Battle of Savo Island

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Battle of Savo Island
Part of the Pacific Theater of World War II
The U.S. cruiser Quincy on fire and sinking as a result of numerous gunfire and torpedo hits from attacking Japanese cruisers. The flames at the far left of the picture are probably from the U.S. cruiser Vincennes, also on fire due to gunfire and torpedo damage.[1]
Date August 8, 1942 – August 9, 1942 Location Vicinity of Savo Island, Solomon Islands Result Japanese victory
Combatants
Allied forces including: United States, Australia, United Kingdom	Empire of Japan
Commanders
Richmond K. Turner, Victor Crutchley	Isoroku Yamamoto, Gunichi Mikawa
Strength
8 cruisers, 15 destroyers[2]	7 cruisers, 1 destroyer[3]
Casualties
4 cruisers sunk, 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers damaged, 1,077 killed[4]	3 cruisers moderately damaged, 58 killed[5]

The Battle of Savo Island, also known as the First Battle of Savo Island and, in Japanese sources, as the First Battle of the Solomon Sea (第一次ソロモン海戦), took place August 8–9, 1942, and was a naval battle of the Pacific Campaign of World War II, between the Imperial Japanese Navy and Allied naval forces. The battle was the first major naval engagement during the Guadalcanal campaign.

In the battle, a Japanese warship force surprised and routed two Allied warship forces, sinking one Australian and three United States (U.S.) cruisers, while taking only moderate damage in return. The Japanese warship force consisted of seven cruisers and one destroyer and was commanded by Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, based at Rabaul, New Britain and Kavieng, New Ireland. In response to the Allied landings on Guadalcanal and Tulagi, Mikawa attacked and defeated the Allied warship screening force, commanded by United Kingdom Admiral British Admiral Victor Crutchley, who was under the command of U.S. Admiral Richmond K. Turner, overall commander of the Allied amphibious forces involved in the landings. Crutchley's force consisted of eight cruisers and 15 destroyers, but only five cruisers and seven destroyers were actually involved in the battle.

As a result of the defeat, remaining Allied warships were forced to withdraw from the Solomon Islands area, temporarily conceding control of the seas around Guadalcanal to Japanese naval forces. Allied transport ships were also forced from the area, leaving Allied ground forces, which had just landed on Guadalcanal and nearby islands the day before as part of the first major Allied offensive in the Pacific in World War II, in a precarious situation, with barely enough supplies, equipment, and food to hold onto their beachhead on Guadalcanal.

[edit] Background

On August 7, 1942, Allied forces (primarily U.S.) landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida Islands in the Solomon Islands. The landings on the islands were meant to deny their use by the Japanese as bases for threatening the supply routes between the U.S. and Australia, and secure the islands as starting points for a campaign with the eventual goal of isolating the major Japanese base at Rabaul while also supporting the Allied New Guinea campaign. The landings initiated the six-month-long Battle of Guadalcanal.^[6]

The overall commander of the naval forces involved in the Guadalcanal and Tulagi operation, as well as commander of the aircraft carrier task groups providing air cover for the landings, was Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, who was embarked aboard the U.S. aircraft carrier Saratoga. The amphibious naval forces that delivered the 16,000 Allied troops to Guadalcanal and Tulagi were commanded by U.S. Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner.^[7] Protecting Turner's troop transport and supply ships, as well as providing naval gunfire support for the landings, was a warship screening force consisting of eight cruisers, 15 destroyers, and five minesweepers under the command of United Kingdom Rear Admiral Victor A. C. Crutchley, who used the Australian cruiser Australia as his flagship.^[8]

Taking the Japanese by surprise, the Allied landing forces accomplished their initial objectives of securing Tulagi and nearby small islands, as well as an airfield (later called Henderson Field by the Allies) under construction at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal, by nightfall on August 8.^[9] During the landing operations on August 7 and 8, Japanese aircraft based at Rabaul attacked the Allied amphibious forces several times, setting afire the U.S. transport George F. Elliot (which eventually sank two days later) and heavily damaging the U.S. destroyer Jarvis.^[10] In the air attacks over the two days, the Japanese lost 36 aircraft, while the U.S. lost 19 aircraft, both in combat and to accident, including 14 carrier fighter aircraft.^[11]

Australian cruiser Canberra (center left) protects three Allied transport ships (background and center right) unloading troops and supplies at Tulagi on August 7 or 8, 1942.

Concerned over the losses to his carrier fighter aircraft strength, "anxious" about the threat to his carriers from further Japanese air attacks, and worried about his ship's fuel levels, Fletcher announced that he would be withdrawing from the Solomon Islands' area with his carrier task forces the evening of August 8.^[12][13] With the unloading going slower than planned and the loss of carrier air cover, Turner decided that he would have no choice but to withdraw his ships from Guadalcanal. He planned to unload as much as possible during the night and depart sometime during the next day (August 9).^[14]

[edit] Japanese response

Taken by surprise by the Allied operation at Guadalcanal, the Japanese immediately initiated several actions, in addition to the airstrikes, in response to the Allied landings. Japanese Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, based at Rabaul, loaded 519 naval troops on two transports and sent them towards Guadalcanal on August 7. However, upon learning that the number of Allied troops landed on Guadalcanal was greater than previously reported, the transports were recalled. Nevertheless, Mikawa also assembled all the available warships in the area to attack the Allied forces at Guadalcanal. Available to Mikawa at Rabaul were the heavy cruiser Chōkai (Mikawa's flagship), light cruisers Tenryū and Yubari and one destroyer- Yunagi. En route from Kavieng were the heavy cruisers of Cruiser Division 6, under Aritomo Goto, that included Aoba, Furutaka, Kako, and Kinugasa.^[15] The Japanese Navy had trained extensively in night fighting tactics prior to the war, a fact that the Allies were unaware of.^[16] Thus, Mikawa hoped to engage the Allied naval forces in a night battle off of Guadalcanal and Tulagi on the night of August 8–9 in which he could employ his night battle expertise while avoiding air attacks from Allied aircraft, which could not operate effectively at night. Mikawa's warships rendezvoused at sea near Cape St. George in the evening of August 7 and took a course to pass north of Buka Island and then down the east coast of Bougainville.^[17]

[edit] Battle

[edit] Prelude

Approach route of Mikawa's warship force for the battle from Rabaul and Kavieng (upper left), pausing off the east coast of Bougainville (center) and then traveling down The Slot the evening of August 8 to attack Allied naval forces off Guadalcanal and Tulagi (lower right).

Mikawa decided to lead his fleet down to Bougainville, where they would halt on the morning of August 8, east of Kieta, in order to minimize his ship's exposure to daytime air attacks during their approach to Guadalcanal^[18] Then they would steam through the dangerous channel known as "The Slot", hoping that no Allied plane would sight him in the fading light. But the Japanese fleet was sighted in St. George Channel, where their column almost ran into a U.S submarine, the S-38, lying in ambush. Too close to fire her torpedoes, her captain, Lieutenant Commander H.G. Munson, radioed:

TWO DESTROYERS AND THREE LARGER SHIPS OF UNKNOWN TYPE HEADING ONE FOUR ZERO TRUE AT HIGH SPEED EIGHT MILES WEST OF CAPE ST. GEORGE.^[19]

Once at Bougainville, Mikawa spread his ships out over a wide area in an effort to mask the composition of his force and launched four float aircraft from his cruisers to reconnoiter Allied naval ship dispositions around the southern Solomons area. At 10:20 and 11:10, his ships were spotted by Australian Hudson reconnaissance aircraft based at Milne Bay in New Guinea.^[20] The first Hudson to sight Mikawa's warships identified them as "three cruisers, three destroyers, and two seaplane tenders." The Hudson's crew tried to radio the sighting report to the Allied radio station at Fall River, New Guinea, but, receiving no acknowledgment, abandoned its patrol and returned to Milne Bay at 12:42 to ensure that the report was distributed to Allied forces as soon as possible. The second Hudson, on the other hand, completed its patrol after also failing to report its sighting by radio and, upon landing at Milne Bay at 15:00, made a report of "two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and one unknown type". For unknown reasons, the reports from these two Hudsons were not distributed to the Allied ships off Guadalcanal until 18:45 and 21:30, respectively, on August 8.^[21]

In the meantime, Mikawa's cruiser's aircraft returned by 12:00 and reported that the Allied naval disposition consisted of two groups of ships, one off Guadalcanal and the other off Tulagi. Mikawa reassembled his warships and began his forces' run towards Guadalcanal, entering The Slot near Choiseul by 16:00 on August 8. Mikawa communicated the following battle plan to his warships,

Mikawa's run down The Slot was unobserved by Allied forces. Turner had requested that U.S. Admiral John S. McCain, Sr., commander of Allied air forces for the South Pacific area, conduct extra reconnaissance missions over the The Slot in the afternoon of August 8. But, for unexplained reasons, McCain did not order the missions, nor did he tell Turner that they were not carried out. Thus, Turner mistakenly believed that The Slot was under Allied observation throughout the day of August 8.^[23]

Chart of the disposition of Allied ships the night of August 8.

To protect the unloading transports during the night of August 8, Crutchley divided the Allied warship forces into three groups. A "southern" group, consisting of the Australian cruisers Australia and Canberra, U.S. cruiser Chicago, and U.S. destroyers Patterson and Bagley, patrolled between Lunga Point and Savo Island to block the entrance between Savo Island and Cape Esperance on Guadalcanal. A "northern" group, consisting of the U.S. cruisers Vincennes, Astoria and Quincy, and U.S. destroyers Helm and Wilson, conducted a box-shaped patrol between the Tulagi anchorage and Savo Island to defend the passage between Savo and Florida Islands. An "eastern" group consisting of two U.S. cruisers and two U.S. destroyers guarded the eastern entrances to the sound between Florida and Guadalcanal Islands.^[24] Crutchley placed two U.S., radar-equipped destroyers to the west of Savo Island to provide early warning for any approaching Japanese ships. The destroyer Ralph Talbot patrolled the northern passage and the destroyer Blue patrolled the southern passage, with a gap of eight to twenty miles between their uncoordinated patrol patterns. At this time, the Allies were unaware of all of the limitations of their primitive ship-born radars, such as the fact that the effectiveness of the radar could be greatly degraded by the presence of nearby landmasses.^[25] Wary of the potential threat from Japanese submarines to the transport ships, Crutchley placed his remaining seven destroyers as close-in protection around the two transport anchorages.^[26]

The crews of the Allied ships were fatigued after two days of constant alert and action in supporting the landings. Also, the weather was extremely hot and humid, inducing further fatigue and "inviting weary sailors to slackness". In response, most of Crutchley's warships went to "Condition II" the night of August 8, which meant that half the crews were on duty while the other half rested, either in their bunks or near their battle stations.^[27]

In the evening of August 8, Turner called a conference on his command ship off Guadalcanal with Crutchley and the Allied ground forces commander, U.S. General Alexander Vandegrift to discuss the withdrawal of Fletcher's carrier task forces and the resulting withdrawal schedule for the transport ships. At 20:55 Crutchley left the southern group, in Australia, to attend the conference, leaving Captain Howard D. Bode, captain of Chicago, in charge of the southern group. Bode, awakened from sleep in his cabin, decided not to place his ship in the lead of the southern group of ships, the customary place for the senior ship, and went back to sleep. At the conference, Turner, Crutchley, and Vandegrift discussed the Hudson sighting reports of the "seaplane tender" force and decided it would not be a threat that night, since seaplane tenders were not the type of ship that would normally try to engage in a surface action. Vandegrift said that he would need to inspect the transport unloading situation at Tulagi before recommending a withdrawal time for the transport ships, and departed at midnight to conduct the inspection. Crutchley elected not to return with Australia to the southern force, but instead stationed his ship just outside the Guadalcanal transport anchorage, without informing the other Allied ship commanders of his intentions or location.^[28]

Chart of the approach and departure of Mikawa's ships from the battle area.

As Mikawa's force neared the Guadalcanal area, the Japanese ships launched three floatplanes to provide one final scouting report of the Allied ships and to provide illumination by dropping flares during the upcoming battle. Although several of the Allied ships heard and/or observed one or more of these floatplanes starting at 23:45 on August 8, none of them interpreted the presence of unknown aircraft in the area as an actionable threat and no one reported the sightings to Crutchley or Turner.^[29]

Mikawa's force approached in a single two-mile column led by Chōkai, followed by Aoba, Kako, Kinugasa, Furutaka, Tenryū, Yubari, and Yunagi. Sometime between 00:44 and 00:54 on August 9, lookouts in Mikawa's ships spotted Blue about five and one-half miles ahead of the Japanese column.^[30]

[edit] Action south of Savo

In order to avoid Blue, Mikawa ordered a course change for his column to pass north of Savo Island.^[31] He also ordered his ships to reduce speed to 22 knots to reduce wakes that might make his ships more visible.^[32] Four minutes later, Mikawa's lookouts spied either Ralph Talbot about 10 miles away or a small schooner of unknown nationality.^[33][34] The Japanese ships held their course while pointing more than 50 of their guns at Blue in anticipation of opening fire at the first indication that the approaching destroyer had sighted them.^[31] When Blue was less than one mile away from Mikawa's force, she suddenly reversed course, having reached the end of her patrol track, and steamed away, apparently completely oblivious to the long column of large Japanese ships sailing by her.^[35] Seeing that his ships were still undetected, Mikawa ordered them to return to a course to pass to the south of Savo Island and to increase speed, first to 26 knots, and then to 30 knots. At 01:25, Mikawa released his ships to operate independently of his flagship, and at 01:31, he ordered, "Every ship attack."^[36]

At about this time, Yunagi detached from the Japanese column and reversed direction, perhaps due to losing sight of the other Japanese ships ahead of her, or perhaps she was ordered to provide a "rear guard" for Mikawa's force. One minute later, Japanese lookouts sighted a warship to port. The sighted warship was the destroyer Jarvis, departing the Guadalcanal area independently for Australia to obtain repairs for the heavy damage suffered earlier that day. Whether Jarvis sighted the Japanese ships is unknown, for her radios had been destroyed. Furutaka launched some torpedoes at Jarvis, which all missed.^[37] The Japanese ships passed as close to 1,100 yards of Jarvis, close enough for officers on Tenryū to look down onto the destroyer's decks without seeing any of her crew moving about. If Jarvis was aware of the Japanese ships passing by, she did not respond in any noticeable way.^[38]

Chart of the southern action between the Allied and Japanese ships. Track of Jarvis not shown.

Two minutes after sighting Jarvis, the Japanese lookouts sighted the Allied destroyers and cruisers of the southern force about 12,500 yards away, silhouetted by the glow from the burning George F. Elliot.^[39] Several minutes later, at about 01:38, the Japanese cruisers began launching salvos of torpedoes at the Allied southern force ships.^[40] At this same time, lookouts on Chōkai spotted the ships of the Allied northern force at a range of 18,000 yards.^[41] Chōkai turned to face this new threat and the rest of the Japanese column followed, while still preparing to engage the Allied southern force ships with gunfire.^[42]

Patterson's crew was alert, for the destroyer's captain had taken seriously the earlier daytime sightings of Japanese warships and evening sightings of unknown aircraft and notified his crew to be ready for action. At 01:43, Patterson spotted a ship, probably Kinugasa, 5,000 yards dead ahead and immediately sent a warning by both radio and signal lamp, "Warning! Warning! Strange ships entering the harbor!" Patterson increased speed to full, fired starshells towards the Japanese column, and her captain ordered a torpedo attack, but his order was not heard due to the noise from the destroyer's guns.^[43]

At about the same moment that Patterson sighted the Japanese ships and went into action, the Japanese floatplanes overhead, on orders from Mikawa, dropped aerial flares directly over Canberra and Chicago.^[44] Canberra was able to respond immediately, with with Captain Frank Getting ordering an increase in speed and a reversal of an initial turn to port, which kept the ship between the Japanese ships and the Allied transports anchored at Guadalcanal, and for her guns to train out and begin firing at any targets that could be sighted.^[45] Less than one minute later, as Canberra's guns began to aim at the Japanese ships, Chōkai and Furutaka fired on the Australian cruiser, scoring numerous hits within a few seconds. Aoba and Kako joined-in with gunfire and within the next three minutes Canberra took up to 24 large caliber hits. Early hits killed her gunnery officer, mortally wounded Getting, and destroyed both boiler rooms, knocking out power to the entire ship before Canberra could fire any of her guns or communicate a warning to other Allied ships. The cruiser glided to a stop, on fire, with a 5- to 10-degree list to starboard, and unable to fight her fires or pump out flooded compartments due to the lack of power. Since all of the Japanese ships were on the port side of Canberra, the damage to the ship's starboard side occurred either due to shells entering low on the port side and exiting below the waterline on the starboard side, or from one or two torpedo hits on the starboard side.^[46] If torpedoes did hit Canberra on the starboard side, then they may have come from a nearby Allied ship, and at this time the U.S. destroyer Bagley was the only ship on that side of the Australian cruiser and had fired torpedoes moments earlier.^[47]

View from the Japanese cruiser Chokai during the battle as aerial flares illuminate the Allied southern force.

The crew of Chicago, observing the illumination of their ship by air-dropped flares and the sudden turn by Canberra in front of them, came alert and awakened Captain Bode from "a sound sleep". Bode ordered his five-inch guns to fire star shells towards the Japanese column, but the shells did not function.^[48] At 01:47, a torpedo, probably from Kako, hit Chicago's bow, sending a shock wave throughout the ship that damaged the main battery director. A second torpedo hit but failed to explode and a shell hit the cruiser's mainmast, killing two crewmen. Chicago continued to steam west for 40 minutes,^[49] leaving the transports behind that she was assigned to protect. The cruiser fired her secondary batteries at the trailing ships in the Japanese column and may have hit Tenryū, causing slight damage. Bode did not try to assert control over any of the other Allied ships in the southern force, of which he was still technically in command. More significantly, Bode made no attempt to communicate a warning to any of the other Allied ships or personnel in the Guadalcanal area as his ship continued to head away from the battle area.^[50]

During this time, Patterson engaged in a gun duel with the Japanese column with the U.S. destroyer receiving a shell hit aft, causing moderate damage and killing 10 crew members. The destroyer, however, continued to pursue and fire at the Japanese ships and may have hit Kinugasa, causing moderate damage.^[51] Patterson then lost sight of the Japanese column as it headed northeast along the eastern shore of Savo Island.^[52] Bagley, whose crew sighted the Japanese shortly after Patterson and Canberra did, circled completely around to port before firing torpedoes in the general direction of the rapidly disappearing Japanese column, one or two of which may have hit Canberra. Bagley played no further role in the battle.^[53] Yunagi exchanged non-damaging gunfire with Jarvis before exiting the battle area to the west with the intention of eventually rejoining the Japanese column north and west of Savo Island.^[54]

At 01:44, as Mikawa's ships headed towards the Allied northern force, Tenryū and Yubari split from the rest of the Japanese column and took a more westward course. Furutaka, either due to a steering problem,^[55] or to avoid a possible collision with Canberra, followed Yubari and Tenryū. Thus, the Allied northern force was about to be enveloped and attacked from both sides.^[56]

[edit] Action north of Savo

Map of the engagement between the Allied northern force and the Japanese warship force.

At the time that Mikawa's ships began their engagement with the Allied southern force, the captains of all three U.S. northern force cruisers were asleep, with their ships "steaming quietly at 10 knots."^[57] Although personnel on all three U.S. cruisers observed flares or gunfire from the battle south of Savo or else received Patterson's warning of threatening ships entering the area, it took some time for the cruiser's crews to go from Condition II to full alert status.^[58] At 01:44, the Japanese column began firing torpedoes and, at 01:50, fastened powerful searchlights on all three northern U.S. cruisers and opened fire with their guns.^[51]

Astoria's bridge crew called general quarters upon sighting the flares south of Savo around 01:49. At 01:52, shortly after the Japanese searchlights came on and shells began falling around the ship, Astoria's main gun director crews spotted the Japanese cruisers and opened fire. Astoria's captain, awakened to find his ship in action, rushed to the bridge and ordered a cease fire, fearful that his ship might be firing on friendly forces. As shells continued to cascade around his ship, the captain ordered firing to begin again less than a minute later. Chōkai, however, had found the range, and Astoria was quickly hit by numerous shells and set afire.^[59] Between 02:00 and 02:15, Aoba, Kinugasa, and Kako joined Chōkai in pounding Astoria, destroying the cruiser's engine room and bringing the flaming ship to a halt. At 02:16, one of Astoria's remaining operational main gun turrets fired at Kinugasa's searchlight, but missed and hit Chōkai's forward turret, causing moderate damage.^[60]

Quincy had also seen the aircraft flares over the southern ships, received Patterson's warning, and had just sounded general quarters and was coming alert when the searchlights from the Japanese column came on. Quincy's captain gave the order to commence firing, but the gun crews were not ready. Within a few minutes, Quincy was caught in a crossfire between Aoba, Furutaka, and Tenryū and was hit heavily and set afire. Quincy's captain ordered his cruiser to charge towards the eastern Japanese column but, as it turned to do so, the ship was hit by two torpedoes from Tenryū, causing severe damage. Quincy managed to fire a few main gun salvos, one of which hit Chōkai's chart room 20 feet from Admiral Mikawa and killed or wounded 36 men, although Mikawa himself was not injured. At 02:10, incoming shells killed or wounded almost all of Quincy's bridge crew, including the captain. At 02:16, the cruiser was hit by a torpedo from Aoba and the ship's remaining guns were silenced due to heavy damage and loss of life. Quincy's assistant gunnery officer, sent to the bridge to ask for instructions, reported on what he found:

Quincy sank, bow first, at 02:38.^[61]

Japanese cruiser Yubari shines searchlights towards the northern force of Allied warships during the battle.

Like Quincy and Astoria, Vincennes also sighted the aerial flares to the south, and furthermore, actually sighted gunfire from the southern engagement. At 01:50, when the U.S. cruisers were illuminated by the Japanese searchlights, Vincennes hesitated to open fire, believing that the seachlight's source might be friendly ships. Shortly thereafter, Kako opened fire on Vincennes who responded with her own gunfire at 01:53.^[62] As Vincennes began to receive damaging shell hits, her captain, U.S. Captain Frederick L. Riefkohl, ordered an increase of speed to 25 knots, but shortly thereafter, at 01:55, two torpedoes from Chōkai hit, causing heavy damage. Kinugasa now joined Kako in pounding Vincennes, although the U.S. cruiser was able to score one hit on Kinugasa causing moderate damage to her steering engines. The rest of the Japanese ships also fired and hit Vincennes up to 74 times, and, at 02:03, another torpedo, this time from Yubari, hit the U.S. cruiser. With all boiler rooms destroyed, Vincennes came to a halt, burning "everywhere" and listing to port. At 02:16, Riefkohl ordered the crew to abandon ship, and Vincennes sank at 02:50.^[63]

During the engagement, the U.S. destroyers Helm and Wilson struggled to see the Japanese ships. Both destroyers briefly fired at Mikawa's cruisers, but caused no damage and received no damage to themselves.^[64]

At 02:16, the Japanese columns ceased fire on the northern Allied force as they moved out of range around the north side of Savo Island. Ralph Talbot encountered Furutaka, Tenryū, and Yubari as they cleared Savo Island. The Japanese ships fixed the U.S. destroyer with searchlights and hit her several times with gun shells, causing heavy damage, but Ralph Talbot was able to escape into a nearby rain squall and the Japanese ships left her behind.^[65]

[edit] Mikawa's decision

At 02:16, Mikawa consulted with his staff about whether they should turn to continue the battle with the surviving Allied warships and attempt to sink the Allied transports in the two anchorages. Several factors influenced his ultimate decision. His ships were scattered and would take some time to regroup.^[66] Mikawa did not know the number and locations of any remaining Allied warships.^[67] More importantly, Mikawa believed that U.S. aircraft carriers were in the area and that his ships had no air cover to protect against aircraft attacks. Mikawa was probably aware that the Japanese Navy had no more cruisers in production, and thus would be unable to replace any that he believed he might lose to air attack the next day if he remained near Guadalcanal.^[68] He was unaware that the U.S. carriers had withdrawn from the battle area and would not be a threat during the oncoming daylight hours. Although several of Mikawa's staff members urged an attack on the Allied transports, the consensus was to withdraw from the battle area.^[69] Therefore, at 02:20, Mikawa ordered his ships to retire.^[70]

[edit] Aftermath and significance

U.S. destroyers Blue and Patterson evacuate the crew from the burning Canberra.

At 04:00 on August 9, Patterson came alongside Canberra to assist the cruiser in fighting her fires. By 05:00, it appeared that the fires were almost under control, but Turner, who at this time intended to withdraw all Allied ships by 06:30, ordered the ship to be scuttled if it was not able to accompany the other ships. After the survivors were removed, the U.S. destroyers Selfridge and Ellet sank Canberra with torpedoes and gunfire.^[71]

Later in the morning of August 9, General Vandegrift advised Admiral Turner that he needed more supplies unloaded from the transports before they withdrew. Therefore, Turner postponed the withdrawal of his ships until mid-afternoon. In the meantime, Astoria's crew tried to save their sinking ship. Astoria's fires, however, eventually became completely out of control and the ship sank at 12:15.^[72]

On the morning of August 9, an Australian coastwatcher on Bougainville radioed a warning of a Japanese airstrike on the way from Rabaul. The Allied transports ceased unloading for a time but were puzzled when the airstrike did not materialize. Allied forces did not discover until after the war was over that this Japanese airstrike instead concentrated on Jarvis south of Guadalcanal, sinking the U.S. destroyer with no survivors. The Allied transports and warships all departed the Guadalcanal area by nightfall on August 9.^[73]

In the late evening of August 9, Mikawa on Chōkai released the four cruisers of Cruiser Division 6 to return to their home base at Kavieng. At 08:10 on August 10, Kako was torpedoed and sunk by the U.S. submarine S-44 70 miles from its destination. The other three Japanese cruisers picked up all but 71 of her crew and completed their journey to Kavieng.^[74]

From the time of the battle until several months later, almost all Allied supplies sent to Guadalcanal came by transports in small convoys, mainly during daylight hours, while Allied aircraft from the New Hebrides and Henderson Field as well as any available aircraft carriers flew covering missions. During this time, Allied forces on Guadalcanal received barely enough ammunition and provisions to withstand the several Japanese offensives directed to try to retake the islands.^[75]

In spite of their defeat in this battle, the Allies eventually won the battle for Guadalcanal, which was an important event in the overall Allied campaign that eventually defeated Japan. In hindsight, if Mikawa had elected to risk his ships to go after the Allied transports on the morning of August 9, he could have ended the Guadalcanal campaign at its inception, and the course of the war in the southern Pacific could have gone much differently. Although the Allied warships at Guadalcanal that night were completely routed, they did accomplish their mission, which was to protect the vital transports from harm. Many of these same transports were used again and again to bring crucial supplies to Allied forces on Guadalcanal over succeeding months.^[76]

Japanese artwork from during the war depicts the destruction of three U.S. cruisers by Japanese warships at Savo Island.

A formal U.S. Navy board of inquiry, known as the Hepburn investigation, subsequently prepared a report of the battle, interviewing most of the major Allied officers involved over several months, beginning in December 1942.^[77] The report was to recommend the official censure for only one officer-Captain Howard D. Bode. The report stopped short of recommending formal action against other Allied officers, including Admiral's Fletcher, Turner, McCain, Crutchley, and Captain Riefkohl. Turner's, Crutchley's, and McCain's careers do not appear to have been affected by the defeat or the mistakes they made in contributing to it. Riefkohl, however, never commanded ships again. Captain Bode, upon learning that the report was going to be especially critical of his actions, shot himself in his quarters on April 19, 1943 and died the next day.^[78]

Admiral Yamamoto signaled a congratulatory note to Mikawa on his victory, stating:

Later on, though, when it became apparent that Mikawa had missed a "golden" opportunity to destroy the Allied transports, he was intensely criticised by his comrades.^[79]

Admiral Turner later assessed why his forces were so soundly defeated in the battle:

Historian Richard B. Frank adds:

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Battle of Savo Island

[edit] References

[edit] Notes

[edit] Books

• D'Albas, Andrieu (1965). Death of a Navy: Japanese Naval Action in World War II. Devin-Adair Pub. ISBN 0-8159-5302-X. 
• Dull, Paul S. (1978). A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941-1945. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-097-1. 
• Frank, Richard B. (1990). Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle. New York: Penguin Group. ISBN 0-14-016561-4. 
• Hammel, Eric (1999). Carrier Clash: The Invasion of Guadalcanal & The Battle of the Eastern Solomons August 1942. St. Paul, MN, USA: Zenith Press. ISBN 0-7603-2052-7.  Book review:[2]; online views of selections of the book:[3]
• Kilpatrick, C. W. (1987). Naval Night Battles of the Solomons. Exposition Press. ISBN 0-682-40333-4. 
• Lacroix, Eric; Linton Wells (1997). Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-311-3. 
• Loxton, Bruce; Chris Coulthard-Clark (1997). The Shame of Savo: Anatomy of a Naval Disaster. Australia: Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd. ISBN 1-86448-286-9. 
• Lundstrom, John B. (2006). Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal. Annapolis:: Naval Institute Press. SBN 1-59114-475-2. 
• Morison, Samuel Eliot (1958). The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942 – February 1943, vol. 5 of History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. ISBN 0-316-58305-7. 
• Murray, Williamson; Allan R. Millett (2001). A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War. United States of America: Belknap Press. ISBN 0-674-00680-1. 
• Newcomb, Richard F. (1961 (Reissue 2002)). The Battle of Savo Island: The Harrowing Account of the Disastrous Night Battle Off Guadalcanal that Nearly Destroyed the Pacific Fleet in August 1942. New York: Owl Books. ISBN 0-8050-7072-9. 
• Warner, Denis Ashton; Peggy Warner & Sadao Senoo (1992). Disaster in the Pacific: New Light on the Battle of Savo Island. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-256-7. 

[edit] External links

• Bates, Richard W. (1950). The Battle of Savo Island, August 9, 1942. Strategical and Tactical Analysis. Part I (PDF). Naval War College. Retrieved on August 11, 2006.
• Cagney, James (2005). Interactive Animation of The Battle of Savo Island, August 9, 1942 (javascript). HistoryAnimated.com. Retrieved on May 17, 2006.
• Horan, Mark. First Battle of Savo Island. Order of Battle. Retrieved on May 17, 2006.
• Lanzendörfer, Tim. Opening Salvos: The Battle of Savo Island, August 9, 1942. The Pacific War: The U.S. Navy. Retrieved on May 17, 2006.
• Office of Naval Intelligence (1943). The Battle of Savo Island 9 August 1942. Combat Narrative. Publications Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence, United States Navy. Retrieved on May 17, 2006.