Operation Lam Son 719
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| Operation Lam Son 719 | |||||||
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| Part of Vietnam War | |||||||
 Operation Lam Son 719 |
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| Combatants | |||||||
 South Vietnam United States |
 North Vietnam |
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| Commanders | |||||||
| Hoang Xuan Lam | Vo Nguyen Giap | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| ARVN: 27,000 troops US: 10,000 troops in support |
25,000-30,000 troops | ||||||
| Casualties | |||||||
| ARVN: 8,483 killed 12,420 wounded 691 MIA/captured US: 176 killed 1,942 wounded 42 MIA |
13,636 killed[citations needed] and wounded 69 captured[citations needed] |
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| Vietnam War |
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| Ap Bac – Binh Gia –Pleiku – Song Be – Dong Xoai – Gang Toi – Ia Drang – Hastings – A Shau – Duc Co –Long Tan – Attleboro – Cedar Falls – Tra Binh Dong – Junction City – Hill 881 – Ong Thanh – Dak To – 1st Tet – Khe Sanh – 1st Saigon – Hue – Lang Vei – Lima Site 85 – Kham Duc – Dewey Canyon – 2nd Tet – Hamburger Hill – Binh Ba – Cambodia – Snuol – FSB Ripcord – Lam Son 719 – Ban Dong –FSB Mary Ann – Easter '72 – 1st Quang Tri –Loc Ninh – An Loc – Kontum – 2nd Quang Tri –Phuoc Long – Ho Chi Minh – Buon Me Thuot – Xuan Loc – Truong Sa –2nd Saigon – Rolling Thunder – Barrell Roll – Pony Express – Steel Tiger – Tiger Hound – Tailwind – Commando Hunt – Linebacker I – Linebacker II – Chenla I – Chenla II – SS Mayagüez |
Operation Lam Son 719 was an operation of the Vietnam War carried out by the South Vietnamese Army with US air and artillery support. The objective of the operation was to disrupt the North Vietnamese build up in Laos and cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail at the city of Tchepone.
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[edit] Ho Chi Minh Trail
From 1959 the Ho Chi Minh Trail had become an important logistical network from which North Vietnam and its military, the Vietnam People's Army, could transport men and material for its war against U.S-supported South Vietnam.
Since 1965, over 600,000 men and thousands of tons of weapons, ammunition and food had travelled through Laos and Cambodia. However, following the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in 1971, the pro-U.S Lon Nol regime denied the use of Sihanoukville by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and their Viet Cong allies by closing down the port. Strategically it was an enormous blow for the North Vietnamese war effort as two-third of all military supplies from the People's Republic of China went through Sihanoukville.
Following the militarily (although not politically) disastrous Tet Offensive of 1968, North Vietnam's battlefield tactics became more conventional, and as a result Communist ground forces in South Vietnam were hard-pressed for replacement of men and material. To prepare for the next big offensive, North Vietnam began increasing the transportation of supplies down the trail, reaching record levels in October 1970.
[edit] Strategy
In order to counter the North Vietnamese build-up South Vietnam's armed forces would attempt to disrupt the infiltration network. With fewer than 20,000 troops committed for Operation Lam Son 719, the main aim of the operation was to raid key targets rather than looking for a major battle with North Vietnamese regulars.
For the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, the basic concept of Lam Son 719 would be hit-and-run. On paper this looked achieveable, due to South Vietnam's rapidly growing air-support and air-mobile capabilities. In order to inflict damage on North Vietnamese human assets the South Vietnamese forces would advance, setting up strongpoints and lure enemy troops into the open, making them vulnerable to superior American air and artillery fire.
The first target for the operation was Tchephone where an estimated 15,000 North Vietnamese troops, some of them from the crack 308th and 320th Divisions, were deployed in the area.
[edit] Lam Son 719
The incursion began on February 8, 1971, with the 1st Armor Brigade advancing west along Route 9. Men of the ARVN 1st Infantry and Airborne Divisions and the 1st Ranger Group, carried by U.S. helicopters, created Landing Zones north and south of Route 9, thereby protecting the Armor Brigade's flanks. After a promising start by the South Vietnamese Army, the North Vietnamese mounted a determined counterattack, threatening all South Vietnamese positions. Despite taking the town of Tchepone, Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam, the officer in charge of the operation, decided to call a retreat before the NVA could exploit his stretched-out and vulnerable position.
The operation failed because of compromised operational security (that telegraphed the intentions and timetable to the NVA), and also the over-extension of the ARVN in difficult terrain, permitting the NVA to sytematically attack the column at places of its choosing. The withdrawal was particularly bloody due to the poor organization and confusion that ensued, resulting in staggering casualties for the ARVN (approximately one half of the total ARVN force engaged in the operation, between 5,000 and 10,000 depending on the source). US helicopter losses during Lam Son 719 accounted for 10% of all helicopter losses from 1961-1975 (see: http://www.mrfa.org/vnstats.htm).
[edit] References
- Bowman, John S. (1989). The Vietnam War Day by Day. New York: Mallard Books. ISBN 0-7924-5087-6.
- Hinh, Nguyen Duy. (1979)Operation Lam Sơn 719. Indochina Monographs, US. Army Center of Military History
- Van Stolkweg. (1971)South Vietnam Takes the Offensive-Lam Son 719. The Hague, Netherlands: Interdoc
