly negotiated EAC surrender instrument. The chief author of the surrender document signed at Reims was a British colonel, John Counsell, an actor and theatrical manager in civilian life, who had cheerfully "cribbed" much of it from the terms for the German surrender in Italy (2 May) published in Stars and Stripes. 2 Its six short paragraphs -none more than two sentences long- simply affirmed the German High Command's unconditional surrender, to take effect fifty-nine minutes before midnight on 8 May.

Given the above I am re-instating the section you took out. The text does not mention the type of Allied Government it only mentions that there was a problem which had to be addressed because the wrong surrender documents were signed and gives the primary reason why this was considered to be a problem. The section its self does not say that it was a military government put in place just that the four allies "assume supreme authority with respect to Germany". Philip Baird Shearer 15:42, 13 May 2005 (UTC)

This is all very nice, but the stuff about the "stab in the back" argument from 1918 and "a future hostile German regime" still makes no sense. The slogan of 1918 was: "Im Felde unbesiegt." How would the "stab in the back" 1945 propaganda have sounded - "In der Amtsstube unbesiegt," or what? There was no way to resurrect the old treason polemics, especially not after the military surrender. Who cared about whether the sanitation department formally surrendered?! The source that you quote (p. 109) never makes the argument that somehow the failure to include the civilian government in the surrender created the danger of repeating the events after WW 1. It just invokes the 1918 situation to point out that a surrender procedure might need to be carefully orchestrated. --SKopp 22:00, 18 Jun 2005 (UTC)

It is interesting that you choose to belittle the concerns of the time with "Who cared about whether the sanitation department formally surrendered?". The Second World War started only 21 years after the First World War. That means that most policy makers, who would have been over the age of 45, had lived through two world wars. That they drafted surrender articles, months before the end of the war, for both the military and the civilian governments, shows that they considered this to be important. Also when it came to the surrender of Japan no such mistake was made[1]. As to the source I have provided: "The Americans in particular, as little as their enthusiasm was for the London-situated EAC, attached great significance to the manner in which the surrender was accomplished, probably more than either the British or the Russians. ... The Americans tended to see the surrender as an end in itself, an end not only to German stab-in-the-back theories but also to the need for U.S. intervention in European wars." seems to cover it. Do you have a source which contradicts this? Philip Baird Shearer 13:44, 19 Jun 2005 (UTC)

I'm not even challenging any of that. It's absolutely believable that great care went into the orchestration of the surrender, and maybe it is worth mentioning that a great deal of that care was wasted because the EAC surrender instrument eventually wasn't used. But there's another, more specific, claim in the passage we're talking about (paraphrased):

The fact that the civilian government did not surrender posed the danger that the German right could repeat its political strategy from 1918.

In 1918, right-wing politicians (including Hitler) argued that the German army had not been defeated on the field of battle, but rather treacherous civilians had aborted the war and allowed a left-wing revolution to abolish the monarchy. Now could anyone please explain to me how such an argument might be repeated when the army is very visibly defeated, the cities lie in ruines, the military leadership has signed an unconditional surrender, but, the civilian government has not formally surrendered? I hope you see how that makes no sense to me. --SKopp 15:44, 19 Jun 2005 (UTC)

No I do not. Hitler and his ilk would have just turned the argument around if the field armies had surrendered and the civilian government had not; (one occasionally hears this argument from "The south will rise again" campaigners over that other unconditional surrender at the end of the American Civil War). In 1918 Germany close to civil war, and its population close to starving, she was defeated militarily, it was just that the armistice saved a formal military surrender. Given the precedent less than a generation earlier it is understandable that the legal eagles wanted to make sure that there could be no future legal argument that the surrender was anything but complete, and so "The Americans tended to see the surrender as an end in itself, an end not only to German stab-in-the-back theories...". If you have a source that says that the the EAC did not include in its intentions an "end to German stab-in-the-back theories", then we can discuss it further. Philip Baird Shearer 16:39, 19 Jun 2005 (UTC)

The argument could simply be "turned around." In 1918 the argument was: "The army was undefeated. Treacherous elements robbed victory from us." In 1945 the argument would have been: "The army was defeated and surrendered. But, the post office never gave up fighting! Treacherous generals robbed victory from us!" - Obviously it doesn't work that way. I get the impression that you think the "stab in the back" (Dolchstoß) propaganda post WW1 was just some sort of legal argument, which was morally questionable but perfectly valid because the allies had neglected to exert a surrender on the correct terms from Germany, or something. In fact it was a distortion of historical facts, if not an outright lie, to frame the leftist government as traitors to the nation. Its effect was not "to resurrect an old quarrel," it was the abolishment of the democratic consitution. This sort of propaganda could not easily be repeated after WW2. Of course, apart from the fact that the military defeat was obvious to everyone, the Allies made sure that nobody could argue otherwise later a) by getting a surrender from the military leadership, b) by placing Germany under military rule, rooting out Nazi organisations, etc. Of course, the removal of the German government was necessary for that - a formal surrender, apparently not.

The whole passage remains confusing. So the Allies "had a problem," but could simply "solve" that problem by signing a declaration - well, that wasn't really much of a problem. They decided "not to recognise Dönitz," well, they arrested him already in May. After that, who could have claimed to be the German government? I think the real story here is that the Allies wanted to abolish the German government, but the surrender was a little botched up, so they handed in their assumption of power a few weeks later, at Berlin. I would suggest the following passage as a replacement:

Contrary to their original intentions, the Allies did not use the surrender instrument drafted by the European Advisory Commission, which would have included an abdication of the German government. After the arrest of the Dönitz government, there was no central German authority and, on 5 July 1945 in Berlin, the supreme commanders of the four occupying powers signed a common Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany (the so-called Berlin Declaration), which formally abolished any German governance over the nation: [...]

If you can provide a source that not only proves a) that a formal civilian surrender was desired; b) that a reiteration of the 1918 events was feared - these two things are undisputed, but that also proves that a) was seen as a crucial requirement for b), then by all means provide that source. --SKopp 12:54, 21 Jun 2005 (UTC)

I can tell by your use of "already" that you are probably German. (I have removed it from the your last posting, for clarity). The source already provided the U.S. reasons for wanting this deceleration "The Americans tended to see the surrender as an end in itself, an end not only to German stab-in-the-back theories...". There are other sources for this which mention it eg From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle Over Germany. Earl F. Ziemke in "Battle for Berlin: end of the Third Reich" writes on page 136 "the planned four power control encountered a legal obstacle after the surrender...Further it could potentially be construed as not effecting the civilian government of Germany at all." Another source which I have to hand, which although not mentioning the EAC, gives a collaborating explanation as to why the surrender of the German civilian government was important to the Allies. It is the analysis of allied interrogations of German military and civilians in 1945 in A. Beevor's "Berlin the downfall 1945" Page 429. If you want more sources you will have to give me a few weeks to find them in a library. I would also appreciate it if you could provide a source which states that total surrender was not in part driven by the perceived need to stop any resurrection of the stab in the back theories and to legalise the military occupation. Philip Baird Shearer 15:35, 21 Jun 2005 (UTC)

I do not find anything in the sources you cite that directly links the necessity of civilian surrender to prevention of a recurrence of the "stab in the back argument." Of course we have the very general assertion that:

"The Americans tended to see the surrender as an end in itself, an end not only to German stab-in-the-back theories..."

But it does not say that the civilian surrender was considered particularly crucial in this regard, which it probably wasn't. Also, we have:

Further it could potentially be construed as not effecting the civilian government of Germany at all.

Probably true, but what does that have to do with said "stab in the back" propaganda? Where is evidence for the fear that a future hostile government would have "a legal argument to resurrect an old quarrel?" Did the war break out in 1939 because Hitler had "a legal argument" from 1918? Hardly so.

I also think that "The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany" not only does not back this claim, it almost seems to imply that a formal civilian surrender was not desired in the circumstances that the Allies eventually found in Germany, i.e. after Hitler's death:

Finally, the surrender instrument required the signature of the "highest German civilian authority" as well as the highest military authority. Hitler had killed himself on 30 April. Grossadmiral Karl Doenitz had announced himself as Hitler's appointed successor two days later and had initiated the negotiations for the surrender; but the Allies did not recognize him as head of state, and his authority, except possibly over the armed forces still fighting, was doubtful. (p. 257)

So, was it entirely by accident that Dönitz didn't get to authorise a civilian surrender?

My view is not based on any written sources, only on my observation that the passage, as it stands, ascribes rationales to the Allies that no reader can follow. And, with all due respect, I don't think it is my duty to provide sources when I don't want to insert any claims in the article. --SKopp 21:20, 23 Jun 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Did Hitler really commit suicide?

"On April 30, 1945, realizing that all was lost, Adolf Hitler committed suicide in his bunker". As far as I know this has actually never been prooved, his body was never found. It's generally accepted that he did but I can't help to be a little sucpicious. So what proof can you present to me?

[edit] what does it matter now?

yeah.