User:Bl4ckVo1d/munka

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Az Olaj-csúcs elmélet szerint bármely földrajzi területen (egy olajkút esetében vagy akár teljes világra nézve is) a kitermelt olaj mennyisége egy harang alakú görbét követ. A teória azt is megmutatja, hogyan kell kiszámolni a termelés időbeli csúcspontját a felfedezésekből, a termelés mennyiségéből és az eddigi teljes kitermelt mennyiségből. A görbe elején (a csúcs előtt) a kitermelés növekszik a felfedezések és a megépülő infrastruktúra következtében. A csúcs után a görbe lefelé görbül a kimerülés miatt.

Az elmélet abból a megfigyelésből indul ki, hogy az olaj mennyisége véges. A teóriát Hubbert elméletnek is nevezik kifejlesztője, az amerikai Marion King Hubbert geofizikus után. Az elmélettel szemben a szakértők kezdetben szkeptikusak voltak, de ma már a legtöbb olajcég rutinszerűen használja a jövőbeni kitermelés becslésére.

Az Olaj-csúcs vonatkozhat egy meghatározott terület kitermelési csúcsára, melyet már sokan megfigzeltek. Nagyobb léptékben az Olaj-csúcs a bolygó teljes olajtermelési csúcsára vonatkozik. Az elmélet szerint a csúcs után az olajtermelés már csak csökkenhet. Az elmélet alapján Hubbert helyesen megbecsülte, hogy az Egyesült Államok olajtermelése 1965-1970 környékén fog tetőzni. A valódi csúcs 1971-ben következett be. Az előadást Hubbert 1956 márciusában tartotta a texasi San Antonioban. Az előadás teljes szövege elérhető itt: [11] Hubbert ekkor azt is megjósolta, hogy a világ olajkitermelése körülbelül 50 év múlva fog tetőzni. Számos megfigyelő szerint (pl: Kenneth S. Deffeyes, Matthew Simmons, James Howard Kunstler) a világ jelenlegi függése az olcsó olajtól az Olaj csúcs után súlyos gazdasági problémákat fog okozni a termelés visszaesése és az ebből következő áremelkedés miatt.

Tartalomjegyzék 1 Hubbert elmélete 1.1 A Hubbert görbe 1.2 Tartalékok 2 Előrejelzések 2.1 Hubbert theory based 2.2 Más modellek 3 Current events 3.1 Peak Oil production - Has it happened already? 3.2 Oil price 3.3 Other oil related 4 Mitigation 4.1 Alternative transportation 4.2 Alternative sources for oil 4.2.1 Popular alternatives 4.2.2 Energy return on energy investment 4.3 Market economy versus government 4.4 Growth-based economic models 4.5 Implications of an unmitigated world peak 5 Other Hubbert peaks 5.1 Natural gas 5.2 Longterm 5.2.1 Coal 5.2.2 Fissionable materials 5.2.3 Metals 5.2.4 Phosphorus 5.3 Underground water reserves and lakes 5.4 Fisheries 6 Criticism 7 References 8 See also 8.1 Books 8.2 Movies 9 External links 9.1 Sites 9.2 Articles 9.3 Programs 9.3.1 Radio 9.3.2 Television 9.4 Reports, essays and lectures

[szerkesztés] Hubbert elmélete

[szerkesztés] A Hubbert görbe

Hubbert feltételezte hogy miután a fosszilis tüzelőanyag készletek felfedezésre kerülnek, a termelés először exponenciálisan nő köszönhetően a az infrastruktúra kiépítésének és a termelés felfutásának. Miután a kitermelés elérte a csúcsot, a kitermelt mennyiség elkezd csökkenni, majd ez exponenciális csökkenésbe fordul. A görbe szimmetrikus és egy csúcsa van, amely a kitermelési mennyiség felénél található.

A kitermelési adatok ismeretében megalkotható az a görbe amely megbecsli a kitermelés lefolyását a jövőben. A módszerrel a kitermelési csúcs és a teljes kitermelt mennyiség is megbecsülhető. In particular, the date of peak oil production or the total amount of oil ultimately produced can be estimated that way. Cavallo ^[1] defines the Hubbert curve used to predict the US peak as the derivative of:

where Q_max is the total resource available (ultimate recovery of crude oil), Q(t) the cumulative production, and a and b are constants. The year of maximum annual production (peak) is:

[szerkesztés] Tartalékok

Az Olaj-csúcs elmélet bármely olyan nyersanyagra vonatkoztatható amely "könnyen" kinyerhető vagy bányászható hagyományos módszerekkel. A csúcs után jellemzően a kitermelés költsége nő, hiszen ekkora már csak a nehezen kitermelhető lelőhelyeken marad olaj.

[szerkesztés] Előrejelzések

Általánosságban a termelési csúcsot csakis utólag lehet pontosan meghatározni. Az Egyesült Államok oljkitermelése 1971-ben volt a csúcson. [12] A legtöbb új olajmezőt 1965-ben fedezték fel. Az Olaj-csúcs időpontjára vonatkozó becslések 2005-től 2025-ig terjednek.

[szerkesztés] Hubbert theory based

1974-ben Hubbert azt jósolta hogy a világ kőolajtermelése 1995-ben fog tetőzni ha a jelenlegi folyamatok folytatódnak. [13] Az 1970-es évek végén és a 80-as évek elején azonban az olajfogyasztás csökkent az új, energiatakarékosabb járműveknek, és a nukleáris energiának köszönhetően. [14] [15] [16] [17]

Az 1980-as évek végén aztán a fogyasztás újra elérte a korábbi szintet és lassú növekedésnek indult. A megváltozott körülmények miatt a kitermelési csúcs végülis nem következett be 1995-ben.

Colin Campbell, az ASPO geológusa szerint a kitermelés csúcsa 2004 augusztusára esett, bár a termelés ekkor 23 milliárd hordó/év volt és nem a Hubbert által jelzett 13 milliárd hordó/év. 2004 folyamán az olajtermelés 30 milliárd hordó volt, ebből 6 milliárd hordó nehézolajból, bitumenből, mélytengeri furásokból és gázból származott (lásd mellékelt grafikon). 2005-ben az ASPO változtatott a becslésen az új csúcs időpontját 2010-re tette [18].

Egy másik szakértő, Kenneth S. Deffeyes Beyond Oil - The View From Hubbert's Peak című könyvében azt jósolta a termelési csúcs 2005 november elejére fog esni. Azóta Deffeyes a becslést 2005 December 16-ára változtatta [19].

A texasi olajmágnás T. Boone Pickens szerint a világ csúcs kőolajtermelése 84 millió hordó/nap lesz, ami 31 milliárd hordónak felel meg évente [20].

[szerkesztés] Más modellek

By United States government prediction [21], world consumption of oil will increase to 98.3 million barrels a day in 2015 and 118 million barrels a day in 2030. This represents more than a 25% increase in world oil production. The Energy Information Administration's study breaks with Hubbert peak theory on several points[22]:

• Does not use symmetry
• Uses a post-peak constant reserves to production ratio of 10
• Authors believe in recovery from "geologically conceivable small sources of conventionally resevoired crude oil"

The United States Geological Survey claimed at one time that there are enough petroleum reserves to continue current production rates for 50 to 100 years[23]. That is countered by an important Saudi oil industry insider who says the American government's forecast for future oil supply is a "dangerous over-estimate."[24] Campbell argues that the USGS estimates are methodologically flawed [25]. One problem, for example, is that OPEC countries overestimate their reserves to get higher oil quotas and to avoid internal critique.

[szerkesztés] Current events

[szerkesztés] Peak Oil production - Has it happened already?

Matthew Simmons, Chairman of Simmons & Company International, said on October 26, 2006 that global oil production may have peaked in December 2005, though cautions that further monitoring of production is required to determine if a peak has actually occurred. ^[2]

Chevron states that "oil production is in decline in 33 of the 48 largest oil producing countries". [26] Other countries have also passed their individual oil production peaks.

World oil production growth trends, in the short term, have been decreasing over the last 18 months. Average yearly gains in world oil production from 1987 to 2005 were 1.2 million barrels per day (mbbl/d) (1.7%). Global production averaged 84.4 mbbl/d in 2005, up only 0.2 mbbl/d (0.2%), from 84.2 mbbl/d (13.4 million m³/d) in Q4 2004 (see figure at right). Production in Q2 2006 was 85.1 Mbbl/d, up 0.4 mbbl/d (0.47%), from the same period a year earlier [27]. Yearly gains in the last 8 years ranged from -1.4 mbbl/d, (-1.9%; 1998-1999) to 3.3 mbbl/d (4.1%; 2003-2004)[28].

Of the three largest oil fields in the world, two have peaked. Mexico announced that its giant Cantarell Field entered depletion in March, 2006 [29], as did the huge Burgan field in Kuwait in November, 2005 [30]. Due to past overproduction, Cantarell is now declining rapidly, at a rate of -13% year over year. [31] In April, 2006, a Saudi Aramco spokesman admitted that its mature fields are now declining at a rate of 8% per year, and its composite decline rate of producing fields is about 2%[32], thus implying that Ghawar, the largest oil field in the world, may have peaked [33].

The Jack 2 deep water test well in the Gulf of Mexico, announced September 5, 2006, may have the potential, however, to provide as much as slightly less than 2 years of U.S. consumption at present levels.

Global warming could make drilling unknown reserves in the arctic less problematic.[34] Increasing investment in harder to reach oil is a sign of oil companies' belief in the end of easy oil:

"All the easy oil and gas in the world has pretty much been found," said William J. Cummings, ExxonMobil's spokesman in Angola. "Now comes the harder work in finding and producing oil from more challenging environments and work areas."[35]

[szerkesztés] Oil price

Main article: Oil price increases of 2004 and later.

In 2004, 30 billion barrels of oil were consumed worldwide, while only eight billion barrels of new oil reserves were discovered. New discoveries of huge, easily exploitable oil fields are most likely a thing of the past. In August 2005, the International Energy Agency reported global demand at 84.9 million barrels per day, resulting in an annual demand of over 31 billion barrels. This means consumption is now within 2 Mbbl/d of production. At any one time there are about 54 days of stock in the OECD system plus 37 days in emergency stockpiles. In June 2005, OPEC admitted that they would 'struggle' to pump enough oil to meet pricing pressures for the fourth quarter of that year. The summer and winter of 2005 brought oil prices to a new high (not adjusted for inflation). On the other hand, some analysts attribute much of this new high to disruptions caused by the war in Iraq.^[3]

[szerkesztés] Other oil related

Chevron has launched the Will You Join Us? [36] campaign, seeking to alert the public to the possibility of petroleum depletion and encourage discussion.

New York tests a fleet of Dodge Sprinter plug-in hybrid delivery vans [37].

High oil prices have started to affect some transportation industries. United Arab Emirates lead the world in Airbus A380 orders because higher oil prices give the airlines of oil exporting countries an advantage. Ford's reliance on SUVs has caused it to become financially unstable.

Speech[38] by Bill Clinton, early supporter of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, explaining peak oil and later warning:

And then finally, and I think most important of all, more important than the deficit, more important then healthcare, more important than anything, is we have got to do something about our energy strategy because if we permit the climate to continue to warm at an unsustainable rate, and if we keep on doing what we’re doing till we’re out of oil and we haven’t made the transition, then it’s inconceivable to me that our children and grandchildren will be able to maintain the American way of life and that the world won’t be much fuller of resource-based wars of all kinds.

General Motors becomes the first automaker to announce plans for producing a plug-in hybrid electric vehicle.[39]

[szerkesztés] Mitigation

Mitigation can reduce oil consumption so it is very important in calculating the timing and shape of a peak. In the chart of world oil consumption it can be seen that only mitigation efforts after 1973 and 1979 oil shocks lowered oil consumption. Most recessions since the 70s have had no effect on curbing the oil consumption shown in the graph.

Conversely the shape of the peak^[4] affects mitigation efforts. Key questions for mitigation are the viability of solutions such as alternative fuel cars, the roles of government and private sector [40] [41], and how early the switch to these technologies would have to be in order to maintain the lifestyle of a country or even prevent changes to the Earth's carrying capacity.

[szerkesztés] Alternative transportation

Sablon:Main

Because most oil is consumed in transportation (approximately 66.6% in America) [42], much of the discussion regarding mitigation of the effects of oil depletion center around the development of transportation that uses less oil.

There are many forms of transportation that do not require oil or require much less than the standard automobile. Today, these include the application of biofuels, high mpg hybrid vehicles and diesel vehicles[43], battery electric vehicles, and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles. Hydrogen vehicles [44] such as General Motors Sequel are also being developed. Because America uses 1 in 4 barrels of global oil consumed [45] [46] and uses 66.6% for transportation, it uses roughly 17% of global oil consumption for transportation and is potentially the largest market for any new type of vehicle. However less than 30% of personal auto expenditures in 2003 were on gasoline and oil as compared with over 40% in 1980[47] and personal use is just one component of overall transportation.

More comprehensive mitigations include better land use planning through Smart growth to reduce transportation inducements, increased capacity and use of mass transit, vanpooling and carpooling, telecommuting and human powered transport from current levels [48]. Rationing is also a form of mitigation - see [49] for driving ban schemes and a list of policies and their oil savings in table E-1. In order to deal with potential problems from peak oil, Colin Campbell has proposed the Rimini protocol.

[szerkesztés] Alternative sources for oil

Sablon:Main

[szerkesztés] Popular alternatives

• hydrogen
• ethanol fuel
• butanol fuel
• biodiesel
• tar sands
• oil shale
• coal liquefaction
• gasification
• renewable energy sources (solar, wind, hydro, tidal, geothermal, wave, ocean thermal)
• nuclear energy (fission or fusion).

One near-term alternative source of liquid fuel is the Athabasca Tar Sands in Alberta, Canada. Production from this source is around 1 million bbl/day as of 2006, and is expected to build up to 3.2 million bbl/day by 2015. Higher oil prices have overcome the high costs of extracting heavy oil from this source. The current extraction process, however, requires large inputs of scarce natural gas and fresh water[50]. The figure for recoverable reserves from this source is currently (mid 2006) around 180 billion barrelsSablon:Fact (cf. the Saudi Arabian reserve of about 260 billion barrels of conventional oil). A similar field, the Orinoco tar sands in Venezuela, is also being exploited. These two are the largest known fields of tar (i.e., bitumen) sands.

The potential of oil shale in the US is discussed by a RAND study ^[5]:

Under high growth assumptions, an oil shale production level of 1 million barrels per day is probably more than 20 years in the future, and 3 million barrels per day is probably more than 30 years into the future.

Synthetic fuel, created via coal liquefaction, requires no engine modifications for use in standard automobiles. As a byproduct of oil embargos during Apartheid in South Africa, Sasol, using the Fischer-Tropsch process, developed relatively low-cost coal-based fuel. Currently, about 30% of South Africa's transport-fuel (mostly diesel) is produced from coal [51]. With crude-oil prices above $40 per barrel, this process is now cost-effective; however the process emits large amounts of carbon dioxide, thus contributing substantially to global warming.

[szerkesztés] Energy return on energy investment

When oil production first began in the mid-nineteenth century, the largest oil fields recovered fifty barrels of oil for every barrel used in the extraction, transportation and refining. This ratio is often referred to as the Energy Return on Energy Investment (EROI or EROEI). Currently, between one and five barrels of oil are recovered for each barrel-equivalent of energy used in the recovery process. As the EROEI drops to one, or equivalently the Net energy gain falls to zero, the oil production is no longer a net energy source. This happens long before the resource is physically exhausted.

Note that it is important to understand the distinction between a barrel of oil, which is a measure of oil, and a barrel of oil equivalent (BOE), which is a measure of energy. Many sources of energy, such as fission, solar, wind, and coal, are not subject to the same near-term supply restrictions that oil is. Accordingly, even an oil source with an EROEI of 0.5 can be usefully exploited if the energy required to produce that oil comes from a cheap and plentiful energy source. Availability of cheap, but hard to transport, natural gas in some oil fields has led to using natural gas to fuel enhanced oil recovery. Similarly, natural gas in huge amounts is used to power most Athabasca Tar Sands plants. Cheap natural gas has also led to Ethanol fuel produced with a net EROEI of less than 1, although figures in this area are controversial because methods to measure EROEI are in debate.

[szerkesztés] Market economy versus government

Part of the current debate revolves around energy policy, and whether to shift funding to increasing energy conservation, fuel efficiency, or other energy sources like solar, wind, and nuclear power. Rep. Tom Udall at congressional peak oil hearings [52]:

Some say that market forces will take care of the peak oil problem. They argue that as we approach or pass the peak of production, the price of oil will increase and alternatives will become more competitive. Following this, consumers will act to replace our need for non-petroleum energy resources. This philosophy is partly true. However, the main problem with this argument is that current U.S. oil prices do not accurately reflect the full social costs of oil consumption. Currently, in the United States, federal and state taxes add up to about 40 cents per gallon of gasoline. A World Resources Institute analysis found that fuel-related costs not covered by drivers are at least twice that much. The current price of oil does not include the full cost of road maintenance, health and environmental costs attributed to air pollution, the financial risks of global warming from increasing carbon dioxide emissions or the threats to national security from importing oil. Because the price of oil is artificially low, significant private investment in alternative technologies that provide a long-term payback does not exist. Until oil and its alternatives compete in a fair market, new technologies will not thrive.

For the United States investments like FreedomCAR, Hydrogen Fuel Initiative [53] and a DOE loan guarantee program [54] are driven by Hubbert peak theory applied to US peak production as well as global peak predictions. In China [55] and Japan [56] lack of native oil resources may also overshadow the world peak. In Europe initiatives such as Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation are marketed more in terms of the environment.

The Congressional Budget Office provides debate of government research versus incentives [57]

...the federal government could more effectively increase the efficiency of the nation's automotive fleet by raising gasoline taxes, imposing user fees on the purchase of low-mileage-per-gallon vehicles, or both. ...Such policies might also spur more-productive research--because automakers would have a greater incentive not only to conduct research into fuel-cell technology but also to broaden their research efforts to include other potential sources of fuel efficiency, such as more-sophisticated drive trains and transmissions and lightweight but durable chassis and body materials.

A warning of the level of incentive required for market driven research and development is stated by Rogner^[6]

Additionally, production cost reductions will not materialize in the absence of investments. Their magnitude and timing may affect the timing of future access to hydrocarbon resources. The scale of upfront investment requirements is expected to increase while the economic risk associated with upstream hydrocarbon projects will likely be higher than for alternative non-energy investment opportunities (61). Therefore, the quest for short-term profits may well be a road block to long-term resource development.

The problems of privately, especially venture capital, funded research and development are not unique to peak oil mitigation^[7]

even if problems associated with incomplete appropriability of the returns to R&D are solved using intellectual property protection, subsidies, or tax incentives, it may still be difficult or costly to finance R&D using capital from sources external to the firm or entrepreneur. That is, there is often a wedge, sometimes large, between the rate of return required by an entrepreneur investing his own funds and that required by external investors.

The severity of the problem for energy is echoed in the International Energy Agency's latest report, “WEO 2006 identifies under-investment in new energy supply as a real risk”.[58]

In the US, transportation by car is guided more by the government than by an invisible hand. Roads and the interstate highway system were built by local, state and federal governments and paid for by income tax, property tax, fuel tax and tolls. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve is designed to offset market imbalances. Municipal parking is frequently subsidized [59]. Emission standards regulate pollution by cars. US fuel economy standards exist but are not high enough to have effect. There is also a gas guzzler tax of limited scope. The United States offers tax credits for certain vehicles and these frequently are hybrids or compressed natural gas cars, see Energy Policy Act of 2005.

Many alternatives to oil require the price of oil to remain above some level in order to be profitable. So investors in these alternatives must gamble with the limited data on oil reserves available. This imperfect information can lead to a market failure caused by a move by nature; for instance see Hotelling's rule for non-renewable resources. Even with perfect information the price of oil correlates with spare capacity and spare capacity does not warn of a peak [60]

To put this into perspective, in 2004 world oil production is 80 Mb/d; spare capacity would need to be 44 Mb/d to be equivalent to US conditions in 1962. To predict that US production would peak in less than ten years given this much spare capacity seemed at the very least completely unrealistic to most people.

This problem might be solved by the government establishing a price floor for oil.[61] A tax shift raising gas taxes is the same idea.[62] Opponents of a price floor for oil argue that the markets would distrust the government's ability to keep the policy when oil prices are low.[63]

[szerkesztés] Growth-based economic models

Several analysts have observed that the underlying issues go more deeply than tactics of how governments interact with private markets, and suggest that economic growth may be a limiting factor for our species. See exogenous growth model and endogenous growth theory. Hubbert believed [64]:

Our principal constraints are cultural. During the last two centuries we have known nothing but exponential growth and in parallel we have evolved what amounts to an exponential-growth culture, a culture so heavily dependent upon the continuance of exponential growth for its stability that it is incapable of reckoning with problems of nongrowth.

Some economists have summed up the problem in the concept of uneconomic growth. At the political right, Fred Ikle has warned about "conservatives addicted to the Utopia of Perpetual Growth" [65]. Brief oil interruptions in 1973 and 1979 caused sharp declines in world GDP[66] growth rate. The fact that growth continued at all during these oil shocks shows some disconnect between growth and progress. Genuine Progress Indicator has been proposed to better track the results of depletion of resources on quality of life. China has replaced GDP with Green Gross Domestic Product.

[szerkesztés] Implications of an unmitigated world peak

According to the Hirsch report prepared for the U.S. Dept. of Energy, a global decline in oil production will have serious social and economic implications without due preparation. Initially an unmitigated peak in oil production would manifest itself as rapidly escalating prices and a worldwide energy crisis. While past oil shortages stemmed from a temporary insufficiency of supply, crossing Hubbert's Peak means that the production of oil continues to decline, so demand must be reduced to meet supply. If alternatives are not forthcoming, then the many products and services produced with oil become scarcer, leading to lower living standards.

• Air travel, using roughly 7% of world oil consumption [67], would be one of the impacted services. The energy density of hydrocarbons and the power density of a jet engine are so necessary for aviation that hydrocarbon fuels are nearly impossible to replace with electricity, to an extent beyond any other common mode of transport.
• A US Army Corps report ^[8] on the military's energy options states

  The Army and the nation’s heavy use of oil and natural gas is not well coordinated with either the nation’s or the Earth’s resources and upcoming availability.

• Shipping costs [68]

  On average, a one percent increase in fuel prices leads to a 0.4% increase in total freight rates. Using this rule of thumb, the recent doubling in oil prices has raised averaged freight rates by almost 40%.

  Shipping costs are particularly relevant to a country like Japan that has greater food miles[69].
• Increasing cost of oil for importing countries ultimately reduces those countries purchase of non-oil goods abroad. The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco discusses [70] oil and the US balance of trade:

  Oil prices have almost quadrupled since the beginning of 2002. For an oil-importing country like the U.S., this has substantially increased the cost of petroleum imports. International trade data suggest that this increase has exacerbated the deterioration of the U.S. trade deficit, especially since the second half of 2004.

  US indications of economic volatility have manifested themselves in the largest increase in inflation rates in 15 years (Sept. 2005), due mostly to higher energy costs.
• Significant oil producing countries will have a national purchasing advantage over similar countries with no oil to sell. This can result in larger militaries for oil producers or inflation of the price of whatever commodities they purchase.[71] Saudi Arabia purchased $40 billion worth of arms from the US since 1990.[72]

Oil industry analyst Jan Lundberg proposes a dark scenario called petrocollapse. Contrasting views note that most uses of oil, from plastics to transportation fuels, have substitutes.

[szerkesztés] Other Hubbert peaks

[szerkesztés] Natural gas

Sablon:Section-stub While Hubbert correctly predicted peak oil in the United States, the peak he predicted for natural gas was very far off. In 2000, U.S. natural gas production was 2.4 times higher than Hubbert had predicted in 1956.

Because gas transport is a complicated operation, the global peak of gas is less important than the peak per continent. The North American peak happened in 2001, according to Western Gas Resources Inc; according to Doug Reynolds, the peak will occur in 2007 [73]; according to Bentley, production will peak anywhere from 2010 to 2020^[9]. Since compressed natural gas powered cars are already available in North America, peak oil and peak gas are related for transportation usage.

Natural gas production may have peaked on the North American continent in 2003, with the possible exception of Alaskan gas supplies which cannot be developed until a pipeline is constructed. Natural gas production in the North Sea has also peaked. UK production was at its highest point in 2000, and declining production and increased prices are now a sensitive political issue. Even if new extraction techniques yield additional sources of natural gas, like coalbed methane, the energy returned on energy invested will be much lower than traditional gas sources, which inevitably leads to higher costs to consumers of natural gas.

The United States accounts for 24% of world natural gas consumption [74]. Since natural gas is the single largest feedstock used to produce fertilizers, an increase in natural gas prices could provide upward pressure on food costs, in addition to the increase in the transportation component of food prices.

[szerkesztés] Longterm

Hubbert explains [75] application of basic mathematics to the (smoothened) rate of production of any finite resource:

(1) For any production curve of a finite resource of fixed amount, two points on the curve are known at outset, namely that at t = 0 and again at t = infinity. The production rate wil be zero when the reference time is zero, and the rate will again be zero when the resource is exhausted; that is to say, in the production of any resource of fixed magnitude, the production rate must begin at zero, and then after passing through one or several maxima, it must decline again to zero. (2) The second consideration arises from the definition of the definite integral in calculus; namely if there exists a single valued function y = f(t), then is a function of x, A = A(x),and represents the area between the curve y = f(t) and the t-axis from the origin out to the distance x.

Here Hubbert expresses the fact that finite resources will eventually run out, in a form on which other mathematical work can build.

[szerkesztés] Coal

Peak coal is significantly further out than peak oil, but we can observe the example of anthracite in the USA, a high grade coal whose production peaked in the 1920s. Anthracite was studied by Hubbert, and matches a curve closely.[76]. Pennsylvania's coal production also matches Hubbert's curve closely, but this does not mean that coal in Pennsylvania is exhausted--far from it. If production in Pennsyslvania returned it its all time high, there are reserves for 190 years. Hubbert had recoverable coal reserves worldwide at 2500 × 10⁹ metric tons and peaking around 2150 depending on how the usage graph is drawn.

More recently, Gregson Vaux has analyzed the expected peak in U.S. coal production. His data suggests a peak taking place sometime between 2032 and 2060, with earlier dates more likely if coal is used as a partial substitute for plateauing or declining global oil supplies and North American natural gas supplies [77] [78].Regarding whether the estimates may be 'optimistic' or 'pessimistic', Vaux adds that "The majority of the calculations were conducted at Carnegie Mellon University in the Fall Semester of 2003 before the severity of the gas crisis had become obvious. It is possible that gas consumption in the U.S. will not remain flat but will actually decline; in this case, the coal peak will come sooner."

This analysis is put into context by the fact that the U.S. has the world's largest reserves of coal, almost as much as the the combined reserves of the counties with the second and third highest amounts of coal (Russia and China, respectively) [79].

[szerkesztés] Fissionable materials

In a paper in 1956 [80], after a review of US fissionable reserves, Hubbert notes of nuclear power:

There is promise, however, provided mankind can solve its international problems and not destroy itself with nuclear weapons, and provided world population (which is now expanding at such a rate as to double in less than a century) can somehow be brought under control, that we may at last have found an energy supply adequate for our needs for at least the next few centuries of the "foreseeable future."

Also technologies such as thorium, reprocessing and fast breeders can in theory considerably extend the life of uranium reserves. Roscoe Bartlett claims[81]

Our current throwaway nuclear cycle uses up the world reserve of low-cost uranium in about 20 years.

Caltech physics professor David Goodstein has stated [82] that

...you would have to build 10,000 of the largest power plants that are feasible by engineering standards in order to replace the 10 terawatts of fossil fuel we're burning today..that's a staggering amount and if you did that, the known reserves of uranium would last for 10 to 20 years at that burn rate. So, it's at best a bridging technology...You can use the rest of the uranium to breed plutonium 239 then we'd have at least 100 times as much fuel to use. But that means you're making plutonium, which is an extremely dangerous thing to do in the dangerous world that we live in.

[szerkesztés] Metals

Hubbert applied his theory to "rock containing an abnormally high concentration of a given metal" [83] and reasoned that the peak production for metals such as copper, tin, lead, zinc and others would occur in the time frame of decades and iron in the time frame of two centuries like coal. The recent jump in the price [84] of copper [85] has become known among traders as "peak copper". Lithium availability is a concern for a fleet of Li-ion battery using cars but world reserves are estimated as adequate for at least 50 years [86]. A similar prediction [87] for platinum use in fuel cells notes that the metal could be easily recycled.

[szerkesztés] Phosphorus

Phosphorus supplies are essential to farming and depletion of reserves is estimated at somewhere from 60 to 130 years [88]. Individual countries supplies vary widely; without a recycling initiative America's supply [89] is estimated around 30 years [90]. Phosphorus supplies affect total agricultural output which in turn limits alternative fuels such as biodiesel and ethanol.

[szerkesztés] Underground water reserves and lakes

Although water is a renewable resource, a reserve such as the Ogallala Aquifer can be mined at a rate that far exceeds replenishment. This turns much of the world's underground water [91] and lakes [92] into finite resources with peak usage debates similar to oil. These debates usually center around agriculture and suburban water usage but generation of electricity[93] from nuclear energy or coal and tar sands mining mentioned above is also water resource intensive.

[szerkesztés] Fisheries

Noting that the Hubbert curve seems to be applicable to any resource that can be harvested much faster than it can be replaced, at least one researcher has attempted to perform Hubbert linearization on fisheries, notably the whaling industry, as well as charting the transparently dependent price of caviar on sturgeon depletion.[94] Other example is the Cod of the north sea[95].

[szerkesztés] Criticism

Economist Michael Lynch[96] claims that the theory behind the Hubbert curve is overly simplistic, and that in his opinion available evidence contradicts some of the more specific predictions.[97] He points to the date of the coming peak, which was initially projected to occur by 2000, but has now been pushed back to 2010, and note that Campbell's predictions for world oil production are strongly biased towards underestimates[98]. Throughout 2001-2003, in his monthly newsletters, Campbell maintained that his 1996 prediction of a peak in 2000 was unchallenged. Finally in his April 2004 Newsletter, Campbell relented and shifted the peak to 2010. Later this was brought forward to 2007 but in October 2005, was shifted back to 2010.

Critics such as Leonardo Maugeri, vice president for the Italian energy company ENI, claim that Hubbert peak supporters such as Campbell previously predicted a peak in global oil production in both 1989 and 1995[99], based on oil production data available at that time. Maugeri claims that nearly all of the estimates do not take into account non-conventional oil even though the availability of these resources is significiant and the costs of extraction and processing, while still very high, are falling due to improved technology. Furthermore, he notes that the recovery rate from existing world oil fields has increased from about 22% in 1980 to 35% today due to new technology and predicts this trend will continue. The ratio between proven oil reserves and current production has constantly improved, passing from 20 years in 1948 to 35 years in 1972 and reaching about 40 years in 2003.^[10] These improvements occurred even with low investment in new exploration and upgrading technology due to the low oil prices during the last 20 years. However, Maugeri feels that encouraging more exploration will require relatively high oil prices [100].

Edward Luttwak argues that peak oil is a myth. He claims that unrest in countries such as Russia, Iran and Iraq has lead to a massive underestimate of oil reserves. ^[11] The ASPO response to Luttwak's article is here[101].

Cambridge Energy Research Associates sells a report[102] that is critical of Hubbert influenced predictions:

Despite his valuable contribution, M. King Hubbert's methodology falls down because it does not consider likely resource growth, application of new technology, basic commercial factors, or the impact of geopolitics on production. His approach does not work in all cases-including on the United States itself-and cannot reliably model a global production outlook. Put more simply, the case for the imminent peak is flawed. As it is, production in 2005 in the Lower 48 in the United States was 66 percent higher than Hubbert projected.

ASPO notes[103] that

We and CERA agree that production from existing oilfields is declining on average at about 5% per annum and this means, according to CERA, that 40 million barrels per day extra capacity is needed by 2015.

[szerkesztés] References

1. ^ Hubbert’s Petroleum Production Model: An Evaluation and Implications for World Oil Production Forecasts, Alfred J. Cavallo, Natural Resources Research,Vol. 13,No. 4, December 2004 [1]
2. ^ http://www.energybulletin.net/21696.html
3. ^ The Economic Costs of the Iraq War: An Appraisal Three Years After the Beginning of the Conflict, Linda Bilmes and Joseph E. Stiglitz, [2]
4. ^ The Shape of World Oil Peaking: Learning From Experience by Robert L. Hirsch [3]
5. ^ Oil Shale Development in the United States, James T. Bartis, Tom LaTourrette, Lloyd Dixon, D.J. Peterson, Gary Cecchine, 2005[4]
6. ^ An Assessment of World Hydrocarbon Resources, Hans-Holger Rogner, Annu. Rev. Energy Environ. 1997. 22:217–62, [5]
7. ^ The Financing of Research and Development, Bronwyn H. Hall, 2002, [6]
8. ^ Energy Trends and Their Implications for U.S. Army Installations, Donald F. Fournier and Eileen T. Westervelt, September 2005 [7]
9. ^ Global oil & gas depletion: an overview, R.W. Bentley, Energy Policy, 30, 189–205, 2002 [8]
10. ^ Maugeri, L. (2004). Oil: Never Cry Wolf--Why the Petroleum Age Is Far from over. Science 304, 1114-1115
11. ^ The truth about global oil supply

• "Feature on United States oil production." (November, 2002) ASPO Newsletter #23.

• Greene, D.L. & J.L. Hopson. (2003). Running Out of and Into Oil: Analyzing Global Depletion and Transition Through 2050 ORNL/TM-2003/259, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, October

• Economists Challenge Causal Link Between Oil Shocks And Recessions (August 30, 2004). Middle East Economic Survey VOL. XLVII No 35

• Hubbert, M.K. (1982). Techniques of Prediction as Applied to Production of Oil and Gas, US Department of Commerce, NBS Special Publication 631, May 1982

[szerkesztés] See also

Prediction

• Matthew Simmons
• Oil reserves
• Abiotic oil
• Hirsch report
• Ehrlich-Simon bet
• Energy conservation
• Energy crisis
• Olduvai theory
• Limits to Growth
• Global strategic petroleum reserves

Economics

• Gross domestic product per barrel
• 1973 energy crisis
• 1979 energy crisis
• 1990 spike in the price of oil
• Oil price increases of 2004-2006
• Petrodollar
• OPEC
• Iranian Oil Bourse
• Biophysical economics

Technology

• Energy conservation
• Energy efficiency
• Energy development
• Fuel economy
• Renewable energy
• Asphalt Bitumen from Renewable Resources
• Tar sands
• Fischer-Tropsch process
• Karrick process
• Future energy development
• Soft energy path

Others

• Proposed Oil phase-out in Sweden

[szerkesztés] Books

Michael C. Ruppert, Crossing the Rubicon: The Decline of the American Empire at the End of the Age of Oil

• Colin J. Campbell, (Head, Association for Peak Oil)
  • Campbell, Colin J. (2004). The Essence of Oil & Gas Depletion. Multi-Science Publishing. ISBN 0-906522-19-6.
  • Campbell, Colin J. (2004). The Coming Oil Crisis. Multi-Science Publishing. ISBN 0-906522-11-0.
  • Campbell, Colin J. (2005). Oil Crisis. Multi-Science Publishing. ISBN 0-906522-39-0.
• Kenneth S. Deffeyes, (petroleum geologist)
  • Deffeyes, Kenneth S. (2002). Hubbert's Peak:The Impending World Oil Shortage. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-09086-6.
  • Deffeyes, Kenneth S. (2005). Beyond Oil: The View from Hubbert's Peak. Hill and Wang. ISBN 0-8090-2956-1.
• Goodstein, David (2005). Out of Gas: The End of the Age Of Oil. W. W. Norton. ISBN 0-393-05857-3.
• Richard Heinberg, (writer on ecology)
  • Heinberg, Richard (2003). The Party's Over: Oil, War, and the Fate of Industrial Societies. New Society Publishers. ISBN 0-86571-482-7.
  • Heinberg, Richard (2004). Power Down: Options and Actions for a Post-Carbon World. New Society Publishers. ISBN 0-86571-510-6. (The gloom and doom scenario)
• Huber, Peter (2005). The Bottomless Well. Basic Books. ISBN 0-465-03116-1. (There will be no oil shortage; the free market will provide.)
• Kleveman, Lutz C. (2004). The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia. Atlantic Monthly Press. ISBN 0-87113-906-5.
• Kunstler, James H. (2005). The Long Emergency: Surviving the End of the Oil Age, Climate Change, and Other Converging Catastrophes. Atlantic Monthly Press. ISBN 0-87113-888-3.
• Leggett, Jeremy (2005). The Empty Tank: Oil, Gas, Hot Air, and the Coming Financial Catastrophe. Random House. ISBN 1-4000-6527-5. (Discusses both peak oil and climate change)
• Lovins, Amory et al (2005). Winning the Oil Endgame: Innovation for Profit, Jobs and Security. Rocky Mountain Institute. ISBN 1-881071-10-3. (The "small is beautiful" view)
• Pfeiffer, Dale Allen (2004). The End of the Oil Age. Lulu Press. ISBN 1-4116-0629-9.
• Ahmed Rashid, (Pakistani journalist)
  • Rashid, Ahmed (2001). Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. Yale University Press. ISBN 0-300-08902-3.
  • Rashid, Ahmed (2003). Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia. Yale University Press. ISBN 0-300-09345-4.
• Rifkin, Jeremy (2002). The Hydrogen Economy: After Oil, Clean Energy From a Fuel-Cell-Driven Global Hydrogen Web. Blackwell Publishers. ISBN 0-7456-3042-1. (Politically influential work; vague on where the hydrogen comes from)
• Simmons, Matthew R. (2005). Twilight in the Desert: The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the World Economy. ISBN 0-471-73876-X.
• Shah, Sonia (2004). Crude, The Story of Oil. Seven Stories Press. ISBN 1-58322-625-7.
• Simon, Julian L. (1998). The Ultimate Resource. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-00381-5. (The "ultimate resource" is innovation, not oil)
• Smil, Vaclav (2005). Energy at the Crossroads: Global Perspectives and Uncertainties. MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-19492-9.
• Tertzakian, Peter (2006). A Thousand Barrels a Second. McGraw-Hill. ISBN 0-07-146874-9.
• Yeomans, Matthew (2004). Oil, Anatomy of an Industry. ISBN 1-56584-885-3.
• Yergin, Daniel (1993). The Prize : The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power. Free Press. ISBN 0-671-79932-0.

[szerkesztés] Movies

• The Electric Wallpaper Co. - The End of Suburbia: Oil Depletion and the Collapse of the American Dream. http://www.endofsuburbia.com/, 2004, 78-minute documentary film. 52-minute version viewable at YouTube at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q3uvzcY2Xug
• Global Public Media - Richard Heinberg at the Vancouver Planetarium, 2003 (viewable online)
• Tropos Dokumentar, PEAK OIL-Imposed by Nature,DVD - 2005
• Aerobar Films - "Oilway To Hell", 2005 (viewable online)
• Mad Max, film set in a society that is suffering from a prolonged fuel shortage
• The West Wing episode The Hubbert Peak
• Lava Productions AG - A Crude Awakening
• Documentary 52': The Epic of Black Gold - Part4/4 - The Oil Depletion
• Peak Oil - a short film by Larry Larstead Now streaming on YouTube, 4 min. film, 2006 (viewable online)
• Oil, Smoke, and Mirrors
• Community Service, Inc. (Producer). (2006). The Power of Community: How Cuba Survived Peak Oil DVD

[szerkesztés] External links

[szerkesztés] Sites

• U.S. Energy Information Agency Petroleum Data
• Association for the Study of Peak Oil
• Post Carbon Institute
• Life After the Oil Crash
• Energy Bulletin Peak Oil News
• Global Public Media
• PeakOil.Com Peak Oil News, Analysis, and Mitigation Alternatives
• 'Eficiencia Energetica Bilingual English/spanish Peak Oil multimedia Blog,'
• PeakOilInTheNews.Com Daily news roundup of Peak Oil news from around the world
• The Oil Drum
• Peak Oil Optimist
• Crisis Energética (Spanish language)
• Will You Join Us (Chevron Corporation)
• The End of Fossil Fuel
• Global Oil Watch - Extensive Peak Oil Library
• Wolf at the Door Beginner's Guide to Peak Oil
• The Peakist News blog on Peak Oil
• Peak Oil News Latest News Articles
• Peak Oil Articles & News
• Oil Depletion Analysis Centre in the United Kingdom
• PowerSwitch in the United Kingdom

[szerkesztés] Articles

• John V. Mitchell (Associate Fellow Chatham House, London): A New Era for Oil Prices; 32 Pages, August 2006
• The Future of Oil from Foreign Policy
• The End of Cheap Oil — Colin Campbell & Jean Laherrère, Scientific American
• International Energy Agency press release
• The End of Oil? — Mark Williams, MIT Technology Review
• The End of Cheap Oil — Tim Appenzeller, National Geographic
• The New Pessimism about Petroleum Resources — Michael C. Lynch
• Peak Lite — Robert Rapier
• Oil shale back in the picture — Robert E. Snyder
• El mundo ante el cenit del petróleo Fernando Bullón Miró
• M. King Hubbert, "Energy from Fossil Fuels", Science, vol. 109, pp. 103-109, February 4, 1949
• Paul Roberts, "Last Stop Gas", Harper's Magazine, August 2004, pp. 71-72
• 'Sweden aims to be world's first oil-free nation by 2020' - Larry West
• BBC News: 'Peak oil' enters mainstream debate
• Between Peak Oil and Climate Change Dan Welch at The Peakist examines the implication of the peak oil crisis for climate changes
• Actions everyone can take to prepare for the possible end of an era - Donna Mosher, Citizens League for Environmental Action Now
• Technocracy, Hubbert and peak oil Article from The North American Technocrat
• U.S. Cities' Preparedness for an Oil Crisis SustainLane.us

[szerkesztés] Programs

[szerkesztés] Radio

• Driven by Oil - BBC radio 4 - Radio series running throughout September 2006

[szerkesztés] Television

• What If: The Oil Runs Out - Discovery Channel (DEPRECATED LINK)
• Peak Oil? - ABC Australia - 4 Corners - Global Supply & Demand Theory-Analysis (ref: ASPO .au, ABARE, IEA & US DoE)

[szerkesztés] Reports, essays and lectures

• Roscoe Bartlett explains peak oil in US Congress
• Review: Oil-based technology and economy - prospects for the future The Danish Board of Technology (Teknologirådet)
• M. King Hubbert on the Nature of Growth
• Peakoil conference 19-20 October 2004
• graph showing oil production in lower 48 US states following Hubbert's predictions
• Rep. Prof. Roscoe Bartlett's hour long Peak Oil presentation to (an empty) U.S. House of Representatives
• An Introduction to Peak Oil by Jim Bliss
• David Holmgren talks about Peak Oil and Permaculture (July 28, 2004) [archive.org]
• Trends in Oil Supply and Demand, Potential for Peaking of Conventional Oil Production, and Possible Mitigation Options: A Summary Report of the Workshop (2006), National Research Council
• The End of Oil, essay 1.pdf, very concise peak-oil study by Bob Lloyd, July 2005

• Peak Oil Theory – “World Running Out of Oil Soon” – Is Faulty; Could Distort Policy & Energy Debate

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