Catalan nationalism
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Catalan nationalism, or Catalanism, is a political movement that advocates for an increased political autonomy of Catalonia, if not independence itself, from Spain and France. This desire is sometimes secondarily extended to the "Catalan Countries".
It was born in the 19th century, with the aim of restoring some kind of self-government to Catalonia, and obtaining recognition for the Catalan language. These demands were summarized in the so-called Bases de Manresa in 1892.
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[edit] The Origins of Catalan national identity
During the first centuries of the Reconquista, the Franks drove the Muslims south of the Pyrenees. To prevent future incursions, Holy Roman Emperor Charlemagne created the Marca Hispanica in 790 CE, which consisted of a series of petty kingdoms serving as buffer states between the Frankish kingdom and Al-Andalus.
Between 878 and 988 CE, the area became a hotbed of Frankish-Muslim conflict. However, as the Frankish monarchy and the Caliphate of Córdoba weakened during the 11th century, the resulting impasse allowed for a process of consolidation throughout the region’s many earldoms, resulting in their combination into the County of Barcelona, which became the embryo of today's Catalonia. By 1070, Ramon Berenguer I, Count of Barcelona, had subordinated other Catalan Counts and intransigent nobles as vassals. His action brought peace to a turbulent feudal system and sowed the seeds of Catalan identity.
According to several scholars, the term “Catalan” and “Catalonia” emerged near the end of the 11th century and appeared in the Usatges of 1150. Two factors fostered this identity: stable institutions and cultural prosperity. While the temporary lack of foreign invasions contributed to Catalonia’s stability, it was not a main cause. Rather, it provided a site for sociopolitical development. For example, after Catalonia merged with the Kingdom of Aragón, to create the Crown of Aragon in 1137 through a dynastic union, the system was designed to mutually check both the king’s and nobility's powers, while the small but growing numbers of free citizens and bourgeoisie would tactically take sides with the king in order to diminish typically feudal institutions.
By 1150, the king approved a series of pacts, called the Usatges, which “explicitly acknowledged legal equality between burghers…and nobility” (Woolard 17). In addition, the Catalan-Aragonese gentry established the Corts, a representative body, comprised of nobles, bishops and abbots that counterbalanced the King’s authority. By the end of the 13th century, “the monarch needed the consent of the Corts to approve laws or collect revenue” (McRoberts 10). Soon after, the Corts elected a standing body called the Diputació del General or the Generalitat, which included the rising high bourgoisie.
In the 13th century, King Jaume I conquered Valencia and the Balearic Islands. Subsequent conquests expanded into the Mediterranean, reaching Sardinia, Corsica, Sicily, Naples and Greece, so by 1350 Catalonia-Aragón “presided over the one of the most extensive and powerful mercantile empires of the Mediterranean during this period” (Woolard 16). Catalonia’s economic success formed a powerful merchant class, which wielded the Corts as its political weapon. It also produced a smaller middle class, or menestralia, that was “composed of artisans, shopkeepers and workshop owners” (McRoberts 11). Over the 13th and 14th centuries, these merchants accrued so much wealth and political sway that placed a significant check on the Aragonese crown. By the 15th century the Aragonese monarch “was not considered legitimate until he had sworn to respect the basic law of the land in the presence of the Corts” (Balcells 9). This balance of power is a classic example of pactisme, or contractualism, which seems to be a defining feature of the Catalan political culture.
Along with political and economic success, Catalan culture flourished in the 13th and 14th centuries. During this period, the Catalan vernacular gradually replaced Latin as the language of culture and government. Scholars rewrote everything from ancient Visigothic law to religious sermons in Catalan (Woolard 14). Wealthy citizens bolstered Catalan’s literary appeal through poetry contests and history pageants dubbed the Jocs Florals, or “Floral Games.” As the kingdom expanded southeast into Valencia and the Mediterranean, Catalan followed.
The medieval heyday of Catalan culture would not last, however. After a bout of famine and plague hit Catalonia in the mid-14th century, the population dropped from 50,000 to 20,000 (McRoberts 13). This exacerbated feudal tensions, sparking serf revolts in rural areas and political impasses in Barcelona. Financial issues and the burden of multiple dependencies abroad further strained the region.
To worsen things, in 1410, the Aragonese king died without leaving an heir to the throne. Finding no legitimate alternative, Catalan-Aragonese leaders appointed Ferdinand I, a Castilian. The new monarch and his descendants began to impinge on the “privileges” of Catalan nobles, infuriating the Generalitat. From 1458 to 1479, civil wars between King John II and local chieftains engulfed Catalonia. During the conflict, John II “had his heir Ferdinand married to Isabella of Castile, the heiress to the Castilian throne, in a bid to find outside allies” (Balcells 11). Their union, which came to be known as the Catholic Monarchs, marked the dawn of the Kingdom of Spain.
This dynastic union deprived the Catalans of foreign policy control, but still allowed a similar level of autonomy as the one from the times of the Crown of Aragon. These political and economic restrictions impacted all segments of society, from Barcelona’s wealthy merchants to its Jewish community (which was soon to become a target of the newly created Spanish Inquisition. Also, because of the locally bred social conflicts, Catalonia squandered in one century most of what it had gained in political rights between 1070 and 1410.
Nevertheless, early political, economic and cultural advances gave Catalonia “a mode of organization and an awareness of its own identity which might in some ways be described as national, though the idea of popular or national sovereignty did not yet exist” (Balcells 9). Other scholars like Kenneth McRoberts and Katheryn Woolard hold similar views. Both support Pierre Vilar, who contends that in 13th and 14th centuries “the Catalan principality was perhaps the European country to which it would be the least inexact or risky to use such seemingly anachronistic terms as political and economic imperialism or ‘nation-state’” (McRoberts 13). In other words, an array of political and cultural forces laid the foundations of Catalan “national” identity. Llobera agrees with this opinion, saying, “By the mid-thirteenth century, the first solid manifestations of national consciousness can be observed.” Indeed, 13th and 14th century Catalonia did exhibit features of a nation-state. The role of Catalan Counts, the Corts, Mediterranean rule and economic prosperity support this thesis. But as Vilar points out, these analogies are only true if we acknowledge that a 14th century nation-state is anachronistic. In other words, those living in Catalonia before latter day nationalism possessed something like a collective identity on which this was to be based, but this does not automatically equate to the modern concept of nation, neither in Catalonia nor elsewhere in similar circumstances during the Middle Age.
[edit] The Development of modern Catalanism
The Corts and the rest of the autochthonous legal and politic organization was finally terminated in 1716 as a result of the Spanish War of Succession. The local population mostly took side and provided troops and resources for Archduke Charles, the pretender who was arguably to maintain the legal status quo. His utter defeat meant the legal and politic termination of the autonomous parliaments in the Crown of Aragon, as the Nueva Planta Decrees were passed and the new King Philip V of Spain of the House of Bourbon created a centralized Spain.
The 18th century Spanish economy depended mostly on agriculture. The social structure stayed hierarchical, if not feudal, while the Roman Catholic Church and Bourbon monarchs wrestled for internal supremacy. Into the 19th century, Spain remained politically and culturally isolated from the rest of Europe. As England, Germany and France tinkered with coal-fed factories, steam engines and new philosophies, Spanish rulers found itself increasingly at odds with the Church, its colonies and haunted by past glories.
Unlike in the rest of Spain, the industrial revolution made some progress in Catalonia, whose pro-industry middle class strived to mechanize everything, from textiles and crafts to wineries. Industrialization and trade went hand in hand with the proto-nationalist Renaixença movement, which, annoyed with the shortcomings of the Royal court in Madrid, began to fashion an alternative, and that was Catalan identity.
To finance their cultural project, a locally bred proto-nationalist intelligentsia sought patronage and protection from Barcelona’s industrial barons. This relationship played a decisive role in the development of Catalanism. On the one hand, intellectuals sought to renew Catalan identity as a response to Spain’s overall backwardness. They wanted to distance themselves from the country’s problems by creating a new ontology rooted in Catalan culture, language and worldview. On the other hand, those same intellectuals avoided demands for separation. They knew that their patrons would want Catalan nationalism to include Spain for two reasons:
- any secession from Spain would devastate industrial markets and impoverish the region.
- The Catalan industrial class was “unconditionally pro-Spanish at heart” (Conversi 18).
As Woolard notes, the economic interests in Madrid and the budding Catalan industrialists converged during the 18th century, resulting in cooperation between. For the nationalist literati, this meant that Catalanism could propagate a national identity, but it had to function within Spain.
Furthermore, Barcelona’s industrial elite wanted Catalonia to stay part of Spain since Catalonia’s industrial markets relied on consumption from other Spanish regions which, little by little, started to join some sort of development. In fact, part of the industrialists’ desire to remain part of Spain was their desire for protectionism, hegemony in domestic markets and the push to “influence Madrid’s political choices by intervening in central Spanish affairs” (Conversi 18-20), thus, it made no economic sense to promote any secession from Spain. To the contrary, Catalonia’s prominent industrialists acted as the Spanish leading economic heads. As Stanley Payne observes: "The modern Catalan élite had played a major role in…what there was of economic industrialization in the nineteenth century, and had tended to view Catalonia not as the antagonist but to some degree the leader of a freer, more prosperous Spain" (482). Barcelona’s bourgeois industrialists even claimed that protectionism and leadership served the interests of the “‘national market’ or of ‘developing the national economy’ (national meaning Spanish here) ” (Balcells 19). The inclusion of Spain was instrumental to Catalonia’s success, meaning that industrialists would not tolerate any secessionist movement. Claiming for independence would have assured nothing but weak markets, an internal enemy and strenghthened anarchist movements. And hence, though manufacturers funded the Renaixença—and Catalan nationalism— they demanded that Catalonia stayed part of Spain to ensure economic stability.
This federalist-like lobbying had not worked at first, nor did it succeed until the late 1880s. Finally, in 1889, the pro-industrialist Lliga de Catalunya managed to save the particular Catalan Civil Code after a liberal attempt to homogenize the national legal structures (Conversi 20). Two years later, they coaxed Madrid into passing protectionist measures, which reinvigorated pro-Spanish attitudes among manufacturers. Then, they also took great profits from Spain's neutrality in World War I, which allowed them to export to both contendents, and the Spanish expansion in Morocco, which Catalan industrials encouraged since it was to become a fast growing market for them. Also, by early 20th century, Catalan businessmen had managed to gain control of the most profitable commerce between Spain and its American colonies and ex-colonies, namely Cuba and Puerto Rico.
This nationalist-industrialist accord is a classic example of inclusionary Catalanism. Nationalists might have hoped for an independent Catalonia but their patrons needed access to markets and protectionism. As a result, nationalists could propagate the Catalan identity provided that it coincided with the industrialists’ pro-Spanish stance. Because the Lliga de Catalunya endorsed this compromise, it dominated Catalan politics after the turn of the century. Payne notes: "The main Catalanist party, the bourgeois Lliga, never sought separatism but rather a more discrete and distinctive place for a self-governing Catalonia within a more reformist and progressive Spain. The Lliga’s leaders ran their 1916 electoral campaign under the slogan ‘Per l’Espanya Gran’ (For a Great Spain)" (482). The Lliga had tempered the nationalist position to one of inclusionary nationalism. It allowed Catalanism to flourish, but demanded that it promote federalism within Spain, and not separation from it. Any deviation from this delicate balance would have enraged those pro-Catalan and Spanish-identifying industrialists. Ultimately, this prevented any moves towards separation while strengthening Catalonia’s “federal” rights after the Mancomunitat took power in 1914.
[edit] Catalanism in the 20th Century
During the first part of the 20th century, the main nationalist party was the right-wing Lliga Regionalista, headed by Francesc Cambó. For the nationalists, the main achievement in this period was the Mancomunitat de Catalunya a grouping of the four Catalan provinces, with limited administrative power. This institution was abolished during the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera.
In 1931, the left-wing Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya party won the elections in Catalonia, advocating a Catalan republic federated with Spain. Under pressure from the Spanish government, the leader of ERC, Francesc Macià i Llussà, accepted an autonomous Catalan government instead, which was called Generalitat de Catalunya. Again, this was abolished in 1939, after the Spanish Civil War was won by the Francoist troops. During the last stages of the war, when the Republican side was on the verge of defeat, Catalan president of the Generalitat, Lluís Companys, rethorically declared Catalan independence, even though it never materialized due to objections within Catalonia and, eventually, by the Second Spanish Republic defeat.
Right after the war, Companys, along with thousands of Spanish Republicans, sought cover in France exiled but because of the, by that time, mutual sympathy between Franco's government and Nazi Germany, he was captured after the Fall of France in 1940 and handed to Spanish authorities, which sentenced him to death. Several political or cultural Catalan movements operated underground during the dictatorship of Francisco Franco, which lasted until 1975. A president of the Catalan government was still designed and operated symbolically in exile.
Companys's successor in exile, Josep Tarradellas, kept away from Spain until Franco's death in 1975. When he came back in 1977 the government of Catalonia -the Generalitat- was restored again. Following the approval of the Spanish constitution in 1978, Catalonia was organized as an Autonomous Community 1979, and in 1980 Jordi Pujol, from the conservative nationalist party Convergència democràtica de Catalunya, was elected president and ruled the autonomous government for 23 consecutive years. In contrast, there is no significant political autonomy, nor recognition of the language in the historical Catalan territories belonging to France (Roussillon, in French département of Pyrénées-Orientales).
Currently, the main political parties which define themselves as being Catalan nationalists are Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, Unió Democràtica de Catalunya and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya. A significant part of the population in Catalonia would support a larger degree of autonomy, and some of them would prefer an independent state. Although it must be noted that in the recent 2006 referendum to decide on a new Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia which has further increased the powers of the autonomous government, only 48.84% of the total electorate voted, which represented an unprecedent abstention in the democratic history of Catalonia.
[edit] References
- Balcells, Albert. Catalan Nationalism: Past and Present. New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1996.
- Conversi, Daniele. The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation. London: Hurst & Company, 1997.
- Guibernau, Monserrat. Catalan Nationalism: Francoism, transition and democracy. Routledge: New York, 2004.
- Harvgreaves, John. Freedom for Catalonia? Catalan Nationalism, Spanish Identity and the Barcelona Olympic Games. New York: Cambridge, 2000.
- Linz, Juan. "Early State-Building and Late Peripheral Nationalisms Against the State: the Case of Spain." Building States and Nations: Analyses by Region. Eds. S.N. Eisenstadt, and Stein Rokkan. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1973. 32-116.
- Llobera, Josep R. Foundations of National Identity: from Catalonia to Europe. New York: Berghahn Books, 2004.
- McRoberts, Kenneth. Catalonia: Nation Building Without a State. New York: Oxford, 2001.
- Payne, Stanley G. "Nationalism, Regionalism and Micronationalism in Spain." Journal of Contemporary History 26.3/4 (1991): 479-491.
- Smith, Angel, and Clare Mar-Molinero. "The Myths and Realities of Nation-Building in the Iberian Peninsula." Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities. Eds. Angel Smith, and Clare Mar-Molinero. Washington DC: Berg, 1996. 1-33.
- Vilar, Pierre. La Catalogne dans L’Espagne moderne. Paris: Flammation, 1977
- Woolard, Kathryn A. Double Talk: Bilingualism and the Politics of Ethnicity in Catalonia. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989.
[edit] See also
[edit] External links
- Catalanism in Catalan Encyclopaedia
- The Spirit of Catalonia. 1946 book by Oxford Professor Dr. Josep Trueta
