Talk:Symbol
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 |
This article is supported by the Sociology WikiProject, which gives a central approach to Sociology and related subjects on Wikipedia. Please participate by editing the article Symbol, or visit the project page for more details on the projects. |
| Start | This article has been rated as Start-Class on the quality scale. |
| High | This article has been rated as High-importance on the importance scale. |
Contents |
[edit] Opening Definition
The article begins:
"Symbols are objects, characters, figures, sounds or colors used to represent abstract ideas or concepts."
Not necessarily abstact, surely? e.g. in Chemistry "K" is a symbol standing for potassium. All symbols are conventional. So why do we not say simply:
"A symbol is something which by convention stands for another: (compare Sign) ".
Views? --Philogo 01:21, 31 January 2007 (UTC)
[edit] Merge with Sign
Regarding the issues raised previously re signs and symbols. We should surely seek to clarify the distinction. Whereas all symbols are conventional, some signs are natural and some conventional.Eg a cough is a natural sign for a cold; a red flag is a conventional sign for danger. It is relativly easy to distinguish symbol from a natural sign; red cabbage leaves are a natural sign of acidic soil, but to my knowledge not used as a symbol of such. There is no reason howeverver why a natural sign might not be adopted by convention as a symbol, as a skull is a natural sign of death but we might adopt it as a symbol of death. It takes a little more care to distinguish a conventional sign from a (conventional) symbol. A red traffic light is a conventional sign indicating the requirment to come to a halt, but we would not say it is a symbol standing for the requirement to halt. A heart is (in some cultures) a symbol of Love, but it is not surely a sign of love. On the other hand is it obvious that an 'X' is a multipliction sign rather than a multiplication symbol.
If sign and symbol are often confused, and often something may be both a sign and a symbol at the same time, then it would be the purpose of Wikipedia to clarify and distingush for the sake of the reader. --Philogo 01:09, 31 January 2007 (UTC)
Does anyone object to the idea of merging this content with the Sign page, and making Symbol a redirect to the merged page?
Gecko 20:27, 2 Apr 2004 (UTC)
I strongly object. Sign and symbol are NOT synonyms, although they have SOME senses in common. No one would say that cough is a "symbol" of influenza, or that the Chrismas tree is a "sign" of Christmas. Rather, this article must point out that one of the meanings of "symbol" is a "sign" (specifically, a "grapheme") usually stading for anything other than a sound. Jorge Stolfi 12:29, 11 Apr 2004 (UTC)
As I point out in Talk:Sign, coughing does symbolize influenza, and a cross on a church is a sign of Christiantity. What do you see as the difference between a symbol and a sign?
You seem to be arguing that only graphemes can be signs. It's true that grapheme is a kind of sign, but by no means is it the only kind of sign there is. For example, the call of a bird can signify its existence -- and is therefore a sign. No grapheme required.
Gecko 17:10, 11 Apr 2004 (UTC)
Gecko, methinks you are confusing philosophy with reality with language. (I myself have slipped down that slope before...)
Language first: in English these words cannot be used interchangeably, so they are not synonyms. For one thing, "symbol" is almost always used for things whose meaning is established and retrieved by convention, even when that convention is based on physical association; whereas a "sign" (in the sense of "evidence") is almost always used when the meaning is established and retrieved by logical or physical necessity. Thus cough may be a "symbol" of influenza in a syrup advertisement or a medical brochure, but it is a "sign" to a medical doctor. A wooden crucifix burned in a Satanic ritual is still a "symbol" of Cristianity but hardly a "sign" (evidence) of it.
Conversely one may use "signs" (hand gestures), but not a "symbols", to show the way to the restroom or speak to the deaf; but bowing, although it is a "sign of" respect, is not a "sign" in this sense. The "signs" that are placed along roads or afixed to walls may have "symbols" printed on them, but are not "symbols" themselves. The "sign" of the number 3.1415926... is positive, whereas its "symbol" is π. A yellow spectral line is a "sign" of sodium, but is "symbol" is "Na".
This may not seem logical, but that is how the language *is*. You may wish that the two words were synonymous, but they just aren't. In summary, "Symbol" almost always means "anything that, by convention, can represent something else in information communication or processing"; whereas "sign" has several very distinct senses, one of them being "evidence" (idependent of whether there are humans, computers, or conventions involved), another one is "hand gesture", another one is "which side of zero", yet another one is "non-phonetic glyph"; and only the last one is a (special case of) "symbol". (Except, however, that an unintelligible pen mark may still be a "sign" but not properly a "symbol"...)
Now, semioticists may have decided to redefine the word "sign" to encompass the common sense of "symbol" and perhaps some more. That is their right, just as topologists redefine "space", graph theorists redefine "edge", and chemists redefine "phase". However that redefinition should be confined to the semiotics and sign (semiotics) pages, and has no right to take over the general sign and symbol pages.
As for the philosophy: You seem to be saying that semioticians expand sign (semiotics) to include not only symbol (things that have conventional meanings to humans) but also sign (evidence), e.g. the syntoms of a disease or the spectral lines of an element, or perhaps even any kind of physical effect whatsoever. ((unwarranted sarcasm deleted Jorge Stolfi 16:15, 12 Apr 2004 (UTC)))
All the best, Jorge Stolfi 19:23, 11 Apr 2004 (UTC)
Your argument here is (frankly) so absurd that I don't even know where to begin. If you knew much at all about symbolic logic, you would be aware that significant portions of it (such as the existential and universal quantifiers, abduction, etc.) were developed by Charles Peirce as he articulated semiotics, which is the study of signs. Obviously signs and symbols are interchangeable if they are subject to the same logical operations. So the distinctions you try to suggest between "philosophy" and "reality" are just gibberish. Your cluelessness here is embarrassing. And trying to "taunt" me by valuing semiotics and Klingon identically is very immature.
Bottom line: You're a troll. Try getting a clue.
Gecko 15:01, 12 Apr 2004 (UTC)
I am sorry, really sorry, for falling into that really bad argumentation mode. Please accept my apopolgies. Jorge Stolfi 15:07, 12 Apr 2004 (UTC)
I have deleted my unwarranted sarcarstic comments about semiotics (or, rather, what I misunderstood semiotics to be). I hope we can start again in a less emotional mode.
As for the difference between "sign" and "symbol" in the English language, my comments above still stand, and in my view are reason enough to keep the two pages separate.
As for reality vs. philosophy, please note that semiotics (like physics, ecology, logic, etc.) is not reality, but a model (or view, or whatever you call it) of reality -- a model that "exists" only inside our minds. It is unfortunately very easy to get into a mode of thinking where one confuses such models with reality. I don't know how to clearly express this warning in words, but I know the problem because, as I said, I have fallen into that pit myself. That happens when one starts believing that categories such as "sign" or relations such as "cause of" are real things and not just artifacts of our own minds.
Finally, as for the scope of semiotics: I still don't know wether it is just the study of "symbols" (things with conventional meanings to humans) or is supposed to include also any effects like spectral lines and medical symptoms. If the latter, then there is good reason to dismiss semiotics as an empty discipline, because a discipline that aims to encompass "everything" -- all phenomena, physical and mental, at all scales of complexity -- will necessarily have nothing useful to say about them.
Jorge Stolfi 16:40, 12 Apr 2004 (UTC)
I'm pretty sure this is a waste of my time, but I'll try...
"As for the difference between 'sign' and 'symbol' in the English language, my comments above still stand, and in my view are reason enough to keep the two pages separate."
And in my view, these are simply arbitrary delinations. For example, you say "cough may be a 'symbol' of influenza in a syrup advertisement or a medical brochure, but it is a 'sign' to a medical doctor." And I have to agree completely! The same cough is both a symbol and a sign. That's because symbols *are* signs.
"A yellow spectral line is a 'sign' of sodium, but [its] 'symbol' is 'Na'."
You don't seem interested in trying to back up this assertion. I could just as easily say that they are both symbols and both signs. And I do.
"This may not seem logical, but that is how the language *is*."
Are you saying that the illogic of language is proof that symbols aren't signs? This makes no sense to me.
"As for reality vs. philosophy, please note that semiotics (like physics, ecology, logic, etc.) is not reality, but a model (or view, or whatever you call it) of reality -- a model that 'exists' only inside our minds."
I never said otherwise, and in any event, this has no bearing on whether signs are symbols or not. For what it's worth, I mostly agree with you.
"You seem to be saying that semioticians expand sign (semiotics) to include not only symbol (things that have conventional meanings to humans) but also sign (evidence), e.g. the syntoms of a disease or the spectral lines of an element, or perhaps even any kind of physical effect whatsoever."
It is not semioticians 'expanding' sign to mean this. Semiotics is, and always was, the study of *all* signs -- anything that can mean something. This has been true since the discipline was pioneered by logicians in the 19th century. The processes of signification and symbolism were only chopped up into various separate disciplines later on by folks who really didn't understand it. This is why, for example, Peirce's work on the logic of sign relations is considered to be formal logic (by some people) and not semiotics. Yet when he actually *did* this work, there was no such false distinction in his mind.
"[H]ere is good reason to dismiss semiotics as an empty discipline, because a discipline that aims to encompass 'everything' -- all phenomena, physical and mental, at all scales of complexity -- will necessarily have nothing useful to say about them."
You dismiss it so casually because you don't really get it. I never claimed that semiotics "aims to encompass everything" -- whatever that means. Those are your words, not mine. Semiotics, as I've said before, is simply the study of signs and symbol systems.
In all seriousness, I encourage you to consider learning something about semiotics and formal logic before you make such categorical claims about the nature of symbols. You might be surprised by what you find.
Gecko 20:50, 12 Apr 2004 (UTC)
Gecko, the meaning of words in English is not "just a matter of definition". Again, semioticians certainly have the right to redefine "sign" *in semiotics* anyway they want, including "any kind of symbol"; but that does not change the common meaning of that word in English. In topology the word "space" is redefined so that it includes a plane, a line, or even a single point; but that does not authorize topologists to claim that "space" and "point" synonymous in English.
In your cough example, just because a brick can be a paperweight and also a weapon, it does not follow that weapons and paperweights are the same thing. The "symbol" for influenza could be changed by convention, but the (medical) "signs" of influenza cannot. This is just another example of the difference in meaning between the words "sign" and "symbol" in the English language — which has nothing to do with logic or semiotics.
I am not entirely ignorant of formal logic, and in fact my final remark — that a "theory of everything" necessarly will have nothing to say — could be viewed as a trivial theorem in logic. I do know, in particular, that formal logic doesn't make any claims whatsoever about the "nature of symbols" — that is why it is called "formal". On the other hand, you are right that I do not know much about semiotics, but I was hoping that the article could help me learn more: at the very least whether spectral lines are or are not considered "signs" in semiotics. I am still confused, alas.
All the best,
Jorge Stolfi 01:41, 13 Apr 2004 (UTC)
For the past few days I've been toying with the notion of "symbols as a kind of sign" vs. "symbols as signs." There is some work in semiotics to back up this distinction; for example, one rendition of the ontological categories breaks signs into three groups: icons, indices and symbols. However in other places the two really are treated synonymously. And it does seem bogus to me to treat symbols as some kind of special case of sign. I'm not aware of any symbol that isn't also a sign, or vice versa, short of accepting artificial (and often irrelevant) delineations between the two. Logic treats them identically. There is no separate predicate calculus for symbols and signs; there is just one predicate calculus for both.
So... I think (given the ambiguity of the notion of a symbol) that I'm willing to put the issue aside for now. I think this ambiguity is what's preventing us from reaching a common understanding. The relationship between sign and symbol in Wikipedia is very broken, replete with many false distinctions and conflicting viewpoints, but I think any attempt to seriously correct it will be stymied by the lack of a widely-accepted practical understanding of symbol processing. Perhaps this is the best we can do for now.
Gecko 02:04, 18 Apr 2004 (UTC)
Agreed. I have written a few more comments to clarify my position, but I feel it is best to keep them off-line. See User:Jorge Stolfi/Sign and Symbol (section III) if you are interested. All the best,
Jorge Stolfi 14:59, 18 Apr 2004 (UTC)
Here: http://intellectualelite.com/2005/09/my-soap-box.html is a pretty good explination of the difference between symbols and signs. However, if you want a better one, go read Leslie White. She makes it very clear. Tzenes 28 Sept 2005
[edit] possible copyvio
This section was added by an unregistered user, can't find it elsewhere but it seems copyvio. Don't know what to do with it so this should be a good holding place for now. --SonicAD 17:26, 11 Dec 2004 (UTC)
A word symbol is used in several different ways, it is "one of the most misused words." In general cultural usage, such as "religious symbol," it is an important object or event, pregnant with meaning that is relatively unknown. Symbols affect people, have power over people, symbol could provoke wars or make piece.
But the same word 'symbol' is often used for traffic signs. It is important to differentiate symbols and signs. Sign is a conventional notation, mark, or object, which stands for something else. The meaning of a sign is known and defined by conventions. In semiotics, words sign and symbol are used inconsistently; usually symbol is understood as a type of sign. In mathematics also conventional notations are often called symbols.
Carl Jung gave first scientific, psychological analysis of the nature of symbol as 'an important event.' Symbol is pregnant with meaning. Symbol, according to Jung, is a psychological process connecting unconscious contents of psyche to consciousness. Symbols make conscious certain aspects of archetypes, the unconscious neural structures of psyche. Symbol is a process, which creates meaning. It is a creative process.
Neurophysiologist Karl Pribram in a book "Languages of the Mind" described signs as neural signals with definite, fixed meanings. He considered symbols as neural signs with adaptive meanings, changable according to circumstances. Leonid Perlovsky in a book "Neural Networks and Intellect" gave a mathematical description of symbol processes. A symbol process starts with a vague, fuzzy content, which evolves into a definite, crisp content. It involves concepts and emotions. Initial fuzzy state is unconscious. Final crisp state is accessible to consciousness.
Every act of perception and cognition is a symbol process. Perception of everyday objects (a glass, a chair) takes about 0.2 second. Cognition involving complex new meanings such as ineffable God, or crucified God, or idea of predestination, or red (communistic) banner (or any national symbol), might take years or centuries. When content of a symbol process completely reaches consciousness, it becomes definite, well understood sign. It does not steer emotions at national levels, does not inspire wars or piece. It becomes a part of everyday culture, and creative powers can turn to new meanings.
A text below illustrates classical semiotic usage of words sign and symbol, which has not recognized complex psychological processes involved in creation new meanings.
[edit] Improvement drive
Graphics is currently nominated to be improved by WP:IDRIVE. Vote for it if you want to contribute.--Fenice 20:11, 16 August 2005 (UTC)
[edit] Intro
Is is just me, or is "token" basically another word for symbol? I don't think it's helpful to define a symbol as a token of something, considering my dictionary defines token as symbol, and most readers are probably more comfortable with the word symbol than token (except for bus fare) in the first place. Thoughts? NickelShoe 17:20, 16 September 2005 (UTC)
- I changed "representational token," which seems redundant and unhelpful as a definition to "conventional representation," but I'm not possessive of my edits, so if somebody knows a better way to express the thought, go for it. NickelShoe 04:39, 27 September 2005 (UTC)
[edit] Sign or Symbol
Just to add one to the pot. I would like to throw in J.E. Cirliot's very helpfull definition of sign and symbol (Cirliot was a 19th century spanish symbol dictionary compiler - look for his 'dictionary of symbols)
- a symbol is something with a primary significance in one context, that also has a secondary significance in a context that is unrelated to the first. - (sometimes more).
- so a christmas tree is primarily a tree, but secondly it symbolises christmas.
- or the bald eagle symbolising the nation of the USA.
- a sign is something that has implicit significance only in its own context.
- so an arangement of the letters 'acipreefse' on a wall might designate a 'fire escape' sign.
- or a red sky might be the sign of good weather to come.
I always find this to be really useful when trying to diferentiate the two. however, as is mentioned above, semiotics has made such extensive use of this context that the definitions above may not do justice to the subtleties of linguistics practised in that field.
Applying this rule to some of the examples on the page causes some disagreement. for instance the cross is not a symbol, it is a sign, having no inherent meaning in itself simply a bisection of a plane in two dimensions (with particular proportions). strangely enough this is bourne out by the comon usage of 'make the sign of the cross' (a lamb or a fish however are 'symbols' of christianity as the first significance is the animal then the second is the association of christianity).
In fact i would go so far as to say that the image on the page is of religious signs, perhaps with the exception of the star of david which unites two previously accepted signs for heaven and earth (triangles)to symbolise the meeting of the two and the illustrated lingam yoni structure, phallic & vulvic symbols of bowl and post.
obviously the issue here is completely reducable in as much as most signs quickly develop strong secondary meanings and therefore become symbols themselves as they are used in other contexts (ie the cough as sign of a cold in medicine then as symbol for cough syrup in advertising).
the example above regarding Pi is a good one. the mark on paper shaped π is a sign for the greek letter Pi or the sound 'p' - its first context, it is a sign. subsequently mathematicians used π (an existing sign) as a symbol to denote the number 3.1416. so we have π drawn on paper that is a sign for the sound 'p' but in turn symbolises 3.1416 - nowadays it is far more common to see the mark π representing the number so its credentials as a symbol have become obscure with the loss of the first significance, the sound p.
it is also arguable everything has some significance out of its own context, so therefore everything is symbolic of something. Doesn't that just frighten the hell out of those academics that love to be able to tidy everything up? the point of symbols is that they are many, varied and personal.
The essential element here is that a symbol has significance totaly unrelated to its primary significance - so a flash sports car can symbolise, wealth, sex, youth and countless other things all of which have nothing to do with vehicles.
To answer the conundrum about wether signs are symbols and vice versa. It seems clear that it is possible to have
- signs need not be symbols (a 30 mph speed sign).
- signs can be symbols (golden arches hamburger chain logo, symbolising capitalism in USSR).
- symbols need not be signs (The devil is symbolised by a goat, the goat is not a sign).
- symbols can be signs (the appearance of (symbolic) christmas trees are a sign of christmas)
In addition something can be a sign and a whole series of symbols at once.
- A red sunrise can be a sign of bad weather (shepards warning) or polution, a symbol of japan, and symbols of picturesque beauty, romance, comunism, and the 1930's in british iconography.
To me there seems also to be a more poetic distinction in that symbols partake of metaphor and are often open to further interpretation, whereas signs tend to be codified and point to specifics.
hope this makes sense - and more to the point hope it helps :DavidP 01:14, 23 October 2005 (UTC)
[edit] Symbol, Symbol (disambig), Symbol (whatever)
JA: TWISI (the way I see it), when we have a generic article like this, plus a corresponding disambiguation page, plus any number of parenthetical context-specific articles, it is best to keep the content on the generic page suitably generic, and to "farm out" the field-specific meanings of the term to dedicated articles via the hub of the disambig page. How do others see that? Thanks, Jon Awbrey 21:04, 19 March 2006 (UTC)
[edit] Symbol and the History of Ideas
I wonder if some of the disputes on this page might be displaced if there were a discussion of the symbol in the context of intellectual history.
The notion of a symbol arose, I think, to address a particular problem in Western intellectual history. In the enlightenment, there was a general demystification of the world. In particular, access to a world of transcendent truths came to be denied. For those who think that humans are in quite a pickle if they cannot access the overarching, transcendent realities that structure the particularities of the world as we see it, this is a problem since it implies that humans cannot have real knowledge (this problem is, in extant sources, first discussed extensively by Plato).
The notion of a symbol was developed to address that issue. A symbol is a particular, which, however, incarnates the universal. As August Schlegel puts it, the symbol is "the infinite represented as finite." As such, the symbol becomes a central concept in the Romantic revolution against the Elightenment. Belief in symbols is an assertion that people can indeed have access to the underlying structures of the word, the Platonic forms, if you like, or the Jungian archetypes. (This is why Jung made such a big deal about symbols).
By the way. This is the reason that the idea of symbol is so difficult. It appears to be a purposely paradoxical concept.
The word "symbol" is perhaps best not understood by what it means today in an abstract definition. Rather it is better understood in that historic context. And that's what makes a symbol different from a sign.
By the way, I credit my perception of the historical significance of the concept of symbol to Andrew van Hendy's The Modern Construction of Myth, pp. 36-37. (You can read those pages with amazon.com's look in the book feature).
Thanks, jrundin
[edit] The Cresent
The scheme about the religous symbols is incorrect. The Cresent is the symbol of Islam it is not to discuss about but the Cresent with a 5 cornered star is the symbol of Turks and also the symbol is on the flag of modern Turkey ... I think this fault should be corrected immediately. Thanks. Drsecancan
[edit] Intro
I'm not really satisfied with the usage of the dictionary definition from Merriam–Webster and feel the second paragraph makes a much more clear and better styled introduction. Any objections to its removal? PoptartKing 15:36, 16 June 2006 (UTC)
