T. V. Paul
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Thazhakuzhyil Paul, M.Phil (JNU), Ph.D. (UCLA) is James McGill professor of International Relations in the department of Political Science at McGill University.
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[edit] Asymmetric Conflict Model
Paul has made major contributions to the study of war initiation by weaker powers. His model of asymmetric conflict attempts to explain offensive action on superior military powers by inferior aggressors, such as the Yom Kippur War initiated by Egypt and Syria against Israel. According to Paul, four factors are necessary for weak states to embark on an attack.
First, the weaker power must have limited aims. Due to its military shortfall, it cannot seek the destruction or complete submission of its opponent, but must instead have a specific and reasonable outcome in mind. This objective must be attainable with the resources the weaker power has at hand. The limited aims strategy seeks to quickly capture the objective, then defend it well, raising the cost of reconquest to the more powerful state above what it is willing to pay. In the Yom Kippur War example, Egypt did not attempt the destruction of Israel or even the full recapture of the Israeli-held Sinai Peninsula. It instead sought to capture only part of the Sinai and adequately defend it against an Israeli counter-offensive.
Second, a weaker power will require suitable weapons. Since a weaker power cannot compete with its more powerful rival in absolute terms, it will utilize weapons that give it a specific and crucial advantage in achieving its specific tactical aims. Egypt's air force had been destroyed by Israel in the Six-Day War, and had not been rebuilt by 1973. To counter Israeli air superioriity, Egypt used Soviet-supplied SAM-6 anti-aircraft weapon systems from the ground.
Third, weaker powers will attack a stronger opponent if it believes the prevailing system of alliances will support or enable their action. Since a smaller power risks a punishing retaliation, it must rely on the international system to restrain its opponent. In 1973, Israel's superpower ally, the United States, was entering a detente with Egypt's patron, the Soviet Union, and was therefore keen to prevent escalation. The U.S. was also fearful of Soviet intervention on behalf of Egypt in the event of escalation by Israel, which led it to put pressure on Israel refrain from an all-out attack in response. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger delayed weapons deliveries to Israel as a signal that the Israelis did not have carte blanche from the US in their response, and also to display dissatisfaction with Israel's participation in peace negotiations in the lead-up to 1973.
Finally, weaker powers that initate conflict will often have a weak, military regime. This allows greater foreign policy-making independence, since the regime does not face risk of being defeated in election and is thus less risk-averse. Regimes led by military elites tend also to view issues in military terms, and seek military solutions to them. This final aspect is a departure from the realist framework that otherwise characterizes Paul's model, since it does not assume all states act as unitary purposive actors, but are instead affected by the circumstances of policy decision-making.
[edit] Honors and awards
- Faculty of Arts Award for High Distinction in Research, McGill University, 2005
- “Popular Professor,” Maclean’s Guide to Canadian Universities, 2005
- Peace Scholar Award, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington D.C., 1989
[edit] Bibliography
- India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power Status (Cambridge University Press, 2002, with B. Nayar)
- Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000)
- Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers (Cambridge University Press, 1994)
- The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry (Cambridge University Press, 2005)
- Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (with J. Wirtz and M. Fortman, Stanford University Press, 2004)
- The Nation-State in Question (with G. John Ikenberry and John A. Hall, Princeton University Press, 2003)
- International Order and the Future of World Politics (with John A. Hall, Cambridge University Press, 1999)
- The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order (with Richard Harknett and James Wirtz, The University of Michigan Press, 1998 & 2000)
