Operation Gibraltar
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Operation Gibraltar | |||||||
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Part of Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 | |||||||
![]() Pakistani infiltrated areas marked in dark green. Infiltration was mainly near the border of Pakistan held Kashmir and in the Vale of Kashmir close to the defacto border. |
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Combatants | |||||||
Pakistani insurgents | Indian Security Forces | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
40,000 | |||||||
Casualties | |||||||
~4,000[1] |
Operation Gibraltar was the name given to the failed plan by Pakistan to infiltrate Jammu and Kashmir, India and start a rebellion. Launched in August 1965, Pakistan Army soldiers and guerrillas disguised as locals entered Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistan with the intention of fomenting an insurgency among Kashmiri Muslims. However, the strategy went awry from the very outset, as the locals did not respond as expected and the infiltrators were soon found. The debacle was followed by an Indian counterattack that resulted in minor victories.
The Operation was a significant one as it sparked a large scale military engagement between the neighbours, the first since the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947. Its success, as envisaged by its Pakistani planners, could have given Pakistan control over a unified Kashmir; something that Pakistan desired to achieve at the earliest. However, the plot drew a blank and produced a war (Indo-Pakistani War of 1965) where Pakistan was found fighting on the defensive.
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[edit] Background
Following the First Kashmir War which saw India gaining the majority of the disputed area of Kashmir, Pakistan sought an opportunity to win back the areas lost. The opening came after the Sino-Indian War in 1962 where India lost to China and as a result the Indian Military was undergoing massive changes both in personnel and equipment. The Rann of Kutch episode in the summer of 1965 where Indian and Pakistani forces clashed resulted in some positives for the Pakistan Army. These factors bolstered Pakistani command thinking that the use of covert methods followed by the threat of an all out war would force a resolution in Kashmir. Assuming that a weakened Indian Military would not respond, Pakistan chose to send in "mujahideens" and Pakistan Army regulars into Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.
The original plan for the Operation, codenamed Gibraltar, was prepared as early as in 1950s, however it seemed appropriate to push this plan forward given the scenario. Backed by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto then foreign minister and others, the aim was an "attack by infiltration" by a specially trained irregular force of some 40,000 men, highly motivated and well armed. It was reasoned that the conflict could be confined only to Kashmir. In the words of Akhtar Hussain Malik a retired Pakistani General, the aims were "to defreeze the Kashmir problem, weaken Indian resolve, and bring India to the conference table without provoking general war."[2]
[edit] Execution of plan
Despite initial reservations by Ayub Khan (President of Pakistan), the operation was set in motion. In the first week of August 1965, (some sources put it at 24 July[3]) Pakistani troops, members from the SSG commandos and irregulars began to cross the Cease Fire Line (now, Line of Control) dividing Indian and Pakistan held Kashmir. Several columns were to occupy key heights around the valley and encourage a general revolt, which would be followed by direct combat by Pakistani troops. According to Indian sources as many as 30,000[4] - 40,000 had crossed the line while Pakistani sources put it at 5,000 -7,000 only. These troops named "Gibralter Force" were given different code names - named mostly after historically significant Muslim rulers - to operate in different areas. The operation's name, Gibraltar, itself was chosen for the Islamic connotations. The 8th century Umayyad conquest of Hispania was launched from Gibraltar, akin to what Pakistan had envisaged in Indian Kashmir, i.e. conquest of Kashmir from Op. Gibraltar. The areas chosen were mainly on the de facto Cease Fire line as well as in the populous Kashmir Valley.
Name of Force | Area of operation |
Salahudin | Srinagar Valley |
Ghaznavi | Mendhar-Rajauri |
Tariq | Kargil - Drass |
Babur | Nowshera-Sundarbani |
Qasim | Bandipura-Sonarwain |
Khalid | Qazinag-Naugam |
Nusrat | Tithwal-Tangdhar |
Sikandar | Gurais |
Khilji | Kel-Minimarg |
The plan was multi pronged. Firstly the infiltrators would mingle with the local populace and instigate them. Meanwhile guerrilla warfare was sought to be started by destroying bridges, harassing enemy communications, logistic installations and headquarters with a view to create conditions of an “armed insurrection” in Kashmir finally leading to a national uprising against Indian rule. All these was done in order to force India from Kashmir as it was reasoned that India would not involve itself in another costly war, thus liberating Kashmir.
[edit] Indian retaliation

Despite such a well planned operation, the intrusions however were detected by Indian forces in Kashmir. With the exception of four districts which did revolt, the local Kashmiris did not cooperate as expected. Instead, they conveyed the news of these planned insurgency over to the local authorities and turned the infiltrators in. The "Mujahids" frantically attempted to artificially create a sense of revolt by indulging in arson, murder, rape and robbery, but to no avail.[5] The "Gibraltar Force" was soon facing attacks from Indian Army who moved in immediately to secure the border. The majority of the infiltrators were captured by the Indian troops, though some managed to escape. India accused the Pakistani government for sending and aiding these seditionists and though Pakistan denied any involvement, it was soon proved that the foreigners were all of Pakistani origin.
India swiftly launched counter attacks across the cease fire line attacking the Pakistan divisions in Azad Kashmir that had provided cover for the infiltrators. As a result many of these posts fell to Indian attacks resulting in minor territorial gains for India. On August 15, India scored a major victory after a prolonged artillery barrage. The success in countering Pakistani plans proved to be a morale booster for Indian troops, coming exactly on its independence day. Fighting continued until the month end as vital pockets like Haji Pir pass - which was the logistical backbone of the saboteurs - and other nearby areas too came under Indian control.
The Indian offensive resulted in panic among Pakistan troops who desperately launched Operation Grand Slam to contain the situation since there was no contingency planned in case of Gibraltar's failure. This however resulted in more problems for Pakistan as India countered by crossing the international border further south in Punjab, India, starting the war of 1965.
[edit] Reasons for failure
While the covert infiltration was a complete disaster that ultimately led to the Second Kashmir War, military analysts have differed on whether the plan itself was flawed. While some have held that the plan was remarkable per se and was let down by poor execution, almost all Pakistani and neutral analysts have maintained that the entire operation was "a clumsy attempt"[6] and doomed to collapse. According to then Chief of Pakistan Air Force Air Marshal Nur Khan, there was little coordination among the military wings on the impending operation[7]. Many even in the Army and political sphere in Pakistan too were unaware of the impending crisis thus surprising not only India but also Pakistan. Further, few people in Kashmir were really interested in revolting against India, a fact largely ignored while planning.[8]
Col SG Mehdi, the SSG commander even cited the above reasons as well as a few others like logistical problems and a confusion of classic guerrilla operations with commandos raids as to why the operation would fail even before its launch. He also adds that many SSG officers were unsure of the means and uncertain of the end.[9] Initially, Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff Musa Khan opposed it on the grounds that if the Operation was a nonstarter, then Pakistan wouldn't be able to defeat India in the ensuing war. Many senior officials also were against the plan as a failure would lead to an all out war with India which many wanted to avoid.
[edit] See also
- Kargil War - A similar infiltration attempt by Pakistan launched in 1999.
- Indo-Pakistan Wars
[edit] Notes
- ^ Kashmiris didn’t back Pakistan in 1965: Gohar
- ^ Hassan Abbas (2004). Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror. M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 0-7656-1497-9. , pp49
- ^ Pervaiz Iqbal (2004). The Armed Forces of Pakistan. Allen & Unwin. ISBN 1-86508-119-1.
- ^ The 1965 War: Lessons yet to be learnt Major General Afsir Karim (retd) - Hosted on Rediff September 19, 2005
- ^ The Kashmir War, 1965: Raid on Badin - ACIG
- ^ South Asia in World Politics By Devin T. Hagerty, 2005 Rowman & Littlefield, ISBN 0-7425-2587-2, pp 26
- ^ Nur Khan reminisces ’65 war - Pakistan's Dawn (newspaper)
- ^ Kashmir in the Shadow of War: regional rivalries in a nuclear age By Robert G. Wirsing Pg 158
- ^ Operation Gibraltar - Role of SSG Para Commandos - Defence Journal of Pakistan.
[edit] References
- Brigadier Shaukat Qadir of PAF on Operation Gibraltar: Battle that never was - Hosted on Rediff.com
- Defence Journal (Pakistan)
- Hassan Abbas (2004). Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, The Army, And America's War On Terror. M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 0-7656-1497-9.
- Mohammad Musa Khan (1983). My Version: India-Pakistan War 1965. Wajidalis.
- Encarta