Hard problem of consciousness

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The term hard problem of consciousness, coined by David Chalmers^[1], refers to the "hard problem" of explaining why we have qualitative phenomenal experiences. It is contrasted with the "easy problems" of explaining the ability to discriminate, integrate information, report mental states, focus attention, etc.

Various formulations of the "hard problem":

• "Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all?"
• "How is it that some organisms are subjects of experience?"
• "Why does awareness of sensory information exist at all?"
• "Why do qualia exist?"
• "Why is there a subjective component to experience?"
• "Why aren't we philosophical zombies?"

[edit] References

1. ^ The Place of Mind, ed. Brian Cooney

[edit] See Also

• David Chalmers
• Mind body problem
• Philosophy of mind
• Qualia

[edit] External links

• Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness by David Chalmers
• Commentary on Chalmers: Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness by Daniel Dennett
• The Objective Consciousness Revisited - Understanding the Nature of Consciousness by Robert G. Heyward