Sino-Indian War

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Sino-Indian War
The Sino-Indian War created bitter enmity between the two Asian giants, China and India.[citation needed]
Date October 10 — November 21, 1962 Location Northeast Frontier Agency Result China holds part of Indian territory then withdraws per unilateral ceasefire Casus belli Chinese: Indian military incursions north of the McMahon Line[1] Indian: People's Liberation Army attack Indian posts on the McMahon Line
Combatants
People's Republic of China	India
Commanders
Lin Biao	B.M. Kaul
Strength
30,000+
Casualties
Never released, estimated at 1,000+	Killed 1,383 Captured 3,968 Missing 1,696 [2]

The Sino-Indian War (Hindi: भारत-चीन युद्ध Bhārat-Chīn Yuddha; Simplified Chinese: 中印边境战争; Traditional Chinese: 中印邊境戰爭; pinyin: Zhōng-Yìn Biānjìng Zhànzhēng), also known as the Sino-Indian Border Conflict, began on 10 October 1962 and was a conflict between the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the Military of India. The cause of the war was a dispute over the Himalayan border in Arunachal Pradesh (which is called South Tibet in China) between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of India. Another battlefield was Aksai Chin, which was claimed to be strategic for the PRC, as it enabled a western connection (China National Highway G219) between the Chinese-administered territories of Tibet and Xinjiang. The war ended when the Chinese unilaterally declared a ceasefire on 20 November 1962, to go into effect at 00:00 21 November 1962, after capturing both disputed areas.

The Sino-Indian War is one of the largest military conflicts fought at such a high altitude and an example of mountain warfare, with combat taking place at over 4267 metres, or 14,000 feet.^[3] Another high-altitude conflict was the Kargil War of 1999. This presented numerous logistical problems for the participating militaries. The conflict led to numerous changes in the Indian military to prepare it for similar conflicts in the future. It also placed pressure on Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru who was blamed for not anticipating Chinese military reactions.

Contents 1 Location 2 Background 3 Events leading up to war 4 Chinese offensive 5 Lull in the fighting 6 Conflict resumes 7 Ceasefire 8 World opinion 9 Aftermath 9.1 India 9.2 China 10 Later border disputes 11 Peace process 12 Notes 13 Further reading 14 External links

[edit] Location

The war occurred in the North East Frontier Agency region and the Aksai Chin region. The battles were at extremely high altitudes of the Himalayas and some of the battles involved numerous mountainous maneuvors. These particular regions were chosen for invasion mainly because of the border disputes and the Tibetan influence over the region. After the first unexpected Chinese offensive, they could hold numerous high mountainous regions which would be difficult to recapture. attack to dislodge the enemy and reclaim high ground in a mountain warfare would require a far higher ratio of attackers to defenders, which is further exacerbated by the high altitude and freezing temperatures.

[edit] Background

Main article: Sino-Indian relations

Sovereignty over two separated pieces of terrority was contested during the Sino-Indian War. One is Aksai Chin is located either in the Indian province of Kashmir or the Chinese province of Xinjiang (East Turkestan). It is a virtually uninhabited high-altitude wasteland crossed by the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway. W. H. Johnson, a civil servant with the Survey of India proposed the "Johnson Line" in 1865, which puts Aksai Chin in Kashmir.^[4] This line was never presented to the Chinese.^[4] At this time, Britain and China were allies and Britain was principally concerned that Aksai Chin not fall into Russian hands.^[4] When China showed an interest in Aksai Chin, Britain proposed a revised boundary, called the MacCartney-Macdonald Line, which puts most of Aksai Chin in Chinese territory.^[4] In 1899, the British presented this line to the Chinese, who raised no objection to it.^[4] This line is approximately the same as the current Line of Actual Control.^[4] Both lines were used on British maps of India.^[4]

The other disputed area is referred to as Arunachal Pradesh by India and South Tibet by China. It is a sparsely inhabited area with numerous local tribes. In 1913-14, representatives of Britain, China, and Tibet attended a conference in Simla, India and drew up an agreement concerning Tibet's status and borders. The McMahon Line, a proposed boundary between Tibet and India for the eastern sector, was drawn by British negotiator Henry McMahon on a map attached to the agreement. All three representatives initialed the agreement, but Beijing immediately objected to the proposed Sino-Tibet boundary and repudiated the agreement. After approving a note which stated that China could not enjoy rights under the agreement unless she ratified it, the British and Tibetan negotiators signed the Simla Convention as a bilateral accord. McMahon had been instructed not to sign bilaterally with Tibetans if China refused, but he did so without the Chinese representative present and then kept the declaration secret.^[5]

In 1913-14, representatives of Britain, China, and Tibet attended a conference in Simla, India and drew up an agreement concerning Tibet's status and borders. The McMahon Line, a proposed boundary between Tibet and India for the eastern sector, was drawn by British negotiator Henry McMahon on a map attached to the agreement. All three representatives initialed the agreement, but Beijing immediately objected to the proposed Sino-Tibet boundary and repudiated the agreement. After approving a note which stated that China could not enjoy rights under the agreement unless she ratified it, the British and Tibetan negotiators signed the Simla Convention as a bilateral accord. McMahon had been instructed not to sign bilaterally with Tibetans if China refused, but he did so without the Chinese representative present and then kept the declaration secret.^[5]

Because of doubts concerning the legal status of the accord, the British did not put the McMahon Line on their maps until 1937, nor did they publish the Simla Convention in the treaty record until 1938. Rejecting Tibet's 1913 declaration of independence, China argued that the Simla Convention and McMahon Line were illegal and that Tibetan government was merely a local government without treaty-making powers. In 1947, Tibet requested that India recognize Tibetan authority in the trading town of Tawang, south of the McMahon Line. Tibet did not object to any other portion of the McMahon line. In reply, the Indians asked Tibet to continue the relationship on the basis of the previous British Government.^[5]

The Chinese Communists defeated the Tibetan army in a battle at Chamdo in 1950 and Lhasa recognized Chinese soveriegnty over Tibet in 1951. The Indian army asserted control of Tawang at this time, overcoming some armed resistance and expelling its Tibetan administrators.^[5][6] In 1954, the China and India concluded the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence under which India acknowledged Chinese sovereignty in Tibet. Indian negotiators presented a frontier map to the Chinese that included the McMahon Line and the Chinese side did not object. At this time, the Indian government under Prime Minister Nehru promoted the slogan Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai (India and China are brothers).

In July 1, 1954 Nehru wrote a memo directing that the maps of India be revised to show definite boundaries on all frontiers. Up to this point, the boundary in the Aksai Chin sector had been described as "undemarcated."^[7] The new maps also revised the boundary in the east to show the Himalayan hill crest as the boundary. In some places, this line is a few kilometers north of the McMahon Line.^[8] Beginning in 1956, the CIA used Indian territory to recruit Tibetan guerrillas to fight Chinese troops, with a base in Kalimpong, India.^[9] The Indian public was outraged when it learned in 1958 that China had built a road between Xinjiang and Tibet through Indian-claimed territory in Aksai Chin.

Indian sympathy for a Tibetan revolt against Beijing's rule led Chinese leaders to suspect that Nehru had secret designs on Tibet. Top leader Mao Zedong was unhappy by the reception the Dalai Lama obtained in India when he fled there in March 1959. The Indian public was outraged when Nehru admitted to parliament that China had built a road between Xinjiang and Tibet through Indian-claimed territory in Aksai Chin. In August, the Chinese army took an Indian patrol prisoner in Longju, just north of the McMahon Line. There was another bloody clash in October at Kongka Pass in Aksai Chin. These clashes involved patrols by the Indian Intelligence Bureau, a civilian agency headed by Nehru favorite N.B. Mullik. Recognizing that it was not ready for war, the Indian Army assumed responsibility for the border and pulled back patrols from disputed areas. Mao decided against further escalation because he feared, on one account, that India would retaliate by permitting the U.S. to station U-2 surveillance aircraft on its territory.^[10] This would allow the CIA to photograph China's nuclear test site at Lop Nor in Xinjiang.^[10] A few days after Kongka Pass, Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai proposed that each side withdraw 20 kilometers from a "Line of Actual Control". He defined this line as "the so-called McMahon Line in the east and the line up to which each side exercises actual control in the west".^[7] Nehru responded with a proposal to turn the disputed area into a no man's land.^[11]

[edit] Events leading up to war

At the beginning of 1961, Nehru appointed General B.M. Kaul army chief.^[12] Kaul reorganized the general staff and removed the officers who had resisted the idea of patroling in disputed areas, although Nehru still refused to increase military spending or otherwise prepare for war.^[12] In the summer of 1961, China began patrolling along the McMahon Line. In November, India responded by adopting a "forward policy" of placing military outposts in disputed areas.^{[12][3][13][14] [15]} There were eventually 60 such outposts, including 43 north of the LAC defined by Zhou.^[7][3] Kaul displayed an astonishing confidence that the Chinese would not react with force.^[12] British author Neville Maxwell, privy to the otherwise confidential Henderson Brooks Report, traces this confidence to Mullik, who was in regular contact with the CIA station chief in New Delhi.^[12] Mullik may therefore have been aware of Mao's sensitivity concerning U-2 flights.

At a Communist Party conference in Beijing in January 1962, Chinese President Liu Shaoqi denounced the Great Leap Forward as responsible for widespread famine.^[10] The overwhelming majority of delegates expressed agreement, but Defense Minister Lin Biao staunchly defended Mao.^[10] A brief period of liberalization followed while Mao and Lin plotted a comeback.^[10] China began preparations for war with India in May or June.^[10]

Various border conflicts and "military incidents" between India and China flared up throughout the summer and fall of 1962. According to Chinese sources, in June 1962, a minor skirmish broke out between the two sides, and the Chinese military suffered defeat with dozens of members of the People's Liberation Army killed and wounded. Units of the Indian and Chinese militaries maintained close contact throughout September 1962; however, hostile fire occurred only infrequently.

The Indian military was not ready for any full-scale combat.^[16] It has just annexed the Portuguese colony of Goa and was facing border disputes in Kashmir.^[16] The Indian National Congress proposed non-violent means to solving India's problems at the time^[16] and Indian military leaders who proposed that India should become ready for a full scale attack were ignored or dismissed.^[2]

On September 8, 1962, a 600-strong PLA unit launched an attack on one of the Indian posts at Dhola on the Thagla Ridge, just north of the McMahon Line.^[16] Nehru had gone to London to attend a Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference and when told of the act, said to the media that the Indian Army had instructions to "free our territory".^[16] While India believe it was it's territory, China believed India had intruded on their side. However, Nehru's directives to Defense Minister V.K. Krishna Menon were unclear, and the response, code named Operation LEGHORN, got underway only slowly. By the time an Indian battalion reached the Thagla Ridge in the Chedong region on September 16, Chinese units controlled both banks of the Namka Chu River. The day after, India's Chief of the Army Staff Kaul ordered his men to re-take the Thagla Ridge. On September 20, at one of the bridges on the river a firefight developed, killing nine Chinese and Indian soldiers.

On October 9th, General Kaul ordered General John Dalvi, Commander of the Seventh Brigade, to take Yumtso La Pass. On 10 October, an Indian military patrol advanced towards Yumtso La only to be met by an emplaced Chinese position of some 1,000 soldiers. The patrol was forced to retreat after taking heavy fire, officially suffering 50 percent casualties (7 killed, 7 missing, and 11 wounded), while the Chinese suffered 33 killed or wounded. The Chinese allowed them to withdraw, and held their fire as they retreated back across the bridge. They also buried the Indian dead with full military honors, in full view of the retreating Indian forces. This was the first occurence of heavy fighting in the war.^[3]

[edit] Chinese offensive

On October 20, 1962, the Chinese People's Liberation Army launched two attacks, 1000 kilometers apart, in the Chip Chap valley in Ladakh and the Namka Chu river. Some skirmishes also took place in Sikkim, which India claimed as a protectorate, at the Nathula Pass. After four days of fierce fighting, the Chinese succeeded in securing a substantial portion of the disputed territory.

On the Namka Chu front, Indian forces expected Chinese forces to cross via one of five bridges and thus defended those crossings. Fearful of flanking attacks, Indian troops also occupied positions at Tsang Le, which were inside Bhutan; Indian forces were told to ignore the line and boundary. However, Chinese forces avoided the crossings by fording the river. Quickly seizing Indian positions and cutting off telephone lines, they were able to take control of Tsangdhar and Hathung La and were in a position to cut off escape and possible resupply for the Indian forces. However, Chinese forces ignored Tsang Le, which was inside Bhutanese territory. Indian forces withdrew back towards Tawang.^[3]

On the Aksai Chin front, the Chinese forces launched attacks in the Chip Chap Valley, Galwan Valley, and Pangong Lake, and overrunning small outposts and garrisons stationed on the frontier. After realizing the magnitude of the attack, Indian Western Command withdrew many of the isolated outposts to the southeast. Daulet Beg Oldi was also evacuated, but it was south of the Chinese claim line and was not approached by Chinese forces.^[3]

On October 22 the PLA launched a mortar attack on Walong, on the McMahon line.^[17] 400 troops proceeded to launch fire on the Assam rifles and Sikh regiment stationed there. After a day of constant fire, the PLA retreated, having suffered 200 casualties with the Indians suffering only 9.^[17] Over the coming months, the Chinese made probing attacks but suffered 5 times the number of casualties as the Indians.^[17]

Later on October 24, 120 officers and jawans of the Ahir Charlie Company of the 13 Kumaon Regiment were airlifted from Hyderabad to the Chushul sector.^[18] They were deployed on the Rezang La Ridge to defend the highest air strip in the world located at 16,000 feet - in ambiguous territory - from impending Chinese takeover.^[18] They were led by Major Shaitan Singh and were a small force called on to defend a stategically located air strip. Their actions in the battle against Chinese troops were appreciated by India as some of largest occurrences of bravery and valour in the war.^[18] Despite being outnumbered they managed to inflict very heavy casualties (official figures were not released) and Shaitan Singh was awarded the Param Vir Chakra (India's highest military decoration) for his actions.^[18]

Indian forces were hampered by their significant inferiority in tactics and lack of combat readiness. The Indian deployment covered a large area and Indian units required an airlift for more supplies. The Indian jawans were not effectively ready for such mountain conflict. Nonetheless, they generally fought bravely and professionally in the early phase of the war until their commanders were replaced on government orders.

[edit] Lull in the fighting

After four days of fierce fighting, the Chinese succeeded in securing a substantial portion of the disputed territory, and the fighting reached a lull, as Chinese forces refrained from further assaults. On the same day (October 24), Zhou Enlai ordered the troops to stop advancing as he attempted to negotiate with Nehru. Zhou sent Nehru a letter, proposing: 1) a negotiated settlement of the boundary, 2) that both sides disengage and withdraw twenty kilometers from present lines of actual control, 3) a Chinese withdrawal north in NEFA, and 4) that China and India not cross lines of pre-sent control in Aksai Chin. Nehru's October 27 reply express interest in the restoration of peace and friendly relations, but instead suggested a return to the "boundary prior to 8 September 1962". Zhou's November 4th reply clarified his offer as a return to the Indian-claimed McMahon Line in NEFA and the traditionally claimed MacDonald Line in Aksai Chin. On November 8, the Indian parliament announced a national emergency and passed a resolution which stated their intent to "drive out the aggressors from the sacred soil of India", and a November 14 letter by Nehru to Zhou once again rejected his proposal.^[3] Nehru was adamant to drive Chinese soldiers of what he called "the sacred soil of India".^[3]

Neither side declared war, used their air force, or fully broke off diplomatic relations; however, the conflict is commonly referred to as a war. It is important to remember that this war coincided with the Cuban Missile Crisis and was viewed by the western nations at the time as another act of aggression by the Communist bloc.^[19] The Chinese side, although in a militarily advantageous position, thus had strong strategic reasons to contain and conclude the conflict as quickly as possible.

[edit] Conflict resumes

The fighting resumed on the eastern theater on November 14th (Nehru's birthday), with an Indian offensive launched from Walong. The offensive failed, and the Chinese launched a counteroffensive which followed the retreating Indians and penetrated their defensive positions.^[3]

Elsewhere on the eastern theater, PLA forces attacked Indian forces near Se La and Bomdi La on November 17th, defended by the Indian 4th Division. Instead of attacking by road as expected, PLA forces forces approached via a mountain trail, and their attack cut off a main road and isolating 10,000 Indian troops. Attacks at Se La were less successful, with five assaults repulsed. However, with its supply route at Thembang cut off by Chinese forces, the forces were ordered to withdraw to Bombdi La. The PLA forces in the quickly annihilated the rest of the 4th Division division, which had been seriously demoralized and disorganized, and penetrated close to the outskirts of Tezpur, Assam, a major frontier town nearly fifty kilometers from the Assam-North-East Frontier Agency border.^[3]

On the western theater, PLA forces launched an infantry attack on November 18th near Chushul village. While frontal attacks were repelled, rear and flanking attacks succeeded, and five hours into the attack, succeeded in forcing an Indian withdrawal from every Indian position east of the Chinese claim line. The Chinese stopped at the claim line and did not assault the village.^[3]

By November 20 (six days after the resumption of combat), there was no organised Indian resistance anywhere in the disputed territories. Zhou Enlai declared a unilateral ceasefire to start on midnight, November 21. Later that same evening, Nehru made an appeal to the United States for armed aid, including airstrikes. The United States replied by sending an aircraft carrier towards the Bay of Bengal, but it was ordered back after the ceasefire.^[3] Zhou had first given the announcement to Indian charge d'affaires on November 19, (before India's request for United States air strikes) but New Delhi did not recieve it until 24 hours later.^[3]

[edit] Ceasefire

Due either to logistical problems (according to official Indian accounts) or for political reasons, the PLA did not advance farther, and on November 21 it declared a unilateral cease-fire. Chinese troops still engaged in some battle with retreating Indian troops,^[2] but for the most part the ceasefire signalled an end to the fighting. The United States Air Force flew in supplies to India in November 1962, but neither side wished to continue hostilities. The PLA withdrew to positions it had occupied before the war and on which China had staked its diplomatic claim. China also returned all weapons and vehicles seized from Indian troops during the war, and released all prisoners unconditionally. Toward the end of the war India increased her support for Tibetan refugees and revolutionaries, some of them having settled in India, as they were fighting the same common enemy in the region. The Nehru administration ordered the raising of an elite guerrilla force composed of Tibetan refugees.^[20]

[edit] World opinion

After the war, Chinese relations with Pakistan greatly improved. Mohammed Ali, External Affairs Minister of Pakistan, declared that massive Western aid to Indian in the Sino-Indian dispute would be considered an unfriendly act towards Pakistan. The following year, China and Pakistan peacefully settled disputes on their shared border, and negotiated the China-Pakistan Border Treaty in 1963, as well as trade, commercial, and barter treaties.^[21]

The Chinese military action has been viewed by the United States as part of the PRC's policy making of using aggressive wars to settle its border disputes and to distract from its internal issues.^[22] According to a study published by the United States Marine Corps, western nations at the time regarded China as an aggressor in the China-India border war, and the war as part of a monolithic communist objective for a world dictatorship of the proletariat.^[3]

The Kennedy administration was disturbed by what they considered blatant Chinese communist aggression against India. In a May 1963 NSC meeting, contingency planning on the part of the United States in the event of another Chinese attack on India was discussed. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor advised the president to use nuclear weapons should the Americans intervene in such a situation. Kennedy insisted that Washington defend India as it would any ally, saying, "We should defend India, and therefore we will defend India"^[23] The Johnson Administration considered and then rejected giving nuclear weapons technology to the Indians.

Since then, the Chinese government began rigorous diplomatic leaps to reduce the negative light in which they were perceived as an aggressor^{[citation needed]}. As for the causes of the war, Chinese Premier Zhou told President Nixon that China did not try and expel Indian troops from south of the McMahon line and that three open warning telegrams were sent to Nehru before the war.^[24] Zhou also told Nixon that Chairman Mao ordered the troops to return to show good faith.^[24] The Indian government maintains that the Chinese military could not advance further south due to logistical problems and the cut-off of resource supplies.

In 1972, Neville Maxwell an Australian journalist and historian, wrote a book which was highly critical of Indian Government; titled "India's China War". The book was banned in India.^[25] After reading the Maxwell book President Richard Nixon later adopted a more friendly attitude to Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in relation to the war.^[24], while Henry Kissinger also reportedly said that had he known the facts of the dispute earlier, his image of Beijing as inherently aggressive would have weakened, together with his support for US intervention in Indochina.^[13]

[edit] Aftermath

[edit] India

After India's defeat, Indian Defense Minister Menon resigned. Prime Minister Nehru also faced harsh accusations from government officials. Neither China nor India officially admitted to starting the war as accusations continued between the two governments.^[3] Indians reacted with an unprecedented surge of patriotism. The main lesson India learned was that India must strengthen its defences and stand on its own feet to be of consequence in the world. India could no longer blindly follow Nehru's trusting polemics of "Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai" and non-violent peace. India's policy of weaponisation via indigenous sources and self-sufficiency was thus cemented. Sensing a weakened army, Pakistan initiated the Second Kashmir War with India in 1965, however India was more decisive and strong in this war and cemented victory.^[26] Two years later in 1967, there was a short border skirmish (dubbed "Chola Incident" by India) between PLA troops and Indian troops.^[27]

The Indian government commissioned an investigation, resulting in the Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat Report on the causes of the war and the reasons for defeat. The Indian government did not declassify the report. India's performance in high-altitude combat in 1962 led to an overhaul of the Indian Army in terms of doctrine, training, organization and equipment. After Indians began scrutinizing the reasons for their military being heavily outnumbered, Indian Defense Minister Menon resigned. Prime Minister Nehru also faced harsh accusations from government officials and members of the military.

In 1964, Alastair Lamb published a The China-India border, which details the history of the border and the origins of the dispute.^[28] This book was banned in India.^[13] Neville Maxwell's 1972 book, India's China War, was also banned in India.^[29]

[edit] China

On the Chinese side, the war was followed by a campaign praising the army called "learn from the People's Liberation Army." The campaign helped promote War Minister Lin Biao, Mao's favoured successor at the time. However, the Chinese government never commissioned an official report on the war. Inside China, everyone felt assured that the Indians had been subdued and China's position as leaders of Asia guaranteed.

While the democratic process in India has allowed more scrutiny on the events leading to the war, on the other hand, published scholarship in China is still expected to explain and justify, not to criticize, the decisions of the Chinese Communist Party, at least on such sensitive matters as war.^[30]

[edit] Later border disputes

In 1967, PLA troops entered into Indian controlled territory and engaged in a skirmish with Indian troops. They were defeated in a battle termed as 'The Chola incident'. The short skirmish did not escalate into a conflict after diplomacy between the two countries solved the issue.^{[citation needed]}

In 1984, squads of Indian soldiers began actively patrolling the dispute area and set up an observation post for the summer in Sumdorong Cha Valley. The Indian team left the area before the winter. In the winter of 1986, the Chinese deployed their troops there before the Indian team could arrive in the summer.^[31] The Indian media gave the matter national prominence, and an angry exchange of official protests between the Chinese and Indian governments followed.

[edit] Peace process

In 1993 and 1996, the two sides signed the Sino-Indian Bilateral Peace and Tranquility Accords, an agreement to maintain peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LoAC). Ten meetings of a Sino-Indian Joint Working Group (SIJWG) and five of an expert group have taken place to determine where the LoAC lies, but little progress has occurred. Recently, during the visit of Chinese Prime Minister to India, China recognised the territory of Sikkim, as belonging to India, while India during the visit of its PM, Atal Behari Vajpayee to China, recognized the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as an autonomous part of China.

Neither the Indian nor the PRC governments appear very interested in disturbing the status quo, and the disputed boundary, called by Indians the Line of Actual Control or the McMahon Line, does not currently appear to be a possible major flash point. Military commissions from China and India meet regularly in the capitals of both countries to discuss the status of the border. However, they have made little progress in resolving this contentious border issue.

On July 6, 2006, the historic silk road passing through this territory was reopened, signaling further hopes of reconciliation between the two powers.

[edit] Notes

[edit] Further reading

• The China-India Border War, 1988 by James Barnard Calvin^[3]
• Neville Maxwell's India's China War^[5]
• Gunnar Myrdal. Asian Drama; An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. New York: Random House, 1968

[edit] External links

• Sino-Indian War (1962)
• Remembering a War: The 1962 India-China Conflict - From Rediff.com
• Neville Maxwell: Henderson Brooks Report
• 1962 Sino-Indian War, Hindustan Times
• War in the Himalayas: 1962 Indo-Sino Conflict INCLUDES OFFICIAL WAR HISTORY, from History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India
• Critical Asian Studies Article: Sino Indian War 1962
• India, China to speed up border dispute talks: 2005 Xinhuanet
• The Rediff Special/Claude Arpi
• 1962 War and Its Implications For Sino-India Relations
• (in Chinese) History of Sino-India Border War
• (in Chinese) Historical maps of the Sino-Indian border
• Conflict in Kashmir: Selected Internet Resources by the Library, University of California, Berkeley, USA; University of California, Berkeley Library Bibliographies and Web-Bibliographies list
• Frontier India India-China Section