Lesson of Munich
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
In international relations, the Lesson of Munich asserts that adversaries will interpret restraint as indicating a lack of capability or political will or both. The name refers to the appeasement of Adolf Hitler's Nazi Germany in negotiations toward the eventual Munich Agreement. Many scholars argue that Neville Chamberlain's capitulation to German demands guaranteed eventual war as Hitler believed he could do as he pleased without the other Great Powers going to war to stop him. Steven Chan describes the moral as "appeasement discredits the defenders' willingness to fight, and encourages the aggressor to escalate his demands." (89)
The breadth of applicability of the Lesson of Munich is disputed, however; whether this was the correct lesson to learn from the Munich negotiations is also subject to debate. The lesson is sometimes invoked to argue for strong, uncompromising response to international challenges; for instance, in the United States to argue for a powerful response to the September 11, 2001 attacks. Critics of the American post-September 11th wars argue, however, that Hitler's Germany cannot be compared with the Taliban's Afghanistan or Saddam Hussein's Iraq.
[edit] References
- Robert J. Beck. "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered". International Security, Vol. 14, No. 2. (Autumn, 1989), pp. 161-191.
- Steven Chan. International Relations in Perspective. New York: Macmillan, 1984.
- J. L. Richardson. "New Perspectives on Appeasement: Some Implications for International Relations". World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 3. (Apr., 1988), pp. 289-316. Especially pp. 290-292.
