Rhodesian Light Infantry
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The Rhodesian Light Infantry, or R.L.I., was a regular army infantry regiment in the Rhodesian army. Composed only of white recruits, the First Battalion Rhodesian Light Infantry was formed within the army of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1961 in Bulawayo.
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[edit] Origin
The battalion's nucleus was formed from the short-lived Number One Training Unit, which had been raised to provide personnel for a white infantry battalion as well as for C Squadron 22 (Rhodesian) SAS and the Selous Scouts (the Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment, not the special forces regiment of the same name - although Ron Reid-Daly, Commanding Officer of the Selous Scouts, had been an officer and non-commissioned officer in the R.L.I.).
1 R.L.I. included 100 recruits from South Africa, and was trained by instructors seconded from the British Army; shortly afterwards the regiment moved to its HQ at Cranborne Barracks near the capital, Salisbury.
As well as Rhodesian-born soldiers, the Rhodesian Light Infantry (and 3 Commando in particular) attracted Englishmen, Irishmen, Scots, Welsh, Americans, Norwegians, South Africans, Portuguese, Brazilians, Australians, New Zealanders, West Germans, and Canadians, plus a host of other nationalities. However, most of these deserted whithin a few months, or were found unsuitable and rejected from the battalion. The great majority of serving members were Rhodesian of which at least half were conscripts.
The battalion was organised into four company size sub-units called 'Commandos', numbered One to Four. In theory each commando had five 'Troops' (platoon size structures), though much of the time there were only four. The average fighting strength of a Commando was about 70. The rank structure was; Trooper, Lance-corporal, Corporal, Sergeant etc. All ranks were called 'troopies' by the Rhodesian media.
[edit] Operations
The R.L.I. was at the forefront of the so-called Bush War or Second Chimurenga, the armed struggle by nationalist guerrillas against the white minority government of Rhodesia from the late 1960s until majority rule in 1980, when the country became known as Zimbabwe. This conflict is an excellent example of classic 'counter-insurgency' warfare - so called 'guerrilla war'.
[edit] Fire Force
The R.L.I.'s most characteristic deployment was the 'fire force' reaction operation. This was an operational assault or response composed of, usually, a first wave of 32 troopers carried to the scene by three helicopters and one DC-3 Dakota, with a command/gun helicopter and a light attack-aircraft in support. The RLI became extremely adept at this type of military operation.
A Commando would be based at an airfield with usually four helicopters, one DC-3 Dakota and the Cessna. The helicopters were Alouette Mk IIIs (in 1979 a few Bell UH-1s were used) of which one was equipped with a 20mm cannon and seating arrangement for the commander of the operation who was usually the officer in charge of the Commando. This machine/entity was called the 'k-car' with a crew of three (pilot, gunner, and commander). The other three helicopters were known as 'g-cars' and carried four 'troopies' along with the pilot and his helper (technician - called 'tech' by the troopies). This carrying capacity of the g-car dictated the combat organisation of the commando, which was called a 'stop'. Stop-1 was assigned to the first g-car, stop-2 to the second, stop-3 to the third. Stop-4 to stop-8 were for the Dakota.
Each stop had four troopies. One was the commander, with a radio, a FN rifle, 100 rounds (7.62 × 51 mm NATO), several types of grenade. One was the machine gunner, with a FN machine-gun and carrying 400 rounds. The other two were riflemen with a FN and 100 rounds, grenades, rifle grenades and medical equipment. By 1979 one of these two was issued a radio.
The Dak carried five stops. Two on the port side, three on the starboard. Apart from the parachutes the equipment was identical to the heli-stops. The machine-gunner had to jump with his machine-gun strapped to his side and carrying 400 rounds.
These eight stops (32 men) were deemed the 'first wave'. The fireforce (of which there were only three most of the time) had responsibility for huge swathes of the country (tens of thousands of square miles). Any sightings of the enemy within the fire-force zone was reported and a siren sounded in the base. The first wave rushed to their air-vehicles, whilst usually the second wave rushed to the lorries, though if it was nearby they were held at the airfield to be picked up by the g-cars. Stops/troopies took turns in heli/para/first/second wave after each scene. Sometimes there was a third wave if numbers permitted, though this was rarely needed.
The most important factors in a fireforce operation were firstly the reliability of the sighting of the enemy and secondly the skill of the fireforce commander. In the first case the majority of succesful contacts were due to the skills of the Selous Scouts (many of which were former enemy). They alone had the capacity to insert observation patrols (OP's) into the bush without being noticed by the inhabitants. In the second case the difficulty of commanding the scene was extreme and good fireforce commanders were highly prized by the troopies.
Although the number of operational parachute jumps was remarkable (the most by any one battalion), the majority of troopies were carried into action by the 'helios'. In these fireforce operations the battalion killed or captured around 3000 of the enemy (the vast majority being ZANLA - Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army) in the last three years of the war, whilst losing less than three hundred killed and wounded (not counting those casualties incurred in patrolling or external ops).
[edit] Other Operations
In addition to the fireforce, the four Commandos were often used in patrolling actions, mostly inside Rhodesia but sometimes in Zambia and Mozambique. In these operations troopies were required to carry well over 100lbs of equipment for five to tens days for one patrol and come back and repeat, for weeks, sometimes months. Also, they parcipitated in many attacks on enemy camps in above countries. In a few of these attacks most or all of the battalion was involved.
[edit] The Importance of Air Power
Fire Force without air power is inconceivable. As the enemy did not have air power and was unable to shoot down significant numbers of aircraft (remarkably few helicopters, and no Dakotas, were shot down in this conflict), Fire Force operations were invincible as long as the infantry performed correctly. Just the movement of the K-car and G-cars around the scene drowned out the sound of the approach of the attackers (there was no shouting or talking in the sweeps) so that often the troopies surprised the defenders, in effect ambushing them.
The terrain varied wildly, from villages surrounded by open fields on flat plains, to dense vegetation amongst huge boulders on mountain slopes. Usually there was plenty of cover. Where the enemy ran and a stop had been placed by the Fire Force commander in the right place (often on a stream bed) the hunt was usually easy. The difficult thing was to walk up to the enemy hiding in a house or cave or behind a boulder and kill or capture him. Many a troopie clawing through obstacles found himself very suddenly a few feet away from another armed man he was supposed to kill or capture. Though the event was shocking (and often results in one or more men being killed), it is far more efficient than firing or dropping ordnance from air and overall reduces civilian casualties.
In the last three years of the war (1977 to 1979) a minimum of one thousand civilians were killed in RLI Fire Force operations. Around half of these were killed by the K-car in error. Had more fire power been available to the Rhodesian Air Force and used, more civilians would have been killed, with fewer RLI and ZANLA fatalities.
[edit] Conclusion
The Rhodesian Light Infantry was an outstanding example of infantry capable of performing any task ordered, no matter the means of transport (whether crossing the Zambezi river in little boats, walking long miles with huge weights, or riding high in G-cars and Daks), no matter what type of operation. Though the enemy was always at a disadvantage in having no radios or air support, the stops always continued in seeking them out even when all the helicopters had to return to base for fuel.
Technical notes
The Cessna referred above was the 'Skymaster', a twin-engine propeller push and pull (with twin booms). Often not available but usually a component of the Fireforce. Armed with (usually) two 30mm rocket pods and two small napalm-bombs (made in Rhodesia and called 'Fran-tan'). This machine was not a killer of humans but was greatly appreciated by the troopies.
The parachutes were known as 'Saviac Mk1's, of U.S manafacture. They were extremely reliable. Overhead static line attachment in the Dak.
Enemy Armaments
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No more than half of ZANLA combatents were armed with AK-47's, mostly supplied from Soviet Sattelite states (none from Russia). At least half had SK rifles(semi-automatic), all from The Chinese People's Republic (which also sent some AK-47's). Both weapons used the same round which had half the power of the 'long' 7.62 round used by the troopies.
[edit] Zimbabwe
Following majority rule, the regiment was disbanded on 1 November 1980. A nucleus of former R.L.I. personnel remained to train and form the First Zimbabwe Commando Battalion of the Zimbabwe National Army. The regimental statue, "The Troopie", was spirited out of Zimbabwe to South Africa, and is now held at the British Empire and Commonwealth Museum in Bristol, United Kingdom.
[edit] External links
- The Rhodesian Light Infantry
- The Rhodesian Light Infantry - Members Listing
- Fireforce Operations
- Rhodesian and South African Military History: An extensive collection of histories and analysis of Rhodesian and South African military operations, to the early 1980s
[edit] See also
[edit] References
- Bond, Geoffrey. The incredibles: the story of the 1st Battalion, the Rhodesian Light Infantry. Salisbury: Sarum Imprint (distributed by Kingstons), 1977. ISBN 0-7974-0233-0.
- Cocks, C. J. Fireforce: one man's war in the Rhodesian Light Infantry. South Africa: St. Albans: Covos; Verulam, 2000. ISBN 0-620-21573-9
