Violinist (Thought Experiment)
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This problem, which is a famous thought experiment, was first posed by Judith Jarvis Thomson in 1971.
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[edit] Killing vs. letting die
Philippa Foot's "Trolley Problem"[1] of 1967 and Judith Jarvis Thomson's later extension of Foot's arguments, the "Famous Violinist Problem" of 1971,[2] which centre on the issue of the difference between an act of actively killing and an act of passively letting die, form a significant part of the ethical debate on abortion.
In 1976, Thomson elaborated as follows:
- Morally speaking it may matter a great deal how a death comes about, whether from natural causes, or at the hands of another, for example,
- Does it matter whether a man was killed or only let to die? A great many people think it does: they think that killing is worse than letting die. And they draw conclusions from this for abortion, euthanasia, and the distribution of scarce medical resources. Others think it doesn’t, and they think this is shown by what we see when we construct a pair of cases which are so far as possible in all other respects alike, except that in one case the agent kills, in the other he only lets die. So, for example, imagine that
- (1) Alfred hates his wife and wants her dead. He puts cleaning fluid in her coffee, thereby killing her.
- and that
- (2) Bert hates his wife and wants her dead. She puts cleaning fluid in her coffee (being muddled, thinking it’s cream). Bert happens to have the antidote to cleaning fluid, but he does not give it to her; he lets her die. [3]
[edit] Relation to abortion debate
In her introduction to her "Famous Violinist Problem", Thomson notes that much of the inadequate debate on abortion was getting lost within the issue of whether the fetus is a person or a mass of tissue.
Having identified this question, Thomson entirely circumvented this misleading and (to the argument) irrelevant issue by "[immediately granting] that the fetus is a person from the moment of conception"; which then allowed her to address what she felt was the only issue involved: that of whether the mother, or the fetus, had the "stronger and more stringent… right to life".[4]
[edit] The "famous violinist" thought experiment
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy describes her thought experiment as follows:
- Judith Jarvis Thomson provided one of the most striking and effective thought experiments in the moral realm. Her example is aimed at a popular anti-abortion argument that goes something like this: The fetus is an innocent person with a right to life. Abortion results in the death of a fetus. Therefore, abortion is morally wrong. In her thought experiment we are asked to imagine a famous violinist falling into a coma. The society of music lovers determines from medical records that you and you alone can save the violinist's life by being hooked up to him for nine months. The music lovers break into your home while you are asleep and hook the unconscious (and unknowing, hence innocent) violinist to you. You may want to unhook him, but you are then faced with this argument put forward by the music lovers: The violinist is an innocent person with a right to life. Unhooking him will result in his death. Therefore, unhooking him is morally wrong.
- However, the argument does not seem convincing in this case. You would be very generous to remain attached and in bed for nine months, but you are not morally obliged to do so. The parallel with the abortion case is evident. The thought experiment is effective in distinguishing two concepts that had previously been run together: “right to life” and “right to what is needed to sustain life.” The fetus and the violinist may each have the former, but it is not evident that either has the latter. The upshot is that even if the fetus has a right to life (which Thompson does not believe but allows for the sake of the argument), it may still be morally permissible to abort. Theorizing about thought experiments usually turns on the details or the patterns of specific cases. [5]
[edit] Criticism
(See also A Defense of Abortion)
In the opinion of some critics, Thomson failed to note a key difference between the thought experiment and the realities that she applied it to. In the case of the violinist, you are not involved in the decision-making process that caused you to become attached.
However, certain other critics offer the apparent non sequitur that the same woman who is considering the abortion of her fetus is supposed to have been intentionally involved in a deliberate pregnancy-choosing-activity (namely engaging in the sex act that produced the fetus).
From this, some have argued that Thomson's thought experiment only closely analogizes abortion in the case of rape and suggest that the issue is purely a question of how the arguments apply in instances where the mother is raped, and they then examine whether or not it is morally justifiable to abort the fetus in such case.
[edit] See also
[edit] Notes
- ^ Foot (1967/1978), pp.23-24.
- ^ Thomson (1971/1986), pp.2-4.
- ^ Thomson (1976/1986), p.78
- ^ Thomson (1971/1986), p.2.
- ^ Taken from Brown (2006). [1]
[edit] References
- Brown, James Robert, "Thought Experiments", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2006 Edition), 2006. [2].
- Foot, P., "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect", reprinted at pp.19-32 in Foot, P., Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy, Basil Blackwell, (Oxford), 1978 (originally published in 1967).
- Thomson, J.J., "A Defense of Abortion", reprinted at pp.1-19 in Thomson, J.J. (Parent, W., ed.), Rights, Restitution, and Risks: Essays in Moral Theory, Harvard University Press, (Cambridge), 1986 (originally published in 1971).
- Thomson, J.J., "Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem", reprinted in pp.78-93 in Thomson, J.J., (Parent, W., ed.), Rights, Restitution, and Risks: Essays in Moral Theory, Harvard University Press, (Cambridge), 1986 (originally published in 1976).
- Thomson, J.J., "The Trolley Problem", reprinted at pp.94-116 in Thomson, J.J. (Parent, W., ed.), Rights, Restitution, and Risks: Essays in Moral Theory, Harvard University Press, (Cambridge), 1986 (originally published in 1985).
[edit] External links
- [3] "Thought Experiments", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
