Vympel R-23

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The Vympel R-23 (NATO reporting name AA-7 Apex) is a medium-range air-to-air missile developed by the Soviet Union for fighter aircraft. An updated version with greater range, the R-24, replaced it in service. It is comparable to the American AIM-7 Sparrow, both in terms of overall performance as well as role.

Contents 1 Development 2 Combat Record 3 Specifications 4 References

[edit] Development

Design of a new missile to arm the MiG-23 fighter started in the mid-1960s under the direction of V.A. Pustyakov's design team. Known as the K-23 during its design, the new weapon was intended for use against bomber-sized targets, with "snap-up" capability to attack targets at higher altitude than the launch aircraft. It originally was intended to have a dual-mode seeker using both semi-active radar homing and infrared guidance, but this proved unfeasible, and separate SARH and IR models (zdeliye (Product) 340 and 360, respectively) were developed instead. Test firings were carried out in 1967, although the SARH missile's seeker head proved to be extremely problematic.

In 1968 the Soviets acquired an AIM-7M and a Vympel team started copying it as the K-25. A comparison of the two led to the K-23 entering production, based largely on its better range and countermeasures resistance. The K-25 work ended in 1971. Nevertheless, several features of the Sparrow were later used in the Vympel R-27 design.

The missile, designated R-23, entered service in January 1974, the SARH version as the R-23R, the IR version R-23T. In the west these were known as the AA-7A and AA-7B, respectively. An inert training round, the R-23UT, was also developed.

Both versions used the same motor and warhead, which had a lethal radius of 8 m (26 ft). The airframe featured four delta wings arranged cruciform just behind the midpoint of the fuselage, and cropped-delta control surfaces at the extreme rear directly behind the wings. Smaller cropped-triangular surfaces are mounted in-line near the nose (their purpose is unclear). The only external difference between the two versions was the nose cone, which was an ogive for the SAHR seeker, and shorter (by 30 cm) and more rounded for the IR version.

Maximum effective range for the R-23R was about 14 km (8.8 mi) at low level and 25 km (15.6 mi) at high altitude. The range for the R-23T was about 11 km (6.9 mi), limited by the visual-range needs of its seeker, not the motor. Both could be launched with the aircraft maneuvering at up to 4g against a target maneuvering at up to 5g. One of its greatest tactical limitations was its lengthy minimum range, which was 1,300 m (4,160 ft) for a rear engagement, and up to 2 km for the SAHR version.

Large numbers of R-23s were built., both by Molniya (ex OKB-4) as well as Vympel (ex OKB-134). The R-23 was also produced under license in Romania as the A-911.

Starting in 1975 an improved version of the weapon was developed to arm the MiG-23ML/MLD. The resultant SAHR R-24R had lock-on after launch capability and expanded range (up to 50 km) and altitude capability (up to 25,000 m/82,000 ft), while the IR R-24T had a much improved seeker with greater sensitivity. Both versions had a larger motor, a heavier warhead, and a greatly reduced minimum range of 500 m (1,600 ft) for a rear-quarter engagement. They also could be used by or against aircraft maneuvering at up to 7g. The missiles were known officially as zdeliye (Product) 140 and 160 in the USSR, and AA-7C and AA-7D in the west.

The R-24 remained in at least limited Russian service until the withdrawal of the last Russian MiG-23s in 1997.

[edit] Combat Record

The R-23/24's combat record is mostly based on action over the Beqaa Valley in June 1982 during the 1982 Lebanon War. Several Russian accounts claim the following:

On 6 June 1982 a MiG-23 brought down an Israeli BQM-34 UAV with an R-23. On 7 June 1982 three MiG-23MFs (pilots Khallyak, Said, Merza) attacked a group of F-16s. Captain Merza detected the F-16s at 23 km and brought down two F-16s with R-23/AA-7s Apex (one from 9 km, another within the distance of 7 or 8 km); however, then himself was shot down. On 8 June 1982 two MiG-23MF again met F-16s. Major Tokhau's MiG-23 detected an F-16 at 20 km, he shot one down with an R-23 fired from a distance of 7 km; however, himself was shot down by an AIM-9 "Sidewinder" fired from another F-16. On 9 June 1982 two MiG-23MFs (pilots Dib and Said) attacked a group of F-16s. Dib brought down an F-16 at about 6 km or 7 km with an R-23, but himself was shot down, most likely by an AIM-9 "Sidewinder".

These claims, however, should be taken with a large grain of salt. They are part of a larger story series of stories claiming Syrian Air Force successes over the IAF. For instance, the Soviet military magazine Red Star claimed "sixty-seven Israeli aircraft, including modern US-made F-15 and F-16 fighters, were downed" in the fighting.^[1] The glowing accounts were generally discounted even inside the Soviet Union, where the destruction of the Syrian Air Force was well known. Rumors persisted that the Syrian Air Force did not even man their approach control, as they expected no aircraft to return from combat over Bekaa.^[2] Even Syrian accounts claim only twenty-five IAF aircraft downed.

Israeli accounts are even more lopsided, claiming they downed 87 Syrian aircraft, while losing a few helicopters, one RF-4E, and an A-4 Skyhawk downed by a PLO SA-7 MANPADS.^[3] IAF control over the electronic combat situation was so complete that Syrian pilots were cut off from their controllers, leading to complete chaos. A Western military observer noted "I watched a group of Syrian fighter planes fly figure-eights. They just flew around and around and obviously had no idea what to do next."^[4] According to Israeli records, Syrian formations were repeatedly blindsided by IAF fighters who were vectored onto them by AWACS aircraft well outside their own radar's range, even had their radars not been heavily jammed. Given the ECM enviornment, it seems highly unlikely the reports of BVR lock-on of the F-16s are accurate. Thus it is unlikely that any Israeli fighters were shot down by the R-23, or any other A-A missile for that matter. This, of course, does not suggest any particular failing on the part of the R-23 itself.

It was also reported that during the war in Angola in the late 1980s, Cuban Air Force MiG-23MF fired a number of R-23 missiles against South African Dassault Mirage F1s, bringing down at least two without suffering any air to air losses.

Many R-23 kills are reported in the war between Iran and Iraq when Iraqi MiG-23 fired them at Iranian F-4D/E and F-5E.

[edit] Specifications

• Length: (R-23R, R-24R) 4.5 m (14 ft 9 in); (R-23T, R-24T) 4.2 m (13 ft 9 in)
• Wingspan: 1 m (3 ft 5 in)
• Diameter: 223 mm (8.8 in)
• Launch weight: (R-23R, R-24R) 222 kg (489 lb), 243 kg (536 lb); (R-23T, R-24T) 215 kg (474 lb), 235 kg (518 lb)
• Speed: Mach 3
• Range: (R-23R) 35 km (22 mi); (R-24R) 50 km (31 mi); (R-23T, R-24T) 15 km (9.4 mi)
• Guidance: (R-23R, R-24R) SARH; (R-23T, R-24T), infrared-homing
• Warhead: expanding-rod high explosive with proximity fuze, 25 kg (55 lb) (R-23) or 35 kg (77 lb) (R-24)

[edit] References

1. ^ Benjamin S. Lambeth, Moscow's Lessons from the 1982 Lebanon Air War, Rand Corporation, September 1984, pg. 15
2. ^ The Rape of Lebanon (Special Issue), Monday Morning, 14-20 June 1982, pg. 17
3. ^ Lt Col David Eshel, The Lebanon War, Eshel-Dramit 1983, pg. 145
4. ^ Lambeth, pg. 9

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