User:Huysman/Sandbox1

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Contents 1 Background 2 Viewpoints 3 Why this subject is controversial 4 The majority view: No working relationship existed 4.1 Difference in ideology 4.2 Some intelligence reports were not credible 4.3 Contacts did not add up to a collaboration 4.4 Conclusions of Intelligence Community 4.4.1 George Tenet 4.4.2 CIA Intelligence reports 4.4.3 Senate Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq 4.5 Criticism of the Intelligence Community view 5 Bush Administration view: A relationship may exist 5.1 Powell's UN Speech 6 The minority view: Saddam and al-Qaeda had a working relationship 6.1 Intelligence Community failures 6.2 Before the invasion 6.3 After the 2003 invasion 7 Notes and References

[edit] Background

Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda were alleged to have established a highly secretive relationship from 1992 through 2003, specifically through a series of meetings reportedly involving the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS).^{[citation needed]} In the lead up to the Iraq War, U.S. president George W. Bush alleged that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda might work together to launch terrorist attacks on the United States[citation needed], basing the administration's rationale for war, in part, on this allegation and others. Critics of the Bush Administration have claimed Bush was intentionally building a case for war with Iraq without regard to the facts.

[edit] Viewpoints

Evidence of high-level contacts between Saddam and al-Qaeda raises two questions:

1. Did the Iraqi regime and al-Qaeda have a cooperative relationship?

2. Did Saddam Hussein's government support the attacks on 9/11?

There are several views regarding the relationship between Saddam and al-Qaeda:

• The intelligence community (CIA, NSA, DIA, etc) view, as seen in the 9/11 Commission Report and the Senate Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq, answers these questions "No" and "No." According to this view, the difference in ideology between Saddam and al-Qaeda would make cooperation in any terrorist attacks very unlikely, although could happen in extremis, that is if Saddam believed he was to be invaded by the US. The Senate Report, however, recognizes the possibility of some cooperation between Saddam and al-Qaeda in the area of training and offers of safe-haven.
• The Bush administration view, as defined by the Colin Powell speech before the UN, answers the questions "Maybe" and "No." Powell presented several credible intelligence reports vetted by the Intelligence Community showing contacts between Iraq's Intelligence Service and al-Qaeda. Powell pointed out that Saddam had already supported Islamic Jihad, a radical Islamist group and there is no reason for him not to support al-Qaeda. Powell discussed concerns Saddam may provide al-Qaeda will chemical or biological weapons.
• A minority view held by some intelligence analysts answers the questions "Yes" and "No." According to this view Saddam and al-Qaeda had an on-again, off-again cooperative relationship and were willing to use the other for their own purposes. This view does not claim Saddam supported the 9/11 attacks but believes that possibility should continue to be investigated.
• The "false flag" view of Laurie Mylroie answers the questions "Yes" and "Yes." Mylroie claims Saddam's regime was behind the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and that Saddam used a "false flag" operation to attack the US on 9/11 and blame al-Qaeda for it. Very few people share Mylroie's view.

[edit] Why this subject is controversial

This subject is hotly debated in part because gathering and analyzing intelligence is a difficult business. Nations and terrorists sometimes run “false flag” operations in which they act in a way to lay blame to another country or group. At other times, detainees and defectors will intentionally provide intelligence agencies with false statements and faked documents. Sometimes these people change their story and it is difficult to know which story is true, if either. The entire question of the “level of certainty” of intelligence reports and assessments is a difficult business.

Former CIA Director Robert Gates makes the point by saying:

"If the stakes and the consequences are small, you're going to want ninety-per-cent assurance. It's a risk calculus. On the other hand, if your worry is along the lines of what Rumsfeld is saying—another major attack on the U.S., possibly with biological or chemical weapons—and you look at the consequences of September 11th, then the equation of risk changes. You have to be prepared to go forward with a lot lower level of confidence in the evidence you have. A fifty-per-cent chance of such an attack happening is so terrible that it changes the calculation of risk." [1]

Another event adding controversy to the subject was the leaking of a classified memo written by Doug Feith to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence during its review of Pre-war Intelligence. The contents of the memo were published in a ‘’Weekly Standard’’ article. [2] Feith’s view of the relationship between Saddam and Osama differed from the official view of the Intelligence Community and engendered a great deal of ill will between intelligence analysts and the Bush Administration.

The issue is also controversial because some Intelligence Community analysts have charged the Bush Administration with “cherry-picking” the intelligence to support a predetermined decision to invade Iraq. [3] The majority view of the Intelligence Community was that no working relationship existed between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda. In the speech by Colin Powell before the U.N. Security Council, the Bush Administration decisively rejected one of the major tenets of the majority view.

[edit] The majority view: No working relationship existed

[edit] Difference in ideology

The 2004 Senate Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq reviewed intelligence investigating Saddam's attitude towards Islamic extremism and reported that analysts had found "that he generally viewed Islamic extremism, including the school of Islam known as Wahhabism, as a threat to his regime, noting that he had executed extremists from both the Sunni and Shi’a sects to disrupt their organizations. ...The CIA also provided a HUMINT report [excised] that indicated the regime sought to prevent Iraqi youth from joining al-Qaida." (PDF) (what page?)

The dislike was mutual. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Osama bin Laden offered to defend Saudi Arabia by sending "jihadist" warriors from Afghanistan to repel Saddam's forces. After the Gulf War, bin Laden continued to criticize Saddam's Ba'ath regime, emphasizing that Saddam could not be trusted.” Bin Laden told his biographer that "the land of the Arab world, the land is like a mother, and Saddam Hussein is fucking his mother."[4]

Larry Wilkerson, former Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell, expressed the Intelligence Community view when he told Voice of America that "Saddam Hussein had his agenda and al-Qaida had its agenda, and those two agendas were incompatible. And so if there was any contact between them, it was a contact that was rebuffed rather than a contact that led to meaningful relationships between them."[5]

[edit] Some intelligence reports were not credible

Some intelligence reports about the link between Saddam and al-Qaeda came by way of the Iraqi National Congress, a group of Iraqis supported by U.S. government in the effort to foment a revolt against Saddam. "The [INC's] intelligence isn't reliable at all," said Vincent Cannistraro, a former senior CIA official and counterterrorism expert. "Much of it is propaganda. Much of it is telling the Defense Department what they want to hear. And much of it is used to support Chalabi's own presidential ambitions. They make no distinction between intelligence and propaganda, using alleged informants and defectors who say what Chalabi wants them to say, [creating] cooked information that goes right into presidential and vice-presidential speeches." (Dreyfuss, December 2002).

A training camp in Salman Pak, south of Baghdad, was claimed by a number of defectors to have been used to train international terrorists (assumed to be al-Qaeda members) in hijacking techniques using a real airplane as a prop. The defectors were inconsistent about a number of details. ^{[citation needed]} The camp has been discovered by U.S. Marines, but intelligence analysts do not believe it was used by al-Qaeda. ^{[citation needed]} Some believe it was actually used for counterterrorism training, while others believe it was used to train foreign terrorists but not al-Qaeda members. ^{[citation needed]}

[edit] Contacts did not add up to a collaboration

Members of Saddam’s government did have contacts with al-Qaeda over the years; however, many of the links are not considered by experts and analysts as convincing evidence of a collaborative relationship. Former counterterrorism czar Richard A. Clarke writes, "[t]he simple fact is that lots of people, particularly in the Middle East, pass along many rumors and they end up being recorded and filed by U.S. intelligence agencies in raw reports. That does not make them 'intelligence'. Intelligence involves analysis of raw reports, not merely their enumeration or weighing them by the pound. Analysis, in turn, involves finding independent means of corroborating the reports. Did al-Qaeda agents ever talk to Iraqi agents? I would be startled if they had not. I would also be startled if American, Israeli, Iranian, British, or Jordanian agents had somehow failed to talk to al-Qaeda or Iraqi agents. Talking to each other is what intelligence agents do, often under assumed identities or 'false flags,' looking for information or possible defectors." ^[1]

[edit] Conclusions of Intelligence Community

[edit] George Tenet

The prewar CIA testimony was that there was evidence of senior level contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda going back a decade involving Iraq providing al-Qaida with various kinds of training-combat, bomb-making, and [chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear] CBRN, but that they had no credible information that Baghdad had foreknowledge of the 11 September attacks or any other al-Qaeda strike.[6][7]. The CIA's report on Iraq's ties to terrorism noted in September 2002 that the CIA did not have "credible intelligence reporting" of operational collaboration between Iraq and al-Qaeda.

CIA Director George Tenet wrote a letter to Congress in which he summarized the findings of credible contacts. The letter from Tenet reads:

Regarding Senator Bayh's Evan Bayh, Democrat of Indiana question of Iraqi links to al-Qa'ida. Senators could draw from the following points for unclassified discussions:

• Our understanding of the relationship between Iraq and al-Qa'ida is evolving and is based on sources of varying reliability. Some of the information we have received comes from detainees, including some of high rank.

• We have solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and al-Qa'ida going back a decade.

• Credible information indicates that Iraq and al-Qa'ida have discussed safe haven and reciprocal nonaggression.

• Since Operation Enduring Freedom, we have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of al-Qa'ida members, including some that have been in Baghdad.

• We have credible reporting that al-Qa'ida leaders sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire W.M.D. capabilities.

• The reporting also stated that Iraq has provided training to al-Qa'ida members in the areas of poisons and gases and making conventional bombs.

• Iraq's increasing support to extremist Palestinians coupled with growing indications of a relationship with al-Qa'ida, suggest that Baghdad's links to terrorists will increase, even absent U.S. military action. [8]

[edit] CIA Intelligence reports

According to the Senate Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq, the CIA reported that "al-Qaida, including Bin Ladin personally, and Saddam were leery of close cooperation," but that the "mutual antipathy of the two would not prevent tactical, limited cooperation." (p. 338) The Senate Report reviewed several CIA intelligence products that touched on this issue, including Saddam’s past use of terrorism and the likelihood Saddam would provide terrorists with weapons capability. The CIA stated Saddam’s past use of terrorism, include:

• Attempted terrorist attacks during the 1991 war using Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) operatives and Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) operatives

• Terrorist attempts in Manila and Jakarta were conducted by IIS operatives

• IIS continued to case targets for attacks in the event of war (Pages 343-344 of Senate Report)

Regarding Iraqi weapons, the CIA was most concerned about Iraq’s interest in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In the CIA assessment Iraqi Support for Terrorism, the CIA noted that UAVs could be used by terrorists to deliver chemical weapons. There was no specific information that Iraq planned to give these weapons to terrorists, but the possibility presented grave consequences. (Page 343-345 of Senate Report)

The CIA determined the following possible outcomes:

• Saddam could use any or all three (Iraqi Intelligence Service, Palestinian terrorists or al-Qaeda) to strike the U.S.

• Saddam was most likely to use IIS

• Saddam could turn to surrogates (Palestinian terrorists or al-Qaeda) if he wanted deniability

• Saddam might decide that only an organization like al-Qaeda would have the worldwide reach to meet his requirements (Pages 342-343 of Senate Report)

[edit] Senate Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq

The conclusions of the Senate Report are reprinted below and hint at an operational relationship including training al-Qaeda terrorists in Iraq in the handling and use of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. One of the sources for the CIA's claim that Iraq had trained al-Qaeda members in bomb making and poisonous gases included the now recanted claims of captured al-Qaeda leader Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi. [9] The CIA has since recalled and reissued all its intelligence reporting about al-Libi’s recanted claims.[10] Likewise, the DIA communicated to President Bush in February 2002 its stance that al-Libi "was intentionally misleading his debriefers."[11]

The Senate Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq published the following conclusions:

Conclusion 91. The Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) assessment that Iraq had maintained ties to several secular Palestinian terrorist groups and with the Mujahidin e-Khalq was supported by the intelligence. The CIA was also reasonable in judging that Iraq appeared to have been reaching out to more effective terrorist groups, such as Hizballah and Hamas, and might have intended to employ such surrogates in the event of war. (Page 345)

Conclusion 92. The CIA's examination of contacts, training, safehaven and operational cooperation as indicators of a possible Iraq-al-Qaida relationship was a reasonable and objective approach to the question. (Page 345)

Conclusion 93. The Central Intelligence Agency reasonably assessed that there were likely several instances of contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida throughout the 1990s, but that these contacts did not add up to an established formal relationship. (Page 346)

Conclusion 94. The CIA reasonably and objectively assessed in Iraqi Support for Terrorism that the most problematic area of contact between Iraq and al-Qaida were the reports of training in the use of non-conventional weapons, specifically chemical and biological weapons. (Page 346)

Conclusion 95. The CIA’s assessment on safehaven — that al-Qaida or associated operatives were present in Baghdad and in northeastern Iraq in an area under Kurdish control — was reasonable. (Page 347)

Conclusion 96. The CIA's assessment that to date there was no evidence proving Iraqi complicity or assistance in an al-Qaida attack was reasonable and objective. No additional information has emerged to suggest otherwise. (Page 347)

Conclusion 97. The CIA's judgment that Saddam Hussein, if sufficiently desperate, might employ terrorists with a global reach — al-Qaida — to conduct terrorist attacks in the event of war, was reasonable. No information has emerged thus far to suggest that Saddam did try to employ al-Qaida in conducting terrorist attacks. (Page 348)

Conclusion 99. Despite four decades of intelligence reporting on Iraq, there was little useful intelligence collected that helped analysts determine the Iraqi regime's possible links to al-Qaida. (Page 355)

Conclusion 100. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did not have a focused human intelligence (HUMINT) collection strategy targeting Iraq's links to terrorism until 2002. The CIA had no (redacted) sources on the ground in Iraq reporting specifically on terrorism. The lack of an official (redacted) U.S. presence in the country (redacted) curtailed the Intelligence Community's HUMINT collection capabilities. (Page 355)

The report also states: "A January 2003 IC assessment of Iraqi support for terrorism explained, “Our knowledge of Iraq’s ties to terrorism is evolving and (REDACTED).'" (Page 350) The Intelligence Community recognized that the final determination of Iraq's ties to terror organizations was yet to be written.

In summary, the majority view of the Intelligence Community holds that a relationship between Saddam and al-Qaeda is unlikely because Saddam was a secular leader who would not trust an Islamic radical like Osama bin Laden. In addition, Osama expressed hostility to Saddam's regime, intelligence reports from the Iraqi National Congress had been discredited and the paucity of evidence for a formal relationship did not convince most analysts that a cooperative working relationship existed.

[edit] Criticism of the Intelligence Community view

• The Intelligence Community cites reports of training and offers of safehaven but then concludes these interactions did not add up to an established formal relationship. (see Conclusion 92, 93 and 94)
• The Intelligence Community was not interested in learning about a relationship between Saddam and al-Qaeda. [12]
• The Intelligence Community did not properly investigated news reports about the pact between Saddam and al-Qaeda that were published around the world. The 9/11 Commission Report did not discuss these accounts and the Senate Report only mentioned the Milan news story of the “pact” because it was mentioned in the Feith memo.[13]
• The 9/11 Commission Report did not discuss Saddam's relationship with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a known al-Qaeda associate. [14]
• The Commission did not discuss Saddam's financial support for Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri reported in U.S. News and World Report and FOX News. [15] [16]

[edit] Bush Administration view: A relationship may exist

On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the UN Security Council to explain the Bush Administration case for war with Iraq. [17] Powell said Iraq and al-Qaeda were connected through Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Powell described Zarqawi and his followers as “al-Qaida affiliates” who were “based in Baghdad” and “operating freely in the capital for more than eight months.” Powell stated:

“We asked a friendly security service to approach Baghdad about extraditing Zarqawi and providing information about him and his close associates. This service contacted Iraqi officials twice, and we passed details that should have made it easy to find Zarqawi. The network remains in Baghdad. Zarqawi still remains at large to come and go.”

According to Powell, Zarqawi was only one link between Saddam and al-Qaeda:

“Going back to the early and mid-1990s, when bin Laden was based in Sudan, an Al Qaida source tells us that Saddam and bin Laden reached an understanding that Al Qaida would no longer support activities against Baghdad. Early Al Qaida ties were forged by secret, high-level intelligence service contacts with Al Qaida, secret Iraqi intelligence high-level contacts with Al Qaida.”

Regarding Saddam’s support for Islamist terror organizations, Powell said:

“Some believe, some claim these contacts do not amount to much. They say Saddam Hussein's secular tyranny and Al Qaida's religious tyranny do not mix. I am not comforted by this thought…And the record of Saddam Hussein's cooperation with other Islamist terrorist organizations is clear. Hamas, for example, opened an office in Baghdad in 1999, and Iraq has hosted conferences attended by Palestine Islamic Jihad. These groups are at the forefront of sponsoring suicide attacks against Israel.”

Regarding the possibility Saddam may give chemical or biological weapons to al-Qaeda, Powell told the story of a senior al-Qaeda detainee:

“He says that a militant known as Abu Abdula Al-Iraqi (ph) had been sent to Iraq several times between 1997 and 2000 for help in acquiring poisons and gases. Abdula Al-Iraqi (ph) characterized the relationship he forged with Iraqi officials as successful.”

When the Senate Report published its review of pre-war intelligence, it also published two conclusions regarding Powell's speech:

Conclusion 103. The information provided by the Central Intelligence Agency for the terrorism portion of Secretary Powell’s speech was carefully vetted by both terrorism and regional analysts.

Conclusion 104. None of the portrayals of the intelligence reporting included in Secretary Powell’s speech differed in any significant way from earlier assessments published by the Central Intelligence Agency. (Page 369 of Senate Report) (PDF)

[edit] Powell's UN Speech

In a February 23 speech to the United Nations,[18] Colin Powell claimed that there is evidence of collaboration between Iraq and Al Qaeda. Many claim that all the testimony came from captured Al Qaeda leader Ibn Al Shayk Al Libi. This is false. Al Libi recanted his claims,^{[citation needed]} stating that he made them while being tortured, although there is no corroboration of his allegations of torture.^{[citation needed]} As Ron Cram points out, the following excerpts reveal sources besides Al Libi:

• "And it's no secret that Saddam's own intelligence service was involved in dozens of attacks or attempted assassinations in the 1990s." - This means there are lots of sources, probably both classified and unclassified.
• "We asked a friendly security service to approach Baghdad" - This means a foreign intelligence service.
• "According to detainee Abuwatia (ph)" - This is not al-Libi.
• "the detainee who provided the information about the targets also provided the names of members of the network" - This could be Abuwatia or someone else.
• "an Al Qaida source" - not clear, but almost certainly not al-Libi.
• "We know members of both organizations met repeatedly and have met at least eight times at very senior levels since the early 1990s." This refers to multiple, credible witnesses about multiple meetings. Probably no one knew about all eight meetings, but several people knew about each of them.
• "a foreign security service tells us" - Again, not al-Libi.
• "A detained Al Qaida member tells us" - Not clear, but again this is probably not al-Libi because he described al-Libi differently.
• "And the record of Saddam Hussein's cooperation with other Islamist terrorist organizations is clear." Again, Powell is talking about multiple reports by credible witnesses. This information is not in doubt.
• "I can trace the story of a senior terrorist operative telling how Iraq provided training in these weapons to Al Qaida. Fortunately, this operative is now detained" This person is also described as "responsible for one of Al Qaida's training camps in Afghanistan." - This may indeed be al-Libi, but notice that Powell reports that al-Libi said "a militant known as Abu Abdula Al-Iraqi (ph) had been sent to Iraq several times between 1997 and 2000 for help in acquiring poisons and gases." This is important because...
• "Abu Abdula Al-Iraqi (ph) characterized the relationship he forged with Iraqi officials as successful." Do you see? Abu Abdula Al-Iraqi confirmed the report al-Libi. Now stop spreading the disinformation that Powell's speech has been discredited."

[edit] The minority view: Saddam and al-Qaeda had a working relationship

[edit] Intelligence Community failures

The minority view holds that the Intelligence Community made a number of mistakes that allowed the attacks of 9/11 to be successful. These mistakes included ignoring evidence and poor assessment of the threat by analysts. These failures have been studied and reported by both the 9/11 Commission Report and the Senate Final Report: Part 1 published December 10, 2002. [19] The Final Report lists a series of "Systemic Findings" relevent to Intelligence Community's ability to reach a vital and accurate threat assessment: 3. Finding: Beginning in 1998 and continuing into the summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community received a modest, but relatively steady, stream of intelligence reporting that indicated the possibility of terrorist attacks within the United States. Nonetheless, testimony and interviews confirm that it was the general view of the Intelligence Community, in the spring and summer of 2001, that the threatened Bin Ladin attacks would most likely occur against U.S. interests overseas, despite indications of plans and intentions to attack in the domestic United States.

4. Finding: From at least 1994, and continuing into the summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community received information indicating that terrorists were contemplating, among other means of attack, the use of aircraft as weapons. This information did not stimulate any specific Intelligence Community assessment of, or collective U.S. Government reaction to, this form of threat.

5. Finding: Although relevant information that is significant in retrospect regarding the attacks was available to the Intelligence Community prior to September 11, 2001, the Community too often failed to focus on that information and consider and appreciate its collective significance in terms of a probable terrorist attack. Neither did the Intelligence Community demonstrate sufficient initiative in coming to grips with the new transnational threats. Some significant pieces of information in the vast stream of data being collected were overlooked, some were not recognized as potentially significant at the time and therefore not disseminated, and some required additional action on the part of foreign governments before a direct connection to the hijackers could have been established. For all those reasons, the Intelligence Community failed to fully capitalize on available, and potentially important, information. The sub-findings below identify each category of this information.

Systemic Findings:

5. Finding: Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community’s understanding of al-Qa’ida was hampered by insufficient analytic focus and quality, particularly in terms of strategic analysis. Analysis and analysts were not always used effectively because of the perception in some quarters of the Intelligence Community that they were less important to agency counterterrorism missions than were operations personnel. The quality of counterterrorism analysis was inconsistent, and many analysts were inexperienced, unqualified, under-trained, and without access to critical information. As a result, there was a dearth of creative, aggressive analysis targeting Bin Ladin and a persistent inability to comprehend the collective significance of individual pieces of intelligence. These analytic deficiencies seriously undercut the ability of U.S. policymakers to understand the full nature of the threat, and to make fully informed decisions.

15. Finding: The Intelligence Community depended heavily on foreign intelligence and law enforcement services for the collection of counterterrorism intelligence and the conduct of other counterterrorism activities. The results were mixed in terms of productive intelligence, reflecting vast differences in the ability and willingness of the various foreign services to target the Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida network. Intelligence Community agencies sometimes failed to coordinate their relationships with foreign services adequately, either within the Intelligence Community or with broader U.S. Government liaison and foreign policy efforts. This reliance on foreign liaison services also resulted in a lack of focus on the development of unilateral human sources. [20]

[edit] Before the invasion

A debate rage in the Intelligence Community prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 regarding the factual accuracy and importance of several propositions. Is there an insurmountable ideological difference between Baathism and Islamism? Many people would disagree with the majority viewpoint and say "No." [21] Was Saddam Hussein's "Return to the Faith" campaign an effort to reach out to Islamic terrorists? The majority viewpoint would say no, but many people would disagree.

The Intelligence Community debated the possibility of a relationship of Saddam and al-Qaeda. Some of the analysts known to have disagreed with the majority view include a Deputy Director of CTC, a DIA analyst (both mentioned in the Senate Report), Michael Scheuer in his 2002 book In Our Enemies' Eyes and Yossef Bodansky, the author of Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America. Scheuer was the head of the CIA team ordered to capture or kill bin Laden. Bodansky was the Director of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare.

The Deputy Director of the Office of Terrorism Analysis in the Counter Terrorism Center told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence a little about the debate inside the CIA:

…when we started this we had a backdrop that was pretty solid on saying Saddam is willing to deal with bad guys and has been doing it for a long time. And he has an intelligence service that has targeted us in the past. We had some information about support for Islamist groups connected with the Arab-Israeli conflict. I think this is significant because I do believe there is a worthwhile debate to have on the ideology of Saddam, but I would also say, coming at this from an aggressive terrorist perspective, we did have a baseline to tell us that he had tried to work on relationship with groups we would identify as Islamist. (Page 344 of Senate Report)

Contrary to the conventional wisdom at the CIA, Saddam had supported Islamist groups. Amatzia Baram, an Iraq expert at the University of Haifa, says Saddam underwent a conversion after he invaded Kuwait and "the Islamic rhetorical style became overwhelming." Saddam changed the flag to include the words "God is great" and began hosting international Islamic conferences that drew Islamists from countries in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. In 1994, Saddam began a "Faith Campaign" in which he built mosques, required government officials to attend prayers and established Quran reciting competitions. Baram claims the change was so sharp that a radical group in Jordan began calling Saddam "the New Caliph Marching from the East." [22] This "conversion", real or not, opened doors for Saddam among radical Islamists. Saddam became a prime supporter of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and of Hamas, paying families of suicide bombers in exchange for their sons' martyrdom. "This is part of Saddam's attempt to harness the power of Islamic extremism and direct it against his enemies" writes Jeffrey Goldberg. [23]

One indication of cooperation between Saddam and Osama was the dual-use facility known as Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory located in Sudan. The Clinton Administration believed the facility was jointly built by Iraq and Sudan for the development of chemical weapons and also involved al-Qaeda. [24] President Clinton ordered Operation Infinite Reach which destroyed the plant August 20, 1998.

In December 1998, President Clinton ordered Operation Desert Fox, a four day bombing attack on targets inside Iraq. Shortly after Operation Desert Fox, a number of news reports came out around the world giving details of the new working relationship between Saddam and Osama:

• "Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Ladin have sealed a pact." - Corriere Della Sera (Milan) - December 28, 1998.

• "…several western diplomatic and security sources which have good relations with Sudan, warned in secret reports they sent at the end of [1998] that Iraq, Sudan, and bin Laden were cooperating and coordinating in field of chemical weapons" at several facilities. - Al-Watan Al-Arabi (Paris) – January 1, 1999

• "President Saddam Hussein, whose country was subjected to a four-day air strike, will look for support in taking revenge on the United States and Britain by cooperating with Saudi oppositionist Osama bin Laden, whom the United States considers to be the most wanted person in the world." - Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London)

• ABC News broadcast a report discussing Saddam’s links to terrorists, including Carlos the Jackal, Abu Nidal, Abu Abbas and Osama bin Laden. - January 14, 1999[25]

The Weekly Standard reported:

’’The London-based Al-Majallah added even more details. According to the Saudi-backed publication, "scores of Iraqi military intelligence men . . . arrived in Afghan territory in December." Also in December, "the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad held a series of meetings between an Iraqi security official and the leaders of a number of Pakistani fundamentalist movements and elements from the Taleban, with the knowledge of Pakistani military intelligence." The purpose of such meetings was to whip up support for Saddam in his confrontation with the U.S. and Britain.’’[26]

The pact was independently cited by U.S. attorney Patrick Fitzgerald in an indictment against Osama bin Laden that was unsealed on November 4, 1998, weeks before the Milan newspaper published its story. Referring to the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Sudan,[27] Fitzgerald wrote: "Al-Qaeda reached an understanding with the government of Iraq that al-Qaeda would not work against that government and that on particular projects, specifically including weapons development, al-Qaeda would work cooperatively with the government of Iraq." (Page 128)[28]

New Yorker magazine published an investigative report in March, 2002 providing evidence of significant ties between Saddam and al-Qaeda:

The allegations include charges that Ansar al-Islam has received funds directly from Al Qaeda; that the intelligence service of Saddam Hussein has joint control, with Al Qaeda operatives, over Ansar al-Islam; that Saddam Hussein hosted a senior leader of Al Qaeda in Baghdad in 1992; that a number of Al Qaeda members fleeing Afghanistan have been secretly brought into territory controlled by Ansar al-Islam; and that Iraqi intelligence agents smuggled conventional weapons, and possibly even chemical and biological weapons, into Afghanistan. If these charges are true, it would mean that the relationship between Saddam's regime and Al Qaeda is far closer than previously thought. [29]

[edit] After the 2003 invasion

Since the invasion, the government has had an opportunity to seize and study documents and to question detainees. Many of the seized documents, called ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom documents' have not been fully translated. The documents are being released on the internet to recruit Arabic translators from around the world to help translate them. The Pentagon has cautioned it has made “no determination regarding the authenticity of the documents, validity or factual accuracy.” [30]

Document ISGZ-2004-009247 mentions a meeting between Osama bin Laden and agents from Iraqi Intelligence Service, known as Mukhabarat, on February 15, 1995. The report indicates that bin Laden requested Saddam begin to broadcast the speeches of a radical Saudi cleric and that they jointly cooperate in attacks against foreign forces (i.e. U.S.) inside Saudi Arabia. [31] Saddam agreed to broadcast these speeches. ABC News writes: "...it is worth noting that eight months after the meeting — on November 13, 1995 — terrorists attacked Saudi National Guard Headquarters in Riyadh, killing 5 U.S. military advisers. The militants later confessed on Saudi TV to having been trained by Osama bin Laden." [32]

Iraqi-American journalist Ayad Rahim helped translate the above document. He comments:

Finally, to Iraqis, the notion that Saddam wouldn't deal with Islamists, because he was "secular," is laughable. Iraqis, who witnessed on television Saddam's dealings with any and all terrorists, have considered him the world's biggest terrorist and have seen him ride whichever wind would prevail for him. During his war with Iran, he "became" Shi'a -- among other things, posters of Muhammad's family tree were circulated showing Saddam and his sons as descendents of the Prophet. In the '90s, he had a revelation, and called for "a campaign of faithfulness," putting the country on a fundamentalist track. Alcohol was banned, extreme tribal ways were advocated for dealing with women, and hundreds of women were beheaded in public (allegedly for prostitution, but actually for dissent), and their heads posted in front of their homes. Then there was his constant championing of "the Palestinian cause" and pan-Arabism, while hosting and sponsoring terrorist groups and conferences of every stripe and flavor -- with, as we see in this document, a process of give-and-take, in the mix. [33]

Documentary evidence exists that Saddam encouraged and recruited terrorists from within his own military to strike U.S. interests. Operation Iraqi Freedom document BIAP 2003-000654 was translated by Joseph Shahda and generated an article in the Weekly Standard. [34] The document is a memo from the commander of an Iraqi Air Force base requesting a list of "the names of those who desire to volunteer for Suicide Mission to liberate Palestine and to strike American Interests." [35]

An Iraqi infantryman volunteered to join al-Qaeda and the Taliban. After being captured and detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the infantryman was questioned. A U.S. government "Summary of Evidence" seems to indicate cooperation between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi Intelligence Service. It says: "In August 1998, the detainee traveled to Pakistan with a member of Iraqi Intelligence for the purpose of blowing up the Pakistan, United States and British embassies with chemical mortars." [36]

Just prior to the U.S. invasion in 2003, Saddam is said to have reached out to al-Qaeda again to establish a terrorist style of warfare against the U.S. Hudayfa Azzam, the son of bin Laden's longtime mentor Abdullah Azzam, has said Saddam Hussein welcomed young al Qaeda members "with open arms" before the war, that they "entered Iraq in large numbers, setting up an organization to confront the occupation," and that the regime "strictly and directly" controlled their activities. [37]

Recent findings such as these showing a cooperative relationship between Iraqi Intelligence Service and al-Qaeda have persuaded 9/11 Commission member Bob Kerrey the 9/11 Commission underestimated the cooperative working relationhsip.[38]

For the next part of this article, go to User:Huysman/Sandbox2.

[edit] Notes and References