Operation Bagration

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Belorussian Offensive
Part of World War II
The Eastern Front at the time of Operation Bagration, which is shown in purple. (click to enlarge)
Date June 22, 1944 - August 19, 1944 Location Belorussian SSR, USSR Result Soviet victory
Combatants
Nazi Germany	Soviet Union
Commanders
Ernst Busch Walther Model Ferdinand Schörner	Konstantin Rokossovski Georgy Zhukov Aleksandr Vasilevsky
Strength
800,000	1,700,000
Casualties
(Soviet est.) 400,000 killed, 158,000 POWs, 590,000 wounded (German est.) 260,000 killed, 250,000 wounded 116,000 POWs	60,000 KIA/MIA, 110,000 WIA/sick

Eastern Front
Barbarossa – Baltic Sea – Finland – Leningrad and Baltics – Crimea and Caucasus – Moscow – 1st Rzhev-Vyazma – 2nd Kharkov – Stalingrad – Velikiye Luki – 2nd Rzhev-Sychevka – Kursk – 2nd Smolensk – Dnieper – 2nd Kiev – Korsun – Hube's Pocket – Belorussia – Lvov-Sandomierz – Balkans – Hungary – Vistula-Oder – Königsberg – Berlin – Prague

Operation Bagration (Russian: Oперация Багратион, Operatsiya Bagration) was the codename for the Soviet Belorussian Offensive^[1] during World War II, which cleared the Germans forces from Belorussian SSR. This Soviet offensive resulted in the destruction of the German Army Group Centre. The Soviet armies directly involved in Operation Bagration were part of the Belorussian Front. This front was further divided into the 1st Belorussian Front commanded by Marshal Georgy Zhukov, the 2nd Belorussian Front commanded by Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky, and the 3rd Belorussian Front commanded by General Ivan Chernyakhovsky. This battle was possibly the single greatest defeat for the Wehrmacht during the war. The operation was named after 18th-19th century Georgian prince Pyotr Bagration, general of the Russian army who died at the Battle of Borodino.

Contents 1 Background 2 The battle 3 Aftermath 4 External links 5 References 6 Footnotes

[edit] Background

Army Group Centre had previously proved a tough nut to crack as Zhukov's defeat in Operation Mars had shown. But by June 1944, despite shortening its front line, it had been exposed following the crushing of Army Group South in the battles that followed the Battle of Kursk, the Liberation of Kiev and the Liberation of the Crimea in the late summer, autumn and winter of 1943-44 - the so-called third period of the Great Patriotic War.

By the middle of June 1944 the distance that the Western Allies from the Cotentin Peninsula and the Soviets from the Vitebsk Gate to Berlin was just over 650 miles for the former and just under 750 for the latter, so for the Third Reich the stratigic threats were about the same.^[2] Hitler underestimated the threat posed by Soviet troops facing Army Group Centre and had redeployed one third of Group Army Centre's artillery, half their tank destroyers, eighty eight percent of their tanks to the southern front where the German high command expected the next major Soviet offensive.^[2]

Bagration, in combination with the neighbouring Lvov-Sandomierz Operation launched a few weeks later in Ukraine, allowed the Soviet Union to recapture practically all the territories within its 1941 borders, advance into German East Prussia, and reach the outskirts of Warsaw after gaining control of Poland east of the Vistula river.

The battle has been described as the triumph of the Soviet theory of "the operational art" - because of the complete co-ordination of all front movements and signals traffic to fool the enemy about the target of the offensive. Despite the huge forces involved, Soviet front commanders left their opposite numbers completely confused about the main axis of attack until too late.

[edit] The battle

On the morning of 22 June 1944, the Soviet attack on Army Group Centre began. This was three years to the day after the Germans launched their attack on the Soviet Union. OKW had been expecting an attack on Army Group North Ukraine. This army group had already been severely weakened and driven from most of the Ukraine. For this reason, badly needed armaments from Army Group Centre were still being diverted to Army Group North Ukraine just prior to the attack.

At the commencement of the offensive the Soviets committed approximately 1,700,000 combat and support troops, approximately 24,000 artillery pieces and mortars, 4,080 tanks and assault guns and 6,334 aircraft. German strength at the outset was approximately 800,000 combat and support troops, 9,500 artillery pieces, but only 553 tanks and assault guns and 839 aircraft [all figures are from Zaloga's book].

On 17 July 1944, the Lvov-Sandomierz Operation was launched. This operation quickly routed the German forces in the Ukraine. The rapid progress of that offensive brought the Soviet forces to the gates of Warsaw in the final days of July. Operation Bagration also created the Courland Pocket. This was the German units of Army Group North cut off and isolated in Courland. The disruption caused by these operations in turn helped the Soviet Union's advance into the Balkans in August 1944.

The Soviet operations were so successful that they only halted only when Soviet supply lines were in danger of over-extension. However, controversy still rages about the decision to provide only limited - and late - assistance to the Polish Home Army during the Warsaw Uprising which began just as Soviet forces reached the eastern outskirts of that city.

Contributing to the German defeat was the transfer of units in response to the invasion of Normandy two weeks earlier. Four Soviet “Fronts” (army groups) totaling over 120 divisions therefore smashed into an even more thinly-held German line. The Soviets were able to achieve a ratio of ten to one in tanks and seven to one in aircraft over their enemy. At the points of attack, the numerical and qualitative advantages of the Soviets were overwhelming. The Germans crumbled. To stop even further advance of Soviet forces, Hitler had to relocate the divisions from Normandy back to Eastern front, to stop Red army from advancing, which helped western Allies a lot, since elite Panther units and number of divisions has been relocated to stop Red Army and Allies did not have to face the elite units.

The capital of Belorussian SSR, Minsk, was taken on July 3, trapping fifty thousand Germans. Ten days later, the Red Army reached the pre-war Polish border. Overall the near-total annihilation of Army Group Centre cost the Germans 2,000 tanks and 57,000 other vehicles. German losses are estimated at 300,000 dead, 250,000 wounded, and about 120,000 captured; overall casualties at 670,000. Soviet losses were 60,000 killed, 110,000 wounded, and about 8,000 missing, with 2,957 tanks, 2,447 artillery pieces, and 822 aircraft also lost.

[edit] Aftermath

Considering comparisons to other battles, this was by far the greatest victory in terms of numbers for the Soviets, having inflicted nearly 4 times as many losses for the Germans and capturing a vast amount of Soviet land back in a span of 2 months.

The German army never recovered from the matériel and manpower losses sustained during this time having lost about a quarter of its Eastern Front manpower, similar to the percentage lost at Stalingrad. The offensive also cut off Army Group North and Army Group North Ukraine from each other, forcing them to withdraw from Soviet territory much more quickly.

[edit] External links

• Article at Historynet.com
• Map showing the location of different armies and the pockets where the German 4th Army and 9th Army were destroyed

[edit] References

[edit] Footnotes

1. ^ Alternative spellings for Belorussian Offensive are Byelorussian Offensive and Belarusian Offensive
2. ^ ^{a b} Ziemke, Earl F., Battle For Berlin: End Of The Third Reich, NY:Ballantine Books, London:Macdomald & Co, 1969. Page 11