Demyansk Pocket
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| Eastern Front |
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| Barbarossa – Baltic Sea – Finland – Leningrad and Baltics – Crimea and Caucasus – Moscow – 1st Rzhev-Vyazma – 2nd Kharkov – Stalingrad – Velikiye Luki – 2nd Rzhev-Sychevka – Kursk – 2nd Smolensk – Dnieper – 2nd Kiev – Korsun – Hube's Pocket – Belorussia – Lvov-Sandomierz – Balkans – Hungary – Vistula-Oder – Königsberg – Berlin – Prague |
| Leningrad and Baltics 1941 - 1944 |
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| Toropets-Kholm – Demyansk Pocket – Spark – Polar Star – Krasny Bor – Lenino– Leningrad Approaches – Narva – Vilnius – Baltic |
Demyansk Pocket (German: Festung Demjansk or Kessel von Demjansk; Russian: Демя́нский котёл) is a name for the encirclement of German troops by the Red Army around Demyansk (Demjansk), south of Leningrad, during the Second World War, which lasted mainly from February 8 until April 21, 1942. A much smaller pocket was simultaneously surrounded in Cholm, about 100 km to the southwest.
On February 8 the Soviet Toropets-Kholm Operation encircled the German 2nd Army Corps as well as part of the 10th Corps (General der Artillerie Christian Hansen), both parts of the German 16th Army (Generaloberst Ernst Busch), during their winter 1941 offensive that ended the Battle of Moscow. Trapped in the pocket were the 12th, 30th, 32nd, 123rd and 290th infantry divisions, as well as the SS-Division Totenkopf. There were also RAD, Police, Todt organization and other auxiliary units who were trapped and assisted in the battle. In total, about 90,000 German troops and another 10,000 auxiliaries were trapped in the pocket. Their commander was General der Infanterie Walter Graf von Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt, commander of the 2nd Army Corps.
The offensive was planned to encircle the entire northern German forces, of which the 2nd Army Corps was only a small part, and the Soviet command was desperate to keep the front moving even after this success. A second thrust was formed up on February 12th, with the additional plan of directly attacking the pocketted German forces by dropping in two parachute brigades. Both were quickly annihilated with little gain. The front soon settled as the Soviet offensive petered out.
After being assured that the pocket could be supplied with its daily requirement of 270 tons by air, Hitler ordered that the surrounded divisions hold their positions until relieved. The Pocket contained two fairly capable airfields at Demyansk and Peski. Weather was surprisingly cooperative, and while there was considerable snow on the ground by this time, resupply operations were generally very successful. The operation did use up all of the Luftwaffe's transport capability, as well as much of their bomber force.
The Soviets grew increasingly desperate to wipe out the pocket, and over the winter and spring launched a number of huge assaults that were repeatedly beaten off. In total three Soviet Armies composed of 18 infantry divisions and three brigades were tied up for 4 months.
On March 21st, 1942 German forces opened a narrow corridor to the pocket. Over the next several weeks this corridor was widened. The battle group was able to break out of the siege on April 21, but the battle had taken a toll. Out of the approximately 100,000 men trapped there were 3,335 lost and over 10,000 wounded. However, their struggle had denied the Soviet High Command numerous units at a critical moment, units that would have otherwise been used elsewhere.
Between the forming of the pocket in early February to its complete evacuation in May the two pockets received 65,000 tons of supplies (both through ground and aerial delivery), 31,000 fresh troops, and the evacuation of 36,000 wounded. However the cost was high, with the Luftwaffe losing 265 transport aircraft and this was despite a marked lack VVS activity in the area.
Even though German units were no longer trapped, fighting in the area continued until February 1943. The Soviets would not liberate Demyansk until March 1st, 1943 (retreat of the German troops). For his excellence in command and the particularly fierce fighting of his elite unit, Totenkopf commander Theodor Eicke was awarded the Oak Leaves to the Knights Cross (88th) on May 20, 1942.
The success of the defense of the pocket would later cause Hermann Göring to propose a similar "solution" to supply the 6th Army, trapped in Stalingrad. In theory the outcome could be equally advantageous; with the 6th Army trapped but still in fighting condition, the Soviets would have to use up much of their strength to keep them contained. This would allow other German forces to form and mount a counterattack in relative safety. However the scale of the forces trapped in the two operations differed greatly, in Demyansk a single army corps (about 1/3rd or an army) with about six divisions, in Stalingrad an entire and greatly reinforced army. Whereas the Demyansk and Kholm pockets together received ca. 265 tonnes of supplies per day, the Sixth Army required an estimated minimum of 500 tonnes to be delivered over a much longer distance, by an air transport force that had already suffered heavy losses, against much more serious VVS opposition, working in a location much further away from good infrastructure. The Luftwaffe simply did not have the resources needed to supply Stalingrad, a major reason for its eventual loss.
