First strike

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For other uses, see First strike (disambiguation).

In nuclear strategy, first strike capability is a country's ability to defeat another nuclear power by destroying its arsenal to the point where the attacking country can survive the weakened retaliation. The preferred methodology is to attack the opponent's launch facilities and storage depots first, in an overwhelming surprise attack -- hence the name. The strategy is called counterforce.

1 First strike and missile defense opposition
2 Counterforce disarming first-strike weapons
3 Destabilizing role of land-based MIRVed ICBMs
4 Soviet Union
5 Bertrand Russell and the merit of a first strike on the USSR
6 Iran
7 Movies about first strike
8 See also
9 References
10 External links

[edit] First strike and missile defense opposition

One reason that critics oppose missile defense systems, such as Reagan's proposed Strategic Defense Initiative, is that they view them as undermining one of the fundamental premises of mutual assured destruction: the proposed defense systems, intended to lessen the risk of devastating nuclear war, would lead to it, according to critics.

The non-missile defense side, seeing that a nation was building a defense against a first strike and believing that the other could launch a first strike if it dared, would then launch a pre-emptive first strike while they still had a chance. The reasoning behind this is that from a game theory point-of-view, mutual destruction is better than defeat.

[edit] Counterforce disarming first-strike weapons

Peacekeeper. 10 MIRV warheads each with a 300 kt yield, CEP 100 m. Designed to destroy the heavy R-36M (SS-18). Decommissioned.
Trident II. Up to 14 warheads, 100/475 kt yield each, CEP 90 m. Main purpose is second-strike countervalue retaliation, but the excellent CEP and much shorter flight-time due to submarine launch makes it an ideal first-strike weapon.
Pershing II. single warhead, variable yield 5-50 kt, CEP 50 m with active radar terminal guidance. Short, 7-minute flight-time and range of 1,800 km, designed to strike C³ installations, bunkers, air fields, air defense sites, and ICBM silos in the European part of the Soviet Union. Decommissioned.
R-36M (SS-18). Single (20 Mt) or 10 MIRV (550-750 kt each) warheads, CEP 500 m. Targeted against Minuteman III silos.

[edit] Destabilizing role of land-based MIRVed ICBMs

MIRVed land-based ICBMs are considered destabilizing because they tend to put a premium on striking first. When a missile is MIRVed, it is able to carry many warheads (3 to 14 in existing U.S. missiles) and deliver them to separate targets. If we assume that each side has 100 missiles, with 5 warheads each, and further that each side has a 95 percent chance of neutralising the opponent's missiles in their silos by firing 2 warheads at each silo. In this case, the side that strikes first can reduce the enemy ICBM force from 100 missiles to about 5 by firing 40 missiles with 200 warheads, and keeping the rest of 60 missiles in reserve. It is because of this that this type of weapon was banned under the START II agreement.

[edit] Soviet Union

First-strike attack, that is, the use of a nuclear first strike capability, was greatly feared during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War the Soviet Union feared the United States would use its nuclear superiority to devastate the motherland. At various points of the Cold War, fear of a first strike attack existed on both sides. Misunderstood changes in posture and well understood changes in technology used by either side were usually fuel on the fire of speculation regarding the enemy's intentions.

In 1982, at a special session of General Assembly of United Nations, the USSR pledged not to use nuclear weapons first, regardless of whether its opponents possessed nuclear weapons or not. This pledge was later abandoned by post-Soviet Russia. India and China are now the only nuclear powers that have declared a no-first-use policy on nuclear weapons.

In the 1940s the US enjoyed a monopoly of nuclear forces, while in the late 1950s and early 1960s Nikita Khrushchev boasted of a Soviet superiority in missile forces. The arrival of Soviet missiles in Cuba was ostensibly aimed to protect Cuba from further planned attacks from the United States after the failed Bay of pigs invasion. The movement of missiles was rationalized by the Soviets on the basis that the US already had nuclear missiles stationed in Turkey. The Cuban Missile Crisis resulted in Khrushchev publicly agreeing to remove the missiles from Cuba, while America secretly agreed to remove the missiles from Turkey. During the crisis, Fidel Castro wrote Khrushchev a letter about the prospect that the US might follow an invasion of Cuba with a first strike against the USSR. The following quotation from the letter suggests to some writers that Castro was calling for a Soviet first strike against the US.

"... the Soviet Union must never allow circumstances in which the imperialists could carry out a nuclear first strike against it."^[1]

In the late 1970s and early 1980s the decision of NATO to deploy new intermediate nuclear forces through cruise and Pershing missiles (along with Ronald Reagan's talk of 'limited' nuclear war) increased Soviet fears that NATO was planning an attack.

In fact Soviet military theory was dominated by the theory of the "deep operation" - a large scale armoured offensive into enemy-held territory - rather than a nuclear offensive. Soviet "conventional" superiority and the fact that the Soviet Union certainly considered the deep operation as a potential first strike weapon in a time of increased tension, increased NATO reliance on nuclear weapons.

Although neither side was actively pursuing a first-strike policy (since the time of Khrushchev, the leaders of orthodox communism believed that "peaceful coexistence" with the "imperialist" powers was possible) both sides relied on military strategies that could have still caused a general nuclear war.

[edit] Bertrand Russell and the merit of a first strike on the USSR

In an exchange of letters in The Economist magazine in 2001, Nigel Lawson, the former British Finance Minister, and Nicholas Griffin, of McMaster University, discussed a speech given in 1948 at Westminster School by the celebrated philosopher Bertrand Russell.^[2] In answer to a question from the audience, Bertrand Russell said that if the USSR's aggression continued, it would be morally worse to go to war after the USSR possessed an atomic bomb than before they possessed one, because if the USSR had no bomb the West's victory would come more swiftly and with fewer casualties than if there were atom bombs on both sides.

To put this into context, only the USA possessed an atomic bomb at that time, and the USSR was pursuing an extremely aggressive policy towards the countries in Eastern Europe which it was absorbing into its sphere of influence. Many understood Russell's comments to mean that Russell approved of a First Strike war with the USSR, including Lawson, who was present when Russell spoke. Others, including Griffin who obtained a transcript of the speech, have argued that he was merely explaining the usefulness of America's atomic arsenal in deterring the USSR from continuing its domination of Eastern Europe. In short, one group of people believe Russell wanted to use the atomic bomb militarily before it was too late, and the other group believe he wanted to use the bomb diplomatically before it was too late. Whatever Russell really meant, it soon became of only historical interest as the USSR successfully detonated its own atomic device a year later in 1949.

[edit] Iran

In the April 17 2006 issue of The New Yorker,^[3] Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Seymour Hersh reported on the Bush Administration's purported plans for an air strike within Iran. Of particular note in his article is that an American nuclear first strike (possibly using the B61-11 bunker-buster nuclear weapon) is under consideration to eliminate underground Iranian uranium enrichment facilities. In response, President Bush cited Hersh's reportage as "wild speculation"^[4] but did not deny its veracity. In fact, Bush had commented earlier in 2006 that while the use of nuclear weapons should indeed be a last resort, it should still always be an option on the table.