Tarnak Farm incident

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An F-16 pilot demonstrates the use of night vision equipment similar to what was worn by two F-16 pilots in the incident.

Date	March 28, 2003
Location	Afghanistan
Result	Four Canadian soldiers killed, eight Canadian soldiers wounded

The Tarnak Farm incident refers to the accidental killing of four Canadian soldiers and the injury of eight others from the Third Battalion of Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (3PPCLI) on the night of April 18, 2002 by an American F-16 fighter jet. The aircraft, piloted by U.S. Air National Guard Major Harry Schmidt, dropped a laser-guided 225-kilogram bomb on the Canadians who were conducting a night firing exercise at Tarnak Farm, near Kandahar.

1 Description of incident
2 Casualties
3 Findings of Board of Inquiry
4 Schmidt's rationale
5 Article 32 Hearing
6 Disposition
7 References
8 External links

[edit] Description of incident

Major William Umbach and his wingman Major Harry Schmidt were returning at night from a 10-hour patrol, at 23,000 feet, when they spotted what they believed to be surface-to-air fire. The fire was actually from a Canadian anti-tank and machine-gun exercise.

Schmidt's testimony at his Article 32 hearing was that he believed his flight lead Major Umbach was under attack. Schmidt requested permission from flight control (AWACS) to fire his 20mm cannons at what he believed to be an anti-aircraft or Multiple Launch Rocket System below. He received the response: "hold fire." Four seconds later, Schmidt said he was "rolling in, in self defense." He dropped a laser-guided bomb 35 seconds later. Schmidt then said "I hope I did the right thing" as the AWACS controller said: "Friendlies, Khandahar."

The incident is explored in detail in the book Friendly Fire by Michael Friscolanti and many facets of the case are brought to light, including perceived problems in communicating the chaotic ground situation to pilots on a daily basis and the use of amphethamines to keep pilots awake during long missions. The book provides verbatim transcripts of long segments of both official boards of inquiry into the incident, as well as Major Schmidt's Article 32 hearing.

[edit] Casualties

The soldiers who died were:

Sgt Marc D. Leger, Age: 29, from Lancaster, Ontario.
Cpl Ainsworth Dyer, Age: 24, Montreal, Quebec.
Pte Richard Green, Age: 21, Mill Cove, Nova Scotia.
Pte Nathan Smith, Age: 27, Porters Lake, Nova Scotia.

The eight injured men include:

Sgt Lorne Ford, Age: 33, Brampton, Ontario
Cpl René Paquette, Age: 33, Winnipeg, Manitoba
Cpl Brett Perry, Age: 26, Winnipeg, Manitoba
Pte Norman Link, Age: 24, Grande Prairie, Alberta
Cpl Brian Decaire, Age: 25, Winnipeg, Manitoba
MCpl Curtis Hollister, Age: 29, Cupar, Saskatchewan
MCpl Stan Clark, Age: 35, Vancouver, British Columbia
Cpl. Shane Brennanm, Age: 28, Collingwood, Ontario

[edit] Findings of Board of Inquiry

Two Boards of Inquiry, one Canadian and one American, were held simultaneously. The two boards shared personnel and information. Canadian Brigadier-General M.J. Dumais was specialist advisor to the Canadian board and co-chair of the American board. The findings of the four-member Canadian Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry, chaired by General Maurice Baril, were released on June 28th, 2002. The Board found that the Canadian troops engaged in the night live-fire exercise had conducted their operations as authorized and in accordance with the established range procedures for the types of weapons fire. The Board concluded that the American F-16 pilots contravened established procedures and were the cause of the incident.

[edit] Schmidt's rationale

Factors that played in the decision to act in self-defence included a well-known incident of a US serviceman who fell out of a helicopter and was captured by enemy forces and tortured, before being killed; US aircrew have subsequently been very wary of exposing themselves to risk. Schmidt stated, in his official apology to the family and friends of the dead and injured Canadians: "My perception was that we had been ambushed, as we had been briefed that Taliban were expected to use ambush tactics in an around Kandahar...I believed that the projectiles posed a real and present danger to our flight and specifically to my flight lead...I believed at the time that my flight lead's transmission to 'check master arm, check laser arm,' indicated he concurred with my decision that the situation required self-defence." (Friscolanti, pp.420-421)

[edit] Article 32 Hearing

During the hearing, five F-16 pilots testified, including one who had led the US Board of Inquiry. All five pilots agreed under oath that the dropping of the bomb by Schmidt was not an unreasonable action. Friscolanti summarized their comments in his book Friendly Fire:

Major John Milton: A reasonable fighter pilot could have believed he was trapped in a threat envelope and had no choice but to drop a bomb. It was Maj. Schmidt's right to roll in self-defense, even after the "hold fire" order.
Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Viets: Rolling in would be a reasonable response because Maj. Schmidt was reasonable to believe that he was already in the threat envelope of a rocket-based weapons system.
Colonel David C. Nichols: A reasonably prudent F-16 pilot might have done the same thing. "Combat aviation is not a science. It's an art."
Lieutenant Colonel Craig Fisher: There were no "significant departures from flight discipline." A reasonable fighter pilot would have egressed the area, but that doesn't mean Maj. Schmidt and Maj. Umbach were reckless.
General Stephen T. Sargeant: A reasonable pilot never would have believed that the fire on the ground was a threat to his flight. And even if he did, turning, descending, and decelerating was an unreasonable reaction. However, disregarding all the alleged reckless maneuvers Maj. Schmidt made to reach the spot where he invoked self-defense, dropping a bomb at that instant was not unreasonable. In other words, if Maj. Schmidt suddenly woke up at 14,000 feet and four nautical miles away from the mystery fire, it would be reasonable to drop a bomb in self-defense. (All five paragraphs direct quotes from Friscolanti, p.449)

One of the issues highlighted by the Inquiry related to the use of "go pills" (amphetamines) in combat. In testimony it was revealed that Schmidt and Umbach were told by their superiors to use "go pills" on their missions, and blamed the incident on the drugs. This was a significant part of the defense of the two pilots. Schmidt's defense also blamed the fog of war.

Another issue that was evident, but remained largely in the background, was the quality of communications between the various coalition forces in Afghanistan.

[edit] Disposition

On September 11, 2002, the U.S. pilots, Majors Harry Schmidt and William Umbach were officially charged with 4 counts of negligent manslaughter, 8 counts of aggravated assault, and 1 count of dereliction of duty. Umbach's charges were later dismissed. Schmidt's charges were reduced (on June 30, 2003) to just the dereliction of duty charge. On July 6, 2004 U.S. Lt.-Gen. Bruce Carlson found Schmidt guilty of dereliction of duty in what the U.S. military calls a "non-judicial hearing" before a senior officer. Schmidt was fined nearly $5,700 in pay and reprimanded. The reprimand, written by Lt. Gen. Carlson said Schmidt had "flagrantly disregarded a direct order," "exercised a total lack of basic flight discipline", and "blatantly ignored the applicable rules of engagement." Umbach was reprimanded for leadership failures and allowed to retire.

This was the most serious case of fratricide or friendly fire to have been experienced by the Canadian Forces (CF) in Coalition operations since the Korean War.

[edit] References

Friscolanti, M. Friendly Fire: The Untold Story of the U.S. Bombing that Killed Four Canadian Soldiers in Afghanistan. John Wiley and Sons Inc. ISBN 0-470-83686-5