Chaim Perelman

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Chaïm Perelman (Varsavia 20 maggio 1912 – Bruxelles 22 gennaio 1984), filosofo polacco del diritto, che ha studiato, insegnato e vissuto la maggior parte della sua vita a Bruxelles.
Si colloca tra i più importanti teorici dell'argomentazione del secolo XX. Il suo capolavoro è il Traité de l'argumentation - la nouvelle rhétorique (1958), scritto con Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, tradotto in inglese con il titolo The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, a cura di John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (1969).
Ha elaborato la cosiddetta "logica del preferibile", in contrapposizione alla logica formale cartesiana.

Indice 1 Biografia 2 Biografia culturale 3 The New Rhetoric 3.1 Overview 3.2 The framework of argumentation 3.3 The starting points of argumentation 3.4 Argument techniques 4 Repliche e Perelman e alla Nuova Retorica 5 Fonti 6 Selezione di biblografia francese 6.1 Articoli 6.2 Libri 6.3 Con Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca: 7 Selezione di bibliografia inglese 7.1 Articoli 7.2 Libri 7.3 Con Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca: 8 Ulteriori letture 9 Voci correlate 10 Collegamenti esterni 11 Biografia culturale 12 Opere 13 La giustizia formale

[modifica] Biografia

Perelman e la sua famiglia emigrarono da Varsavia ad Anversa (Belgio) nel 1925. Cominciò gli studi universitari alla Université Libre de Bruxelles, dove sarebbe rimasto per tutta la durata della sua carriera. Conseguì il primo dottorato in legge nel 1934, con una tesi di laurea sul filosofo e matematico Gottlob Frege, ed una seconda laurea nel 1938. Nello stesso anno, Perelman fu nominato docente a Bruxelles alla Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia. Alla fine della guerra, era diventato il più giovane professore di storia di quell'Università.

La ricerca iniziale di Perelman in materia di diritto e filosofia fu effettuata sotto l'egida del positivismo logico. Nel 1944, completò uno studio empirico sulla giustizia e concluse che ogni applicazione delle leggi coinvolge "giudizi di valore": poiché però i valori non possono essere assoggettati ai rigori della logica, e non sono suscettibili di giustificazione razionale, il fondamento della giustizia può diventare arbitrario. Dopo aver terminato la ricerca, Perelman considerò insostenibili le sue stesse conclusioni se il giudizio di valore fa parte integrante della "ragion pratica" del processo decisionale (motivazione), e dire che questi giudizi difettano di basi logiche era negare il fondamento razionale della filosofia, della legge, della politica e dell'etica.

Come risultato dei suoi studi empirici sulla giustizia, Perelman respinse il positivismo in favore di una filosofia retrograda che impone un fondamento logico ai giudizi di valore. Nel 1948, Incontrò Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, che ebbe anche come assistente all'Università Libera di Bruxelles, e cominciò con lei una collaborazione circa un progetto che avrebbe istituito la vecchia retorica come fondamento per un logico giudizio di valore.

Nel 1958, Perelman e Olbrechts-Tyteca pubblicarono il loro lavoro sulla logica informale col nome di Traité de l'argumentation: la nouvelle rhétorique. Ispirato allo spirito delle osservazioni di Frege, il lavoro analizza un ampio numero di argomenti attuali dall'ambito di filosofia, legge, politica, etica, e giornalismo. Il risultato fu una "teoria generale dell'argomentazione" collegata alla considerazione dei valori, del pubblico, e di quei punti sfocati di partenza della tecnica generale dell'argomentazione.

Nel 1962, Perelman fu invitato da Henry W. Johnstone (1920-2000, docente di filosofia alla Pennsylvania State University, autore di Philosophy, Rhetoric and Argumentation) e da Robert T. Oliver (antropologo, autore di The influence of rhetoric in the shaping of Great Britain, History of Public Speaking in America e The Psychology of Persuasive Speech) a prendere un posto alla Pennsylvania State University come professore emerito. La collaborazione tra Johnstone e Perelman in particolare, che ebbe inizio prima della pubblicazione di La nouvelle rhétorique, si dimostrò fruttuosa. Johnstone creò l'importante giornale Filosofia e retorica, e Perelman si stabilì negli Stati Uniti come autorità nella "teoria dell'argomentazione".

Per l'intero ventennio successivo, Perelman continuò a pubblicare lavori correlati alla New rhetoric. Diede anche significativi contributi agli studi legali come direttore del Centro nazionale per la Ricerca sulla Logica (presso l'Università Libera di Bruxelles), e nel frattempo continuava a pubblicare su argomenti di filosofia del diritto.

Come riconoscimento del suo impegno accademico e civile, Perelman fu nominato barone dal Parlamento belga nel dicembre del 1983. Morì nella propria abitazione, in Bruxelles, per un attacco di cuore il 12 gennaio 1984.

[modifica] Biografia culturale

Dopo aver terminato De la justice nel 1944, Perelman rifiutò i vantaggi del positivismo logico oltre le sue applicazioni nella scienza pura. In Philosophies premières et philosophie regressive, pubblicato cinque anni dopo, delineò ulteriormente i limiti delle prime filosofie o metafisica. Poiché questi approcci si basavano su una serie di assiomi auto-evidenti e reciprocamente supportantisi, ogni errore percepito avrebbe invalidato l'intera filosofia e la sua pretesa di rivelare verità universali e assolute. Le alternative prevalenti, in particolare il relativismo di Jean-Paul Sartre, erano anch'esse insostenibili per Perelman, dato che gli assoluti della metafisica in questi approcci venivano semplicemente rimpiazzati dallo scetticismo assoluto.

During his research with Olbrechts-Tyteca, Perelman would develop a philosophy that avoided the absolutes of both positivism and radical relativism. After encountering an excerpt of Brunetto Latini in the appendix of Jean Paulhan’s Les fleurs de Tarbes, Perelman began researching ancient Greco-Latin approaches to argumentation. He found that while a specific logic of value judgments had never been established, an approach to the problem was apparent in the works of Aristotle. In the Posterior analytics, Aristotle establishes the principles of demonstration or analytics, which rely on the accepted premises and necessary conclusions of the syllogism. In the Topics and elsewhere, Aristotle opposes the demonstrative approach to dialectics, or rhetorical reasoning, which relies on premises that are acceptable in a given situation and are thus contingent. With Aristotle's distinctions, Perelman was able to perceive the contradiction of first philosophies: while claiming to reveal universal and absolute truths according to demonstrative methods, philosophy was in reality more concerned with persuading specific audiences to accept its claims. For Perelman, then, a viable philosophy – capable of establishing aspects of being and inducing reasonable action – must be constructed according to probabilities and must be able to withstand impositions of value and other contingencies stemming from its reception by particular audiences. Perelman’s approach, which he termed regressive philosophy, thus sought to incorporate socially constructed truths and to remain amenable to changes should those truths be modified.

While rhetoric and argumentation provided the core of Perelman’s philosophy, his regressive approach also shaped his treatise on non-formal argumentation. In the conclusion of the New rhetoric, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca state that in opposition to the absolutes common in philosophy, their project acknowledges that “men and groups of men adhere to opinions of all sorts with a variable intensity” and that “these beliefs are not always self-evident, and they rarely deal with clear and distinct ideas.” To uncover the logic that governs these beliefs and ideas, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca rely on a regressive philosophy that accounts for the variability of particular situations and particular values. Perelman would employ this same approach in future developments of the New Rhetoric and in subsequent writings on law and justice.

[modifica] The New Rhetoric

[modifica] Overview

Perleman and Olbrechts-Tyteca began research on the logic of non-formal arguments in 1948. Following Frege’s comprehensive approach to the study of mathematics, they collected a wide range of writing from academic, professional, religious, and popular realms to devise and apply their theory. After encountering Latini and “rediscovering” the Greco-Latin rhetorical tradition, both the project and its philosophical basis took a definitive shape. Perelman hypothesized that the rationale governing non-formal argument could be derived from the principles of rhetorical theory and from considerations of audience and values in particular. These considerations in turn affected the specific structure of arguments, including the bases of agreement and the availability of specific appeals. Perelman’s analysis also produced an overview of the various techniques apparent across the diverse group of arguments collected in the course of research.

The following discussion of the New rhetoric is organized according to the three sections of the book, and covers the major concepts contained in each.

[modifica] The framework of argumentation

The New rhetoric is founded on the assertion that “since argumentation aims at securing the adherence of those to whom it is addressed, it is, in its entirety, relative to the audience to be influenced” (1969, p.19). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca rely in particular for their theory of argumentation on the twin concepts of universal and particular audiences: while every argument is directed to a specific individual or group, the orator decides what information and what approaches will achieve the greatest adherence according to an ideal audience. This ideal, Perelman explains, can be embodied, for example, "in God, in all reasonable and competent men, in the man deliberating or in an elite" (2001, p. 1393). Like particular audiences, then, the universal audience is never fixed or absolute but depends on the orator, the content and goals of the argument, and the particular audience to whom the argument is addressed. These considerations determine what information constitutes "facts" and "reasonableness" and thus help to determine the universal audience that, in turn, shapes the orator's approach.

The adherence of an audience is also determined by the orator's use of values, a further key concept of the New rhetoric. Perelman's treatment of value and his view of epideictic rhetoric sets his approach apart from that of the ancients and of Aristotle in particular. Aristotle's division of rhetoric into three genres – forensic, deliberative, and epideictic – is largely motivated by the judgments required for each: forensic or legal arguments require verdicts on past action, deliberative or political rhetoric seeks judgment on future action, and epideictic or ceremonial rhetoric concerns values associated with praise or blame and seeks no specific decisions. For Aristotle, the epideictic genre was of limited importance in the civic realm since it did not concern facts or policies. Perelman, in contrast, believes not only that epideictic rhetoric warrants more attention, but that the values normally limited to that genre are in fact central to all argumentation. "Epideictic oratory," Perelman argues, "has significance and importance for argumentation because it strengthens the disposition toward action by increasing adherence to the values it lauds" (1969, p. 50). These values, moreover, are central to the persuasiveness of arguments in all rhetorical genres since the orator always attempts to "establish a sense of communion centered around particular values recognized by the audience" (1969, p. 51).

[modifica] The starting points of argumentation

All argumentation, according to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, must proceed from a point of agreement; contentious matters in particular cannot be introduced until sufficient agreement on prior or related issues has already been established. The bases of agreement are divided into two categories: the first deals with facts, truths, and presumptions; the second with values, hierarchies, and loci of the preferable.

Both facts and truths are normally established prior to argument; these are aspects of reality that would be agreed to, for instance, by the universal audience as conceived by the orator. Neither facts nor truths provide opportunity for dispute; as Perelman explains, "if we presuppose the coherence of reality and of our thruths taken as a whole, there cannot be any conflict between facts and truths on which we would be called to make a decision" (2001, p. 1394). Presumptions, like facts and truths, need not be defended. Should the argument require opposing presumptions, however, the orator may overturn previous opinion by proving an opposite case.

Values, both concrete and abstract, may also constitute starting points, although none should be treated as universal. Establishing and reinforcing common values is necessary, according to Perelman, because they influence action and determine acceptable behaviour (2001, p. 1394). Values, moreover, are normally arranged in hierarchies that can also serve as starting points for argument. An audience will value both justice and utility, for example, but an argument may require a determination of preference between the two. Like values, hierarchies can be abstract or concrete; they may also be homogeneous, in the case of degrees, or heterogeneous, in the example of honesty and truthfulness. Both values and hierarchies can be justified by the final point of agreement, which Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca term loci of the preferable. These loci or commonplaces are derived from the third book of Aristotle's Topics and allow agreement according to the determination of which, between two loci, is more preferred. Thus, an argument may begin from the determination that an intrinsic quality, such as health, is preferred over a contingent quality, such as beauty.

The final aspect of argument starting points discussed in the New rhetoric is the creation of "presence." From the body of ideas that are agreed upon by a given audience, the orator may choose to emphasize or lend presence to certain elements while deemphasizing others. As Perelman explains, "things present, things near to us in space and time, act directly on our sensibility," yet if things distant – from the past or future – are more relevant to the argument, they may be lent presence through specific rhetorical figures, such as hypotyposis or anaphora (2001, p. 1395). All points of agreement, moreover, may be distinguished as primary or secondary according to the purpose of the argument and the composition of the particular audience. This is accomplished, Perelman notes, by linguistic categories that allow the orator to mount arguments "under the guise of a descriptive narrative" (ibid).

[modifica] Argument techniques

Because non-formal argument is concerned with the adherence of an audience – rather than the mere demonstration of propositions proper to formal logic – the orator must ensure that the audience adheres to each successive element of an argument. Perelman outlines two ways the orator may achieve this acceptance or adherence: the first involves associations according to quasi-logical arguments, appeals to reality, and arguments that establish the real; the second approach responds to incompatible opinions through the dissociation of concepts.

Quasi-logical arguments, Perelman explains, are "similar to the formal structures of logic and mathematics" (2001, p. 1396). Definition is a common quasi-logical approach that is used not only for establishing the meaning of a term but also for emphasizing certain features of an object for persuasive purposes. Other quasi-logical arguments include relations of division, arguments of reciprocity, and arguments of probability. While these techniques appear to share the qualities of formal demonstrations, Perelman notes that for all quasi-logical approaches, "complementary, nonformal hypotheses are necessary to render the argument compelling" (2001, p. 1398).

The remaining associative techniques involve appealing to reality and establishing the real. Arguments of the former category can be further divided into those conveying succession and those dealing with coexistence. Relations of succession include causes and effects, such as the consequences of a particular action, or means and ends, such as the projected outcome of an event or process. Relations of coexistence, on the other hand, associate a person or essence to a specific act, and include arguments from authority. Like appeals to the real, arguments that establish the structure of reality can be divided into two categories: arguments from example or model, and arguments by analogy. The former rely on generalizations derived from a single situation, in the case of example, or on the conformation of a single situation to an accepted practice or ethos, in the case of models. Appeals to the real that rely on analogy are common and, according to Perelman, are "typical to Plato, Plotinus, and all those who establish hierarchies within reality" (2001, p. 1399). These appeals establish the relation between two terms by noting their similarity to another, more familiar set of terms; for example, "truth is to Socrates what gold is to a miser." Metaphor, another common aspect of argumentation, is a form of condensed analogy.

When orators seek to reconcile incompatible opinions, they may gain adherence by a dissociation of concepts. The final technique discussed by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca is a common approach in metaphysics that opposes appearances to reality. As Perelman explains, reality is normally perceived "through appearances that are taken as signs referring to it. When, however, appearances are incompatible – an oar in water looks broken but feels straight to the touch – we must admit…that some appearances are illusory and may lead us to error regarding the real" (2001, p. 1400). This recognition in turn fosters a conception of reality by which appearances may be judged; those aspects conforming to the real are considered valuable, while those not consistent with reality are dismissed as illusive. The dissociation of ideas can be extended to any realm where the tenets of an argument are incompatible with accepted opinion; "real democracy," for instance, can be opposed to "apparent democracy, or formal or nominal democracy, or quasi-democracy" (ibid.). In the process of this opposition, adherence to "real democracy" is achieved not on the basis of its merit as an idea, but rather through the devaluation of opposing terms.

[modifica] Repliche e Perelman e alla Nuova Retorica

The most common criticisms of the New rhetoric focus on Perelman's concept of a universal audience; these include early reviews by Henry W. Johnstone, and later work by John W. Ray and Lisa Ede. Argumentation theorists Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Kruiger also criticize the apparent separation of audience considerations and argument techniques. As Frank (2003) outlines, however, the positive reception of New rhetoric far outweighs its criticism. The work has been translated, in whole or in part, into 9 languages and has been described variously as "groundbreaking," by J. Robert Cox, a "bombshell," by Michael Leff, and as "one of the most influential modern formulations of rhetorical theory,” by Brian Vickers. The New rhetoric and its later developments have been foundational for argumentation theory in the last thirty years, and Perelman's work has influenced studies ranging from justice and reason to social psychology and political geography.

[modifica] Fonti

• Frank, D.A. (2003). After the new rhetoric. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 89(3), 253-66.
• Frank, D.A. & Bolduc, M.K. (2003). Chaim Perelman’s 'First philosophies and regressive philosophy': Commentary and translation. Philosophy and Rhetoric, 36(3), 177-88.
• Gross, A.G. (1999). A theory of rhetorical audience: Reflections on Chaim Perelman. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 85, 203-11.
• __________. (2000). Rhetoric as a technique and a mode of truth: Reflections on Chaim Perelman. Philosophy and Rhetoric, 33(4), 319-35.
• Gross, A.G., & Dearin, R.D. (2003). Chaim Perelman. Albany: State University of New York Press.
• Perelman, C. (2003). First philosophies and regressive philosophy. Philosophy and Rhetoric, 36(3), 189-206.
• __________. (2001). The new rhetoric: A theory of practical reasoning. In P. Bizzell and B. Herzberg (Eds.), The rhetorical tradition (pp. 1384-1409): New York: Bedford Books.
• __________. (1984). The new rhetoric and the rhetoricians: Remembrances and comments. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 70(2), 188-96.
• Perelman, C. and Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969). The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation. (J. Wilkinson and P. Weaver, Trans.). Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

[modifica] Selezione di biblografia francese

[modifica] Articoli

• (1948). Le probleme du bon choix. Revue de l’Institute de Sociologie, 3, 383-98.
• (1949). Philosophies premières et philosophie régressive. Dialectica, 3, 175-91.

[modifica] Libri

• (1963). Justice et raison. Bruxelles: Presses Universitaires de Bruxelles.
• (1968). Droit, morale et philosophie. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence.
• (1969). Le Champ de l'argumentation. Bruxelles: Presses Universitaires de Bruxelles
• (1976). Logique juridique. Paris: Dalloz.
• (1977). L'Empire rhétorique. Paris: Vrin.
• (1984). Le Raisonnable et le déraisonnable en droit. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence..

[modifica] Con Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca:

• (1950). Logique et rhétorique. Revue philosophique, 140, 1-35.
• (1952). Rhétorique et philosophie: Pour une théorie de l'argumentation en philosophie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
• (1958). Traité de l'argumentation: La nouvelle rhétorique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France

[modifica] Selezione di bibliografia inglese

[modifica] Articoli

• (1955). How do we apply reason to values? Journal of Philosophy, 52, 797-802.
• (1968). Rhetoric and philosophy. Philosophy and Rhetoric, 1, 15-24.
• (1984). The new rhetoric and the rhetoricians: Remembrances and comments. The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 70(2), 188-96.
• (2003). First philosophies and regressive philosophy. Philosophy and Rhetoric, 36(3), 189-206.

[modifica] Libri

• (1963). The idea of justice and the problem of argument. (J. Petrie, Trans.). New York: Humanities Press.
• (1979). The new rhetoric and the humanities: Essays on rhetoric and its applications. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
• (1982). The realm of rhetoric. (W. Kluback, Trans.). Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

[modifica] Con Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca:

• (1969). The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation. (J. Wilkinson and P. Weaver, Trans.). Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

[modifica] Ulteriori letture

• Arnold, C. (1970). La nuova retorica di Perelman. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 55, 87-92.
• Dearin, R.D. (1989). La nuova retorica di Chaim Perelman: Dichiarazioni e repliche. In Lanham: University Press of America.
• (1969). Le basi filosofiche della teoria della retorica di Chaim Perleman. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 55, 213-24.
• Golden, J.L. e Pilotta, J.J., Eds. (1986). Practical reasoning in human affairs: Studies in honor of Chaim Perelman. Boston: D. Reidel.
• Maneli, M. (1994). La nuova retoria di Perelman come filosofia e metodologia per il prossimo secolo. Boston: Kluwer.
• Ray, J.W. (1978). Il pubblico universale di Perelman. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 64, 361-75.

[modifica] Voci correlate

• Logica
• Filosofia
• Retorica
• Logica giuridica
• René Descartes

[modifica] Collegamenti esterni

• Foss, Foss, and Trapp, Capitolo su Perelman da Readings in contemporary rhetoric
• Adam Kissel, Note sulla Nuova retorica
• Richard Long, Il ruolo del pubblico nella Nuova Retorica di Chaim Perelman
• Renato José de Oliveira, Chaim Perelman e la filosofia dell'educazione
• Moreira Necho, Istituto Moreira Necho
• Chaim Perelman e Paul Foriers, Legge natura e e diritti naturali (in Dictionary of the history of ideas)
• (EN) Chaim Perelman
• (PL) Chaim Perelman

[modifica] Biografia culturale

Perelman ha dato contributi rilevantissimi nell'ambito della filosofia del diritto, della logica, della teoria dell'argomentazione. Molte pagine dei suoi vari scritti sono dedicate al tema fondamentale dell'esistenza: comunicare. Nella visione di Perelman, se si comunica bene, si persuade l'interlocutore, come aveva già inutito Epitteto quando diceva che «le opinioni, non i fatti, muovono gli uomini».
La retorica è la scienza che conferisce potere persuasivo. Nella società attuale, dovrebbe essere questa la scienza più studiata, mentre è quella meno studiata, se non nei salotti che contano.

[modifica] Opere

• La giustizia, Giappichelli, Torino, 1959
• Retorica e filosofia, De Donato, Bari, 1959
• (con Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca), Trattato dell'argomentazione, Einaudi, Torino 1966
• Diritto, morale, filosofia, Guida, Napoli 1973
• Il campo dell'argomentazione, Pratiche, Parma 1979
• Logica giuridica. Nuova retorica, Giuffrè, Milano 1979
• Il dominio retorico, Einaudi, Torino 1981 (prima edizione: L'empire rhétorique. Rhétorique et argumentation, Paris 1977)

Vi sono poi raccolte di scritti di Perelman:

• Éthique et droit (curata da A. Lempereur), Édition de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1990.
• Teoria e pratica dell’argomentazione. Antologia degli scritti (a cura di G. Furnari Luvarà), Soveria Mannelli, ed. Rubbettino, 2005

[modifica] La giustizia formale

Nel saggio La giustizia formale, Perelman enuncia sei concezioni della giustizia. Esse sono:

1. a ciascuno la stessa cosa;
2. a ciascuno secondo i suoi meriti;
3. a ciascuno secondo le sue opere;
4. a ciascuno secondo i suoi bisogni;
5. a ciascuno secondo il suo rango;
6. a ciascuno secondo ciò che la legge gli attribuisce.

Dato che queste sei formulazioni sono tra loro inconciliabili, secondo Perelman ci sono tre soluzioni:

1. dichiarare che queste concezioni della giustizia non hanno nulla in comune (ma allora quale di queste corrisponde alla vera giustizia?)
2. dichiarare che una sola di esse è vera;
3. cercare l'elemento che queste sei formulazioni hanno in comune

Questa ricerca è resa possibile dal "metodo dell'analisi logica": in ognuna delle formulazioni, si individua l'elemento indeterminato (ciò che in matematica si chiama variabile), e lo si determina facendo luogo alle varie concezioni di giustizia. Quando si trova un elemento comune, questo costituirà la definizione formale (astratta) di giustizia, ed ogni formulazione particolare o concreta costituirà uno degli innumerevoli valori della giustizia formale.