Powell Doctrine
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The Powell Doctrine, also known as the Powell Doctrine of Overwhelming Force, was elaborated by General Colin Powell in the run up to the 1990-1991 Gulf War. It is based in large part on the Weinberger Doctrine, devised by Caspar Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense and Powell's former boss.
The questions posed by the Powell Doctrine, which should be answered affirmatively before military action, are:
- Is a vital national security interest threatened?
- Do we have a clear attainable objective?
- Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
- Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted?
- Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
- Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?
- Is the action supported by the American people?
- Do we have genuine broad international support?
The fifth point of the Doctrine is normally interpreted to mean that the U.S. should not get involved in peacekeeping or nation-building exercises. Powell expanded upon the Doctrine, asserting that when a nation is engaging in war, every resource and tool should be used to achieve overwhelming force against the enemy, minimizing US casualties and ending the conflict quickly by forcing the weaker force to capitulate. This is well in line with Western military strategy dating at least from Carl von Clausewitz's On War. However, in the context of the Just War theory, the doctrine of overwhelming force may violate the principle of proportionality.
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The Powell Doctrine has been expanded in recent years to include the use of a proper exit strategy for military intervention. Expanding upon the doctrine this idea helps to support points two and three of the doctrine by creating a basis for concise fighting on foreign soil.