Battle of FSB Mary Ann
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Battle of FSB Mary Ann | |||||||
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Part of the Vietnam War | |||||||
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Combatants | |||||||
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Commanders | |||||||
William P. Doyle | Unknown | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
231 | 50 | ||||||
Casualties | |||||||
30 KIA, 82 wounded |
15 found dead |
Vietnam War |
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Ap Bac – Binh Gia –Pleiku – Song Be – Dong Xoai – Gang Toi – Ia Drang – Hastings – A Shau – Duc Co –Long Tan – Attleboro – Cedar Falls – Tra Binh Dong – Junction City – Hill 881 – Ong Thanh – Dak To – 1st Tet – Khe Sanh – 1st Saigon – Hue – Lang Vei – Lima Site 85 – Kham Duc – Dewey Canyon – 2nd Tet – Hamburger Hill – Binh Ba – Cambodia – Snuol – FSB Ripcord – Lam Son 719 – Ban Dong –FSB Mary Ann – Easter '72 – 1st Quang Tri –Loc Ninh – An Loc – Kontum – 2nd Quang Tri –Phuoc Long – Ho Chi Minh – Buon Me Thuot – Xuan Loc – Truong Sa –2nd Saigon – Rolling Thunder – Barrell Roll – Pony Express – Steel Tiger – Tiger Hound – Tailwind – Commando Hunt – Linebacker I – Linebacker II – Chenla I – Chenla II – SS Mayagüez |
The Battle of FSB Mary Ann was fought when Viet Cong sappers attacked the U.S firebase located in Quang Tin Province, South Vietnam.
Fire Support Base Mary Ann was set up with the purpose of providing a shield for Da Nang and the surrounding hamlets, the base was also designed as an interception point against movements of enemy troops and materiel down the Dak Rose Trail. The base was manned by 231 American soldiers.
The firebase was scheduled to be handed over to the South Vietnamese Army, so 21 ARVN soldiers were sent out to Mary Ann to take over the camp when all U.S soldiers are pulled out.
For months leading up to the attack the level of enemy activity in the area had been low and contacts were infrequent, although two weeks before the assault a large cache of enemy supplies were captured. The lack of significant engagements, plus the insignificant position of the firebase, had give the U.S soldiers in the area a false sense of security. But that was about to change.
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[edit] Intelligence
Prior to the attack on Fire Support Base Mary Ann, there had been reports of Viet Cong infiltration within the ranks of the 21 South Vietnamese contingent. In one incident, a South Vietnamese lieutenant inquired about the easiest way to get off the firebase because his men wanted to go fishing. The South Vietnamese officer got his answer, the easiest way in and out of the camp was the south end of the firebase.
The incident, coupled with intelligence reports that the enemy were posing as ARVN, were largely ignored by officers of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade. In addition to the failure of the officers to act, out-of-date American intelligence suggests that the Viet Cong 409th Sapper Battalion were preparing for a major push against South Vietnamese troops about 15 to 20 kilometers east of Mary Ann.
Fire Support Base Mary Ann was similar to other U.S firebases in South Vietnam, although it occupied a hilltop which looked like a camel with two humps. Running northwest to southeast the firebase stretches 500 meters across two hillsides with twenty-two bunkers. The headquarters, consists of the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and Company Command Post (CP), was located at the southend of the camp. The northwest end of the camp consist of an artillery position with two 155mm howitzers, the fire direction center and the artillery command post. Surrounding the firebase was a trench system protected by concertina wires. During the assault the Viet Cong would hit the key targets with deadly accuracy.
[edit] Battle for Mary Ann
On the night of March 28, 1971, 50 sappers of the Viet Cong 409th Sapper Battalion approached the wires of FSB Mary Ann and take up their positions to launch an attack on the men of 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry, 196th Light Infantry Brigade.
The Viet Cong sappers came prepared, wearing only khaki shorts and soot, with an AK-47 or RPG-7 strapped to their back, satchel charges to their chest and grenades around their belt. The sappers moved silently and slowly in small squads of three to six men, with mortar support they attacked U.S mortar and artillery positions at 0230 hours. The VC had achieved the element of surprise as American soldiers were neither prepared or on alert. Amidst all the explosions, the Viet Cong managed to penetrate the southside of the FSB's perimeter. By the time the American soldiers inside the bunkers had recovered from the confusion, the sappers were already inside the camp hitting half of the bunkers using satchel charges and RPG-7.
The surprise attack by the Viet Cong had the effect of immobilising the camp's defenders, but the few of those who survived the initial onslaught managed to mount resistance against their attackers. During the ensueing fire-fight, some of the enemy gun fire had actually came from the South Vietnamese section of the camp while ARVN soldiers were no where to be seen. The Tactical Operations Center (TOC) was struck by 82mm mortar shells, it awakens Lt. Col.William P. Doyle who was subsequently knocked out by the explosions.
Once Lt. Col. Doyle had regained his consciousness an order was made for helicopter gunships and illumination, at that stage the south end of the Tactical Operations Center was burning after a sapper had set off a satchel charge that caused the case of white phosphorus grenade to explode. Despite suffering from severe wounds, Doyle made his way out of the TOC and started firing his M-16 at the sappers, but was knocked out again by a grenade.
At 0251 hours radio telephone operator David Tarney managed to raise Landing Zone Mildred, when Lieutenant Thomas Schmitz requested artillery positions to adjust their guns and fire at Fire Support Base Mary Ann to save the surviving Americans there. Doyle then informed Schmitz that the TOC would be evacuated and they would lose radio contact.
Doyle and another officer had moved to the south end of the firebase at 0320 hours when another group of VC sappers appeared and started up the hill. At around 0330 hours, the Viet Cong disengaged and withdrew from the firebase trying to drag their dead and wounded comrades through the wires of the firebase, when a helicopter gunship turned up and began firing its guns at the sappers. The wounded survivors of the 1st Battalion were finally airlifted out when Lt. Col. Richard Martin, commander of the 3rd Battalion, arrived with the medevacs.
On the next day at 1600 hours, the Viet Cong sweep Fire Support Base Mary Ann with machine gun fire with one U.S soldier wounded as a result.
[edit] Results
The battle for firebase Mary Ann produced disastrous results for the U.S Army, which suffers 33 killed and 83 wounded. It was the most deadly attack on a single U.S firebase during the Vietnam War. Viet Cong casualties were largely unknown, but 15 bodies were left behind in the aftermath of the attack, blood trail and drag marks indicated that the Viet Cong may have suffer more casualties.
Colonel William S. Hathaway, commander of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, were relieved of duty while Lieutenant Colonel William P. Doyle was reprimanded. Doyle remained in service until his retirement but never received another promotion.
Due to the debacle at Fire Support Base Mary Ann, the South Vietnamese Army decided not to garrison the firebase and it was closed on April 24, 1971.
[edit] Reference
- William Nolan, Keith(1996)Sappers in the Wire: The Life and Death of Firebase Mary Ann. Publisher: Pocket Books. ISBN 0-671-00254-6