R. v. Skinner
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| R. v. Skinner | |||||||||
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| Hearing: December 5, 1997 Judgment: February 19, 1998 |
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| Court membership | |||||||||
| Reasons given | |||||||||
| Majority by: Dickson C.J. Joined by: La Forest and Sopinka JJ. Concurrence by: Lamer J. Dissent by: Wilson J. Joined by: L'Heureux-Dubé J. |
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| Laws applied | |||||||||
| Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 000 | |||||||||
R. v. Skinner, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1235, is a leading constitutional decision of the Supreme Court of Canada on the freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
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[edit] Background
Dorman Skinner was arrested while trying to proposition an undercover police officer. He was charged with "communicating in a public place for the purpose of obtaining the sexual services of a prostitute" contrary to s. 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code. He was convicted at trial. On appeal Skinner argued that the provision of the Criminal Code violated his right to freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter. The Court of Appeal agreed and found a violation that could not be saved under section 1 of the Charter. It was also suggested that the provision may also violate the right to freedom of association under section 2(d) of the Charter.
The issues before the Supreme Court was whether section 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code violated sections 2(b) and 2(d) of the Charter. If so, whether the provision is justifiable under section 1 of the Charter.
In a four to two decision, the Court overturned the ruling of the Court of Appeal. It held that the provision violated section 2(b) but was saved under section 1, and did not violate section 2(d).
[edit] Opinion of the Court
The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Brian Dickson. He first found that section 195.1(1)(c) did not violate the freedom of association. He stated that the law targets expressive content alone and does not relate to association. The provision does not depend on whether there was an agreement for exchange between consenting individual. Though the law may prevent communication for certain commercial activities it is not sufficient to invoke the freedom of association.
In considering the freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter, Dickson applies the same reasoning from the earlier Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), which found that section 195.1(1)(c) of the Code violated the freedom of expression but was saved under section 1.
[edit] Dissent
Justice Bertha Wilson, supported by Claire L'Heureux-Dubé, dissented. She, like Dickson, pointed to the Criminal Code reference decision where she had found that the provision violated section 2(b) of the Charter but could not be saved under section 1.
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