大西庇阿
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大西庇阿，全名为（征服非洲的）普布利乌斯·科尔内利乌斯·西庇阿（拉丁语：P·CORNELIVS·P·F·L·N·SCIPIO·AFRICANVS[1]，前235年~前183年）古罗马统帅和政治家。他是第二次布匿战争中罗马方面的主要将领之一，以在扎马战役中打败迦太基统帅汉尼拔而著称于世。由于西庇阿的胜利，罗马人以绝对有利的条件结束了第二次布匿战争。西庇阿因此得到他那著名的绰号：“征服非洲的”（AFRICANVS）。
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[编辑] 家庭背景
普布利乌斯·科尔内利乌斯·西庇阿出身于西庇阿家族，该家族是古罗马著名贵族氏族科尔内利乌斯氏族的一个支系。他的祖先中有好几位担任过执政官职务。他的曾祖父，卢基乌斯·科尔内利乌斯·西庇阿（“大胡子”）是前280年的贵族监察官。科尔内利乌斯氏族是古罗马六个最显赫的贵族氏族之一（其它五个是曼利乌斯氏族，费边氏族，埃米利乌斯氏族，克劳狄氏族和瓦莱里乌斯氏族），而在大西庇阿生活的时代，西庇阿家族正处于其权势的颠峰，是科尔内利乌斯氏族中最有力的分支。
大西庇阿是前218年的执政官普布利乌斯·科尔内利乌斯·西庇阿的长子，与父亲同名。他的母亲庞波尼娅出身于罗马的一个著名平民氏族，可能属于骑士等级。他有一个弟弟卢基乌斯·科尔内利乌斯·西庇阿（“征服亚洲的”）也是罗马的著名将领。关于大西庇阿出生家庭的其它情况，人们知道的很少。
[编辑] 早期活动
大西庇阿很早就卷入了罗马的军事活动。当时罗马与迦太基的斗争正达到最高潮（第二次布匿战争），迦太基名将汉尼拔率军侵入了意大利本土。前218年，年轻的西庇阿在提基努斯河战役中第一次参加战斗。这次战役中罗马军的指挥官是西庇阿的父亲普布利乌斯·科尔内利乌斯·西庇阿，迦太基军的指挥官是汉尼拔。结果罗马人被击败，按照传统说法，西庇阿救了他父亲一命。接下来西庇阿又参加了特雷比亚战役（前218年）。前216年，西庇阿在关键的坎尼会战中担任军团长。坎尼会战的结果是罗马人再次遭到惨败，他们的统帅、执政官卢基乌斯·埃米利乌斯·保卢斯阵亡。埃米利乌斯·保卢斯的女儿埃米利娅·保拉后来成为西庇阿之妻。
坎尼会战之后，以卢基乌斯·卡埃基利乌斯·梅特鲁斯为首的一些贵族青年对形势感到悲观失望，企图逃离罗马。西庇阿作出惊人的举动：他召集支持者手持武器闯入这些青年的集会场所，胁迫他们发誓决不背叛罗马，并继续为罗马服役。这次事件可能对元老院也产生了振动。由于在与汉尼拔的战斗中已经损失了五分之一的成年公民（仅坎尼一役的损失就可能高达70000人），罗马人心动摇，主张向敌人让步者大有人在。但最终，元老院中的主要势力都坚持继续对迦太基作战，主张与迦太基妥协者没有产生任何重要影响。
前212年，西庇阿宣布竞选市政官。由于他未达到法定年龄（担任市政官者自动成为元老，而元老要求年满30岁），保民官否决了他的竞选资格。但此时的西庇阿已因其勇敢和爱国名声大噪，支持者众多，遂以毫无异议的票数当选。保民官最后也收回了他们的反对意见。就这样，西庇阿在24岁时成为市政官，进入了罗马的晋升体系。
[编辑] 征服西班牙
前211年西庇阿失去了两个亲人：他的父亲普布利乌斯·科尔内利乌斯·西庇阿和叔叔格奈乌斯·科尔内利乌斯·西庇阿·卡尔弗斯。他们在西班牙作战时，双双死于与汉尼拔的弟弟哈斯德鲁巴尔·巴卡的战役。第二年，西庇阿主动请缨要求指挥即将派往西班牙的新的罗马军队。尽管年轻，西庇阿凭借高贵的举止和充满激情的语言说服了元老院和民众，成功地当选为派往伊比利亚半岛的资深执政官。按照李维的说法，当时实际上只有西庇阿一个人谋求这个职务；其他人认为前往西班牙作战无异于送死。在西庇阿于前210年抵达西班牙时，整个埃布罗河以南的地区已经全被迦太基控制。迦太基在西班牙的将领是汉尼拔的两个弟弟哈斯德鲁巴尔·巴卡和马戈·巴卡，以及哈斯德鲁巴尔·吉斯科。这三人无法协调一致，从而使罗马人可能从中获利。
西庇阿在埃布罗河河口处登陆，并立即发动奇袭攻取了迦太基人在当地的一个基地新迦太基（今卡塔赫纳），获取了大批战略物资。由于约束军队、善待俘虏等措施，他成功地给当地人留下了“罗马人是解放者”的印象。李维讲述了一个故事：西庇阿手下的士兵抓到了一名美丽的女子，并把她献给他们的指挥官；但西庇阿得知这名女子已经与一个凯尔特人酋长订婚后，就立刻释放了她，没有伤害她的贞洁。显然，西庇阿希望通过这些手段使西班牙居民支持罗马，反对迦太基。因为罗马与迦太基的主战场在意大利（在那里汉尼拔仍处于绝对优势），西庇阿不可能指望从罗马获得足够增援；因此他与当地人民建立良好关系是十分明智的决策。例如，那名被他释放的妇女的未婚夫就率领他的部落来帮助罗马人（根据李维的记载）。
前209年西庇阿进行了他的第一次大会战，成功地把哈斯德鲁巴尔·巴卡从他位于瓜达尔基维尔河上游的过冬地拜伦赶走。在战斗前西庇阿很担心马戈·巴卡和吉斯科会把他们的部队投入战场，那样的话迦太基人会很轻易地对数量上居于劣势的罗马人形成合围。因此西庇阿的策略是迅速击溃三个敌人中的一个，以为他进行机动应付另两个敌人制造空间。双方的步兵几乎不分高下，但西庇阿隐藏了一支骑兵预备队。当这支骑兵被投入使用后，哈斯德鲁巴尔的防线崩溃了。尽管获胜，西庇阿没能对哈斯德鲁巴尔进行有效的追击，以阻止这支军队开往意大利支援汉尼拔。后来哈斯德鲁巴尔成功地翻越了阿尔卑斯山，但在梅陶罗河战役中被罗马执政官盖乌斯·克劳狄·尼禄击败（前207年）。
在以武力制服了一些不顺从的西班牙部落领袖后，西庇阿于前206年在伊利帕战役（发生于今塞维利亚附近）中对迦太基人取得了一次决定性的胜利。在这次战役之后，迦太基人终于被迫放弃他们经营了多年的西班牙。
在征服西班牙之后，西庇阿开始为进军非洲作准备。他先后遣使和亲自前往努米底亚，希望说服其统治者与罗马结盟。努米底亚对迦太基来说至关重要，该地区提供了迦太基的绝大部分雇佣兵。在坎尼会战中，努米底亚骑兵给罗马人留下了可怕的回忆。西庇阿成功地取得了东努米底亚国王马西尼萨的支持，而西努米底亚国王西法克斯则成为迦太基的同盟者。
在从非洲返回西班牙时，西庇阿的军队发生了一场小规模叛变，很快就被平息。在攻克迦太基人最后的据点加的斯、肃清西班牙西南部之后，西庇阿于前206年返回罗马。
[编辑] 征战非洲
In the following year (205 BC), Scipio was unanimously elected to the consulship at the age of 31. Scipio wanted to go to Africa, but his jealous enemies in the Roman senate only allowed him to go as far as Sicily and did not grant him an army. Nevertheless, Scipio raised and trained a volunteer army while in Sicily.
By this time, Hannibal's movements were restricted to the southwestern toe of Italy. Scipio was intent on transferring the war to Africa, and his great name drew to him a number of volunteers from all parts of Italy. Interestingly, among these volunteers were the shamed survivors of the fiasco at the Battle of Cannae, anxious to once again prove their worth as soldiers. Scipio began turning Sicily into a training camp and a staging point for his planned invasion.
Scipio, his brother and father, realized that the Carthaginian, and especially Numidian superiority in cavalry would prove decisive against the largely infantry forces of the Roman legions. In addition, a large portion of Rome's cavalry were allies of questionable loyalty, or noble equites exempting themselves from being lowly foot soldiers. One anecdote tells of how Scipio pressed into service several hundred Sicilian nobles to create a cavalry force. The Sicilians were quite opposed to this servitude to a foreign occupier (Sicily being under Roman control only since the First Punic War), and protested vigorously. Scipio assented to their exemption from service providing they pay for a horse, equipment, and a replacement rider for the Roman Army. In this way, Scipio created a trained nucleus of cavalry for his African campaign.
The Roman Senate sent a commission of inquiry to Sicily and found Scipio at the head of a well-equipped and trained fleet and army. Scipio pressed the Senate for permission to cross into Africa. The conservative branch of the Roman Senate, championed by Fabius Maximus, the Cunctator (Delayer), opposed the mission. Fabius still feared Hannibal's power, and viewed any mission to Africa as dangerous and wasteful to the war effort. Scipio was also harmed by some senators' disdain of his Hellenophile tastes in art, luxuries, and philosophies. The introduction (205 BC) of the Phrygian worship of Cybele and the transference of the image of the goddess herself from Pessinus to Rome to bless the expedition may have affected public opinion against Scipio as well. All Scipio could obtain was permission to cross over from Sicily to Africa if it appeared to be in the interests of Rome, but not financial or military support.
At the commissioners' bidding, Scipio sailed in 204 BC and landed near Utica. Carthage, meanwhile, had secured the friendship of the Numidian Syphax, whose advance compelled Scipio to abandon the siege of Utica and dig in on the shore between there and Carthage. The following year, he destroyed the combined armies of the Carthaginians and Numidians by approaching by stealth and setting fire to their camp, where the combined army panicked and fled, only to be destroyed by Scipio's army. Though not a "battle," both Polybius and Livy estimate that the death toll in this single attack exceeded 40,000 Carthaginian and Numidian dead, and more captured.
Historians are roughly equal in their praise and condemnation for this act. Polybius said, "of all the brilliant exploits performed by Scipio this seems to me the most brilliant and more adventurous." On the other hand, one of Hannibal's principal biographers, Theodore Ayrault Dodge, goes so far to suggest that this attack was out of cowardice and spares no more than a page upon the event in total, despite the fact that it secured the siege of Utica and effectively put Syphax out of the war. The irony of Dodge's accusations of Scipio's cowardice is the attack showed traces of Hannibal's penchant for ambush.
Scipio quickly dispatched his two lieutenants, Laelius and Masinissa, to pursue Syphax. They ultimately dethroned Syphax, and ensured Prince Masinissa's coronation as King of the Numidians. Carthage, and especially Hannibal himself, had long relied upon these superb natural horsemen, who would now fight for Rome against Carthage.
[编辑] 扎马战役
With Carthage now deserted by her allies, and surrounded by a veteran and undefeated Roman army which Dodge states was the best ever fielded, Carthage began opening diplomatic channels for negotiation. At the same time, Hannibal Barca and his army were recalled to Carthage, and despite the moderate terms offered to Carthage by Scipio, Carthage suddenly suspended negotiations and again prepared for war. The army that Hannibal returned with is a subject of much debate. Advocates for Hannibal often claim that his army was mostly Italians pressed into service from southern Italy, and that most of his elite veterans (and certainly cavalry) were spent. Scipio's advocates tend to be far more suspicious, and believe the number of veteran forces to remain significant.
Hannibal did have a trained pool of soldiers who had fought in Italy, as well as eighty war elephants. Hannibal could boast a strength of 58,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry, compared to Scipio's 34,000 infantry and 8,700 cavalry. The two generals met on a plain between Carthage and Utica on October 19, 202 BC, at the Battle of Zama. Despite mutual admiration, negotiations floundered due largely to Roman distrust of the Carthaginians as a result of the Carthaginian attack on Saguntum, the breach of protocols which ended the First Punic War (known as Punic Faith), and a perceived breach in contemporary military etiquette, due to Hannibal's numerous ambushes.
Hannibal arranged his infantry in three phalangial lines designed to overlap the Roman lines. His strategy, so oft reliant upon subtle stratagems, was simple: a massive forward attack by the war elephants would create gaps in the Roman lines, which would be exploited by the infantry, supported by the cavalry.
Rather than arranging his forces in the traditional manipular lines, which put the velites, principes, and triarii in succeeding lines of 500 men groups, Scipio instead put the maniples in a chequer pattern, with his elite heavy infantry in diagonals. This was done to match the length of the Carthaginian line, but also as a strategem against the war elephants. When the Carthaginian elephants charged, they found well laid traps before the Roman position, and were greeted by Roman trumpeters which drove many back out of confusion and fear. In addition, many elephants were goaded harmlessly through the loose ranks by the velites and other skirmishers. Roman javelins were used to good effect, and the sharp traps caused further disorder among the elephants. Many of them were so distraught that they charged back into their own lines. The Roman infantry was greatly rattled by the elephants, but Massinissa's Numidian and Laelius' Roman cavalry began to drive the opposing cavalry off the field. Both cavalry commanders pursued their routing Carthaginian counterparts, leaving the Carthaginian and Roman infantries to engage one another. The resulting infantry clash was fierce and bloody, with neither side achieving local superiority. The Roman infantry had driven off the two front lines of the Carthaginian army and in the respite, took an opportunity to drink water. The Roman army was then drawn up in a long line one soldier deep and then marched towards Hannibal's veterans, who had not yet taken part in the battle. The final struggle was bitter, and only won when the allied cavalry rallied and returned to the battle field. Charging the rear of Hannibal's army, they caused what many historians have called the "Roman Cannae."
Many Roman aristocrats, especially Cato, expected Scipio to raze that city to the ground after his victory. However, Scipio dictated extremely moderate terms in contrast to an immoderate Roman Senate. With Scipio's consent, Hannibal was allowed to become the civic leader of Carthage, which the Cato family did not forget. In contrast to his moderation towards the Carthaginians, he was cruel towards Roman and Latin deserters: the Latins were beheaded and the Romans crucified.
[编辑] 返回罗马
[编辑] 晚年
[编辑] 注释
- ↑ 读作：“（征服非洲的）普布利乌斯·科尔内利乌斯·西庇阿，普布利乌斯之子，卢基乌斯之孙”
[编辑] 资料来源
- 苏联历史百科全书·人物卷，1961~1973
- 外国历史名人传，中国社会科学出版社，书号：11114·4
| 前任： 卢基乌斯·维图里乌斯·斐洛 & 昆图斯·卡埃基利乌斯·梅特鲁斯 |
罗马执政官 前205年 与普布利乌斯·李锡尼·克拉苏·迪维斯共职 |
繼任： 马尔库斯·科尔内利乌斯·凯特库斯 & 普布利乌斯·塞姆普罗尼乌斯·图迪塔努斯 |
| 前任： 马尔库斯·波尔基乌斯·加图 & 卢基乌斯·瓦莱里乌斯·弗拉库斯 |
罗马执政官 前194年 与提贝里乌斯·塞姆普罗尼乌斯·隆古斯共职 |
繼任： 卢基乌斯·科尔内利乌斯·梅鲁拉 & 奥卢斯·米努基乌斯·特尔姆斯 |
