Meditations on First Philosophy

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Meditations on First Philosophy (subtitled In which the existence of God and the real distinction of mind and body, are demonstrated) is a philosophical treatise written by René Descartes first published in Latin in 1641. The French translation was made by the Duke of Luynes with the supervision of Descartes and was published in 1647 with the title Méditations Metaphysiques. The original Latin title is Meditationes de prima philosophia, in qua Dei existentia et animae immortalitas demonstratur. The book is made up of six meditations, in which Descartes first discards all belief in things which are not absolutely certain, and then tries to establish what can be known for sure.

The Meditations consist of the presentation of Descartes' metaphysical system in its most detailed level and in the expanding of Descartes' philosophical system, which he first introduced in the fourth part of his Discourse on Method (1637). Descartes' metaphysical thought is also found in the Principles of Philosophy (1644), which the author intended to be a philosophy guidebook.

1 Meditations
2 Objections and replies
3 See also
4 Notes and references
5 Further reading
6 External links

[edit] Meditations

[edit] Meditation I

Descartes begins the first meditation by noting the large number of false beliefs which he had adopted in his childhood. It is necessary to start over entirely, he realizes, if he wants to establish anything in the sciences which is firm and likely to last. In order to do this, he will suspend judgment about any of his beliefs which are in any way uncertain. To inspect each belief separately would take too long; he must find some way to undermine all of his beliefs at once.

The first way that Descartes tries to undermine his beliefs is by considering the fact that he remembers that his senses have deceived him before. If he has been misled by sensory information in the past (e.g. he judged that the stick in the water was bent, when in fact it was straight), then he may be deceived now, "and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once."

Descartes acknowledges, however, that this consideration doesn't undermine his beliefs very effectively, since it really seems as if he is sitting in his dressing gown by the fire, holding this piece of paper in his hands, and so on. How could his senses be misleading him about these things?

He goes on to suggest more powerful reasons to doubt that his beliefs are true. In general, his method is that of forming skeptical hypotheses. In the first meditation, he considers whether he is mad, dreaming, or deceived by an evil demon. If any of these scenarios were the case, many of his beliefs would be false. For instance, if he were mad, he might believe completely ridiculous things e.g. that his head is a pumpkin (he only considers the possibility that he is mad briefly and then seems to dismiss it). If he were dreaming, it would be false that he is sitting by the fire. He would only be imagining this were true, when in fact he's lying in bed asleep. Likewise, if there were a powerful being deceiving him, he would believe that there is a sky and an earth and so on, since the demon would make it appear to him as if this is the case, when in fact none of these things exist.

The general form of these arguments is:

If I am dreaming/deceived, then my beliefs are not true.
I don't know whether I am dreaming/deceived.
Therefore, I don't know whether my beliefs are true.

Descartes' goal — as stated at the beginning of the meditation — is to suspend judgment about any of his beliefs which are even slightly doubtful. The skeptical scenarios show that all of the beliefs which he considers in the first meditation, including at the very least all of his beliefs about the physical world, are doubtful. So he decides to suspend judgment. He will henceforth give up all of his beliefs about the physical world. This is very difficult. At the end of the first meditation Descartes compares himself to a prisoner who enjoys an imaginary freedom while asleep, and dreads waking. In the same way Descartes slips back into his old beliefs, and dreads waking to toil "amid the inextricable darkness of the problems [he] has now raised."

It is important to keep in mind when reading the Meditations that Descartes intends to lead the reader along with him gradually. He begins with skepticism and attempts to offer a solution. Thus, he should not be uncharitably read as contradicting himself when, for instance, he thinks something is doubtful in the first meditation and as certain in the last. Several of his objectors fail to read the meditations as a guide, in which the order of the arguments is important, and so make this mistake.

[edit] Meditation II

In Meditation II: On the Nature of the Human Mind, Which Is Better Known Than the Body, Descartes lays out a pattern of thought, sometimes called representationalism, in response to the doubts forwarded in Meditation I. He identifies five steps in this theory:

We only have access to the world of our ideas; things in the world are only accessed indirectly.
These ideas are understood to include all of the contents of the mind, including perceptions, images, memories, concepts, beliefs, intentions, decisions, etc.
The ideas represent things that are separate from themselves.
These represented things are many times "external" to the mind.
It is possible for these ideas to constitute either accurate or false representations.

Descartes argues that this representational theory disconnects the world from the mind, leading to the need for some sort of bridge to span the separation and provide good reasons to believe that the ideas accurately represent the outside world. The first plank he uses in constructing this bridge can be found in the following excerpt:

I have convinced myself that there is nothing in the world - no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Doesn't it follow that I don't exist? No, surely I must exist if it's me who is convinced of something. But there is a deceiver, supremely powerful and cunning whose aim is to see that I am always deceived. But surely I exist, if I am deceived. Let him deceive me all he can, he will never make it the case that I am nothing while I think that I am something. Thus having fully weighed every consideration, I must finally conclude that the statement "I am, I exist" must be true whenever I state it or mentally consider it. (Descartes, Meditation II: On the Nature of the Human Mind, Which Is Better Known Than the Body).

In other words, one's consciousness implies one's existence. In one of Descartes' replies to objections to the book, he summed this up in the phrase, I am, I exist, which is often confused with the famous quote, I think, therefore I am.

Once he has secured his existence, however, Descartes seeks to find out what "I" is. He rejects the typical method which looks for a definition, e.g. Rational Animal, because the words used in the definition would then need to be defined. He seeks simple terms that do not need to be defined in this way, but whose meaning can just be "seen." From these self-evident truths, complex terms can be built up.

The first of these self-evident truths is Descartes' proof of existence turned on its head:

But what then am I? A thinking thing. And what is that? Something that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, and also sense and has mental images. (Descartes, Meditation II: On the Nature of the Human Mind, Which Is Better Known Than the Body).

To define himself further, Descartes turns to the example of wax. He determines that wax isn't wax because of its color, texture or shape, as all of these things can change and the substance still be wax. Therefore, he distinguishes between ordinary perception and judgement. The reality of the wax is "grasped, not by the senses or the power of having mental images, but by the understanding alone." When one understands the mathematical principles of the substance, such as its expansion under heat, figure and motion, the knowledge of the wax can be clear and distinct.

If a substance such as wax can be known in this fashion, then the same must be of ourselves. The self, then, is not determined by what we sense of ourselves - these hands, this head, these eyes - but by simply the things one thinks. Thus, one "can't grasp anything more easily or plainly than [their] mind."

[edit] Meditation III

Argument 1

I have an idea of God (an infinitely perfect substance).
That idea must have a cause.
Nothing comes from nothing.
The cause must have at least as much formal reality as the idea.
I am not infinitely perfect.
I could not be the cause of the idea.
There must be a cause that is infinitely perfect.
God exists.

Argument 2

I exist.
My existence must have a cause.
The cause must be either:

a) myself

b) my always having existed

c) my parents

d) something less perfect than God

e) God

Not a. If I had created myself, I would have made myself perfect.
Not b. Continued existence does not follow from present existence.
Not c. This leads to an infinite regress.
Not d. The idea of perfection that exists in me cannot have originated from a non-perfect being.
e. God exists.

There are three basic or distinct types of ideas or classes of thought. They are volitions, affections, and judgments. Or you may call them desires, feelings, and conclusions if you wish, but they are just categories. But even within those categories of thought there are but two cause and effect relationships for thoughts. They are: one, that we are deceived by our thoughts (falsity and error); or two, that our thoughts do not deceive us (honesty and truth).

As we have discussed in the previous meditations, some of these thoughts are reactions to the senses; in other words, before we even form our thoughts based on the senses, we could have already been deceived by our senses. Then there are the thoughts that are simply independent of the corporeal; in that the truth or falsity of our thoughts will not depend the least bit on the extension of our senses.

Then let us consider some of these ideas that do not depend on any objects in a real world. Some appear to be innate (ideas in and of themselves); others adventitious (not corporeal, but derived from the corporeal); and others to be made up entirely (fictitious).

Take for example the mind's ability to count things. We know that the corporeal objects we choose to count are capable of deceiving us because there is no such thing as absolute precision in anything. Every physical or mechanical object we consider is subject to some tolerance for error. We just allow ourselves to accept a certain margin and call it good. Take for example, our one meter measuring stick. To us, one meter stick is just as good as the next, but if we really examined two different measuring sticks on a microscopic level, we would see that no two measuring sticks are ever exactly the same. Even if we could test the exact number of atoms in each of the measuring sticks, no two things can occupy the exact same space with the exact same temperatures and thus the constant state of expansion and contraction of molecules alone would not allow two supposedly identical one meter measuring sticks to precisely be identical; it is just close enough for us to dismiss all argument.

But then there is also a non-corporeal aspect to counting, which is the mere subjective framework that our minds have created for the ordering process of counting. Take again for example, our one-meter measuring stick. Even though we cannot ascribe to our senses as to the precision of the stick, we can ascribe to the concept of its singularity. In other words, we can count it - and when we count, there is but one. No matter that it cannot ever be exactly one meter, it is none-the-less capable of being exactly one thing, one object, a singular instance in our minds to contemplate.

Then the subjective idea of counting things is a type of idea which although indirectly derived from our senses, does not actually depend on our senses. Counting therefore cannot deceive us within our own framework (unless of course there is a creator capable and willing to design this entire framework as a part of an elaborate deception). An understanding of the counting of quantities therefore falls under the category of an adventitious thought; i.e. we are given a concept of corporeal "things" through the extension of our senses and then our minds seek to place some order over the concept of quantity over the extension.

Humans are thinking (conscious) things, that is, beings who doubt, affirm, deny, know a few things, and are ignorant of many; who love, hate, have a will, and who imagine likewise, and perceive. And if we have imagined that two and three make five, there is no denying or deceiving, because counting is but a conceived framework within those confines of our own imaginations. The exercise of counting then is not subject to the senses, only to our thinking minds.

In our own minds, two and three make five. We can ask another person, and get the same; two and three make five. But then we might ask ourselves; could we be deceived even about the framework of our own imaginations? Or more importantly, who or what could possibly be capable of such an infinite deception that we could be wrong about the counting concept independently of our senses? Is there ever a possibility that two and three do not make five? And what power could exist that even the spirit of our own thinking mind could be so deceived.

Yet if we are not deceived, what kind of power can take physical things which have no objective truth to them (i.e. no exactness, as discussed above) and then place order over those objects capable or making us perceive them as real objects. In order to consider either such deception or such majesty, then we must consider deity, or a power greater than the whole of our existence. And again, just as we strive to understand the truth of things, we must equally try to understand that which is false (what is cannot be produced by what is not). So, when we can seek to consider power and majesty of deity capable of designing the order of counting for our minds to discover, we might also consider how deity could have deceived us in our adventitious discovery.

On the other hand, we must consider too that we are not deceived and the subjective counting of things existing per singuli (i.e. innate and true in and of itself, deity not included) is a possibility. To fathom such thoughts we must again return to conceptualization, or the possibilities of thinking and of the thinking mind.

There are only four alternatives to the framework suggested above as to how the concept of quantity (counting) has come to be in our minds:

1. There is a God and that power has ordered quantity as an instance for our minds to discover.

2. There is no God, but the counting of quantities is a simple truth in and of itself.

3. There is a God and that deity has deceived us as to the order of quantities.

4. There is no deity and the counting of quantities is but a simple falsehood.

Some of our volitions (wants) can be denied by our existence, i.e. you can't always get what you want. However, some of our other volitions cannot be denied; in other words, we just make the choice and it happens. In our brains, for example, we simply choose to open our eyes and then it happens. The only way to deny that volition would be to poke out our eyes or otherwise seal them shut. But as long as we have eyes and a muscular skeletal system with nerves, we can open them.

We then confront ourselves with the realization that counting holds true across from one individual to another. It doesn't matter whom or what taught us counting, they all taught us that two and three make five. Counting, therefore is not an idea of the mind alone, innate to us babes of the womb, but rather taught to us through our extensions. And through that confirmation from both our minds and of our extensions, that two and three make five, it is no longer just a part of our individual minds, but has been extended. This is to suggest that counting is both a subjective and an objective process, but we can continue to refocus this examination on just the subjective portions alone.

Thus, because other persons can confirm our counting of things, three of the four alternatives for existence of deity can still exist, but as to the fourth alternative, that two and three do not make five, it has no purpose in this existence. If in some "land of nod" where two and three make something else, then let those citizens live in their own land, for we in our own exploration of these principles we have no need for another two and three here. So unless and until there is a chance for us to pass on to the next world, the next existence, we only have our reality to deal with here and the idea that two and three do not make five is simply "out of this world" and can therefore can be dismissed from this world without further ado. We just cast it out of our world just like that. It is one of those volitions that we all can simply partake in and we cast out any idea that two and three equal anything but five in this world, no matter who or what created it.

Perhaps we should now seek to eliminate some of the other alternatives above. We have seen, for example, that two and three make five both in our minds and in our extension and the idea that two and three do not make five has been found repugnant to us and has been cast out. But to cast God out as a deceiver, we have not yet arrived, because a power capable of creating an order of quantity for counting is certainly also capable of deceiving us. So, we are still left wondering whether or not there is a God, yet also whether or not God has deceived us.

So let us turn to the alternative that there is no God, i.e. there is no God and two and three make five inherently.

Let us look outside of our windows on to the street below. And if you have a house with windows and there are people below, to the people we see passing by on the street, in the minds of those other persons who have no choice but to be a part of our extension now that we have looked at them, whether deceived or not; all of their extensions, whether the truth of two and three make five is truth created, truth per singuli, or even deception thrust upon us; to those people, now because of our realization of them; they have no choice but to be deprived of the simple "I think, therefore I am" proposition as discussed above, but rather are left with a "We think therefore we are" proposition, because we perceive them and they have no choice in that. And since our citizens of "Land of Nod" spoken of previously, have been cast out by us because two and three make five for us, then two and three make five for them as well. In every instance and for each of those persons walking down on the street, two and three make five.

And now returning to our quest we are engaged, which is an attempt to rule out any of the four alternative frameworks above, to arrive lastly at the one correct and true status of things, the next step is to rule out is whether God can be a deceiver. It doesn't matter whether or not there is a God at this point except that if there is a God, we can rule out that God is a deceiver, at least as to this world.

No matter the reasoning or purpose, two and three make five, so for any God who is a deceiver (perhaps we call him Lucifer) we have the same power to cast him out as we did other falsehoods. Back in the "Land of Nod" where two and three were of a different color, there was a wonderful place for Lucifer to exists. If he comes here to deceive us that two and three do not make five, we simply send him back to the Land of Nod, because as soon as we learn something absolutely to be a falsehood and not depending the least on our extensions, we then have the volition to cast it out. Therefore, despite our doubtful corporeal existence, our non-corporeal thought process allows us to command "Lucifer, you are dismissed, and God shall not be a deceiver!"

Now it may have seemed just a game to us; that we even considered this counting process or thought that we could cast out error and deceit. But the ultimate goal in this discourse is of course to arrive at whether or not God exists. What then was the purpose of the above exercise in casting out error? The answer: it was simply to prove to ourselves in our status of doubt that we still do have the power to cast our error whenever it is incontrovertibly recognized. We can now use that power to move on to the bigger questions.

Now we are left with but two alternatives: God exists, or God does not, but we have used the above exercise simply to cast our error. Now we should try to apply the same process with our last two alternatives. But we must be equally able to convince ourselves whether other people exist or not. Since we now know in this reality the true essence of quantity (counting of things), we have placed a great deal of our trust and reliance on our extensions, such as those people down on the street. It seems that it would be a simple exercise to merely trust our thoughts that another human being outside ourselves truly exists, yet knowing now that everything outside of our thoughts is merely extension, making an infallible declaration of those people's existence is really just quite as difficult as declaring that there is a God.

We can look out our windows and indeed we can see the people down on the street, but as we said above, all corporeal things, even down to our very own physical existence is nothing but extension. What a step it would be to further declare absolutely that those extensions that we view are actually other souls that do also exist.

But comfort can be found in the fact that we can prove to ourselves that at least one other true spirit in the universe outside ourselves does exist and the proof of that is that we did not know how to count as babes; that is, we had to be taught to count. Someone or something had to teach us through our extensions. Then once we learned, the concept of counting, i.e. the concept within itself, no longer required of our extensions in order to be true and without deception. Two and three make five. We are not alone and are not deceived in this, for we have cast out the error.

Now we know for sure that at least one being outside ourselves exists because we have been taught one way or another, God or Man, but at least one of the two remaining alternatives is now true. Both cannot be false, we have cast out the idea that all could be false. But both could yet be shown to be true.

So now back to whether or not there is a God. Which type of thought do we now turn to in order to answer this question? Will it be volition, affection, or a judgment? Volition has worked well for the action to cast out falsehoods and it was our judgment that gave us the power to do so. Now, it was also easy to use our volitions to open our own eyes. It was easy by judgment to cast upon falsehoods that we have allowed falsehoods to be cast out. But as to the truth or error of deity, is seems we cannot yet be sure and yet we drive on, because it is only in judgments that formal falsity, or falsity properly so called, can be met with.

We have seen that if there is a God, that deity will not be a deceiver, but we have not established any power or volition within ourselves to be able to cast God out. Neither have we arrived at any judgment powerful enough to dismiss the possibility in our minds that the people on this earth may be without a God. We must decide which thought then to trust to take us to the next step. Our affections it seems have not yet been used and affections may well turn out to be what we need in order to decide. But on the other hand, affections do not seem to be useful at all in coming to incontrovertible conclusions.

But as mankind can endeavor to obtain by degrees a more intimate and familiar knowledge of self and his affections, the knowledge of the opportunity for true companionship is no small thing when for many people, the possibility of isolation is truly one of the most feared of fears. It is no small thing therefore, to contemplate whether any being outside ourselves truly exists.

Now using the same logic as having taken away two of the alternative frameworks above, if we attempt now to also cast God out of this world, we would also necessarily have to have the power to cast out the existence other people. And as to those people we see on the street, even though two and three make five, we know that someone or something has necessarily taught us that it is so. Either it was God who created the world and set the framework for the counting of things, or those frameworks simply existed and only those people on the streets of our extensions have been quite responsible for bringing the ability to our minds to count them.

It seems we can either derive then that it is the people are who are real but God is not real; or another possibility is that God is real and the people are not real. Perhaps though, we might also consider both are real and both are necessary. Because we have already found it repugnant that we are lone beings in this world (someone or something had to teach us to count) if the people of our extensions are indeed on the street, then could we not be the extension of one or more of them? "I think, therefore I am" was previously proven as a postulate, yet it now seems that the "We think, therefore we are" is perhaps the more complete postulate from which to proceed here, even if we cannot yet derive for certain who the we is going to be.

Until this point in our analysis, there has not been one iota of proof that we could ever use an affection to cast out error or to cast truth onto any of our ideas. And there seems to be no such power to allow us to use affection, such as hope or faith, with such power to decide unequivocally the truth of God or of his falsity. Faith and hope are but affections on the sides of the same coin, opposite of doubt and fear. Falsity also arises when our ideas represent what is nothing as if it were something.

If we travel into the darkest cave on this earth and bring with us no candle, or at least having traveled into the cave with the candle and for a time we put the candle out once inside the cave, there will remain only darkness until someone or something will light the candle and/or bring light back into the cave. With this picture in mind, let us ask ourselves if we, like the candle, possess any power or means of the natural light required to cause ourselves to exist in this moment, and that same power to yet exist a moment afterward (relight the candle). Since we are merely thinking beings, if such a power resided in us, we should, without doubt, be conscious of it. For no power can bring something from nothing. Each cause must contain within it at least the capability of the creating its effect. So, we now know that we are dependent upon some power of being different from ourselves, as with the light, to turn have turned us on, i.e. created us as thinking beings, much in the same way that someone must light the candle in the cave in order for there to be light.

Next, it is perfectly evident that there must also be at least as much reality in the cause as there is in its effect. Whatever in the end is realized as the cause of our existence, it must be like us a thinking being, because no effect can come from a cause that is incapable of producing the effect. And yet, the only cause capable of producing a thinking being such as ourselves must possess in itself the idea and all the perfections we have attributed to Deity.

We might also ask whether this cause owes its origin and existence to itself, or to some other cause. For if this cause is self-existent, it follows then that this cause is God; for any cause that possesses the perfection of self-existence, it must likewise, without doubt, have the power of actually possessing every perfection of which it has. In other words, all the perfections conceived belong to God. But if we owe one causes existence to another cause, then we demand again, for a similar reason, whether this second cause exists of itself or through another being, until, from stage to stage, we at length arrive at an ultimate cause, which will be God. Therefore, let us re-convince ourselves of the certainty of the following statement and with purpose and conviction; let us reconvene to tell ourselves: we are not alone.

But before one examines this matter with more care, and passes on to the consideration of other truths which may be derived from it, it seems to be only right to pause for a while in order to contemplate the alpha and the omega, to ponder at leisure infinite marvellous attributes, to consider, and admire, and adore, the beauty of a light so resplendent, at least as far as the strength of one's mind, which is in some measure dazzled by the sight, will allow one's to do so. For just as faith teaches of a supreme felicity of the other life consists only in this contempation of a divine majestic, so continued learning by experience that a similar meditation, though incomparably less perfect, causes all to enjoy a great satisfaction of which only can be had with moments of awakened life.

[edit] Meditation IV

The conclusions of the previous Meditations that "I" and "God" both exist lead to another problem: If God is perfectly good and the source of all that is, how is there room for error or falsehood? Descartes attempts to answer this question in Meditation IV: On Truth and Falsity.

If I've gotten everything in me from God and He hasn't given me the ability to err, it doesn't seem possible for me ever to err. (Descartes, Meditation IV: On Truth and Falsity).

The framework of his arguments center on the Great Chain of Being, in which God's perfect goodness is relative to His perfect being. On the extreme opposite end of the scale is complete nothingness, which is also the extremity of evil. Thus, humans are an intermediary between these two extremes, being less "real" or "good" than God, but more "real" and "good" than nothingness. Thus, error (as a part of evil) is not a positive reality, it is only the absence of what is correct. In this way, its existence is allowed within the context of a perfectly inerrant God.

I find that I am "intermediate" between God and nothingness, between the supreme entity and nonentity. Insofar as I am the creation of the supreme entity, there's nothing in me to account for my being deceived or led into error, but, inasmuch as I somehow participate in nothing or nonentity - that is, insofar as I am distinct from the supreme entity itself and lack many things - it's not surprising that I go wrong. I thus understand that, in itself, error is a lack, rather than a real thing dependent on God. Hence, I understand that I can err without God's having given me a special ability to do so. Rather, I fall into error because my God-given ability to judge the truth is not infinite. (Descartes, Meditation IV: On Truth and Falsity).

Descartes also concedes two points that might allow for the possibility of his ability to err. First, he notes that it is very possible that his limited knowledge prevents him from understanding why God chose to create him so he could make mistakes. If he could see the things that God could see, with a complete and infinite scope, perhaps he would judge his ability to err as the best option. He uses this point to attack the Aristotelian structure of causes. The final cause described by Aristotle are the "what for" of an object, but Descartes claims that because he is unable to completely comprehend the mind of God, it is impossible to completely understand the "why" through science - only the "how."

I realize that I shouldn't be surprised at God's doing things that I can't explain. I shouldn't doubt His existence just because I find that I sometimes can't understand why or how He has made something. I know that my nature is weak and limited and that God's is limitless, incomprehensible, and infinite, and, from this, I can infer that He can do innumerable things whose reasons are unknown to me. On this ground alone, I regard the common practice of explaining things in terms of their purposes to be useless in physics: it would be foolhardy of me to think that I can discover God's purposes. (Descartes, Meditation IV: On Truth and Falsity).

Second, he realized that God has the ability to create a large number of things of which he would just be a part. Perhaps the error is only apparent when looking at the individual and is reconciled when looking at the whole.

When asking whether God's works are perfect, I ought to look at all of them together, not at one isolation. For something that seems imperfect when viewed alone might seem completely perfect when regarded as having a place in the world. Of course, since calling everything into doubt, I haven't established that anything exists besides me and God. But, when I consider God's immense power, I can't deny that He has made - or, in any case, that He could have made - many other things, and I must therefore view myself as having a place in a universe. (Descartes, Meditation IV: On Truth and Falsity).

Lastly, Meditation IV attributes the source of error to a discrepancy between two divine gifts: understanding and will. Understanding is given in an incomplete form, while will (by nature) can only be either completely given or not given at all. When he is presented with a certain amount of understanding and then chooses to act outside of that, he is in error. Thus, the gifts of God (understanding and will) both remain good and only the incorrect usage by him remains as error.

If I suspend judgement when I don't clearly and distinctly grasp what is true, I obviously do right and am not deceived. But, if I either affirm or deny in a case of this sort, I misuse my freedom of choice. If I affirm what is false, I clearly err, and, if I stumble onto the truth, I'm still blameworthy since the light of nature reveals that a perception of the understanding should always precede a decision of the will. In these misuses of freedom of choice lies the deprivation that accounts for error. And this deprivation, I maintain, lies in the working of the will insofar as it comes from me - not in my God-given ability to will, or even in the will's operation insofar as it derives from Him. (Descartes, Meditation IV: On Truth and Falsity).

[edit] Meditation V

Meditation V: On the Essence of Material Objects and More on God's Existence begins with the stated purpose of expanding the "known items" of God and self to include outside material objects, Descartes saves that for Meditation VI in lieu of something he deems more fundamental but in the same direction: a discussion concerning the ideas of those external items. Along the way, he stumbles upon another claimed logical proof of God's existence.

Before asking whether any such objects exist outside me, I ought to consider the ideas of these objects as they exist in my thoughts and see which are clear and which confused. (Descartes, Meditation V: On the Essence of Material Objects and More on God's Existence).

In pondering these ideas of external objects, Descartes realizes they can be separated into those that are clear and distinct and those that are confused and obscure. The former group consists of the ideas of extension, duration and movement. These geometrical ideas cannot be misconstrued or combined in a way that makes them false. For example, if the idea of a creature with the head of a giraffe, the body of a lion and tail of a beaver was constructed and the question asked if the creature had a large intestine, the answer would have to be invented. But, no matter how you combine or rearrange mathematical properties, the three angles of a triangle will still add up to 180 degrees and the largest side will always be opposite the largest angle. Thus, Descartes discovers that these truths have a nature or essence of themselves, completely independent of one's thoughts or opinions.

I find in myself innumerable ideas of things which, though they may not exist outside me, can't be said to be nothing. While I have some control over my thoughts of these things, I do not make the things up: they have their own real and immutable natures. Suppose, for example, that I have a mental image of a triangle. While it may be that no figure of this sort does exist or ever has existed outside my thought, the figure has a fixed nature (essence or form), immutable and eternal, which hasn't been produced by me and isn't dependent of my mind. (Descartes, Meditation V: On the Essence of Material Objects and More on God's Existence).

While thinking about the independence of these ideas of external objects, Descartes realizes that he is just as certain about God as he is about these mathematical ideas. He asserts that this is natural as the ideas of God are the only ideas that imply God's existence. He uses the example of a mountain and a valley. While one cannot picture a mountain without a valley, it's possible that these do not exist. However, the fact that one cannot conceive of God without existence inherently rules out the possibility of God's non-existence. Simply put, the argument is framed as follows:

God is defined as an infinitely perfect being.
Perfection includes existence.
So God exists.

While Descartes had already claimed to have confirmed God's existence through previous arguments, this one allows him to put to rest any discontent he might have had with his "distinct and clear" criteria for truth. With a confirmed existence of God, all doubt that what one previously thought was real and not a dream can be removed. Having made this realization, Descartes asserts that without this sure knowledge in the existence of a supreme and perfect being, assurance of any truth is impossible.

Thus I plainly see that the certainty and truth of all my knowledge derives from one thing: my thought of the true God. Before I knew Him, I couldn't know anything else perfectly. But now I can plainly and certainly know innumerable things, not only about God and other mental beings, but also about the nature of physical objects, insofar as it is the subject-matter of pure mathematics. (Descartes, Meditation V: On the Essence of Material Objects and More on God's Existence).

[edit] Meditation VI

In Meditation VI: On the Existence of Material Objects and the Real Distinction of Mind from Body, Descartes addresses the potential existence of material outside of the self and God. First, he asserts that such objects can exist simply because God is able to make them.

Insofar as they are the subject of pure mathematics, I now know at least that they can exist, because I grasp them clearly and distinctly. For God can undoubtedly make whatever I can grasp in this way, and I never judge that something is impossible for Him to make unless there would be a contradiction in my grasping the thing distinctly. (Descartes, Meditation VI: On the Existence of Material Objects from Body).

Knowing that the existence of such objects is possible, Descartes then turns to the prevalence of mental images as proof. To do this, he draws a distinction between mental images and understanding, the former being something that is seen like a mental photograph and the latter being something that is understood but not pictured. He uses an example of this to clarify:

When I have a mental image of a triangle, for example, I don't just understand that it is a figure bounded by three lines; I also "look at" the lines as though they were present to my mind's eye. And this is what I call having a mental image. When I want to think of a chiliagon, I understand that it is a figure with a thousand sides as well as I understand that a triangle is a figure with three, but I can't imagine its sides or "look" at them as though they were present. (Descartes, Meditation VI: On the Existence of Material Objects and the Real Distinction of Mind from Body).

Descartes has still not given proof that such external objects exist, however, only shown that their existence could conveniently explain this mental process. To obtain this proof, he first reviews his premises for the Meditations - that the senses cannot be trusted and what he is taught "by nature" does not have much credence. However, he views these arguments within a new context; after writing Meditation I, he has proved the existence of himself and of a perfect God. Thus, Descartes jumps quickly to proofs of the division between the body and soul and that material things exist:

Proof for the body being distinct from the soul

It is possible for God to create anything I can clearly and distinctly perceive.
If God creates something to be independent of another, they are distinct from each other.
I clearly and distinctly understand my existence as a thinking thing (which does not require the existence of a body).
So God can create a thinking thing independently of a body.
I clearly and distinctly understand my body as an extended thing (which does not require a soul).
So God can create a body independently of a soul.
So my soul is a reality distinct from my body.
So I (a thinking thing) can exist without a body.

Proof of the reality of external material things

I have a "strong inclination" to believe in the reality of external material things due to my senses.
God must have created me with this nature.
If independent material things do not exist, God is a deceiver.
But God is not a deceiver.
So material things exist and contain the properties essential to them.

After using these two arguments to dispel solipsism and skepticism, Descartes seems to have succeeded in defining reality as being in three parts: God (infinite), souls, and material things (both finite). He closes by addressing other details about reality that some could see as inconsistencies, such as senses in amputated limbs, dropsy and dreams.

[edit] Objections and replies

Descartes submitted his manuscript to several philosophers, theologians and a logician before publishing the Meditations. Their objections and his replies (many of which are quite extensive) were included along the first publication of the Meditations. In the Preface to the Meditations, Descartes writes: “I…ask my readers not to pass judgment on the Meditations until they have been kind enough to read through all these objections and my replies to them.” Thus, this dialogue could be seen as an integral part of Descartes' views expressed in the Meditations.

The seven objectors were, in order (of the sets as they were published): The Dutch theologian Johannes Caterus (Johan de Kater); various "theologians and philosophers" gathered by Descartes' friend and principal correspondent, Friar Marin Mersenne; the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes; the theologian and logician Antoine Arnauld; the philosopher Pierre Gassendi; another miscellany gathered by Mersenne; and the Jesuit Pierre Bourdin.

They make many objections to Descartes’ arguments and method. Some of the objections show that the objector has misunderstood the text. Descartes’ response to these is often dismissive and curt (e.g., in response to Hobbes, “I cannot possibly satisfy those who prefer to attribute a different sense to my words than the one I intended”). Other objections are more powerful, and in some cases it is controversial whether Descartes responds to them successfully.

Some of the most powerful objections include the following:

Objections to proof(s) of God’s existence:

A. We have no (clear ) idea of an infinite Being (1st, 2nd, and 5th objections).

B. From the fact that I can think of perfect being, it doesn’t follow that the perfect being exists (1st, 2nd, and 5th).

C. We could get the idea of God without God’s causing the idea (2nd, 3rd).

D. Nothing can cause itself to exist (4th), so God can’t cause himself to exist.

Objections to the epistemology:

A. How can we be sure that what we think is a clear and distinct perception really is clear and distinct (3rd, 5th)?

B. Circle objection 1: if we aren’t certain that judgments based on clear and distinct ideas are true before we prove God’s existence, then we can’t be certain that we are a thinking thing (2nd). Circle objection 2: if we aren’t certain that clear and distinct ideas are true before we prove God’s existence, then we can’t be certain that God exists, since we use clear and distinct ideas to prove God’s existence (4th).

C. Contrary to what Descartes argues, we are certain that bodies exist/that perception coincides with reality(5th, 6th).

Objections to philosophy of mind:

A. Ideas are always imagistic (3rd), so we have no idea of thinking substance (non-image idea).

B. We can’t conclude that the mind (thinking thing) is not also a corporeal thing, unless we know that we know everything about the mind. But we don’t know that we know everything about the mind. So we don’t know that the mind isn’t corporeal. (4th, 5th, 7th).

[edit] See also

17th-century philosophy

[edit] Notes and references

[edit] Collected works in French and Latin

Oeuvres De Descartes, 11 vols., edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1983).

[edit] English translations

The Philosophical Writings Of Descartes, 3 vols., translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
The Philosophical Works of Descartes, 2 vols, translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane, and G.R.T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

[edit] Single works

Meditations on First Philosophy, translated by John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
Méditations Métaphysiques, translated by Michelle Beyssade (Paris: GF, 1993).

[edit] Further reading

Alquié, Ferdinand. La découverte métaphysique de l'homme chez Descartes (Paris: PUF, 2000).
Beyssade, Jean-Marie. La Philosophie première de Descartes (Paris: Flammarion, 1979).
Cottingham, John. (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Descartes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
Dicker, Georges. Descartes: An Analytical and Historical Introduction (New York: OUP, 1993)
Frankfurt, Harry. Demons, Dreamers and Madmen (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970).
Gilson, Étienne. Etudes sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien (Paris: Vrin, 1930).
Gueroult, Martial. Descartes selon L'Ordre des Raisons (Paris: Aubier, 1968). Translated by Roger Ariew as Descartes' Philosophy Interpreted According to the Order of Reasons (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
Hatfield, Gary. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Descartes and the Meditations (London: Routledge, 2003).
Kenny, Anthony. Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1968).
Rorty, Amelie. (ed.) Essays on Descartes' Meditations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).
Williams, Bernard. Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (London: Penguin Books, 1978).
Wilson, Margaret. Descartes (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978).