戰略
维基百科，自由的百科全书
戰略是戰爭行為計劃的總稱。戰略包括軍事行動的計畫，武力的運動與處置，以及欺瞞敵人。現代戰略研究之父克劳塞维茨將戰略定義為「藉以結束戰爭的戰役的部署」。戰略是統治戰爭行為的「藝術」或「科學」之一。另一項是戰術，在戰役中執行計畫與操縱武力的學問，還有一項是後勤學，維持一支軍隊的學問。
目录 |
[编辑] 戰略的基礎
- 「人皆知我所以勝之形，而莫知吾所以制勝之形。故其戰勝不復，而應形於無窮。 」（《孫子兵法》）
戰略與戰術密切相關。兩者都處理距離，時間與力量。但是戰略的尺度較大，而戰術的尺度較小。本來戰略統治戰前準備，而戰術控制戰時執行。但是在20世紀，如此的分別已經模糊。
基本上戰略只處理軍事事務。在原始社會，政治領袖與軍事領袖往往是同一人。即使不是，兩者之間的溝通也很緊密。但是隨著軍事專業化，政治與軍事的分別越來越大。另一方面，政治統治軍事的觀念出現，因而出現了所謂「大戰略」，這包括整個國家在戰爭中的資源分配。在大戰略的架構下，屬於軍事的領域被縮小為軍事行動戰略：大型軍事部隊（如師或軍團）的計畫與控制。但是在更後期，隨著軍隊的擴大，通訊與控制科技的進步，「軍事戰略」與「大戰略」之間的差異又縮小了。
大戰略的基礎是外交。國家能透過外交結盟或迫使另一國服從，進而不戰而勝。大戰略的另一要素是戰後和平的管理。正如克勞塞維茨所指明，一個成功的戰略可以是達到目標的手段，但戰略本身並不是目標。歷史上有無數的例子證明，在戰場上的成功並不保證長久的和平與安全。
戰略與戰術都必須隨科技的進步而演進。但成功的戰略往往比武器或設備維持得更久，一直它被淘汰。第一次世界大戰中，盟軍就利用拿破崙時代的全體攻擊戰略，但敵不過以戰濠、機鎗與鐵絲網所組成的防守力量。同樣地，在第二次世界大戰，法國利用第一次世界大戰的經驗採用純防守戰略，築成「無法侵入」的馬其諾防線，但後來完全被德國的「閃擊戰」摧毀。
[编辑] 戰略原理
很多戰略家都嘗試將成功的戰略濃縮成一些原理，例如：孫子在《孫子兵法》定義了13個原理，而拿破崙列出了115條準則。
以下是最普遍的戰略原理：
- 目標 -- 選擇有決定性的目標
- 指揮 -- 統一而簡單的指揮方針
- 進攻 -- 進攻才可獲得勝利
- 合作 -- 統籌各單位及資源
- 主動 -- 向敵人採取主動
- 集中 -- 善用部署調動，以眾擊寡
- 節約 -- 減少時間、人手及資源的浪費
- 運動 -- 適當地使用速度，令敵人無法掌握
- 奇襲 -- 利用欺騙、速度及創意突襲敵人
- 保密 -- 戰略要保密，以防範敵人預早反應
- 彈性 -- 保持彈性以迎接不同情況的變化
- 簡單 -- 戰略計劃愈簡單愈好
- 士氣 -- 無時無刻保持高昂士氣
一直以來，先進的戰爭技術發展亦無損這些戰略原理的用處。一部份戰略家認為緊緊地遵守這些基本原因可以保證勝利，但亦有一些戰略家認為戰爭是不可預測的，所以要靈活地制定戰略。
[编辑] 戰略發展
[编辑] 早期戰略
戰略原理最早可以追溯到公元前500年的《孫子兵法》及斯巴達思想，亞歷山大、漢尼拔、凱撒及秦始皇的戰役中亦顯示了他們對戰略計劃的運用。馬漢在《制海權論》的序中，描述羅馬人如何使用制海權將漢尼拔與迦太基的通訊中斷，以及將漢尼拔逐出意大利。
馬基維利於1520撰寫的《戰爭藝術》(Dell'arte della guerra)描述在大戰略中，政治與軍事之間的關係。在三十年戰爭中，瑞典的古斯塔夫二世示範了有效地利用作戰戰略就可以得到戰爭的勝利。
一直到了十八世紀，才有戰略的嚴謹研究。在七年戰爭(1756-1763)中，腓特烈大帝運用了「消耗戰略」來保存自己的軍隊及阻止敵人的進攻。腓特烈大帝利用普魯士中央位置的優勢，使他的軍隊可以快速而且集中地調動，去迎擊來自法國、奧地利、俄羅斯及瑞典的威脅。若果無法打敗對手，亦可以拖延至達成外交解決方案。腓特烈大帝的成功導致人們對「幾何戰略」的研究，「幾何戰略」的重點在於運動線、對地形的了解及佔據有利位置的戰略。
[编辑] 成吉思汗與蒙古
相比起歐洲在戰爭藝術的發展，蒙古的領袖成吉思汗提供了實際的例子。成吉思汗與他的子孫們的成功，是建基於運動與恐懼，他的戰略攻擊是瞄準敵方民眾的心理。在持續而仔細地運用這個戰略，成吉思汗與他的繼承者才可以征服歐亞大陸的大部份地區。
成吉思汗的軍隊和戰略是由部族弓騎兵與眾多蒙古牧馬而組成，每個弓兵至少都擁有兩匹馬，大約平均每人五匹馬，所以整隊軍隊都可以高速移動。再加上蒙古我菜單上，馬奶與馬血都是重要部份，所以成吉思汗的牧馬可以同時作為移動及後勤工具。
因此對比起蒙古的軍隊，其他的軍隊顯得比較笨重和遲鈍，透過運動與連續攻勢，以致中國、波斯、阿拉伯和歐洲的軍隊完全無抵抗之力。
當面對城塞時，蒙古的運動與速度的戰略會受到極大阻礙。此時蒙古軍隊就會使用比較陰險的技巧，如原始的生化武器，利用投石器等的彈道武器會使用死去的動物屍體投進城市中，散播病菌。如果特定城市拒絕投降，攻下城塞之後要殺盡全城的人民以作威嚇，這是叫作心理戰。
上述所提及的蒙古戰略，都是建基於對重心的攻擊，尤其是對於心理上的重心。亦可以歸納入集中、運動、奇襲及簡單，這四個要點，所以蒙古大軍當時才可在歐亞地區稱霸。
[编辑] 拿破崙戰略
The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars that followed revolutionized military strategy. The impact of this period was still to be felt in the American Civil War and the early phases of World War I. With the advent of cheap small arms and the rise of the drafted citizen soldier, armies grew rapidly in size to become massed formations. This necessitated dividing the army first into divisions and later into corps. Along with divisions came divisional artillery; light-weight, mobile and with great range and firepower. The rigid formations of pikemen and musketeers firing massed volleys gave way to light infantry fighting in skirmish lines.
Napoleon I of France took advantage of these developments to pursue a brutally effective "strategy of annihilation" that cared little for the mathematical perfection of the geometric strategy. Napoleon invariably sought to achieve decision in battle, with the sole aim of utterly destroying his opponent, usually achieving success through superior manouevre. As ruler and general he dealt with the grand strategy as well as the operational strategy, making use of political and economic measures. Napoleon was ultimately defeated when his opponents adopted the strategies that he had perfected.
Napoleon's practical strategic triumphs inspired a whole new field of study into military strategy. The two most significant students of his work were Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian with a background in philosophy, and Antoine-Henri Jomini, who had been one of Napoleon's staff officers. Clausewitz's On War has become the bible of strategy, dealing with political, as well as military, leadership. His most famous assertion being:
- "War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of policy carried out by other means."
Clausewitz dismissed "geometry" as an insignificant factor in strategy, believing instead in the Napoleonic concept of victory through battle and destruction of the opposing force, at any cost. However, he also recognised that limited warfare could influence policy by wearing down the opposition through a "strategy of attrition".
In contrast to Clausewitz, Antoine-Henri Jomini dealt mainly with operational strategy, planning & intelligence, the conduct of the campaign, and "generalship" rather than "statesmanship". He proposed that victory could be achieved by occupying the enemy's territory rather than destroying his army. As such, geometric considerations were prominent in his theory of strategy. Jomini's two basic principles of strategy were to concentrate against fractions of the enemy force at a time and to strike at the most decisive objective.
One notable exception to Napoleon's strategy of annihilation and a precursor to trench warfare were the Lines of Torres Vedras during the Peninsular campaign. French Armies lived off the land and when they were confronted by a line of fortifications which they could not out flank, they were unable to continue the advance and were forced to retreat once they had consumed all the provisions of the region in front of the lines.
The Peninsular campaign was notable for the development of another method of warfare which went largely unnoticed at the time, but would become far more common in the 20th century. That was the aid and encouragement the British gave to the Spanish who forced the French to squander most of the assets of their Iberian army in protecting the army's line of communications. This was a very cost effective move for the British, because it cost far less to aid Spanish insurgents than it did to equip and pay regular British army units to engage the same number of French troops. As the British army could be correspondingly smaller it was able to supply its troops by sea and land without having to live off the land as was the norm at the time. Further, because they did not have to forage they did not antagonise the locals and so did not have to garrison their lines of communications to the same extent as the French did. So the strategy of aiding their Spanish civilian allies in their guerrilla war benefited the British in many ways, not all of which were immediately obvious.
[编辑] 工業時期戰略
The evolution of military strategy continued in the American Civil War (1861-65). The practice of strategy was advanced by generals such as Robert E. Lee, Ulysses S. Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman, all of whom had been influenced by the feats of Napoleon (Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson was said to have carried a book of Napoleon's maxims with him). However, the adherence to the Napoleonic principles in the face of technological advances such as the long-range infantry rifle generally led to disastrous consequences. The time and space in which war was waged changed as well. Railroads enabled swift movement of large forces but the manoeuvring was constrained to narrow, vulnerable corridors. Steam power and ironclads changed transport and combat at sea.
There was still room for triumphs of strategy of manoeuver such as Sherman's March to the Sea in 1864, but these depended upon an enemy's unwillingness to entrench. Towards the end of the war, especially in defense of static targets as in the battles of Cold Harbor and Vicksburg, trenches between both sides grew to a World War I scale. Many of the lessons of the American Civil War were forgotten when in wars like the Austro-Prussian War or the Franco-Prussian War manoeuver won the day.
In the period preceding World War I, two of the most influential strategists were the Prussian generals, Helmuth von Moltke and Alfred von Schlieffen. Under Moltke the Prussian army achieved victory in the Austro-Prussian War (1866) and the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), the latter campaign being widely regarded as a classic example of the conception and execution of military strategy. In addition to exploiting railroads and highways for manoeuvre, Moltke harnessed the telegraph for control of large armies. He recognised the increasing need to delegate control to subordinate commanders and to issue directives rather than specific orders.
Moltke is most remembered as a strategist for his belief in the need for flexibility and that no plan, however well prepared, can be guaranteed to survive beyond the first encounter with the enemy.
Field Marshal Schlieffen succeeded Moltke and directed German planning in the lead up to World War I. He advocated the "strategy of annihilation" but was faced by a war on two fronts against numerically superior opposition. The strategy he formulated was the Schlieffen Plan, defending in the east while concentrating for a decisive victory in the west, after which the Germans would go on to the offensive in the east. Influenced by Hannibal's success at the Battle of Cannae, Schlieffen planned for a single great battle of encirclement, thereby annihilating his enemy.
Another German strategist of the period was Hans Delbrück who expanded on Clausewitz's concept of "limited warfare" to produce a theory on the "strategy of exhaustion". His theory defied popular military thinking of the time, which was strongly in favour of victory in battle, yet World War I would soon demonstrate the flaws of a mindless "strategy of annihilation".
At a time when industrialisation was reaping major advances in naval technology, one American strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, almost single-handedly brought the field of naval strategy up to date. Influenced by Jomini's principles of strategy, he saw that in the coming wars, where economic strategy could be as important as military strategy, control of the sea granted the power to control the trade and resources needed to wage war. Mahan pushed the concept of the "big navy" and an expansionist view where defence was achieved by controlling the sea approaches rather than fortifying the coast. His theories contributed to the naval arms race between 1898 and 1914.
[编辑] 一次大戰
At the start of World War I strategy was dominated by the offensive thinking that had been in vogue since 1870, despite the more recent experiences of the Second Boer War (1899-1902) and Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), where the machine gun demonstrated its defensive capabilities. By the end of 1914, the Western Front was a stalemate and all ability to manoeuver strategically was lost. The combatants resorted to a "strategy of attrition". The German battle at Verdun, the British on the Somme and at Passchendaele were among the first widescale battles intended to wear down the enemy. Attrition was time-consuming so the duration of World War I battles often stretched to weeks and months. The problem with attrition was that the use of fortified defenses in depth generally required a ratio of ten attackers to one defender, or a level of artillery support which was simply not feasible until late 1917, for any reasonable chance of victory. The ability of the defender to move troops using interior lines prevented the possibility of fully exploiting any breakthrough with the level of technology then attainable.
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of strategy in World War 1 was the difference among the British between the "Western" viewpoint (held by Field Marshal Haig) and the "Eastern"; the former being that all effort should be directed against the German Army, the latter that more useful work could be done by attacking Germany's allies. The term "Knocking away the props" was used, perhaps an unfortunate consequence of the fact that all of Germany's allies lay south of (i.e. 'beneath') her on the map. Apologists and defenders of the Western viewpoint make the valid point that Germany's allies were more than once rescued from disaster or rendered capable of holding their own or making substantial gains by the provision of German troops, arms or military advisers, whereas those allies did not at any time provide a similar function for Germany. That is, it was Germany which was the prop, and her allies (particularly Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary) did not suffer significant reverses until Germany's ability to come to their aid was grossly impaired.
On other fronts, there was still room for the use of strategy of manouever. The Germans executed a perfect battle of annihilation against the Russians at the Battle of Tannenberg (1914). In 1915 Britain and France launched the well-intentioned but poorly conceived and ultimately fruitless Dardanelles Campaign, combining naval power and an amphibious landing, in an effort to aid their Russian ally and knock the Ottoman Empire out of the war. The Palestine campaign was dominated by cavalry, which flourished in the local terrain, and the British achieved two breakthrough victories at Gaza (1917) and Megiddo (1918). Colonel T.E. Lawrence and other British officers led Arab irregulars on a guerrilla campaign against the Ottomans, using strategy and tactics developed during the Boer Wars.
World War I saw armies on a scale never before experienced. The British, who had always relied on a strong navy and a small regular army, were forced to undertake a rapid expansion of the army. This outpaced the rate of training of generals and staff officers able to handle such a mammoth force, and overwhelmed the ability of British industry to equip it with the necessary weapons and adequate high-quality munitions until late in the war. Technological advances also had a huge influence on strategy: aerial reconnaissance, artillery techniques, poison gas, the automobile and tank (though the latter was, even at the end of the war, still in its infancy), telephone and radio telegraphy.
More so than in previous wars, military strategy in World War I was directed by the grand strategy of a coalition of nations; the Entente on one side and the Central Powers on the other. Society and economy were mobilized for total war. Attacks on the enemy's economy included Britain's use of a naval blockade and Germany employing submarine warfare against merchant shipping.
Unity of command became a question when the various nation states began coordinating assaults and defenses. Under the pressure of horrendously destructive German attacks beginning on March 21, 1918, the Entente eventually settled under Field Marshal Foch. The Germans generally led the Central Powers, though German authority diminished and lines of command became confused at the end of the war. The March offensive, intended to drive a wedge between the French and British armies, turn on the latter and destroy it, lost direction and became driven by its territorial gains, its original purpose neglected.
World War I ended when the ability of the German army to fight became so diminished that Germany asked for peace conditions. The German military, exhausted by the efforts of the March offensives and dispirited by their failure, was first seriously defeated during the battle of Amiens (8-11 August 1918) and the German homefront entered general revolt over a lack of food and destruction of the economy. Victory for the Entente was almost assured by that point, and the fact of Germany's military impotence was driven home in the following hundred days. In this time, the Entente reversed the gains the Germans had made in the first part of the year, and the British Army (spearheaded by the Canadians and Australians) finally broke the Hindenburg defensive system.
Though his methods are questioned, Britain's Field Marshal Haig was ultimately proved correct in his grand strategic vision: "We cannot hope to win until we have defeated the German Army." By the end of the war, the best German troops were dead and the remainder were under continuous pressure on all parts of the Western Front, a consequence in part of an almost endless supply of fresh American reinforcements (which the Germans were unable to match) and in part of industry at last supplying the weakened Entente armies with the firepower to replace the men they lacked (whilst Germany wanted for all sorts of materials thanks to the naval blockade). Interior lines thus became meaningless as Germany had nothing more to offer its allies. The props eventually fell, but only because they were themselves no longer supported.
The role of the tank in World War One strategy is often poorly understood. Its supporters saw it as the weapon of victory, and many observers since have accused the high commands (especially the British) of shortsightedness in this matter, particularly in view of what tanks have achieved since. Nevertheless, the World War One tank's limitations, imposed by the limits of contemporary engineering technology, have to be borne in mind. They were slow (men could run, and frequently walk, faster); vulnerable (to artillery) due to their size, clumsiness and inability to carry armour against anything but rifle and machine gun ammunition; extremely uncomfortable (conditions inside them often incapacitating crews with engine fumes and heat, and driving some mad with noise); and often despicably unreliable (frequently failing to make it to their targets due to engine or track failures). This was the factor behind the seemingly mindless retention of large bodies of cavalry, which even in 1918, with armies incompletely mechanised, were still the only armed force capable of moving significantly faster than an infantryman on foot. It was not until the relevant technology (in engineering and communications) matured between the wars that the tank and the airplane could be forged into the co-ordinated force needed to truly restore manoeuvre to warfare.
[编辑] 戰間期的發展
一次大戰之後，飛機與坦克成為戰略研究的重點。例如義大利的杜黑就提出了《制空論》，認為飛機帶來的空權就會決定未來的戰爭。杜黑也提出了戰略轟炸的概念：利用飛機空中轟炸瓦解敵國的經濟力量與人民意志。
電報與無線電大幅改善了通訊，運輸技術也強化了大量人力的動員。另一方面，軍官能有效控制的士兵人數卻下降了。軍隊人數的增加導致軍官的需求增加。
[编辑] 二次大戰
同盟國大量使用欺敵戰略，成功誤導了軸心國。另一方面，大戰略也在二次大戰中大大的發揮。在戰爭結束之前，美國與蘇聯雙方就已各自在計劃戰後和平的管理與國際關係（例如德國事務）。這時的大戰略決定了後來冷戰時期的局勢。
[编辑] 冷戰
二次大戰核武器的發展，使類似相互保證毀滅的嚇阻理論成為冷戰的主要戰略。美國與蘇聯雙方各自驚人的核武器使得雙方不敢直接衝突，而第三世界的武力則被兩大強權控制，時常發生「代理戰爭」。
冷戰的戰略思想在這樣的嚇阻理論主導之下，研究所謂「第一擊」、「第二擊」、「有限的第一擊」、代理戰爭等等。另一項重點則是在國際經濟與意識形態上的對抗。
[编辑] 冷戰之後
冷戰之後進入美國成為單一「超級強權」的時代。在這時美國的戰略著重在利用科技減少傷亡，提升效率。例如利用信息科技的「以網路為中心的作戰」。
