Ethical naturalism
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Ethical naturalism, sometimes also called moral naturalism or naturalistic cognitivistic definism,[1] is a theory in meta-ethics which states that:
- Ethical sentences express propositions (see Cognitivism (ethics)),
- The meanings of ethical sentences can be expressed without the use of ethical terms (e.g., "good" and "right"), and
- These non-ethical terms refer to natural properties.
The first part stands in opposition to noncognitivism, the second to non-definism, and the third to non-naturalistic definitions of "good" and "right", most commonly those which relate the ethical terms to the will of God as in divine command theory.
Ethical naturalism has been criticized most prominently by ethical non-naturalist G. E. Moore, who formulated the Open Question Argument. Garner and Rosen say that a common definition of "natural property" is one "which can be discovered by sense observation or experience, experiment, or through any of the available means of science." They also say that a good defition of "natural property" is problematic but that "it is only in criticism of naturalism, or in an attempt to distinguish between naturalistic and nonnaturalistic definist theories, that such a concept is needed."[2]
It is important to distinguish the versions of ethical naturalism which have received the most sustained philosophical interest, for example, Cornell Realism, from the position that 'what is, is right'. This later view is often criticized by proponents of Sociobiology, as part of a defense of the Fact-value distinction. However, a sophisticated ethical naturalist does not believe, in any straightforward sense, such a slogan. Moreover, ethical naturalism rejects the fact/value distinction: it suggests that inquiry into the natural world can increase our moral knowledge in just the same way it increases our scientific knowledge.
Contents |
[edit] Theory of value
The theory of value — an important branch of ethics — contains a number of theories of what "good" means or, construed differently, what sorts of things are good. One could look at the theory of value as a way of determining how to reduce goodness to non-ethical properties, for there are many examples of such reductions in value theory. Hedonism, for example, is the view that goodness is ultimately just pleasure. It should be noted, however, that not all philosophers working on value theory would view their theories as "reductions".
[edit] Ethical theories which can be naturalistic
[edit] Notes
[edit] References
- Garner, Richard T.; Bernard Rosen (1967). Moral Philosophy: A Systematic Introduction to Normative Ethics and Meta-ethics. New York: Macmillan. LOC card number 67-18887.
[edit] External links
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Moral Naturalism", by James Lenman, first published Thu Jun 1, 2006; substantive revision Mon Aug 7, 2006
- Philosophy 302: Naturalistic Ethics
