Mohammed Mosaddeq

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Dr. Mohammed Mosaddeq (Mossadeq (help·info)) (Persian: محمد مصدق‎‎ Moḥammad Moṣaddeq, also Mosaddegh or Mossadegh) (19 May 1882 - 5 March 1967) was the democratically elected^[1][2] prime minister of Iran from 1951 to 1953. He was twice appointed to office by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, and approved by the vote of parliament ^[3]. Mossadegh was a nationalist and passionately opposed foreign intervention in Iran. He was also the architect of the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry which was dominated and exploited by the British through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (today known as British Petroleum (BP).

He was later removed from power by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, in a CIA orchestrated coup^[4], supported and funded by the British and the U.S. governments. The coup was led by CIA agent Kermit Roosevelt, Jr.^[5][6], the grandson of U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, and came to be known as Operation Ajax^[5], after its CIA cryptonym, and as the "28 Mordad 1332" coup, after its date on the Iranian calendar. ^[7]

Contents 1 Early life 2 Early political career 3 Prime minister 4 Plot to depose Mossadegh 4.1 Operation Ajax 4.2 Shah's Exile 5 Legacy 6 References 7 Further reading 8 External links

[edit] Early life

Mohammad Mossadegh was born in 1882 in Tehran to an Ashtiani finance minister and a Qajar princess. When his father died in 1892, he was appointed the tax collector of the Khorasan province and was bestowed with the title of "Mossadegh-os-Saltaneh" by Nasser al-Din Shah. [2] He studied at the École libre des sciences politiques[3] in Paris and in 1914, received his PhD in Law from the University of Neuchâtel in Switzerland. His dissertation was pioneering for its in-depth study of Shi'i Islamic law in a European language, and Mossadegh rendered many Islamic legal terms for the first time into French.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] Early political career

Mossadegh started his career in Iranian politics with the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, when at the age of 24, he was elected from Isfahan to the newly inaugurated Persian Parliament, Majles. In 1920, after being self-exiled to Switzerland in protest to the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919, he was invited by the new Persian Prime Minister, Hassan Pirnia (Moshir-ed-Dowleh) to become his "Minister of Justice"; but in his route to Tehran, he was asked by the people of Shiraz to become Governor of the "Fars" Province. He was later appointed Finance Minister, in the government of Ahmad Ghavam (Ghavam os-Saltaneh) in 1921, and then Foreign Minister, in the government of Moshir-ed-Dowleh in June 1923. He then became Governor of the "Azerbaijan" Province. Later in 1923, he was re-elected to the Majlis and voted against the selection of the Prime Minister Reza Khan as the new Shah of Persia.

By 1944, Reza Shah Pahlavi had abdicated, and Mossadegh was once again elected to parliament. This time he took the lead of Jebhe Melli (National Front of Iran), an organization he had founded, aiming to establish democracy and end the foreign presence in Iranian politics, especially regarding the exploitation of Iran's rich oil resources by the "Anglo-Iranian Oil Company" (AIOC).

After negotiations for higher oil royalties failed, on 15 March 1951 the Iranian parliament voted to nationalize Iran's oil industry and seized control of the British-owned and operated AIOC. Prime Minister General Haj-Ali Razmara, elected in June 1950, had opposed the nationalization bill on technical grounds. Razmara was assassinated on 7 March 1951 by Khalil Tahmasebi, a member of the militant fundamentalist group Fadayan-e Islam.

[edit] Prime minister

On 28 April 1951 the Majlis named Mossadegh as new prime minister by a vote of 79-12. Aware of Mossadegh's rising popularity and political power, the young Shah was left with no other option but to give assent to the Parliament's vote. Shortly after coming to office, Mossadegh enforced the Oil Nationalization Act, which involved the expropriation of the AIOC's assets.

Responding to the latter, the British government announced it would not allow Mossadegh's government to export any oil produced in the formerly British-controlled refineries. A blockade by British ships was established in the Persian Gulf to prevent any attempts by Iran to ship oil out of the country. Furthermore, the AIOC withdrew its British trained technicians when Mossadegh nationalized the oil industry. Thus, many of the refineries lacked properly trained technicians that were needed to continue production. An economic stalemate thus ensued, with Mossadegh's government refusing to allow any British involvement in Iran's oil industry, and Britain refusing to allow any oil to leave Iran.

Since Britain had long been Iran's primary oil-consumer, the stalemate was particularly hard on Iran. While the country had once boasted over a 100 million dollars a year in exports to Britain, after nationalization, the same oil industry began increasing Iran's debt by nearly 10 million dollars a month. The Abadan Crisis quickly plunged the country into economic difficulties.

Despite the economic hardships of his nationalization plan, Mossadegh remained popular, and in 1952 was approved by parliament for a second term. Sensing the difficulties of a worsening political and economic climate, he announced that he would ask the Shah to grant him emergency powers. Thus, during the royal approval of his new cabinet, Mossadegh insisted on the constitutional prerogative of the prime minister to name a Minister of War and the Chief of Staff. The Shah refused, and Mossadegh announced his resignation.

Ahmad Qavam (also known as Ghavam os-Saltaneh) was appointed as Iran's new prime minister. On the day of his appointment, he announced his intention to resume negotiations with the British to end the oil dispute. This blatant reversal of Mossadegh's plans sparked a massive public outrage. Protestors of all stripes filled the streets, including communists and radical Muslims led by Ayatollah Kashani. Frightened by the unrest, the Shah quickly dismissed Qavam, and re-appointed Mossadegh, granting him the full control of the military he had previously requested.

Taking advantage of his popularity, Mossadegh convinced the parliament to grant him increased powers and appointed Ayatollah Kashani as house speaker. Kashani's radical Muslims, as well as the Tudeh Party, proved to be two of Mossadegh's key political allies, although both relationships were often strained.

Mossadegh quickly implemented more sociopolitical changes. Iran's centuries old feudal agriculture sector was abolished, and replaced with a system of collective farming and government land ownership.

[edit] Plot to depose Mossadegh

The government of Britain had grown increasingly distressed over Mossadegh's policies and were especially bitter over the loss of their control of the Iranian oil industry. Despite Mossadegh's repeated attempts to negotiate a reasonable settlement with them, they refused outright the same terms, and later total control over Iranian oil.

Unable to resolve the issue singlehandedly due to its post-Second World War problems, Britain looked towards the United States to settle the issue. The United States was led to believe by the British that Mossadegh was increasingly turning towards Communism and was moving Iran towards the Soviet sphere at a time of high Cold War fears. ^[8] [4][5][6]

Acting on the opposition to Mossadegh's of the British government and fears that he was, or would become, dependent on the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party at a time of expanding Soviet influence,^[9] the United States and Britain began to publicly denounce Mossadegh's policies for Iran as harmful to the country.

[edit] Operation Ajax

In October 1952 Mossadegh declared that Britain was "an enemy", and cut all diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom. In November and December 1952, British intelligence officials suggested to American intelligence that the prime minister should be ousted. The new US administration under Dwight Eisenhower and the British government under Winston Churchill agreed to work together toward Mossadegh's removal. In March 1953 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles directed the US Central Intelligence Agency, which was headed by his younger brother Allen Dulles, to draft plans to overthrow Mossadegh [7].

On 4 April 1953, CIA director Dulles approved $1 million to be used "in any way that would bring about the fall of Mossadegh". Soon the CIA's Tehran station started to launch a propaganda campaign against Mossadegh. Finally, according to The New York Times, in early June, American and British intelligence officials met again, this time in Beirut, and put the finishing touches on the strategy. Soon afterward, according to his later published accounts, the chief of the CIA's Near East and Africa division, Kermit Roosevelt, Jr. arrived in Tehran to direct it.^{[citation needed]}

The plot, known as Operation Ajax, centered around convincing Iran's monarch to use his constitutional authority to dismiss Mossadegh from office, as he had attempted some months earlier. But the Shah was uncooperative, and it would take much persuasion and many meetings to successfully execute the plan. Meanwhile, the CIA stepped up its operations. According to Dr. Donald N. Wilber, who was involved in the plot to remove Mossadegh from power, in early August, Iranian CIA operatives pretending to be socialists and nationalists threatened Muslim leaders with "savage punishment if they opposed Mossadegh," thereby giving the impression that Mossadegh was cracking down on dissent, and stirring anti-Mossadegh sentiments within the religious community.^{[citation needed]}

Mossadegh became aware of the plots against him and grew increasingly wary of conspirators acting within his government. He set up a national referendum to dissolve parliament. Some purport that the vote was rigged, with Mossadegh claiming a 99.9 percent victory for the "yes" side. Allegations that Mossadegh was resorting to dictatorial tactics to stay in power were in turn cited by the US- and British-supported opposition press as a reason to remove Mossadegh from power.^{[citation needed]} Parliament was suspended indefinitely, and Mossadegh's emergency powers were extended.

Inside Iran, Mossadegh's popularity was eroding as promised reforms failed to materialize [8], and the economy continued to suffer due to heavy British sanctions. The Tudeh Party abandoned its alliance with Mossadegh, as did the conservative clerical factions.

[edit] Shah's Exile

In August 1953 Mossadegh attempted to convince the Shah to leave the country. The Shah refused, and formally dismissed the Prime Minister, in accordance with the foreign intelligence plan. Mossadegh refused to leave, however, and when it became apparent that he was going to fight, the Shah, as a precautionary measure foreseen by the British/American plan, flew to Baghdad and on from there to Rome, Italy, after hesitantly signing two decrees, one dismissing Mossadegh and the other nominating General Fazlollah Zahedi Prime Minister, subsequent to pressure from the US and UK intelligence agencies. The choice had fallen on Zahedi, whom in the months before, Roosevelt and Wilbur had identified as perfectly suitable to carry out strong-armed tactics^{[citation needed]}, during and following the coup. Fazlollah Zahedi was to prove that they had backed the right horse, after all he had fallen out with Mossadegh and resigned from his post as minister of the interior, as well as having been briefly detained already on suspicions of planning a coup of his own, by Mossadegh's orders in February of 1953.^{[citation needed]} Fearing imminent re-arrest, Zahedi went into hiding, with another affair, the torture death of Tehran's chief of Police, General Afshartus being blamed on him by the authorities.^{[citation needed]}

Once again, massive protests broke out across the nation. Anti- and pro-monarchy protestors violently clashed in the streets, leaving almost 300 dead. Funded with money from the U.S. CIA and the British MI6, the pro-monarchy forces, led by retired army General and former Minister of Interior in Mossadegh's cabinet, Fazlollah Zahedi, gained the upper hand on 19 August 1953 (28 Mordad). The military intervened as the pro-Shah tank regiments stormed the capital and bombarded the prime minister's official residence. Mossadegh managed to flee from the mob that set in to ransack his house, and, the following day, surrendered to General Zahedi, who had meanwhile established his makeshift headquarters at the Officers' Club. A tearful Dr. Mossadegh was received in dignity however and placed under arrest in a comfortable apartment [9] at the Officers' Club and transferred to a military jail shortly after.

Shortly after the return of the Shah on 22 August 1953 from the brief self-imposed exile in Rome, Mossadegh was tried by a military tribunal for high treason. Zahedi and the Shah were inclined, however, to spare the ailing man's life (the death penalty would have applied according to the laws of the day). Mossadegh received a sentence of 3 years in solitary confinement at a military jail and was exiled to his village, not far from Tehran, where he remained under house arrest until his death, on 5 March 1967.

Zahedi's new government soon reached an agreement with foreign oil companies to form a "Consortium" and "restore the flow of Iranian oil to world markets in substantial quantities." [10].

[edit] Legacy

When the Iranian revolution occurred in 1979, the overthrow of Mossadegh was used as a rallying point in anti-US protests. To this day, Mossadegh is one of the most popular figures in Iranian history [11], though he is generally ignored by the government of the Islamic Republic. Despite his stature as a nationalist he is shunned because of his secularism and western manners.^[10]

The extent of the US role in Mossadegh's overthrow was not formally acknowledged for many years, although the Eisenhower administration was quite vocal in its opposition to the policies of the ousted Iranian Prime Minister. In his memoirs, Eisenhower writes angrily about Mossadegh, and describes him as impractical and naive, though stops short of admitting any overt involvement in the coup.

Eventually the CIA's role became well-known, and caused controversy within the organization itself, and within the CIA congressional hearings of the 1970's. CIA supporters maintain that the plot against Mossadegh was strategically necessary, and praise the efficiency of agents in carrying out the plan. Critics say the scheme was paranoid and colonial, as well as immoral.

In March 2000, then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated her regret that Mossadegh was ousted: "The Eisenhower administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons. But the coup was clearly a setback for Iran's political development and it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America." In the same year, the New York Times published a detailed report about the coup based on CIA documents. [12].

For his sudden rise in popularity inside and outside of Iran, and for his defiance of the British, Mossadegh was named as Time Magazine's 1951 Man of the Year. Other notables considered for the title that year include Dean Acheson, Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur.^[11]

In early 2004, the Egyptian government changed a street name in Cairo from Pahlavi to Mossadegh, to facilitate closer relations with Iran.

Preceded by Hossein Ala'	Prime Minister of Iran 1951 – 1952 July 16	Succeeded by Ghavam os-Saltaneh
Preceded by Ghavam os-Saltaneh	Prime Minister of Iran 1952 July 21 – 1953 August 19	Succeeded by Fazlollah Zahedi

[edit] References

[edit] Further reading

• Abrahamian, Ervand, Khomeinism : essays on the Islamic Republic. Berkeley : University of California Press, c1993. 0-520-08173-0
• Farhad Diba, Dr.Mohammad Mossadegh; A Political Biography. London: Croom Helm, 1986, ISBN 0-7099-4517-5
• Mostafa Elm, Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1994, ISBN 0-8156-2642-8
• Mark Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran, Cornell University Press, 1991, ISBN 0-8014-2412-7
• Mary Ann Heiss, Empire and Nationhood: The United States, Great Britain, and Iranian Oil, 1950-1954, Columbia University Press,1997, ISBN 0-231-10819-2
• Stephen Kinzer, All The Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, John Wiley & Sons, 2003, ISBN 0-471-26517-9
• Id., Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq, Times Books, 2006, ISBN 0-8050-7861-4
• Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution, Yale University Press, 2003, ISBN 0-300-09856-1
• Homa Katouzian, Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran, I B Tauris & Co, 1991, ISBN 1-850-43210-4
• Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne. Translated into Persian as Mosaddegh va Coup de Etat by Ali Morshedizad, Ghasidehsara Pub. Co.

[edit] External links

• The Mohammad Mossadegh Project - Site containing pictures, media and biography of Mossadegh
• James Risen: Secrets of History: The C.I.A. in Iran -- A special report.; How a Plot Convulsed Iran in '53 (and in '79). The New York Times, 16 April 2000.
• [13] New York Times Archive containing declassified US intelligence Documents on the Coup of 1953
• In Memory of August 19, 1953 by Sasan Fayazmanesh, 18 August 2003.
• Mossadegh's photo album
• Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran Book and declassified documents from the National Security Archive, 22 June 2004
• The Secret CIA History of the Iran Coup - U.S. National Security Archive
• An alternative view by Ardeshir Zahedi
• 50 Years After the CIA’s First Overthrow of a Democratically Elected Foreign Government
• How to Overthrow A Government: The 1953 U.S. Coup in Iran
• A short account of 1953 Coup in Iran
• The Sunday Herald, Over A Barrel