Private language argument

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The private language argument is a philosophical argument said to be found in Ludwig Wittgenstein's later work, especially in Philosophical Investigations. The argument was central to philosophical discussion at the end of the last century, and continues to arouse interest. The argument is supposed to show that the idea of a language understood by only a single individual is incoherent.

In the Investigations Wittgenstein does not present his arguments in a succinct and linear fashion, instead he describes particular uses of language, and prompts the reader to contemplate the implications of that use. As a result of this, there is considerable dispute about both the nature of the argument and its import. Indeed, it has become common to talk of private language arguments.

Archaeologists of philosophy have located precursors of the private language argument in a variety of sources prior to Wittgenstein. Gottlob Frege and Locke are prominent in these excavations.^[1] Locke is also a prominent exponent of the view targeted by the argument, since he proposed in his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding that the meaning of a word is the idea it stands for.

Contents 1 Significance 2 Philosophical Investigations 2.1 What a private language is 2.2 The sensation S 2.3 Memory scepticism 2.4 Meaning scepticism 2.5 The Beetle in a box 2.6 Following a rule 3 Kripke's interpretation 4 Notes 5 References 6 External links

[edit] Significance

The importance of the private language argument derives from its centrality in debates about the nature of language.

One compelling theory about language has it that words map to ideas, concepts or representations in each person's mind. On this account, the concepts in my head are distinct from the concepts in your head. But I can match my concepts to a word in our common language, and then speak the word. You then match the word to a concept in your mind. So our concepts in effect form a private language which we translate into our common language and so share. This account is found for example in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and more recently in Jerry Fodor's Language of thought theory.

Wittgenstein's argument seeks to show that this sort of account is incoherent.

If the idea of a private language is incoherent, then it would follow that all language is essentially public: that language is at its core a social phenomenon. This would have profound implications for other areas of philosophical study. For instance, if one cannot have a private language, it might not make any sense to talk of private sensations such as qualia; nor might it make sense to talk of a word as referring to a concept, where a concept is understood to be a private mental representation.

[edit] Philosophical Investigations

Main article: Philosophical Investigations

The argument is found in part one of the Philosophical investigations. This part consists of a series of "remarks" numbered sequentially. The argument is generally thought to be presented in the few remarks following §256.

[edit] What a private language is

In order to tell if someone understands a word or phrase, one looks to behaviour. If someone were to behave as if they understood a language which no-one else can make sense of, we might call this an example of a private language.^[2] It is not sufficient here, however, for the language to simply be one that has not yet been translated. In order to count as a private language in Wittgenstein's sense, it must be in principle incapable of translation into an ordinary language - if for example it were to describe those inner experiences supposed to be inaccessible to others.^[3] The private language being considered is not simply a language such that there is only one speaker, but a language that in principle can only be understood by one person. For example, the last speaker of a dying language would not be speaking a private language, since the language remains in principle learnable. A private language must be unlearnable and untranslatable, and yet it must appear that the speaker is able to make sense of it.

[edit] The sensation S

Wittgenstein sets up a thought experiment in which someone is imagined to associate some recurrent sensation with a symbol by writing S in their calendar when the sensation occurs.^[4] Such a case would be a private language in the Wittgensteinian sense. Furthermore, it is presupposed that S cannot be defined using other terms, for example "the feeling I get when the manometer rises"; for to do so would be to give S a place in our public language, in which case S could not be a statement in a private language.^[5]

It might be supposed that one might use "a kind of ostensive definition" for S, by focusing on the sensation and on the symbol. Early in The Investigations, Wittgenstein attacks the usefulness of ostensive definition^[6]. He considers the example of someone pointing to two nuts while saying "This is called two". How does it come about that the listener associates this with the number of items, rather than the type of nut, their colour, or even a compass direction? One conclusion of this is that to participate in an ostensive definition presupposes an understanding of the process and context involved, of the form of life.^[7] Another is that "an ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in every case". ^[8]

In the case of the sensation S Wittgenstein argues that there is no criterion for the correctness of such an ostensive definition, since whatever seems right will be right, 'And that only means that here we can't talk about "right".'^[9] The exact reason for the rejection of private language has been contentious. One interpretation, which has been called memory scepticism, has it that one might remember the sensation wrongly, and that as a result one might misuse the term S . The other, called meaning scepticism, has it that one can never be sure of the meaning of a term defined in this way.

[edit] Memory scepticism

One common interpretation is that the possibility exists that one might misremember the sensation, and therefore one does not have any firm criterion for using S in each case.^[10] So, for example, I might one day focus on that sensation, and link it to the symbol S; but the next day, I have no criteria for knowing that the sensation I have now is the same as the one yesterday, except for my memory; and since my memory might fail me, I have no firm criteria for knowing that the sensation I have now is indeed S.

But if one person can misremember, it is entirely possible that several people could misremember. So memory scepticism could be applied with equal effect to ostensive definitions given in a public language. For example, Jim and Jenny might one day decide to call some particular tree T; but the next day both misremember which tree it was they named. If they were depending entirely on their memory, and had not written down the location of the tree, or told anyone else, then they would appear to be in the same difficulties as the individual who defined S ostensively. And if this is the case, the argument presented against private language would apply equally to public language.

It seems then that memory scepticism alone will not provide us with an argument against private language.

[edit] Meaning scepticism

Another interpretation, found for example in the account presented by Anthony Kenny^[11] has it that the problem with a private ostensive definition is not just that it might be misremembered, but that such a definition cannot lead to a meaningful statement.

Let us first consider a case of ostensive definition in a public language. Jim and Jenny might one day decide to call some particular tree T; but the next day misremember which tree it was they named. In this ordinary language case, it makes sense to ask questions such as "is this the tree we named T yesterday?" and make statements such as "This is not the tree we named T yesterday". So one can appeal to other parts of the form of life, perhaps arguing: "this is the only Oak in the forest; T was an oak; therefore this is T".

An every-day ostensive definition is embedded in a public language, and so in the form of life in which that language occurs. Participation in a public form of life enables correction to occur. That is, in the case of a public language there are other ways to check the use of a term that has been ostensively defined. We can justify our use of the new name T by making the ostensive definition more or less explicit.

But this is not the case with S. Recall that because S is part of a private language, it is not possible to provide an explicit definition of S. The only possible definition is the private, ostensive one of associating S with that feeling. But this is the very thing being questioned. "Imagine someone saying: 'But I know how tall I am!' and laying his hand on top of his head to prove it."^[12]

A recurrent theme in Wittgenstein's work is that for some term or utterance to have a sense, it must be conceivable that it be doubted. For Wittgenstein, tautologies do not have sense, do not say anything, and so do not admit of doubt. But furthermore, if any other sort of utterance does not admit of doubt, it must be senseless. Rush Rhees, in his notes on lectures given by Wittgenstein, while discussing the reality of physical objects, has him say:

We get something similar when we write a tautology like "p → p". We formulate such expressions to get something in which there is no doubt - even though the sense has vanished with the doubt.^[13]

As Kenny put it , "Even to think falsely that something is S I must know the meaning of S; and this is what Wittgenstein argues is impossible in the private language."^[14] Because there is no way to check the meaning (or use) of S apart from that private ostensive act of definition, it is not possible to know what S means. The sense has vanished with the doubt.

Wittgenstein uses the further analogy of the left hand giving the right hand money.^[15] The physical act might take place, but the transaction could not count as a gift. Similarly, one might say S while focusing on a sensation, but no act of naming has occurred.

[edit] The Beetle in a box

If we can talk about something, then it is not private in the sense considered. The converse of this is that if something is private in the appropriate sense, then we cannot talk about it.

Wittgenstein invites us to imagine a community in which the individuals each have a box containing a "beetle". No one is permitted to see anyone else's beetle, so that each person knows what a "beetle" is like only by inspecting the contents of their own box.^[16]

If the "beetle" had a use in the language of these people, it could not be as the name of something - because it is entirely possible that each person had something completely different in their box, or even that the thing in the box constantly changed, or that each box was in fact empty. The nature of the content of the box is irrelevant to whatever language game it is used in.

By analogy, it does not matter that one cannot experience another's subjective sensations. Talk of such subjective experience is learned through public experience, and the actual content is irrelevant; all we can discuss is what is available in our public language.

[edit] Following a rule

It is common to describe language use in terms of the rules that one follows, and Wittgenstein considers rules in some detail. He famously suggests that any act can be made out to follow from a given rule.^[17] He does this in setting up a dilemma:

This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And there would be neither accord nor conflict here.^[18]

One can give an explanation of why one followed a particular rule in a particular case. But any explanation for rule following behaviour cannot be given in terms of following a rule, without involving circularity. One can say something like "She did X because of the rule R" but if you say "She followed R because of the rule R¹" one can then ask "but why did she follow rule R¹?" and so potentially become involved in a regression. Explanation must have an end.^[19]

His conclusion:

What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases.^[20]

So following a rule is a practice. And furthermore, since one can think one is following a rule and yet be mistaken, thinking one is following a rule is not the same as following it. Therefore following a rule cannot be a private activity.^[21]

[edit] Kripke's interpretation

In 1982 Saul Kripke published a new and innovative account of the argument in his book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.^[22] Kripke takes the paradox discussed in §201 to be the central problem of the Philosophical Investigations. He develops the paradox into a Grue-like problem, arguing that it similarly results in skepticism, but about meaning rather than about induction. ^[23] He proposes a new form of addition, which he calls quus (symbolised by ⊕), which is identical with plus in all cases except those in which either of the numbers to be added are greater than 57, thus:

x ⊕ y = x+y, if x, y, < 57, otherwise =5

He then asks if anyone could know that previously when I thought I had meant plus, I had not actually meant quus. He claims that his argument shows that "Each new application we make is a leap in the dark; any present intention could be interpreted so as to accord with anything we may choose to do. So there can be neither accord, nor conflict". ^[24]

Kripke's account is considered unfaithful to Wittgenstein and infused with his own views by some commentators, who dub it "Kripkenstein".

[edit] Notes

Remarks in Part I of Investigations are preceded by the symbol "§". Remarks in Part II are referenced by their Roman numeral or their page number in the third edition.

1. ^ A detailed account can be found in: Dejnoñka, Jan Origins of the Private Language Argument Diálogos 66, 59-78, 1995
2. ^ 269.
3. ^ §256.
4. ^ §258.
5. ^ §270.
6. ^ §27-34
7. ^ §23.
8. ^ §28, italics in original
9. ^ §258.
10. ^ This account is supported by §207
11. ^ Kenny, Anthony. Wittgenstein pp.193-4
12. ^ §279.
13. ^ The Language of Sense Data and Private Experience: Notes taken by Rush Rhees of Wittgenstein's Lectures, 1936 Lecture VIII, February 24, 1936. in Klagge, James, Nordmann, Alfred (editors) (1993) Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951p. 318. See for comparison, Investigations, §298
14. ^ Kenny (1973) p. 192
15. ^ §268
16. ^ §293
17. ^ "Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule", §198-9
18. ^ §201
19. ^ §87
20. ^ §201, italics in original
21. ^ §202
22. ^ Kripke, Saul. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Basil Blackwell Publishing, 1982.
23. ^ Kripke, Saul. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. pp7-25
24. ^ Kripke, Saul. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. pp 55

[edit] References

Kenny, Anthony (1973). Wittgenstein. Penguin Books. ISBN 0-14-021581-6. 

Kripke, Saul (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.. Basil Blackwell Publishing. ISBN 0-631-13521-9. 

Klagge, James; Nordmann, Alfred (editors) (1993). Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing company. ISBN 0-87220-155-4. 

Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953/2001). Philosophical Investigations. Blackwell Publishing. ISBN 0-631-23127-7. 

[edit] External links

• Stanford Encyclopedia entry for the argument