L Jean Camp
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
| Born | Charlotte, NC |
|---|---|
| Field | privacy |
| Institution | Indiana University Bloomington |
| Alma mater | Carnegie Mellon |
| Known for | Trust and Risk in Internet Commerce, economics of security |
| Notable prizes | Senior Member of the IEEE |
Professor L Jean Camp (born Charlotte, North Carolina) is an Associate Professor at the Indiana University School of Informatics. She was previously an Associate Professor at Harvard's Kennedy School. Her area of work a combination of computer security and the social sciences. In particular she focuses upon studies of trust, privacy and economics of security.
She is the author of Trust and Risk in Internet Commerce, Economics of Identity Theft and editor of Economics of Information Security. She is the inventor of anonymous atomic transactions. Including these three books, she has written more than one hundred works.
She has a Bachelor's degree in Mathematics from UNC Charlotte and a Bachelor's degree in Electrical Engineering from UNC Charlotte in 1989, after which she worked in Catawba Nuclear Facility. She returned to the academy after a year, earning a Masters in Electrical Engineering from UNC Charlotte in 1991. She then moved to CMU to complete her Ph.D. in Engineering and Public Policy.
[edit] Research
Her current research is on leveraging social identities and personal history to create digital context. In contrast to meta-data, tagging, and linking each person creates history intrinsically in every (in)action. Unfortunately while individuals people create histories, individuals are the least likely to have access. De.li.cio.us can track your history as can Google. This work leverages social identities and history to create usable credentails. See Net Trust. Individuals can only use their own information and histories if they turn all this data over to a third party for processing.
A related topic is on proof of work. Proof of work is a beautiful mathematical idea in its initial instantiation but it is not currently working. Under what conditions will it work, and how much should identity be linked to make it work? The answer to this is that the great identity-centric network-wide POW solutions are doomed to failure: Domain Name Keys, and DNSSec cannot solve spam. Yet individuals using their own histories for white lists can build a network that removes the profit from spam.
The economics of spam is undeniably related to the economics of vulnerabilities. When does it make sense to patch in economic terms? The answer depends on the cummulative risk probability of vulnerabilities. Initial studies indicate that vulnerabilites have very long tails, and the proability of having an unpatched vulnerability exploited tends to one over time.
Bringing these disparate threads together is the economics of identity.
[edit] Bibliography
- Trust and Risk in Internet Commerce
- Economics-Identity-Theft-Avoidance-Possible/dp/0387345892 Economics of Identity Theft
- Economics of Information Security
- [http://[www.usenix.org/publications/library/ proceedings/ec96/summaries/node20.html Anonymous Atomic Transactions]]
- Net Trust
