Talk:George Henry Thomas
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[edit] Shiloh/Corinth
There was never any primary source indication that Grant felt resentment towards Thomas. As second-in-command of the Corinth effort underneath Halleck, Grant's authority over the original Army of the Tennessee superceded Thomas'. Grant considered resigning, but indications are that the pace of the movement and attacks from the press drove him to exasperation.
[edit] Thomas' Legacy
Grant wasn't responsible for rending Thomas' troops from him after Atlanta, Sherman was.
[edit] Nashville
The odds in Nashville were no more lopsided than what Grant faced in Virginia, or, what Sherman faced in Georgia. After Nashville, the Army of Tennessee was completely routed & was no longer an effective force. Perhaps I should have specified 'Union victory' when I said only battle studied. von Moltke was famous for his contempt of US Civil War battles, with the exception of Nashville. I knew a man who studied at St Cyr in the 1930s, &, Nashville & Brice's Crossroads were the only battles explored in detail. He studied more on his own, & could not understand why all the incompetents were installed over Thomas, until I mentioned the power of the Ohio Congressional delegation. Sherman for example. The man's performance at Chattanooga was disgraceful, yet he was promoted over Thomas. Grant/Sherman constantly denigrated him as "slow", as when he waited until he was certain that Hooker was engaged on the Conf left before ordering the assault on Missionary Ridge. The Union would have benefitted had Grant been "slow" at Cold Harbor. Thomas' accomplishments have never been adequately appreciated by the most prominent historians. -- Achilles 19:21 18 June 2005
- Interesting, thanks for the data. I am amazed by the Brice's Crossroads reference because it is such an obscure battle in the US. Anyway, the reason I said lopsided is that Thomas had a 5-3 advantage over Hood, but the latter's men were completely demoralized and enervated by Franklin and they had no clothing or supplies for a winter battle. It may have been McPherson who wrote that Hood mortally wounded his army at Franklin, but killed it at Nashville. I actually admire Thomas and think Grant treated him poorly, so we shouldn't argue too much. However, I would suggest that there are few historians who would rank him above either Sherman or Sheridan. Hal Jespersen 02:27, 19 Jun 2005 (UTC)
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- Thomas should be rated higher than, at least, Sherman. Sheridan was Thomas' subordinate throughout the Western war until he through in his lot with Grant after Chattanooga. I don't see how he could be considered superior. Thomas twice saved the Army from annihilation-- at Murfreesboro & Chickamauga, &, possibly, during the Atlanta campaign at Peachtree Creek. Had Sherman followed Thomas' suggestion at Snake Creek Gap, the Georgia campaign might well have ended in May 1864. I suppose it's like Spruance & Halsey-- the quiet professional is overlooked while the self-promoter is idealized. Although, historians aren't afraid to point out Halsey's mistakes. -- Achilles 07:41 19 June 2005
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- I agree Thomas was a superb battlefield commander, however he never had a chance to show if he had any strategic gift. The Civil War was full of generals who performed well in the subordinate role but fell apart when they had to conduct a large campaign by themselves. Sherman's fans have the Atlanta campaign to point to and Grant's have the Vicksburg campaign. Sheridan's can at least point to his actions in the Shenandoah Valley. In contrast, Thomas never took the initiative against Hood so it's difficult to say what he would have been capable of had he needed to take the initiative. That's probably why he's not placed in the same league as Sherman, Grant or even Sheridan. To do otherwise is to play "what if" games. Toiyabe 00:46, 13 December 2005 (UTC)
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I am unaware of any battle that was postponed until sides were evened. Greater odds are normally what Generals seek when attacking. Continuing the line of Hoods lower manpower, also should be noted that about 20,000 of Thomas's force were untrained recruits and many unarmed. In fact several thousand were sent back because of an inability to arm them.
Regarding Thomas's initiative against Hood, what do you call "Nashville'? Earlier in the Atlanta Campaign he fought off a Hood attack at the Peachtree Creek while Sherman passed the time away idling with McPherson unaware a battle was taking place.
As to Thomas's strategic abilities, I submit his version of the "Atlanta Campaign" found in the O. R.s
CHATTANOOGA, February 28, 1864.
Major-General GRANT,
Nashville : General Butterfield, by my direction, has recently examined the line between here and Nashville, and reports that he thinks 6,000 men will be sufficient to guard that line, two regiments of which force should be cavalry. From what I know of the road between Nashville and Decatur, 2,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry will be sufficient to protect that line. One thousand infantry will be sufficient to protect the line from Athens to Stevenson. Probably both lines of communication can be guarded by 6,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, a great portion of which should be made up from the local militia of Tennessee, or troops organized especially for the preservation of order in the State. I believe, if I can commence the campaign with the Fourteenth and Fourth Corps in front, with Howard's corps in reserve, that I can move along the line of the railroad and overcome all opposition as far, at least, as Atlanta. I should want a strong division of cavalry in advance. As soon as Captain Merrill returns from his reconnaissance along the railroad lines, I can give you a definite estimate of the number of troops required to guard the bridges along the road.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General, U. S. Volunteers
oneplez
[edit] Rock
I removed that reference to hiding behind a rock (which was a dead link in any event) because, while it may have been true that he hid behind a rock at one point, this is certainly not the derivation of his nickname, as the edit implied strongly. I know of no substantial biography of Thomas (beyond that campaign description from 1882) that make such a claim and I do not know if the context of that statement was appropriate. If you have a more recent reference that makes such a direct connection, bring it forward, but provide enough context to avoid misleading readers. Hal Jespersen 02:49, 20 March 2006 (UTC)
ʛ I have re-read the Chickamauga chapter in Cist's "The Army of the Cumberland" and found no reference to hiding behind rocks as the source of the 'Rock of Chickamauga' sobriquet. You were correct to remove the wording. Here is a link to the Cist book: [1] Dmercado 20:40, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
[edit] Photo of General Thomas in the Atlanta and Franklin/Nashville paragraph
The posted photo of Gen. George Thomas and a group of officers at a council of war near Ringgold, Georgia, May 5, 1864 is a great Civil War photo, but one thing to note is that it is not actually General Thomas at the table. It is General Richard W. Johnson.
Here is some info from the following web page: http://home.att.net/~dmercado/johnson_photo.htm
This photo is captioned as Gen. George Thomas and a group of officers at a council of war near Ringgold, Georgia, May 5, 1864 in several books. It purports to show General Thomas at a table during the Atlanta campaign. I never thought it was Thomas, as Thomas did not have a receding hairline and a close look at the uniform reveals the button pattern of a brigadier not a major general, but I had no idea of who the officer was. There were many generals in the picture that served under Thomas including Generals Jeff C. Davis, John Brannan, John H. King and William D. Whipple. Eventually I found the correct caption (referencing General R. W. Johnson at the table) in the book, Mapping the Civil War, featuring rare maps from the Library of Congress by Christopher Nelson with captions by Brian Pohanka, Fulcrum Publishing, Golden, CO ISBN 1-56373-001-4.
Apparently this mistake was made by someone at the Library of Congress years ago and never questioned until the research by Mr. Pohanka. –Dave Mercado Dmercado 04:48, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
