Talk:Redundancy theory of truth
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[edit] Ordinary Language Philosophy
Two questions. First, in ordinary language philosphy are "Snow is white" and "Snow is white is true" the same? I think that in linguistic pragmatics, which I recognize is not the subject of this article, the two statements are different. The first simply states a fact, the second implies re-assertion or assertion in the face of a perceived doubter. They also differ in the temporal focus of a likely listenter. The first states an obvious fact, and the listener focuses on what comes next after this statement; she expects this to be a building block in a developing conversation. The second states an obvious fact, but the listener focuses on what must have happened earlier in the conversation to lead the speaker to make an emphatic (re-)statement of an obvious fact; he expects that for some reason, this apparently obvious, indubitable fact has become doubted.
Second, would it make sense to make some reference to the way ordinary language philosophy differs (might differ?) from other branches on this issue of disquotationality/redundancy? I certainly am not up to the task, but my thoughts on this might encourage someone who's qualified to do so. Interlingua 15:11, 15 February 2006 (UTC)
