R. v. Lifchus

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

R. v. Lifchus

Hearing: May 29, 1997
Judgment: September 18, 1997


Full case name:	Her Majesty The Queen v. William Lifchus
Citations:	[1997] 3 S.C.R. 320

Court membership

Chief Justice: Antonio Lamer
Puisne Justices: Gérard La Forest, Claire L'Heureux-Dubé, John Sopinka, Charles Gonthier, Peter Cory, Beverley McLachlin, Frank Iacobucci, John C. Major

Reasons given

Majority by: Cory J.
Joined by: Lamer C.J. and Sopinka, McLachlin, Iacobucci and Major JJ.
Concurrence by: L’Heureux-Dubé J.
Joined by: La Forest and Gonthier JJ.

R. v. Lifchus, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320 is a leading Supreme Court of Canada decision on the legal basis of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for criminal law. Cory J. outlined several core principles the reasonable doubt standard and provided a list of points that must be explained to a jury when they are to consider the standard.

1 Background
2 Opinion of the Court
- 2.1 Guidelines
3 Aftermath
4 External link

[edit] Background

Lifchus was a stockbroker who misrepresented the value of a bond in his personal margin account to his employer, defrauding them of a substantial amount of money. He was charged with fraud and theft of over $1000.

Lifchus was convicted of fraud before a jury. He appealed on the ground that the jury was misinstructed about the standard of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt".

There were four issues before the Court:

must the trial judge provide the jury with an explanation of the expression "reasonable doubt"?
if so, how should this case amount to a misdirection on th meaning of "reasonable doubt"?
If the charge in this case was insufficient, should the Court give effect to s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code?

[edit] Opinion of the Court

The Court found in favour of Lifchus and ordered a new trial. The opinion of the Court was written by Cory J. with a minority opinion by L'Heureux-Dubé J.

Cory used the case as an opportunity to describe the significance of the "reasonable doubt" standard. He described it as a fundamental principle in criminal justice and was intertwined with the presumption of innocence. As such, the description of the meaning to the jury must be done very carefully.

[edit] Guidelines

Cory provides a series of principles upon which a trial judge must formulate their definition of "reasonable doubt" to a jury.

It should be explained that:

the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is inextricably intertwined with that principle fundamental to all criminal trials, the presumption of innocence;

the burden of proof rests on the prosecution throughout the trial and never shifts to the accused;

a reasonable doubt is not a doubt based upon sympathy or prejudice;

rather, it is based upon reason and common sense;

it is logically connected to the evidence or absence of evidence;

it does not involve proof to an absolute certainty; it is not proof beyond any doubt nor is it an imaginary or frivolous doubt; and

more is required than proof that the accused is probably guilty -- a jury which concludes only that the accused is probably guilty must acquit.

On the other hand, certain references to the required standard of proof should be avoided. For example:

describing the term "reasonable doubt" as an ordinary expression which has no special meaning in the criminal law context;

inviting jurors to apply to the task before them the same standard of proof that they apply to important, or even the most important, decisions in their own lives;

equating proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" to proof "to a moral certainty";

qualifying the word "doubt" with adjectives other than "reasonable", such as "serious", "substantial" or "haunting", which may mislead the jury; and

instructing jurors that they may convict if they are "sure" that the accused is guilty, before providing them with a proper definition as to the meaning of the words "beyond a reasonable doubt".