Operation Medak Pocket
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Operation Medak Pocket | |||||||
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Part of the Croatian War of Independence | |||||||
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Combatants | |||||||
Croatia | Republic of Serbian Krajina | ||||||
Commanders | |||||||
Janko Bobetko, Petar Stipetić |
Mile Novaković | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
Over 2,500 soldiers, T-72 tanks, Large numbers of artillery |
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Casualties | |||||||
27 killed and wounded (estimate) [1] |
38 Serbs killed, 50+ wounded |
Croatian War of Independence |
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Plitvice Lakes – Borovo Selo – Vukovar (Battle, Massacre) – The Barracks – Dubrovnik – Gospić – Otkos 10 – Škabrnja – Orkan 91 – Voćin – Miljevci – Maslenica – Medak Pocket – Flash – Zagreb – Storm |
Operation Medak Pocket (Croatian: Medački džep) was a military operation undertaken by the Croatian Army between September 9 – September 17, 1993 in which a salient around the small village of Medak in the south-central Lika region of Croatia, then under the control of the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina, was attacked by Croatian forces.
The Croatian offensive temporarily succeeded in expelling rebel Serb forces from the pocket after several days of fighting. However, the operation ended in controversy after a skirmish with United Nations peacekeepers and the Croatian forces were accused of having committed serious war crimes against local Serb civilians. Although the outcome of the battle was a tactical victory for the Croatians, it became a serious political liability for the Croatian government and international political pressure forced a withdrawal to the previous ceasefire lines.
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[edit] Background
Much of the interior of the Lika region of southern Croatia was captured by Krajina Serb(RSK) forces and the Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army during 1991, as Croatia moved towards independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (see History of modern Croatia for more on this period). The region saw heavy fighting throughout the summer and autumn of 1991, during which Croatian Serb rebels established the self-proclaimed (but internationally unrecognised) Republic of Serb Krajina. Almost all of the non-Serb population in the Serb-held area was killed, expelled or forced to seek refuge in government held areas). Serious human rights violations were also perpetrated against Serbs in the Croatian government-held parts of the region, most notably the Gospić massacre of October 1991. A ceasefire was agreed following the fall of the town of Vukovar at the end of the Battle of Vukovar in November 1991 and a United Nations peacekeeping force (UNPROFOR) was inserted to police the armistice lines.
Despite this, sporadic sniping and shelling continued to take place between the two sides. Gospić, which was close to the front lines, was repeatedly subjected to shellfire from the Serbian Army of Krajina (SVK). The town was of great importance in securing lines of communication between Dalmatia and the rest of Croatia. Much of the shelling took place from the Serb-controlled Medak Pocket, an area of high ground approximately four to five kilometres wide and five to six kilometres long which consisted of the localities of Divoselo, Čitluk and part of Počitelj plus numerous small hamlets. The pocket was primarily a rural area with a combination of forest and open fields. It was fairly lightly inhabited before the attack, with about 400 Serb civilians residing in the area [2] and was held by units of the SVK's 15th Lika Corps.
The pocket adjoined Sector South, one of the four United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in Croatia. It was not actually in the UNPA but lay just outside in a so-called "pink zone", or disputed area, patrolled by UNPROFOR peacekeepers. Prior to the Medak Pocket offensive, Croatian government forces had launched several relatively small-scale attacks to retake rebel Serb-held territory in "pink zones" at the Miljevci Plateau in June 1992 and the area of the Maslenica bridge in northern Dalmatia in January 1993[2]. It has been alleged that the timing of the Maslenica and Medak offensives was owed to the political imperatives of Croatian President Franjo Tuđman, who was facing political difficulties following Croatia's intervention in the war in Bosnia.[3]
[edit] The offensive
[edit] 9–14 September
Croatian forces began their offensive at approximately 06:00 on 9 September 1993. The attack involved around 2,500 troops drawn from the Croatian Army's Gospić Operational Zone, including the 9th Guards Brigade, 111th Brigade, Gospić Home Guard Battalion, Lovinac Home Guard Battalion and Special Police Units of the Croatian Ministry of the Interior (MUP). The Croatians were largely armed with standard-issue Warsaw Pact equipment captured from the Yugoslav People's Army, including T-72 tanks, as well as large numbers of artillery pieces and an array of small arms.
The SVK was taken by surprise and fell back. After two days of fighting the Croatian forces had taken control of Divoselo, Čitluk and part of Počitelj. The salient was pinched out with the new front line running just in front of the village of Medak. In retaliation for the offensive, Serb forces began to use long-range artillery to shell the city of Karlovac and fired FROG-7 ballistic missiles into the Croatian capital Zagreb.[4]
The SVK launched counter-attacks which retook some of the captured territory and brought the Croatian advance to a halt. It also threatened to attack 20 or 30 more targets throughout Croatia unless the captured territory was handed back. The two sides exchanged heavy artillery fire during 12–13 September, with the UN recording over 6,000 detonations in the Gospić-Medak area. On 13 and 14 September, Croatian Air Force MiG-21 aircraft attacked SVK artillery and rocket batteries in Banija and Kurdun but one aircraft was shot down near Vrginmost.[5]
[edit] 15–17 September
The offensive attracted strong international criticism and, facing political and military pressure at home and from abroad, the Croatian government agreed to a ceasefire. The United Nations commander in Croatia, General Jean Cot, arranged and mediated ceasefire discussions.[5] On 15 September a ceasefire agreement was signed by General Mile Novaković, on behalf of the Serbian side and Major-General Petar Stipetić, on behalf of the Croatian side. The agreement required the Croatian forces to withdraw to the start lines of 9 September, and for Serb forces to withdraw from the pocket and remain out thereafter. The Croatian withdrawal was scheduled for 1200 on 15 September.[2]
In order to oversee the withdrawal and protect local civilians, UNPROFOR sent 875 troops of the Second Battalion of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (known as the "Princess Pats") to move into the pocket, accompanied by two French Army mechanized units. The UN forces, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel James Calvin, were instructed to interpose themselves between the Serb and Croatian forces.
The Canadians were among the best armed and armoured troops at UNPROFOR's disposal, making them a natural choice for this dangerous task. They were equipped with M-113 armoured personnel carriers and carried a mix of C-6 medium machine guns, C-7 automatic rifles, C-9 light machine guns, and 84 mm Carl Gustav anti-tank rockets. The attached Heavy Weapons Support Company brought 81 mm mortars and a specially fitted APC armed with anti-tank guided missiles.[4]
The Croatian forces decided to oppose the Canadians when they arrived at the pocket, arguing that they had not received authorisation from Zagreb. When the Canadians began constructing a fortified position, the Croatians fired over five hundred artillery shells at them. The barrage was sporadic, however, and the Canadians successfully used breaks in the shelling to repair and reinforce their positions. In the end, only four Canadians were wounded by the attack.
The UN forces subsequently took control of abandoned Serbian positions but again came under fire from the Croatian lines, with the attackers using rocket propelled grenades and anti-aircraft guns. The UN troops then dug in at their positions and returned fire. As night fell the Croatians attempted several flanking manoeuvres but the Canadians responded with sniper fire against the Croatian infantry. The French used 22 mm cannon fire to suppress Croatian heavy weapons. Although this destroyed only few of the heavy weapons, the aggressive UN response convinced the Croatians to only use their strongest weapons sporadically. They did not deploy their most powerful weapons, such as their tanks, apparently fearing that the UN would use anti-tank missiles and air support against them. [4] The Canadian commander at Medak, Colonel Jim Calvin, later reported that "27 of [the Croatian Army's] members were killed or wounded during the fire fights with my battle group during the 14 days in Medak" [1]
The clash was not much publicised at the time but Calvin and his troops were decorated in 2002 for their bravery. However, the Croatian newspaper Nacional published a report claiming that "the armed conflict between the Croatian and Canadian forces in operation Medak Pocket from 9 to 17 September 1993 never happened" and that the Canadians had fired "no more than a couple of shots into the night."[6] This was strongly denied by the Canadian Department of National Defence and decorated Canadian Army veterans who served at Medak.[7] In Canada, the alleged event has been referred to as "Canada's secret battle", while in Croatia this event is denied.
For their part, the Croatian authorities, both civil and military, during the aftermath of the skirmish with the UN forces and in the years that followed, have never admitted that any serious battle with the UNPROFOR forces in the Medak area ever occurred and claim that the Canadian forces' version of events is politically motivated. No relatives or family members of the Croatian soldiers who were killed in the operation are known to have appeared in the Croatian media with their personal stories or confessions.
In the aftermath of the clash, the Croatians withdrew to their original start positions but deliberately prolonged the process, delaying the UN advance at each checkpoint and roadblock. The withdrawal was finally verified as having been completed by 1800 on 17 September, bringing the offensive to an end. However, it was already clear by then that serious war crimes had been committed by the Croatians during the withdrawal. The UN forces found widespread evidence of acts of murder, ethnic cleansing and other crimes.[4]
[edit] War crimes investigations
The UN immediately began an investigation into the events at Medak. The task was hampered by the systematic destruction that had been carried out by the withdrawing Croatians. The UN forces found that (in the words of an official Canadian study on the incident) "each and every building in the Medak Pocket had been leveled to the ground", in a total of eleven villages and hamlets. [4]
Investigators from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) determined that 29 Serb civilians had been unlawfully killed and many others had suffered serious injuries; many of the victims were women and elderly people. Five Serb soldiers who had been captured or wounded were said to have been murdered. More were thought to have been killed, but the bodies were said to have been removed or destroyed by the Croatians. [4] In addition, Serb-owned property was systematically looted and destroyed to render the area uninhabitable. Personal belongings, household goods, furniture, housing items, farm animals, farm machinery and other equipment were looted or destroyed, and wells were polluted to make them unusable. An estimated 164 homes and 148 barns and outbuildings were burned down or blown up. Much of the destruction was said to have taken place during the 48 hours between the ceasefire being signed and the withdrawal being completed. [2] [8]
Several members of the Croatian military were subsequently charged with war crimes. The highest-ranking indictee was General Janko Bobetko. He was indicted for war crimes by the ICTY in 2001 [9] but died before the case was heard by the court, and in consequence the trial was cancelled.
The wider area was under the jurisdiction of the Gospić Military District, commanded at the time by Brigadier Rahim Ademi. He was also indicted by the ICTY and was transferred there in 2001. In 2004, General Mirko Norac – who was already serving a 12-year jail sentence in Croatia for his role in the Gospić massacre – was also indicted and transferred to The Hague.The two cases were joined in July 2004 and in November 2005 the Tribunal agreed to a Croatian government request to transfer the case back to Croatia, for trial before a Croatian court. [10]
[edit] Aftermath
After the offensive, most of the villages in the area were destroyed and depopulated. Even today, the region is still largely abandoned, though some Serbs have since returned to it.[11] The region remained, in effect, neutral ground between the warring sides until near the end of the war. Part of it was recaptured by the Croatians during Operation Flash in May 1995 and the Croatian Army took the rest of it on 4 August 1995 during Operation Storm, which ended in the defeat of the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina.
The Medak Pocket offensive can be considered a tactical victory for the Croats in that it reduced the Serb threat against Gospić and permanently eliminated the possibility of splitting Croatia in half as had been planned. The goal having been achieved, Croatian Army did not, at the time, press any further since the geopolitical and strategic situation was not ideal for a major offensive to fully control the region. The offensive also exposed serious weaknesses in the Croatian Army's command, control, and communications, which had also been a problem in Operation Maslenica earlier in the year.
The operation caused serious political difficulties for the Croatian government, which was heavily criticised abroad for its actions at Medak. The well-publicised accusations of war crimes, along with the Muslim-Croat bloodshed in Bosnia, led to Croatia's image being severely tarnished; in many quarters abroad, the country was viewed as having moved from being a victim to an aggressor.[12][13] It also provided a major propaganda boost for the Serbian side.
The war crimes committed during the operation damaged the credibility of UNPROFOR as well, as its forces had been unable to prevent them despite being in the vicinity at the time. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN Secretary-General, admitted that
- "The 9 September 1993 Croatian destruction of three villages in the Medak pocket has, despite the robust action taken by UNPROFOR to secure the withdrawal of Croatian forces, further increased the mistrust of the Serbs towards UNPROFOR and has led to the reaffirmation of their refusal to disarm. In turn, this refusal to disarm, as required in the United Nations peace-keeping plan, has prevented UNPROFOR from implementing other essential elements of the plan, particularly facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons to their places of origins in secure conditions."[14]
[edit] Notes
- ^ a b "Testimony to the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs", April 27, 1998
- ^ a b c d International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor v. Rahim ADEMI and Mirko NORAC — Consolidated Indictment
- ^ Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War, p. 291. Yale University Press, 1997
- ^ a b c d e f Lee A. Windsor, "The Medak Pocket"
- ^ a b David C. Isby, Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990–1995, p. 269
- ^ Nacional, December 4, 2002
- ^ "The Medak Pocket", Army.ca forums
- ^ "Final report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, Annex VII, Medak investigation", 28 December 1994
- ^ The prosecutor of the tribunal against Janko Bobetko. un.org. UN.org. Retrieved on 14 April 2006.
- ^ "Rahim Ademi and Mirko Norac case transferred to Croatia", ICTY press release of 1 November 2005
- ^ "Memories live on for Croatia's victims", BBC News, 23 October 2002
- ^ Ivo Bicanic, "Croatia", in Balkan Reconstruction, p. 168. Routledge, 2001
- ^ Adam LeBor, Milosevic: A Biography, p. 224. Yale University Press, 2004
- ^ UN Secretary-General, Report S/1994/300, 16 March 1994
[edit] External links
- Case Study - The Medak Pocket by Miroslav Međimorec
- Professionalism Under Fire: Canadian Implementation of the Medak Pocket Agreement, Croatia 1993, by Lee A. Windsor
- ICTY - Indictment of General Rahim Ademi
- ICTY - Indictment of General Janko Bobetko
- The Medak investigation from the final report of the United Nations Commission of Experts United Nations investigation
- List of additional resources by Miroslav Međimorec
- Firefight at the Medak Pocket Maclean's magazine
- Honor for our troops in Canada's secret battle Article by Toronto Star
- Opinion of USA Department of State for this matter